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Abstract 
I argue that for Southeast Asian Chinese the shift from China-oriented identity to local-
oriented identity was a particular historical dynamic that came about largely through 
internal responses to changing political and social conditions. This special historical 
event can be traced through the discourse of hua-ren ('!filA), ethnic Chinese in rather 
cultural sense than political sense, which distinguished Southeast Asian Chinese from 
Chinese in China. The discourse was generated from the debate among Chinese in both 
Malaya and Indonesia in the 1940s. The main elements which contributed to this debate 
were traditional and new Nanyang identities, Japanese pan-Asianist propaganda, 
Chinese experience under Japanese occupation, the Indonesian revolution, the armed 
struggle of the Malayan Communist Party, ethnic politics in Malaya and Indonesia, and 
the re-sinization movement in the post-wartime era. This dissertation discusses each of 
these aspects. I intend to build an 'autonomous history' of Southeast Asian Chinese, 
breaking away from the framework of national history, linking pre-wartime and post-
wartime history, and bringing Chinese and Japanese elements to modem Southeast 
Asian history. 
This study examines the development of a discourse of hua-ren identity between 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore before those countries were formed or gained their 
independence. Specifically, it will illustrate how the term hua-ren was used to make 
distinctions between Chinese within and outside China; its implications for 
inclusion/exclusion; and its use to maintain Chineseness in the new situation of 
Southeast Asia. Through the debate on the nature of literature, rights to gain citizenship 
and the will to keep Chineseness, the thesis will demonstrate how ethnic Chinese 
negotiated new identities within the new nations during this critical early phase of 
iii 
nation-formation. I demostrate and argue in this study that the sources of the new 
approach to identity among the Southeast Asian Chinese were the Chinese communities 
themselves and the dramatic political and social changes of the time, not the policy 
decisions of the Chinese or Southeast Asian national governments. It should be 
considered as one aspect of the autonomous history of the Southeast Asian Chinese. 
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Note on spelling and transliteration 
Chinese Words 
The romanization of Chinese words in the text will use either standard Hanyu spelling 
or the original spelling which usually appeared in primary source material. If the 
original spelling was widely used, it will be used in the text and the Hanyu spelling will 
be provided in the footnote when it appears for the first time. The Chinese characters 
will be provided in footnotes as well if it will help to understand the meaning or to 
identify people's names, place names or names of institutes. A table of contraposition 
of those names will be provided in the Glossary. If differing pronunciation of a Chinese 
term in Chinese languages is meaningful, the spelling will be provided too. 
Japanese Words 
Japanese words will be romanized in the text and the characters (kanji) will be provided 
in footnotes. The complete table of Japanese names of persons and institutes will be 
provided in the Glossary. If the same characters were used in the Chinese language 
term, then both spellings will be provided in the text. The kanji will appear mainly in 
traditional form because they were used at that time. 
Indonesian/Malay Words 
The modern spelling system for Malay/Indonesian words will be considered first if the 
old spelling of the same words have their counterparts in modern spelling. But names 
of persons will be kept in their original spelling. 
vii 
Select Glossary 
East Asia, including East and Southeast Asia 
culture/language same people 
. .. . ··········· ................................................. ' 
of a magazine, literally 'under the monsoon'' 
pages in Chinese newspapers 
1m11tu:al cooperation, a tradition of work practice in 
communities. 
!liakkoi;chi~····· T/\lVii==:;fi··· ti. !:,;1;;t;i 1c~;o;;m.;,·,;crs.=,.·;u,;nder one roof, an expression used 
!describe the wartime vision of a new Asian order. 
soldiers 
...... ',.,,,,,,' ''' .. .... . ..• ' .. '''' .......... "" ........... . .... .... ". ... .. . ·: 
more cultural meaning 
jde1;ce11dants of Chinese 
viii 
Japanese and protect Malaya 
IJ a1,anese military police 
groups, race, nation 
Seas", Southeast Asia 
five ideal principals of the Indonesian Republic 
the ideal principal of the Indonesian Republic 
local-born Chinese, or qiaosheng in Mandarin 
bigshot, businessman 
Chinese 
*I: Indonesian or Malay language, J: Japanese, M: Mandarin Chinese. H: Indonesian 
terms which come originally from Hokkien 
ix 
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Introduction 
This dissertation presents the voices of the Chinese of Indonesia and Malaya between 
the 1930s and the 1950s as their community went through the process of searching for a 
new identity. The central concern is to explain how and why the Chinese in Malaya and 
Indonesia reacted as they did to the intense political and ideological changes that took 
place amongst the indigenous populations of these two countries from the late 1930s to 
the mid-1950s, an important transitional period for Southeast Asian Chinese. These 
reactions generated a new approach towards Chinese identity in Southeast Asian 
nations: Chinese were to become citizens of their countries of residence and to be loyal 
to the new nations, but to also maintain a certain degree of Chineseness within their 
local Chinese communities. Chinese communities in Malaya and Indonesia in this 
period strove to seek a balance between political and cultural identity in a context where 
identities were unstable. 
My argument is that this change in identity was a distinct historical process, that took 
place within the short space of about two decades and involved a succession of 
adaptations to new conditions, at an important time of transition in the modern history 
of Southeast Asia. In this it was different from the gradual process of reorientation of 
identity that most immigrant populations have gone through. To understand this process, 
it is necessary to understand the changes of circumstance. The sources of the new 
approach to identity among the Southeast Asian Chinese were the Chinese communities 
themselves and the dramatic political and social changes of the time, not the policy 
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decisions of the Chinese or Southeast Asian national governments. It should be 
considered as one aspect of the autonomous history of the Southeast Asian Chinese. 
The Chinese residents of Indonesia and Malaysia developed a new discourse of Chinese 
identity during the establishment of new nations when the political situation was not yet 
clear, so that the process of nation-building gave rise between 1945 and 1949 to a 
'discourse of Chineseness' that distinguished between Chinese people in China, and 
those outside China. It made the term 'Huaren' (ethnic Chinese) 1 become a semantic 
category with its own distinct meaning and a legal tenn with impact on policy towards 
the Chinese. Although the ethnic Chinese communities faced different conditions in 
each country, many Chinese persons developed a new sense of identity-that 
maintaining Chineseness did not require political identification with China---through 
negotiating with the other peoples of the new states at a critical early stage of the 
process of national construction in both countries. This consciousness can be found in 
different fields such as literature, rights, and citizenship. 
The agreement on sole nationality for Chinese citizens living outside China reached by 
Zhou Enlai and the Indonesian government at the Bandung Conference of Non-aligned 
Nations of Asia and Africa in 1955 should not be seen as the reason for this change in 
identity among the Nanyang Chinese. Rather, it should be seen as developing out of the 
discourse created as the Southeast Asian Chinese themselves sought for a new identity 
in the new states. This development in consciousness of identity is of great importance 
to subsequent relations between Chinese and indigenous people in these two countries, 
Huaren ('/¥A). 
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to the substitution in Southeast Asia after the war of a broadly based discourse of 
Chineseness for the old discourse of the Chinese sojourner, and to the policies of the 
People's Republic of China towards the Southeast Asian Chinese. 
The interaction between the Chinese communities and the 'host society' in these two 
countries in that period was important in the example it set for Chinese communities 
elsewhere of separation of political and cultural identity within a Chinese diaspora. The 
history of this period has shaped the political and cultural identities of local Chinese 
communities in Malaysia and Indonesia today. The development of ethnic Chinese 
identity in Malaysia and in Indonesia has often been seen as producing diametrically 
opposed types of identity for Chinese in Malaya and Indonesia, as follows: today ethnic 
Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore (both of which were administered together as 
British Malaya before 1955) have separated political identity from cultural identity in 
the framework of a multi-ethnic country, politically shifting their identification from 
China to their new nations, while maintaining their cultural Chineseness, but until 
recent times the Chinese of Indonesia remained under the shadow of the assimilation 
policy, which associates political and cultural identity by demanding that Indonesian 
Chinese cease from Chinese cultural practices in order to show loyalty toward 
Indonesia. This study will demonstrate that the principle behind the interaction between 
Chinese communities and their 'host society' in this period was similar in Malaya and 
Indonesia, although subsequent developments gave rise to two different types of 
identity situations. The history of the interaction is important in order better to 
understand the inter-ethnic relationship between Chinese and indigenous populations; 
all kinds of tensions in the 'ethnic politics' of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia today 
can be traced back to this period. Although the focus of this study is on Malaya and 
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Indonesia, the post-war environment of the broader Southeast Asian region and the 
implications for the Chinese diaspora in general will be taken into account. 
This study focuses on the national identities of ethnic minorities, rather than on other 
categories of identity, such as communal or gender identity. The concept of identity 
used in this study is national identity as perceived in the discursive context of the 
national community. It is the way a group of people is identified according to their 
perceived political or cultural relationship with the nation. We understand that people 
have multiple kinds of identities such as personal, collective, legal, political and other 
kinds. By the nature of the topic, the main focus of this study is collective identity. The 
personal identity of some Chinese writers and leaders will be discussed in later chapters 
because of their representative cases. Political activities and legal struggles of Nanyang 
Chinese are not the concern of this study, but they will be mentioned when it is 
necessary. The indigenous discourses of sovereignty will not be mentioned in this 
study. Some Chinese intellectuals thought that they should have equal rights with so-
called 'indigenous people' because Chinese people had their settlements earlier than 
those 'indigenous people'. It is not necessary to talk about sovereignty for Chinese 
identity because ethnic Chinese did not claim sovereignty at all. 
The word 'Chinese' in this study is used mainly in the Southeast Asian context, and can 
be defined as Chinese living outside China but still maintaining some degree of 
interaction with China or so-called 'Chinese culture', physically or spiritually. 2 People 
of Chinese descent who were seen by contemporaries as assimilated into the host 
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society, specifically the Straits Chinese, Baba, peranakan and mestizo communities, are 
not the focus of this study, but will be mentioned when relevant. In most cases, the 
term 'Chinese' which was used in Chinese sources at the time we are discussing means 
totok Chinese, or Chinese people with Chinese culture. The division between totok and 
peranakan among the Chinese population in both Malaya and Indonesia was common 
in Chinese sources as the Straits Chinese, Baba, and peranakan Chinese were all 
translated by the same term, qiaosen, in the Chinese language. 3 
The identity of the Southeast Asian Chinese has been conceived differently at different 
times. \Vith the definition of Chinese above, ethnic Chinese had usually been situated 
in a 'between two cultures' space. In the first half of this century, Southeast Asian 
Chinese were still considered to belong to a single, China-centred Chinese culture with 
some exception of the category of Baba or peranakan Chinese. From a Chinese point of 
view on their history, this kind of category was temporal. Once they received Chinese 
education, they would be the same as other Chinese, as Chinese were defined by 
culture. 
The term 'Nan yang' in this study means 'Southeast Asia' .4 It is a traditional Chinese 
term for Southeast Asia, meaning literally 'the South Seas'. Although it is still arguable 
whether the term Nan yang covered all areas presently known as 'Southeast Asia', 
'Nanyang' was used to refer to Southeast Asia in the Chinese media. It became a term 
Go Shukei, Kakyo honshitsuron. l1'he Theory cf Essence cf Overseas Chinese] (Tokyo: Chikura, 1944). 
~±£, <¥m;f;:i!fllillt> ~ Cli!:g: 1944) • 
Qiaosen (fit"!::). 
Nanyang (1¥Jff). 
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of identity among the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia as well as in China, 
where it referred to Southeast Asian sojourners. Another term which appears in this 
study is the Japanese te!1ll 'Nan'yo', derived from 'Nanyang' and using the same 
characters. Nanyo includes the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. In contrast, 
'Nanyang' refers to Southeast Asia only. The details of the meaning of 'Nan yang' will 
be explored in greater depth in Chapter Two. 
When terms used in Malaya and in Indonesia differ, this dissertation will use a unified 
terminology for convenience in addressing similar situations existing in both places at 
the same time. The term 'pribumi' will be used to convey the idea of 'native' in both 
Malaya and Indonesia, even though this term was in fact mainly used in Indonesia and 
the term 'bumiputra' was used in Malaya. We should consider another term, asli, which 
also means "native"or "indigenous" in Malay and Indonesian language. Asli, was used 
to indicate the "indigenous" majority in Indonesia, from the Dutch period to the 1940s.5 
But the term as/i was used to indicate primitive people in Malaya, or later Malaysia.6 It 
is not a proper term for the situation in which we consider both Indonesia and Malaya. 
So the term pribumi was chosen in this study.7 Similarly, 'peranakan' will be used to 
mean Chinese who had adopted indigenous culture in both places, rather than using 
Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis ('v!elboume: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 3. 
Robert Knox Dentan, Malaysia and the "Originlll People": a Case Study of the Impact of Development on 
Indigenous Peoples. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), p. 8. Iskandar Carey, Cirdllg A;Ji: the Aboriginal 
Tnbes of Peninsular Mlllaysia. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
More and more publications now selected the term plibumi to describe the relationship between ethnic 
Chinese and indigenous majority for all times. For example, Leo Suryadinata. Pribumi Indonesians; liie 
Chinese Minority and China. (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann. 1978). Kwik Kian Gie and etc. "Pribumi -
Chinese Relations" , The Iblitics of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives. Ian 
Chalmers and Vedi R. Hadiz eds. (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 204-222. 
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'baba', the common Malayan term, as the term peranakan was also used in Malaya.8 
Chinese-speaking circles of the 1930s to the 1950s used the same vocabulary to refer to 
pribumi and peranakan in both Indonesia and Malaya, and the Malay language of the 
time had not yet been codified into Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia.9 
In this study, I use the oeuvre of a group of 'Chinese writers' as links from one period to 
the next. This group of writers can be called the 'Feng Xia group' .10 Feng Xia was the 
name of a Chinese-language weekly, literally meaning 'Under the Monsoon', which 
indicated their concern was Nanyang. It appeared after the Second World War and was 
run by a group of authors who had gone into hiding for some time in Sumatra during the 
Japanese occupation. These writers emerged in Southeast Asia to become major leaders 
of Chinese public opinion immediately after the war, and although they left Southeast 
Asia in the late 1940s, the debates in which they were engaged are commonly 
understood to be an important part of the history of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. 
Their lives and deeds link succeeding historical periods, and link the Chinese in 
Indonesia to the Chinese in Malaya. These writers will therefore appear at different 
points in several chapters, but they are discussed in depth in Chapter 5. 
IO 
Peranakan was used in both Malaysia and Indonesia until recently. For example, Teo, Kok Seang, The 
Peranakan Chinese of Kelantan : Culture, Language and Identity of a Chinese Sub-Community in 
Malaysia. (Kuala Lumper, ASEAN Academic Press, 1999). Tan, Chee-Beng, The Baba ofMelaka: 
Culture and Identity of a Chinese Peranakan Community in Malaysia. (Pelanduk Publications, 2002). 
Charles Cappel also discussed the usage of warga negara and keturunan in Indonesia. Warga negara 
means 'citizens' and keturunan means 'descendents' . Cappel, Charles A. Cappel, Indonesian 
Chinese in Crisis, pp. 3-5. But both terms, which could indicate other categories such as Indian or Arab, 
were not specialised for ethnic Chinese. And these terms were not used in Malaya. 
Feng Xia(JJil r). 
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The material in this dissertation is ordered chronologically, a chapter for each distinct 
stage or period. In the chapters dealing with the situation before the Japanese 
occupation, Indonesia and Malaya will generally be discussed together in relation to the 
Nanyang Chinese, because at that time there were no developed nation states in the 
region, and the Chinese of the region used 'Nanyang Chinese' to refer to themselves 
collectively. Indonesia and Malaysia are also dealt with together in the fourth and fifth 
chapters, because the focus is on Chinese writers under the Japanese occupation. 
Indonesia and Malaysia are then dealt with separately in the sixth and seventh chapters, 
but still from a perspective which compares and contrasts events proceeding in the two 
countries at the same time. 
In Chapter 1, I outline the content and argument of the dissertation, in particular why I 
chose to investigate this period of Malayan and Indonesian history. The narrative of the 
Southeast Asian Chinese begins in this period, and this Chinese narrative was the 
principal source of ideas for Chinese in all parts of Southeast Asia about how their 
communities should be identified nationally, in the local political context. The research 
methods used in the dissertation will also be explained in this chapter. The five main 
themes which provide the analytical framework for the dissertation will be outlined. 
Chapter 2 discusses Chinese identification with Nanyang/Southeast Asia in the 1930s, 
particularly as it was expressed in Chinese writing of the period. Because the Southeast 
Asian countries were still European colonies then, there was less space for the Chinese 
to identify as Southeast Asians, but fora were created by the Southeast Asian Chinese 
literature of the period for the Chinese to imagine 'Nanyang'. In this dissertation I refer 
to newspapers, academic publications, books and other forms of contemporary literature 
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m discussing the Nanyang identity of the Southeast Asian Chinese, and how the 
Chinese intellectual view of Nanyang developed from the output of a number of 
Chinese writers who travelled south and identified themselves with Southeast Asia. 
Chapter 3 discusses the changing relationship between the Chinese in Southeast Asia 
and the Chinese in China, especially after the start of the war with Japan. In terms of 
family ties and the structure of local communities, there were very close links between 
Nanyang and mainland China. After the war began, the Nanyang Chinese press shifted 
the focus of its concern to China, and also invited a number of Chinese writers to come 
south and write for the Nanyang press, which made the relationship still closer. 
However, this development was the turning point that caused the Nan yang Chinese after 
the war to develop their own distinct identity. During this process, the cultural 
separation of Nan yang from China gradually manifested itself. 
Chapter 4 discusses the impact of the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia on Chinese 
concepts of identity. This begins with pre-war Japanese perceptions of Southeast Asia, 
their understanding of the place of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, and Japanese pan-
Asianism. It then turns to the influence of the Japanese occupation on post-war 
relations between the Chinese and the native Malays and Indonesians, and how changes 
in this relationship set the foundations for change in the self-identification of the 
Nanyang Chinese. 
Chapter 5 follows the progress of a group of Chinese writers who fled from Malaya to 
Sumatra during the Japanese occupation, in order to point out how they developed ideas 
on the Indonesian revolution and the Malayan anti-colonial struggle in these special 
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circumstances. It deals in depth with three of these writers, describing the evolution of 
their political thought as seen from the evidence of their writing and their actions, and 
how their ideas subsequently influenced general public opinion among Chinese about 
their place in the new Southeast Asia. 
Chapter 6 discusses how Chinese in Malaya and Indonesia explored the implications of 
national identification at a time when the external political situation was uncertain, and 
how the narrative of Chinese perception of themselves as people of Malaya or Indonesia 
developed. In Malaya, different terminologies arose that distinguished between the 
Chinese in China and the Chinese in Nanyang, and the cultural sphere of 'Mahua' 
(Malayan Chinese) arose among Chinese who identified nationally with Malaya. u In 
Indonesia the debate confirmed that the Chinese should be on the side of pribumi 
nationalism, and that they should be able to choose their nationality themselves. 
Chapter 7 deals with the community organizations founded in Malaya and Indonesia in 
the 1950-1955 period that fostered local identity among the Chinese, and with how 
these organizations addressed the conflict between local identification and Chineseness. 
I discuss the Chinese Teachers' Federation (UCSTA) in Malaya, in its capacity as 
representative organ of the educational profession, as an example of how a public 
organization could promote identification with Malaya while upholding cultural 
Chineseness. In Indonesia, I examine the Citizenship Consultative Society (Baperki). 
This organization, established with the aim of achieving citizenship rights and the rights 
" Mahua (,\Iii~). 
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to learn Chinese language for Indonesian Chinese, helped to create the legal and 
institutional framework for Chinese edueation in Indonesia. 
The Conclusion sums up the implications of the narratives set out in the preceding 
chapters. It explains why the Chinese in Southeast Asia developed new concepts of 
identity in quite a short period of time. Although it was the particular circumstances of 
this short time that made it possible for the new conceptualisations of identity to 
develop, the consequences of the change in national identification among the Southeast 
Asian Chinese have endured. 
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Chapter 1 
The Critical Period for the Nanyang Chinese 
Psychologists have long held that the critical period in personal development is that 
time in which the person develops and establishes a basic personality. This idea can 
apply to collective identity such as Nanyang Chinese. Many popular opinions among 
Nanyang Chinese say that the pivotal period in changing Chinese identity in Southeast 
Asia was the period of the Pacific War, as people use post-wartime and pre-wartime as 
the main time frame for the issue of Chinese identity in Southeast Asia. I will argue, 
however, that the shift from a China-centred to a Nanyang-centred identity occurred 
over a broader time frame. This study treats the transitional period of modem Southeast 
Asian history from the 1930s to the 1950s, from the British and Dutch colonial era to 
the post-war era when Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia were becoming independent, 
as the critical period in the shaping of Nan yang Chinese identity. 
I would like to highlight the significance of this research from different angles in this 
chapter. The scope of this study will go beyond national history because interaction 
between ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia often took place across national boundaries in 
the period of the 1930s to the 1950s. In the tradition of 'autonomous history', I will 
examine the agency of the Southeast Asian Chinese in the construction of their political 
and cultural identity, rather than regarding them as the objects of government policy or 
ethnic discrimination. The Japanese occupation is considered in the context of 
Southeast Asian history, in terms of its implications for domestic politics, social 
relations and intellectual life, before and after the war. I will pay particular attention to 
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the development of the term huaren as it was used in Southeast Asian Chinese media 
and public discourse, because the clearest sign of change in thinking about identity is a 
change in the term for self-reference. 
The Huaren Discourse and its Southeast Asian Origin 
Huaren was chosen as the name of an English language World Wide Web site set up in 
January 1998 to collect and broadcast information on the 'mistreatment' of ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia in particular, and the fate of the global Chinese diaspora in 
general, after destructive anti-Chinese riots erupted throughout the archipelago of 
Indonesia in January and February of that year. It seems that this was the first use in the 
international English language media of the term huarenl, which now is commonly used 
to refer to the Chinese diaspora in Chinese language media.2 For a long time, Chinese 
of the diaspora have struggled with terminologies such as 'Chinese', 'overseas 
Chinese', or 'ethnic Chinese' in English, and zhongguoren, huaqiao, huaren, or huayi in 
Huaren ( "}..) . The meaning of this term will be explained later. All Chinese terms will be spelled in 
Mandarin according to the standard Pinyin system and given in Chinese characters in footnotes when they 
appear for first time. If Chinese terms, including persons' names, are better known in other Chinese 
'diclcctsllanguages' , such as Hokkien. Cantonese, Teochew or Hakka, spelling for that pronunciation 
will be provided. These 'dialects/languages' , which should be treated as different 'languages' from 
a linguistic point of view, are often called 'dialects' from a Chinese nationalist approach ·· as with all 
Chinese dialects, they are mutually intelligible in writing, though unintelligible when spoken, - and this 
usage has become became common among Chinese in Southeast Asia. 
The web site was set up by two ethnic Chinese from different backgrounds. One is a Canadian who was 
born in Hong Kong, and the other is a New Zealander who came originally from Malaysia. See 
'Tragedy and Technology Makes Chinese Unite' The Straits Times, 20 August 1998. 
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Chinese to refer to themselves.3 The term huaren is used by Chinese of the diaspora, 
particularly Southeast Asian Chinese, to address their condition of being outside China, 
and to distinguish themselves from the Chinese in China. The promotion by scholars 
from Southeast Asia of the usage in English of 'ethnic Chinese', which can be seen as a 
literal translation of huaren, instead of 'overseas Chinese,' reflects this dilemma of self-
reference, imposed by the situation of being at the same time Chinese, 'overseas' from 
the perspective of China, and an ethnic minority with real or imputed connections with a 
foreign country, in the countries where they lived.4 The late appearance of this usage in 
the English-speaking world shows that this semantic struggle and the political impulse 
behind it has not yet received adequate attention in English language research circles. 
The Huaren website published information on the fate of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, 
which it described as 'the issue commanding the attention of the diverse communities of 
the Chinese diaspora throughout the world'. 5 Many efforts have since been made 
through this web site to compile the general history of Chinese migrants in each 
country. Some foreign media have commented on this to emphasize how ethnic 
Chinese are using cyber-technology to communicate and gather together globally.6 But 
Zhongguoren ($1i!)0, Huaqiao ('!jli~), Huayi ('!l¥1iifl. 
The best example of this by a scholar from Scutheast Asia is the book, Ethm'c Chinese as Southeast Asi&7, 
edited by Leo Suryadinata. (Singapore: Institute of Soufaeast Asian Studies, 1997). Leo Suiyadimta 
addressed this issue directly in one article in this book, · 'Et'mic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas 
Chinese, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?' 
Wang Rui Zhi etc., 'Baoxing jinu quanqici huaren.' Yazhou zhoukan [Asia Week, Chinese Versio!!], 
29 (3August1998--9 August 1998, Hong Kong), p. 40 . .:£~~~' «~f.f;fl:~i£l5j<'!j¥A,>> 0 <<:2i%1~ 
fU>, 29 (3 Aupst 1998--9August1998): 40. 
For example, Wayne Amold, 'Chmese Diaspora Using Internet to Aid Plight of Brethren Abroad' The 
Wall Street Jouma!, 23 July 1998. 
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the compilation of migration history from each country ironically symbolizes the loss of 
common memory among the Chinese diaspora in the post World War II era. One of the 
few things remaining in common is the Chinese term Huaren, which is used to refer to 
all categories of ethnic Chinese, newcomers from China or descendants of Chinese 
migrants, regardless of what languages they speak, which nationality they are, and 
where they come from. 
Today huaren is used to denote people's identity along with other terms which refer to 
the Chinese diaspora. The usage of huaren emphasizes the difference between Chinese 
in China and ethnic Chinese outside China, which reflects a trend in the discourse of 
Chineseness to distance the Chinese of the diaspora from the political implications of 
associating with China. In the post-1940s Cold War environment, this association 
caused the Chinese of Indonesia and Malaysia to be in danger of being identified as 
agents of Communism. So huaren often qualifies a nationality other than Chinese, as in 
American huaren, Singaporean huaren and so on. In this way, the meaning of 
Chineseness is put into the context of inclusion in other countries, in order to avoid any 
impression that the Chinese of the diaspora desire to be linked with the 'fatherland', 
China. By contrast, the terms zhongguoren and huaqiao emphasise links with China. 
The most common term for Chinese people is zhongguoren, which literally means 
'people of Chinese nationality' but is often used to indicate Chinese people generally. 
Zhongguoren is the term most often used to mean 'Chinese' in China and in all other 
places except Southeast Asia. Since it implies Chinese nationality, it is rejected by 
ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia today, because the majority of ethnic Chinese are 
citizens of their country of residence and are unwilling to be addressed as Chinese 
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nationals. 7 Another term of self-reference among overseas Chinese is huaqiao, the 
literal meaning of which is 'Chinese sojourners'. This term is seen as inappropriate for 
ethnic Chinese today because 'Chinese sojourners' is politically loaded in the local 
context, implying that they are more Chinese than Malaysian or Indonesian. In other 
overseas Chinese communities in North America, Latin America, Oceania (including 
Australia), and Europe, where political conditions are different, huaqiao is still in 
common use to indicate Chinese people outside China. The regionally specific political 
implications of these terms reflects the distinct nature of Chinese identity among the 
ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Only in Southeast Asia is the terminology of Chinese 
identity so politically sensitive. 
Today, the term huaren is used more often than any other term in the Chinese language 
to refer to Chinese of the diaspora anywhere in the world. For the places where we will 
discuss in this study, there is widespread acceptance at the subjective level of the new 
ideas of "Yinhua" for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and "Mahua" for ethnic Chinese in 
Malaysia nowaday.8 There is no generally agreed translation of the term 'diaspora' in 
the Chinese language so far. Huaren has become more popular because its meaning is 
free from the political implications of zhongguoren and huaqiao. The first character, 
hua, is a homonym for the character for 'flower', hua. It symbolizes the flourishing of 
Gu Hong Ting, Dongnanya huaqiao di r.:ntong wenti [The Probiem of Identity of the Southeast A~ian 
Chinese] (Taipei: Lianjing Publishing Co., 1994), pp. 4-5. tlill\l~, <Jilti'f'is:!-~i¥J~/g[Fijfo~!!l'i> (1';Jt : 
~-~ilill&0l\'J, 1994), 4·5.' 
Zau Son Dong, "Dongnanya huaren rentong zbuang'iian di ruogan guancha." [Some Observations on 
Changi~g Identities o: Southeast Asian Chinese] fti\\flft];f[. <];f[l¥12•A~f5)!¥1#!i!ta<J:S:'fllll.~> The 
Ethnic Chinese: P!oceedings of the Intemafjonal Conference on Changing Idemides and Relations in 
Southeast Asia. Teresita Ang See and Go Bon Juan eds. (Manila: Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran. 1994). 
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Chinese culture, so that hua means Chinese in the cultural sense. The second character, 
ren, means people, so that huaren means Chinese people in the cultural sense. 
Few people realise that this modern usage of huaren has a very short history. It has 
been used in the Chinese media to distinguish ethnic Chinese living outside China from 
Chinese in China only since the Second World War, even though the term huaren 
occurs in the Chinese classics.9 
The tendency for diasporic Chinese to distinguish themselves from China has its origins 
in Southeast Asia. The details of this development will be explored in this study. The 
Southeast Asian political context explains why new migrants from mainland China, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan to other overseas destinations do not have the same degree of 
sensitivity to the use of these terms as ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia. Today 
Chinese newspapers in the USA, Canada, Australia and other common destinations for 
Chinese migrants often use Zhongguoren, Huaqiao and Huaren interchangeably. 
It is important to trace the origin of this differentiation of usage between Zhongguoren, 
Huaqiao and Huaren in order to understand the identity of Southeast Asian Chinese.10 
For example, the Dong Xi Yang Kao (1606) used huaren throughout, for instance ""!J!'A);::lft1')(Jitl!:i:., te!i 
:9Eill.frr~i. U'iFt§tt, tt:f1Ii=f.1b1i'f A, B'1if=:.sornfB" Huaren d8 kui huo taosan, esi slum' gu 
JiJn, her1g s/Ji xiang zllen, Ji )Jan er wan wu qian ren, cunz/Je san bai kou ezyi [The Chinese were defeated 
and fled, to die of hunger in the mountain vai!eys, where corpses lay piled on corpses. Twenty-five 
thousand were lost, and only three hundred remained] (<l:f!:l§l'Fil>'>~Zli §7f-:fll!i). 
A similar effort had been made by Tan Liok Ee, who compared the usage of Bangsa and Minzi (R~) in 
both Malay text and Chinese text fo:- the idea of nation in both context. Tan Liok Tile rheroi:ic of 
Bangsa aRd Minzu: community and 1wrio11 in tension, the Malay Peninsula, 1900-1955. (Clayton, Vic.: 
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monash University, 1988). 
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The process in which ethnic Chinese tried to create new forms of identity for their own 
communities by differentiating Chinese in the ancestral land and Chinese in Southeast 
Asian countries will be traced as a specific historical process. Chinese print material 
published in Southeast Asia shows that the centre of this movement was in the Chinese 
communities in Malaya (including present day Malaysia and Singapore) and 
Indonesia. ll The crucial time for the development of this idea was before and after the 
Second World War. Extensive political and social changes in this period are obvious in 
both Malaya and Indonesia. In the 1930s, conflict between Japan and China drove 
overseas Chinese communities to support their ancestral land. The sense of patriotism 
towards China amongst these communities reached a new high. In the 1950s, on the 
other hand, many leaders of Chinese communities in Malaya and Indonesia encouraged 
their members to move in locally oriented directions of political and cultural identity. 
Within less than two decades, Chinese people in Malaya and Indonesia underwent a 
dramatic change in their identity. The process of change of identity associated with the 
rise of the term huaren should be traced in order to understand its implications for 
ethnic Chinese in post-war Southeast Asia. 12 
l! 
" 
Here, Malaya and Indonesia will be treated more from an issue-oriented approach than a geographical 
approach. This is because the boundaries between Malaya and Indonesia were still in the process of 
definition durir.g the 1940s and 50s. So. cities and other places within these new nations will not be 
specified unless it is nece~sary. Talcing this into consideration, Sumatra will be considered in the 
Indonesian framework and Singapore in the Malayan framework, even though this sometimes over-
simplifies the historical facts. 
At the same time, the new terms for ethnic Chinese in Malay or Bahasa Indonesian generated new 
meaning. The usage of warganegara rnd keluf1J1Jan in Ba.'lasa Indonesia had been discussed by Charles 
Coppel. See the first chapter of Charles Cappel, Jndant-sian Chinese in Crisis. (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1983). 
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The evolution of Chinese identity in Malaya and Indonesia is also important in 
understanding Chinese identity in other Southeast Asian countries. Even though the 
circumstances of the Southeast Asian Chinese differ from country to country, the 
discourse of new identities flowed across national boundaries and influenced Chinese 
elsewhere in the region, through the continuing communication with other Chinese 
communities in the post-war era. Sooner or later, most Chinese communities in 
Southeast Asia went through a similar process of identity change. They all experienced 
the following stages: the rise of Nanyang identity before the Sino-Japanese war, the 
patriotic movement toward China during the Sino-Japanese war and the reflections 
inspired by the Japanese pan-Asianist policy of the occupation, and the response of the 
ethnic Chinese to the rise of nationalism in the Southeast Asian nations after the Second 
World War. This process created a particular kind of Chinese identity in Southeast 
Asia, which I would describe as the Southeast Asian model of Chinese identity. This 
process, which involved major political changes, is different from the process 
undergone by overseas Chinese in other areas, such as the USA, Britain, Australia, and 
New Zealand, where the political system and the integrity of the nation have remained 
stable and change in the perceived national identity of Chinese migrants has been 
mainly caused by generational change. 
Towards the Autonomous History of Southeast Asian Chinese 
These changes in use and meaning of the terms for identification reflect the process of 
identity change among ethnic Chinese as it took place through discussion, debate and 
social action. Although many English-language studies of the Southeast Asian Chinese 
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have paid special attention to the issue of identity, few have considered how and why 
the Southeast Asian Chinese created a discourse to distinguish themselves from the 
Chinese in China and to express a growing feeling of belonging to the Southeast Asian 
lands. These studies implied that the change of identity among Southeast Asian 
Chinese was an inevitable process resulting from two major factors: local nationalism 
and the rise of communism in China. Under the influence of the Cold War many of 
these studies asserted that Southeast As.ian Chinese would become a fifth column for 
Communist China. For instance, C. P. Fitzgerald claimed that the Chinese communities 
in Southeast Asia were the expeditionary force of China. 13 The existence of ethnic 
Chinese was seen as a problem to solve. Victor Purcell indicated that this 'problem' 
drove him to conduct his extensive research on Malayan Chinese and later on Southeast 
Asian Chinese.14 
The following is an example of this 'problem' approach: 
" 
'Apart from its influence on the foreign relations of Southeast Asian countries, 
the Chinese minority offers an internal problem of fantastic complexity to the 
nations of the area. Certain aspects of this problem are common to the whole 
region, such as an increase in the proportion of local-born to the immigrant 
Chinese population, the growing urbanization of the Chinese community as a 
whole, the increasing domination by the Chinese of the region's economy, and 
the ever stronger attraction which the area holds for Chinese immigrants and for 
the two regimes each claiming to be the government of China. Though the 
status of the Chinese varies from country to country, all the governments of the 
area have been setting restrictions on their immigration, education, and political 
Fitzgerald, C. P., The Jilild China: the Chinese CoJ1JJJJunities in Southeast As1a. (Melbourne: Angus and 
Robertson, 1965). 
See Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford L"niversity Press, 1948) and Victor Purcell, 
The Chinese in Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1965). Purcell addressed Hiis as 
his main concern in the preface to the first edition. 
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and economic activities. Generally speaking, four factors determine the 
relations between the resident Chinese and the governments and peoples of 
Southeast Asia: Chinese economic domination, their cultural unassimilability, 
the attitude of the local Chinese toward their homeland, and relations between 
the Southeast Asian governments and the Peking and Formosa regimes.'" 
The solution proposed at that time for the 'Chinese problem' was often that of 
'assimilation'. Victor Purcell suggested mixed marriage and religious conversion were 
the best ways for the Chinese to assimilate into local communities. G. William 
Skinner's studies comparing the degree of assimilation among Chinese in Java and 
Chinese in Thailand revealed the same concern. 16 These studies may have been 
influenced by the model of the 'melting pot' in the United States, as well as by Cold 
War ideology and fears of a Chinese fifth column. 
Studies which addressed the issue of identity among Southeast Asian Chinese as an 
'assimilation question' considered social structural factors such as the assimilation 
strategies of post-colonial national governments, religion, and population structure. 
Attention to these factors is important to understand the identity issue. But we should 
also consider the issue from the point of view of Chinese agency, such as Chinese 
leaders, Chinese writers, Chinese associations, Chinese newspapers, Chinese schools 
and people who participated in these agents. With this in mind, this study will focus on 
how the ethnic Chinese interpreted external affairs and what new ideas they developed 
in response to the changing situation. Statements by ethnic Chinese during this 
ll 
" 
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, !Yfinority Problems In Soul'1eas1 Asia. (California: Stanforc 
L'niversity Press), p. 3. 
George William Skinner, 'The Chinese Minority.' In Ruth Mc Vey, ed. !11do11esia. (New Haven: HRAP 
Press. 1%3), pp. 97-117. 
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transition period and memoirs of prominent figures in the Chinese communities will be 
examined in order to understand their point of view. 
Talcing these Chinese statements about the new Chinese identity in Southeast Asia into 
account will help to explain the relationship between the Chinese minorities and 
Southeast Asian nationalism. For instance, even though there were many disputes 
between ethnic Chinese and Malay leaders, the Chinese community in Malaya were 
enthusiastic in support of Malaysian independence in the early 1950s. In Indonesia, 
even though several serious riots targeting ethnic Chinese took place during the 
Indonesian revolution, Chinese businessmen were still willing to provide goods and 
weapons for the Indonesian armed struggle for independence.17 The factor of rising 
local nationalism cannot alone explain the change in Chinese identity. The history of 
Chinese migration indicates that Chinese people have often gone to 'sojourn' in other 
countries at times when the local political agenda there did not favour them, like 
Australia in the nineteenth century, and Russia early in the twentieth. The rise of 
communism in the ancestral land can also not be the only reason for the Chinese of the 
diaspora reorienting their identity. The cases of North Korean migrants in Japan and 
Cuban migrants in the United States show that communism is not inevitably a reason 
for reorientation of identity. 
People do not change their concept of their own identity overnight. Without the new 
concept of Chinese identity which developed in this transition period, ethnic Chinese in 
Southeast Asia may have made other political choices in the post-war situation. 
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Considering their situation as new migrants in a newly independent country, these 
foreign nationals might not have built up a sense of belonging to the new country so 
quickly. Considering their situation as migrants whose fatherland had become a 
communist state, those who had strong ties with their hometowns and with their 
relatives might have found it more difficult to distance themselves from these ties. The 
Chinese minorities' stand towards nationalism in post-war Southeast Asia was the 
product of decades of debate about Chinese identity. These debates might not have 
created consensus among Chinese, but they inspired some people to continue to search 
for new answers concerning their identity. The 1930s were a time when people 
searched for a new approach and sense of belonging, when several groups of Chinese 
intellectuals started to address the question of identity, and this preoccupation continued 
to find expression in their writings and activities during the period of Japanese 
occupation. The debates about Chinese identity right after the end of the Pacific War 
were the outcome of this development. This created the foundations for a new 
distinctive approach to Chinese identity among Chinese migrants in Indonesia and 
Malaya. 
In short, the aim of this study is to construct an 'autonomous history' of the Southeast 
Asian Chinese and give the Chinese voice to narrate their interaction with the nationalist 
movements and their evolution of a new identity, separate from China. 18 They were the 
" 
Twang Peck Yang, The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence 1940-
1950. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
About t'ie discussion on 'Autonomous History' in the Southeast Asian context, see John R. W. Smail, 
"On t'ie Poss'bi!ity of an A:itonomous History of Modem Southeast Asia" Joumal of Southeast Asian 
History, 2(2): 72-102. 1961, and John R.W. Smail, Alllonomo11s Histolies, Particular Troths: Essays in 
Honor of John R. W: Smail. (University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies. 1993). 
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agents of social action and reform as well as the objects of government policy. Taking 
the impact of the Japanese occupation into account, the characteristics of the transition 
in Southeast Asia from the colonial era to independence will be addressed. And at the 
same time, we may redirect the Chinese issue away from the melting pot perspective, 
influenced by the Cold War mentality, and towards the multiculturalist or human rights 
perspective. 
In the Land of Orang Melayu: Beyond National Boundaries 
In the Southeast Asian setting, it is not simple to determine who is Chinese, since 
people have migrated from China to this region for centuries. This study deals mainly 
with Chinese who lived outside China but still maintained some degree of physical, 
spiritual or communal interaction with China. This definition of 'Chinese' is based on a 
study of overseas Chinese by Go Shiyukei in the 1940s. 19 In this study, the terms 
'Chinese diaspora', 'ethnic Chinese' and 'Nanyang Chinese' will be used here and there 
with different emphasis, but throughout 'Chinese' will convey the sense of interaction 
with China. 
We can use another angle to consider the main group of people in this study. As many 
studies have indicated, the Chinese communities had become a complicated assemblage 
because of the long history of Chinese migration to the region. It is difficult to 
generalise about the diverse situations of the various Chinese populations in the region. 
Go, Shiyukei, Kakyo honshil1iuron. [The Essence of the Overseas Chinese] (Tokyo: Chikura, 1944). p. 2. 
1944). 2. 
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Wang Gungwu has suggested using a classification into three groups, the 'A, B and C 
group' theory, to clarify the different meanings of Chineseness. 20 This classification 
linked political consciousness with social status. This study will use a similar scheme to 
classify Chinese communities by cultural affiliation with China, according to how 
recently they or their forebears migrated. Of the three groups, the A group is the 
assimilated population, though in a different sense of 'assimilation' from that associated 
with post-war Indonesian government policy. It includes baba and 'straits Chinese' in 
British Malaya and peranakan in Indonesia. The B group is the Chinese who were born 
in Southeast Asia but received Chinese education. The people in this group are bi-
cultural. The C group is Chinese people born and educated in China. In this study, we 
will mainly discuss the B and C groups. People of peranakan background will be 
considered only when they were identified as Chinese. Later sections of the thesis will 
also question the distinction between peranakan and totok in the post-war period. 
I will use a transnational approach to the study of Chinese identities. Investigation of 
the identity issue among Chinese in two separate territories, Malaya and Indonesia, 
highlights the cross-border interaction among Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. 
Until now the framework for studies of modern Southeast Asian history has usually 
been nationally based. When people working on Southeast Asian history became more 
cautious to avoid seeing the Southeast Asian subject only from the objectifying eyes of 
Western colonialists, they tended to pursue Southeast Asian subjectivity in the concepts 
expressed in the patriotic discourse of the new nations. Chinese sources of this period 
Weng C-ung.,u, 'Political Chine~e: An Aspect cf their Contribution to Mcdern Soathoast Asian 
History' , in Bernhard Grossmann ed., Southeast As1a in the Modem World. (Wiesbaden 0. 
Harrassowitz, 1972), p. 117. 
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have therefore been neglected, because they do not fit the framework of either 
colonialism or nationalism. 
For these reasons, events in which people were involved across national borders have 
been neglected. For example, the chairman of Baperki, Siauw Giok Tjhan, was 
encouraged to organise Chinese pera:nakan youth to join the Indonesian Independence 
movement by Tan Kah Kee, a leader of the Chinese community in Malaya, who went 
into hiding in Malang during the Japanese occupation.21 This kind of linkage, especially 
instances of 'spiritual' linkage of the type described by Goto Ken'ichi, 22 has been 
overlooked by scholars working on Malayan (Singaporean and Malaysian) and 
Indonesian history. 
'This study follows a group of Chinese writers who went from Singapore to Sumatra in 
the 1940s as an example of intelleetual and spiritual linkage between Chinese in Malaya 
and Indonesia. Three major figures among them will appear from time to time in 
different chapters. For these three, during the 1940s, the boundary between Malaya and 
Indonesia was of little consequence in their efforts to build up a sense of belonging and 
a will to associate with the indigenous people, the Orang Malayu, the Malayu people. 
Both Malaya and Indonesia were the land of Orang Malaya. The issue of identity was 
similar for them in both places. 
21 Siauw Giok TJ'han, Liam Zaman Perwujudan Integrasj Wa}ir. (Jaka..'1a: Yayasan Teratai, 1981). p. 75. 
Goto Kenichi, "Baperki of Indonesia: Its Fonnation, Development and Dissolution." In Tomw A.fia 
kakyo to cfJugoku--chugoku kizoku isl11ki kara kajin ishild e. [Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia imd 
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The three figures will be introduced briefly here, since the details of their accounts of 
their Nanyang experiences will be discussed in Chapter 5. The first is Yu Ta Fu, a well-
known writer in both China and Nanyang. He came to Singapore to edit the literary 
section of a Chinese journal after the Sino-Japanese war erupted. It is remarkable to 
note the sudden change of style in this writer who, inspired by a strong humanistic 
ethos, wrote vehement political essays to arouse anti-Japanese sentiment among the 
overseas Chinese. The war turned him from a melancholy literary individualist into an 
enthusiastic fighter against Japanese occupation, resulting in his becoming the leader of 
an anti-Japanese campaign three years later, when the Pacific War broke out. The 
whole group of writers were then forced to flee together to Sumatra. In Sumatra Yu 
disguised himself as a businessman, only to be recruited as an interpreter for the 
Japanese while incognito and eventually die a tragic death. 
The second is Hu Yu Zhi, a most influential political commentator in Singapore at that 
time. During his exile in Indonesia, he organized a group of Chinese writers, who had 
gone into exile with him and with whom he remained in contact, to study Bahasa 
Indonesia and Indonesian society. Later these writers tried to encourage local Chinese 
youth to do the same, even after they came back to Singapore. Hu learned Bahasa 
Indonesia while staying in a Medan village during the Japanese occupation, and so 
adroitly did he master the language that he even compiled an Indonesian-Chinese 
dictionary and a linguistic text on Indonesian grammar in Chinese. He also derived his 
pen name, Sabin, from the local name system and kept it even after his return to 
Singapore, where he edited the influential magazine Fengxia, (literally 'Land under the 
China: Conversion of the Object of Their Identity from China to the Countries of Residence] (Tokyo: The 
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Monsoon'). This magazine systematieally sought to encourage young Malayan Chinese 
to identify themselves more closely with the local community. 
The third writer is \Vang Ren Shu, a novelist who is generally known by his pen name, 
Ba Ren. He became an expert in Indonesian studies and the first Chinese Ambassador 
to Indonesia. His stay in Indonesia was an experience that not only remoulded his 
thinking but also changed his own destiny. He joined the same group of Chinese 
intellectuals living incognito in Sumatra as Yu and Hu during the Japanese occupation, 
but decided to remain in Medan after the Japanese left. He founded a pro-democracy 
union and launched a daily newspaper in Medan. His writing often appeared in 
Singapore but was mostly about Indonesia. During the conflict between Dutch colonists 
and local Indonesians in 1948, he was expatriated to China. Two years later he was 
commissioned as the first Chinese ambassador to Indonesia. After his term as 
ambassador, he devoted himself to the study of Indonesian history. 
Among them, Hu and Wang were later seen as left-wing writers because they were 
identified as members of the Chinese Communist Party. But the influence of the 
Chinese writers which was discussed in this study only continued up to 1949 when 
China became a communist country. Both Hu and Wang were only revealed as 
members of the Malayan branch of the China Democratic League (CDL), an intellectual 
organisation which promoted democracy and concerned social issues before 1949. 
Before 1949, both did not show their membership of Chinese Communist Party and the 
China Democratic League had not been seen as a pro-Chinese Communist Party 
Institute of Developing Economies, 1993). p. 8!. 
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organisation. The writings of Wang and Hu could not be seen as pro-CCP propaganda 
up to the period which we will discuss in this study. After 1949, all of these Chinese 
writers which we discussed in this study had left Malaya and Indonesia to go to China. 
It would be a different story. 
To use the lives and thoughts of Yu Ta Fu, Hu Yuzhi and Ba Ren to trace the 
development of a new consciousness of identity throughout the Southeast Asian 
Chinese population does not imply the belief that currents of opinion among restricted 
intellectual circles were the cause of this development, either in the case of the 
Southeast Asian Chinese or as a rule. They were not without effect on posterity, but 
their thoughts on the proper place in the world of the Southeast Asian Chinese would 
not have become the foundation of a consciousness of Chineseness generalised through 
the Chinese population if these thoughts had not been socialised and publicised through 
mass Chinese organizations founded in Malaya and Indonesia after the war, and if the 
general Chinese public had not been mobilised to join these organizations or at least 
follow their progress by issues that affected all Chinese in the region-Chinese 
education, and the effects of assimilatory social policies. These writers are studied 
because, as writers, they published their reflections and opinions on Chinese identity to 
an extent which Chinese shopkeepers and tradesmen rarely had the time and resources 
for. Being Chinese and on the spot, they addressed social dilemmas that we can only 
assume to have faced all Chinese in the region, whether they wrote about it or not. 
The category 'Nanyang' used in this study includes both Malaya and Indonesia. Before 
the Pacific War and even in the 1940s, 'Nanyang Chinese' would have been a more 
appropriate categorisation for ethnic Chinese in Malaya and Indonesia than any phrase 
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using the names 'Malaya' or 'Indonesia'. The distinction between Malaya and 
Indonesia gradually became significant in the late 1940s. Therefore, the situation in 
Malaya and Indonesia will be discussed separately in the later chapters, though from a 
comparative approach. 
The Japanese Occupation: Interruption or Continuation? 
Both Malaya and Indonesia under European colonial rule before WWII are seen by 
scholars as plural societies. The Chinese and indigenous communities had only limited 
cultural and political interaction at that time, with the exception of the peranakan and 
baba groups. However, external political events brought about significant changes in 
less than two decades. 
The wartime experience of Japanese rule provided for a sudden encounter between the 
two communities in the political arena. Since then, the concerns of the Chinese 
communities have been part of the political agenda in both the new nations. However, 
the impact of the Japanese occupation on Southeast Asian Chinese identity has been 
neglected by scholars. Many identify the Second World War overall as the turning 
point for the evolution of Chinese identity in the region. The experience of Japanese 
occupation was an important factor in this process, but few scholars who deal with the 
issue of Southeast Asian Chinese identity have taken it into account. 
There are several reasons why relatively little has been written about this issue. One is 
that the impact of the Japanese occupation on the Chinese in Southeast Asia was 
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overshadowed by two major events. The first was the development of the Southeast 
Asian nationalist movement, and the second, the emergence of the Chinese Communist 
Party in the civil war in China right after the Second World War. It is understandable 
that these two factors should have been considered the major reasons for the changes in 
the identity concepts of Southeast Asian Chinese. This is bceause, on the one hand, the 
great need for national integration in the new nations led to the desire of policy makers 
to naturalise or to assimilate the Chinese residents and, on the other hand, the situation 
in China, first war then Communist revolution, made some Southeast Asian Chinese 
reluctant to go back there. Compared to the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, 
both of these factors lasted for a longer time and have continued to exert an influence 
until the present day. 
The change in Chinese identities in Malaya and Indonesia predates both national 
independence and Chinese Communism. It should not be seen as the result of national 
independence, as the Chinese-language materials of the earlier period show that this 
impression is misleading. The Nanyang Shang Pao, one of the mainstream Chinese 
newspapers in Singapore, on 8 January 1946 urged Chinese readers to take Malayan 
citizenship and to join the local political domain rather than to concern themselves only 
with China's affairs. The author distinguished between the Chinese in China, as 
zhongguoren, and the Chinese in Nanyang (the South Seas), as Nanyang huazu. The 
English translation of both terms is the same, 'Chinese', but the former is defined in 
Chinese by membership in the Chinese nation (literally 'person of China') while the 
latter means ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia (literally 'person of Chinese lineage in the 
South Seas'). This national separation of different kinds of Chineseness was quite 
widespread in post-war Southeast Asia. Most Chinese in Southeast Asia preferred to 
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state their ethnicity as huaren or huazu, not zhongguoren. This terminology appeared 
right after the Japanese occupation and is dominant in Singapore and Malaysia today. 
In Indonesia, the issue emerged even earlier. At the meeting of the Indonesian 
Investigative Committee for Independence Preparation in July 1945, the Chinese 
representatives proclaimed that the new Republic should give full citizenship to all 
people of Chinese descent who were living in Indonesia. The Indonesian nationalists 
basically agreed with them. The idea actually came from the advice of the Japanese, 
since at that time Indonesia was still under Japanese control, and the Japanese appointed 
four Chinese representatives to the Committee. If we consider the same issue before the 
war, only a small group of peranakan Chinese (local-born Chinese) ever advocated that 
peranakan Chinese should be able to become Indonesian subjects, and no Indonesian 
party seriously considered including the Chinese in the new nation. This suggests that 
the Japanese era was a turning point in changing Chinese identity. 
The impact of Japanese occupation on the relations between ethnic Chinese and the 
nationalist movement will be part of this study too. Although Benedict Anderson has 
said that the Japanese occupation basically maintained the racial separation policy of 
European colonialism,23 the impact of Japanese policy was quite different from the 
effect of European rule in this area. 24 Japanese perceptions of race, racially 
differentiated policies during the occupation, expression of race perceptions in 
Benedict R. O'G. A'lderson, 'Light of Asia' In Josef Solverstein ed. Sou/beast Asia in World WM JI: 
Four Essays. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1966). 
Genevieve Collins Linebarger, 'The Aftermath of Japanese Colonialism in Southeast Asia.' In Robert 
Strausz-Hupe and Harry W. Hazard eds. The Idea of Colonialism. (London: Atlantic Books, 1956). 
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propaganda, and how ideas of identity and ethnic relations in local society changed 
from before the war to after the war will be examined. There were differences between 
Japanese and European colonial structures in terms of ethnic policy towards Chinese 
which strongly influenced ethnic relations between the Chinese and the indigenous 
population. By comparing the different meanings of Chinese identity in Southeast Asia 
before and after the Japanese occupation, the significance of the Japanese factor can be 
made clear. The effect of the Japanese occupation in Southeast Asia on Chinese 
identity can be traced to the interaction between the Japanese, the Chinese and native 
nationalism. 
However, the difficulty in dealing with this issue is that the impact seems very indirect, 
and sometimes paradoxical. We cannot trace Japanese influence on Chinese identity as 
a sustained cultural influence. The occupation lasted only three and a half years. Even 
though the Japanese pursued a very strong policy of Japanisation, the Japanese factor 
was never significant in this region again after this short period of occupation. Soon 
after the Japanese occupation, the pursuit of independence became the major issue for 
the indigenous populations of most Southeast Asian countries. Through the process of 
decolonisation and nation-building, Japanese influence soon abated. So it is very 
difficult to trace the Japanese influence in Southeast Asia in terms of cultural 
characteristics among the local population, except for the existence of some Japanese-
trained warlords and political leaders. However, the Japanese occupation forced both 
pribumi and Chinese cormnunities to rethink their attitudes towards Western 
colonialism and sense of identity. It had a 'circuit-breaker' effect. 
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The Critical Period for the Southeast Asian Chinese Diaspora: the 1930s to the 
1950s 
Most studies of the Southeast Asian Chinese take 'pre-war' and 'post-war' for granted 
as names for distinct historical periods, although the periodisation should be examined 
from the point of view of tracing Nanyang Chinese agency against the background of 
external events that traditionally have determined the periodisation.25 Examination of 
identity issues over a longer period of time will better show the impact of the Japanese 
occupation. By comparing identity statements of Malayan and Indonesian Chinese just 
before and just after the Japanese occupation, we can find that ideas of race and 
attitudes towards other races underwent a fundamental change in this period. A group 
of Japanese scholars, like Kurasawa Aiko, who deal with Southeast Asian history have 
suggested taking the 1930s to the 1950s as the transition period, rather than only the war 
years. 26 Over this longer period of time, the basic changes in Southeast Asian history 
can be seen more clearly. Other historians may see the Second World War as a rupture 
in Southeast Asian history, but the significance of a rupture is clearer when it is situated 
in a longer context. 
Many of these scholars actually came :rom Chinese communities in Malaya or Indonesia. They did not 
consider further explanation necessary because this transition period was part of their experience or the 
experience of their parents' generation. 
Kurasawa Aiko, "Sengo tonan ajia sekai keisei no ishizue: 1930 nendai 1950 nendai rekishi saiko" . 
[The Foundation of the Postwar Southeast Asian World: Ret.'1inking History between the 1930s and the 
1950s] Tonan ajia shi kakukai kaiho. [Annals of Association of Southeast Asian History]. 63: 10-15. kiR 
~1-,«~~JlUl'!7S/7tltff.%f&G')/il: 1 9 3 O'Pftl 9 5 O'Pft~.'i!!ll}~».<Jl-ti¥l7S/7 
51.!"J!:~~'ilb, 63: 10-15. 
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The classification of ethnic Chinese in Australia provides a good illustrative contrast 
how perception of identity changes over time without external political interruptions. 
Nowadays in Australia, the classification of Chinese migrants is based on national 
political boundaries rather than their sub-ethnicity or regional origin in China. Today 
these Chinese migrants are described as Malaysian Chinese, Philippines Chinese and so 
on. This is different from the situation in Australia in the first half of this century, when 
most Chinese migrants were classified by sub-ethnic origins, for instance as Hokkien, 
Cantonese, Hakka or Hailam. When Laurence W. Crissman, an Australian scholar, 
mapped the 'segmentary structure' of overseas Chinese communities in Australia in 
1967, he found that the sub-ethnic origins of Chinese migrants gave rise to the 
segmentary units for urban Chinese.27 In 1985, the same author found the phenomenon 
of segmentation still existed in Chinese communities in Australia, but that the 
segmentary units were new categories based on political boundaries. 28 
This change in the categorisation of Chinese migrants in Australia reflects the change 
within the Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora over the past few decades. It is obvious 
that in the past five decades, for Southeast Asian Chinese, interaction with their new 
nations in Southeast Asia has become more important than their links with their regional 
origins in China. Sub-ethnic groups like Hakka still exist but do not have the same 
significance as before. It is a different picture from that presented by many early 
studies of the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia, which indicated that the sense of 
Laurence W. Criss1rum. 'The Segmentary Structure of Urbar. Overseas Chinese Communities.' ,}fan (n. 
s.) 2 (June 1967) 185 ·204. 
Laurence W. Crissmim, 'The Segmentation <md Integration of the Chinese in Brisbane, Australia' 
Journal of Comparative Family Studies. (1985). 
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belonging to their sub-ethnic communities of origin was stronger than that of belonging 
to the territories where they lived. The importance of this is that Chinese identity is not 
fixed, even in stable political situations, but changes with the cireumstances. 
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Chapter 2 
The Rise of Nanyang Identity in the 1930s 
To understand the change of direction in Chinese perceptions of national identity in 
Southeast Asia, it is necessary to begin with the 1930s. The beginning of change in 
identity within Southeast Asian Chinese communities can be sensed in the emergence of 
popular Chinese writing about Southeast Asia and from Southeast Asia. One reason 
why we need to deal with Southeast Asia as a whole rather than more specifically with 
Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies is that the Chinese themselves mainly used the 
category 'Southeast Asian' to describe the Chinese communities of the region, rather 
than the formal names of the colonies of the time. Although many families descended 
from early Chinese immigrants had been settled for centuries in various parts of 
Southeast Asia, and were known as peranakan, baba, mestizo, or other descriptions 
implying permanent residence, the Chinese population in Southeast Asia was a floating 
population, particularly from the point of view of the Chinese-speaking people 
themselves. When these Chinese found a better opportunity in another place, they 
readily moved. Some prominent Nanyang Chinese who will be dealt with later in this 
study moved several times within the region before they settled down and became 
leaders of their communities. Lim Lian Giok, the chairman of USTAC in Kuala 
Lumpur in the 1950s, was a teacher in a Chinese high school in Java in the 1930s. 1 
Wang Ji Yuan, a journalist for a pro-Indonesian Chinese newspaper in Jakarta after 
Lim Lian Giok (#i!l!::Ji, Lin Lian Yu in Mandarin). 
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WWil, worked in Singapore before he moved to Java during the Pacific War. 2 
Therefore, the category 'Southeast Asia' will be used in discussion of the identity issue 
before the Second World War, even though the focus is on Malaya and Indonesia. 
There are, however, different opinions as to when Chinese residents in Southeast Asia 
began to have a sense of belonging to the territories where they lived. Yang Song Nian 
suggested, in his survey of 'new Chinese literature' in Malaya3 that the sense of being 
locally oriented for Southeast Asian Chinese began to strengthen between 1927 and 
1930. Cui Gui Qiang has argued, following his research on the activities of Chinese 
associations, that the 1950s for the majority of Chinese residents in Malaya were the 
period of identity shift from being China-oriented to being local-oriented. 4 But he 
insisted that the shift was beginning to become evident before the Southeast Asian 
nations achieved their independence. Hara Fujio suggested that the latter half of the 
1950s was the critical period for change in perception of identity among the Chinese in 
Malaya, because this was when Chinese newspapers changed their format to avoid 
using signs and terminology containing Chinese national symbols, such as terms of the 
Chinese calendar.5 These smdies of Chinese identity change differ over the meaning of 
'locally oriented identity', using different indicators to define it. 
Wang Ji Yuan CHC5I:J. 
Yang Song Nian, }{inma zaoqi zuojia yanjiu. [Smdies of Chinese Writers of the Early Period in Singapore 
a,~d Malaya] (Singapore: Wenxue shuwu. 1988), pp. 1-18. :fll;;ft:if:, <mhili!f'.Wl1'F*l&l'l'C> (mtO:IS!': X. 
o!jtltf~. 1988), 1-18. 0 
Cui Gui Qiang, Xinma huaren guo}ia rentong de zfwanxiang. [The shifting direction of national identity in 
Singapore and lvfalaya] (Singapore: Nanyang Xuehui, 1989). i!1i!t~, < Wfl:!ii1i\1A.Fiillli::W.fil!ll<J.'3rfj], 
1945-1959> • <ffto:IS!': i'11~\!t, 1989)., 
Hara Fujio (Jlli'.::f:::;:i::'), l•vfalaya Chinese 1wd China: Conv=ion in Identity Consciousness, 1945-1957. 
(Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1997), pp. 98-104. 
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A definition of locally oriented identity based on the discursive use of the key word 
'Nanyang' to refer to the Southeast Asian Chinese will be used here for investigation of 
the issue of Chinese identity. This discourse actually created new categories which 
changed in perception of identity of being outside China. By examining different 
discourses about Southeast Asian Chinese in the 1930s, we find a new kind of identity 
appearing. It will be called 'Nan yang identity', as this kind of identity was always 
associated with the term 'Nanyang' in Chinese texts in this period. Although the 
Chinese term Nanyang had appeared much earlier, the association of the 1930s between 
Nanyang and Southeast Asian Chinese identity demonstrates a new perception of 
identity. Nanyang identity had some characteristics which could be seen as locally-
oriented, even though it was not strongly associated with any category delimited by 
political boundaries. It is understandable that this kind of identification was often 
overlooked, because scholars have paid more attention to post-colonial nationalist 
movements associated with specific political entities. But to understand Southeast 
Asian Chinese identity before the defeat of the European colonial powers in Southeast 
Asia by Japan in the Pacific War, it is essential to understand the importance of the 
'Nanyang' concept. It is also advantageous to take Nanyang identity into account in 
understanding the Chinese response to the new nationalist politics and their ethnic 
relations with indigenous populations after the war. 
Different forms of written material in Chinese in the 1930s will be investigated for their 
perspective on the identity issue. They include newspapers, academic research, popular 
essays, school textbooks and literature. In the 1930s, all kinds of Chinese writing used 
the term 'Nanyang' to indicate the Southeast Asian region, including even places like 
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Bunna where ethnic Chinese went by land rather than sea. Nanyang discourse, which I 
would define as writing about Nanyang and writing from Nanyang, started to flourish in 
the 1930s. The emergence of discourse about Nanyang in the 1930s shows that being in 
Nan yang had acquired a particular significance, differentiated from being in China. The 
new identity was strongly attached to the term Nanyang. Today, the term Dongnanya6, 
directly translated from 'Southeast Asia' in English, has replaced Nanyang as a more 
neutral term in many formal occasions. But Nanyang is still in common use in spoken 
and written Chinese to indicate a connection between Chinese people and Southeast 
Asia. In Singapore, which was the centre of Chinese publishing in the 1930s, this term 
still conveys a strong feeling of being Chinese in the Southeast Asian region today. 
Emerging Nanyang Writing 
'Nanyang' traditionally indicates places south of China that can be reached by sea as it 
means South Sea(s) literally, but it also includes mainland territories south of China 
reached by road.7 For instance, Nanyang has also included the areas of Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia and Burma, which Chinese immigrants usually reached by land.8 There is a 
general impression that this term has been used for a long time in Chinese literature, 
since it reflects traditional Chinese attitudes towards this region. But surprisingly the 
Dong-nan-ya CJ;i[!W:s;!). 
Xu Yunqiao, Nanyang s!Ji. [The History of Nanyang] (Singapore: World Bocks, 1961), p. 3. li'F~~. <IW 
l"F'!t:> 0 <WTJJol!J\'.: t!t:!'l-1\!fffll, 1961). 3 , 
Foe example, Ai Wu travelled mostly in Burma. He also used L'le term "Nanyang' in writing of his 
experiences. See Ai Wu, Nanxingji. [Record of Travels in the South] (Shanghai: Shenghuo Shuju, 1935), 
3t~, <lWff~C> ° Ct.ml: 1935) 0 
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word Nanyang came into use only late in the Qing Dynasty, in the 1880s. Before this, 
the names for this region had been 'East Seas' (Dong Yang), or 'West Seas' (Xi Yang) 
in the Ming Dynasty.9 Before the Ming Dynasty, this region was called 'South Oceans' 
(Nan Hai} or 'Southwest Oceans'(Xinan Hai} 10 When a late Qing dynasty intellectual, 
Wei Yuan, wrote his breakthrough piece, 'Hai guo tu zhi', (The Nation Should 
Approach the Oceans)11 , to persuade the Emperor to change China's inward-looking 
foreign policy, he called this area 'the Southeast Seas' (Dongnanyang) 12• The term 
Nanyang only came into regular use in Chinese texts after the Qing dynasty sent its first 
diplomatic representative to Singapore in 1881. After this, Nanyang gradually came to 
indicate the whole Southeast Asian region. 13 
Writing about Nanyang 
Writing was particularly important in shaping pre-war Chinese identity in Southeast 
Asia. The variety of spoken languages among Chinese migrants in this region meant 
that no single language could be a basis of solidarity for ethnic Chinese as a whole. 
Chinese people in Southeast Asia spoke mainly Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, Hailam 
and Teochew, which are not mutually intelligible. In many cases finding a common 
Dong Yang (WA"); Xi Yang\@#). 
"' Fong Cheng Jun, Zhongguo Nanyang jaotongshi. [The History of Communication by Sea between China 
and the South Seas.] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshu guan, 1937), pp. 1-2. /.\f,J:ijl:~, <tj:illi!Jl¥Jic'P:9:':l!TIR> Ct 
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language in which to communicate was a problem when Southeast Asian Chinese met 
together. Mandarin was decreed to be the national language in China in 1919, but only 
very few Southeast Asian Chinese residents were able to speak Mandarin. 14 There is 
only one written form of the Chinese language, though, so written Chinese became the 
most significant means of communication between Chinese communities. 
Before the war, Chinese communities tended to be classified according to their regional 
origins into bang (a Mandarin term meaning 'group'). For example, there were the 
Hokkien bang, the Cantonese bang, and the Hakka bang. Understanding the sub-ethnic 
divisions among Southeast Asian Chinese and their organizations helps in 
understanding the nature of the various identity concepts among Chinese migrants 
before the rise of Nanyang discourse. The Chinese migrant population in Malaya and 
Indonesia expanded in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The sense of belonging to 
a place, among these migrants, was directed toward their regional origin in China rather 
than to China as a whole. C. F. Yong confirms that classification by regional origins 
was characteristic of Chinese communities in the pre-WWII era. 15 These affiliations 
were the centre of social life and represented the shared interests of people from the 
same region. They referred not only to geographic regions of China but also to spoken 
languages. People who spoke the same language preferred to migrate to the same area, 
Mandarin is based on the dialect spoken in Peking. It was widely spoken in North China but not in South 
China, where most Nanyang Chinese came from. See Huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, J'inni huaqiao 
zbi [History of the Chinese in Indonesia] (Taipei: Qiaowu weiyuanhui, 1977). 'lj!'filllif;l;i!i~.lil:!!!", <EPIB 
:!l!fjj!lji&:> (i:J'~c: jj!lji"§~ .li!\it. 1977); Huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuan hui, Malaiya buaqiao zhi. [History 
of the Chinese in "vfalaya] (Taipei; Qiaowu weiyuanhui.1977). :!l!ftita~~ji[\l'f, <,ll1,.*'lllll'fililit> ("El 
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to live together, to work in the same profession, to form their own associations, and 
even to marry within the group. 16 There were also many associations based on clans, 
trades or professions, but most of these were also dominated by people with a common 
regional origin. 17 Chinese schools were also distinguished on the same basis. 
Organisations representing Chinese from the same region maintained Chinese schools 
in which the regional dialect was the medium of instruction. But though the Chinese 
communities in Southeast Asia were sharply distinguished by regional origins, the 
significance of this differentiation was downplayed in Chinese writing, which was seen 
as representative of the entire Chinese community. 
The earliest Chinese records of Southeast Asia are centuries old. This early literature 
records life and customs in the South Seas from the viewpoint of the Chinese literati. It 
was published for elite circles in China. Different kinds of Nanyang literature in 
Chinese emerged in the 1930s. Chinese newspapers published in the region were the 
most obvious. In 1927 to 1929, commercial Chinese newspapers started to appear in 
Southeast Asia. Academic writing about Nan yang, especially Nan yang Chinese history, 
flourished in China in the 1930s and later in Southeast Asia. Essays on Nanyang 
frequently appeared in intellectual review magazines as well as popular magazines. 
There was also a strong need for Chinese textbooks for Southeast Asian Chinese 
" 
C. F. Yong, Chinese Community Structure and U:adership 1:0 Pre-War Singapore. (Singapore: Souih Seas 
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schools. Chinese travel literature about exploration of Nanyang appeared at the same 
time. All of these phenomena demonstrate the rise of a genre of Nanyang literature after 
the late 1920s. These kinds of writing sustained different discourses of the Nanyang 
Chinese. They gave Chinese people, in the homeland or in migrant societies, a clear 
image of being Chinese in Nan yang. 
Emergence of Chinese Newspapers 
Some Chinese newspapers started to be published in Southeast Asia early in the 
twentieth century, but the circulation was very small and the language was classical 
Chinese. The Chinese sojourners would have found it hard to gain a sense of belonging 
to their local place through the existing Chinese literature, particularly since these 
newspapers were published by anti-Qing revolutionary organizations and were 
concerned first and foremost with Chinese politics. The Nanyang Sang Pao and the Sin 
Chew lit Pao were commercial Chinese dailies first published in the late 1920s. 18 
Unlike the newspapers issued early in the century, these dailies did not serve as 
propaganda agencies of any political party or revolutionary group. There are further 
difference between these newspapers and the newspapers of the earlier period. First, the 
l7 
18 
Mai Liu Fang (Mak Lau-Fong), Fangyan rentong, [Dialect Group Identity: A Study of Chinese Sub-ethnic 
Groups in Malaya] (Taipei: Zhongyanyuan minzusuo, 1985). and Mak Lau-Fong, 'The Social Alignment 
Patterns of the Chinese in Nineteenth-Century Penang' , Modem Asian Studies 1989: 23 (2) 259. 
Nanyang Shang Pao (i¥lff:l!M&l, literally 'Nanyang Business Daily' , and Sin Chew Jit Pao (~}}H B 
¥!,1), which means Singapore Daily, still exist today, though they have been merged into one newspaper, 
the United Daily (®Iii;-!f.¥~) in Singapore. Cuo Nansen ed. Cong Xingzhou Ribao kan Xingzhou 
wushinian, 1929-1979. (Singapore: Sin Chew Jit Pao, 1979). lj!.i¥J'tjjjjj, <f1E£#tl 8¥!,l:'WJlUHI 50 if:. 
1929-1979>. [50 years of Singapore through the Singapore Daily] (*'T:IJD:\lli:: £#flB~. 1979). 
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language they used was vernacular Chinese rather than classical Chinese. Second, these 
newspapers emphasised the needs of their readers in Nanyang. They contained news, 
market reports, literature and advertisements. They were presses which both reflected 
and shaped the views of the community. They provided a public sphere for Southeast 
Asian Chinese to share passions and express their own opinions. It fostered a sense of 
belonging in the Southeast Asian tenitories for the Chinese residents. Because the first 
generation of Chinese migrants usually came to Nanyang to earn their living and went 
back to China after they retired, they did not automatically develop a sense of 
community with other Nan yang Chinese. But in the late 1920s the Chinese newspapers 
took on the role of serving all Chinese communities in Nanyang. 
Why did the Chinese popular press in Southeast Asia come so late in view of the long 
history of Chinese migration to this region? The history of Chinese migrants to 
Southeast Asia shows that the composition of the Chinese population in Southeast Asia 
and the political situation in China made it difficult for mass print media to exist. The 
imperial government prohibited travel abroad throughout most of the Qing Dynasty. 19 
So early Chinese migrations to Southeast Asia consisted of small numbers of people 
who gathered in ports of trade, until 1860, when the Qing were forced to recognise the 
right of labourers to go abroad by treaty with Britain and France, which wanted more 
cheap labour from China to help in the development of Southeast Asia, the West Indies 
and the colonised African islands. After that the majority of Chinese migrants to 
Southeast Asia were coolies, contracted workers or small shopkeepers. 
According to the Law of The Great Qing 225, 'All officers, soldiers or civilians who go overseas for 
trade or to settle in the outer islands, must go to the scaffold as condemned rebels. People who come from 
the same county and who conceal for them will also be sentenced to death.' 
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The political situation in China did not offer a stable framework by which overseas 
Chinese could identify themselves as Chinese nationals. Before the establishment of the 
Republic of China in 1912, the Manchu-dominated Qing government was seen as a 
foreign regime by the people of South China. The Qing government did not even 
recognize overseas Chinese as its subjects until 1909. Sun Yat-sen's revolution took 
quzhu dalu (expel Manchu barbarism) 20 as its chief rallying-cry. In this situation, 
identifying themselves as Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka or Tiochew was natural for 
Chinese migrants. 
The Republican revolution of 1911 changed this situation.21 Some intellectuals left 
China to live among the Chinese residents in the South Seas, working mostly as 
schoolteachers in Chinese schools or for Chinese newspapers. Involvement in the 
Republican revolution was limited to a small number of people. The Chinese 
newspapers which appeared at that time were mainly either for the revolution or anti-
revolutionary. In Indonesia, Chinese newspapers began to be published because of the 
conflict between Republicans and constitutional monarchists in the first decade 
of the twentieth century. The first modern Chinese daily newspaper in 
Indonesia was Sishui ribao, or 'Surabaya Daily', which began publication in 
1903. Another newspaper, Sudao ribao, literally 'Sumatra Daily', followed in 
1904 in Medan. 22 Later in this decade, Si bin ri bao in Surabaya, Su men da la 
Qu zhu da lu (.I!@~~~). 
For details of foe Chinese revolutionary rr.overr.ent in Nanya.-ig , see Yen Ching-Hwa.-ig, "The Chinese 
Revolutionary Movement in Malaya (1900-191 !)" . Ph. D. dissertation, ANU, J 969. 
Sishui nbad.i1Jlll1' El ¥11) , Sudao dbac(j'jfib El¥!!). 
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bao in Medan and Hua duo bao were very enthusiastic in promoting the 
Chinese Republican revolution. 23 This was called overseas Chinese nationalism 
or a 'pan-Chinese movement' by scholars. 24 
The Chinese newspapers in Singapore started earlier. The first one, Lat Pau, (literally 
'Straits Daily') started publication in 1881. At the tum of the century, the government 
of the Manchu Dynasty in China was on the point of collapse, and the revolutionary 
organization led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (or Sun Zhong Shan) was regrouping its strength in 
Nan yang. 25 At the same time, the constitutional monarchists represented by Liang 
Qichao had gone into exile overseas, and some of them broadcast their ideas in 
Nanyang after the failure of the reforms of 1898 in China. In the last decade of the 19fu 
century, three more Chinese newspapers were established in Singapore. They were 
Xing bao ('Singapore Reporter') Ri xin bao ('New Daily News') and Tian nan ri bao 
('South Skies Daily'). Political activists used these newspapers to publicise their ideas. 
Some newspapers were even distributed free to attract readers. For example, Thoe Lam 
lit Poh (Tunan ribao) was founded by Chen Chu Nan, who sold his house to launch this 
newspaper for the cause of the Revolution. The Chinese newspapers of this period were 
in wenyan (classical Chinese), which related to the spoken vernacular much as Latin 
related to English in the days when classical education was essential for a career in 
government for English speakers. They were very much a means for the elite to promote 
Zhong Guang Xing, Yinni huaqiao baoye shi [The History of Indonesian Chinese Newspapers] (Taipei: 
Zhengzhong shuju.1975), pp. 1-3. <EPrtl~fi!lijiffi~Jil::> (il~c: JEtj:ljl;t1€;J, 1975), 1-3 ° 
Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism. The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement 1/J Indwesia 
1900-1916. (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960). 
Sun Yat-sen (~{!Ir in Cantonese) or Sun Yi Xian in Mandarin, Sun' s alternative name, Sun Zhong 
Shan(J*tp[lj), is the one by which he is generally known in Chioese. 
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or debate their ideas. It is fair to say that Chinese newspapers prior to the 1930s failed 
to convey any sense of belonging to the local territories either in Malaya or in 
Indonesia. Before the Chinese commercial newspapers emerged in the 1930s, Chinese 
newspapers were an element of elite culture. They expressed very little concern about 
the indigenous population or local affairs in the Nanyang territories. The main concern 
of Chinese newspapers in the region was on China, not on Nanyang before the 1930s. 
The appearance of the commercial, mass.oriented Chinese newspapers in Southeast 
Asia changed the situation. The most important base for commercial, mass-oriented 
Chinese newspapers in Southeast Asia was Singapore. The Nanyang Shang Pao 
(Nanyang Business Daily) started in 1923 and the Sin Chew lit Pao (Singapore Daily) 
in 1929. 26 Both were also issued in other major cities in Southeast Asia. The market 
for commercial Nan yang news dailies increased because Chine.se residents in Southeast 
Asia were eager to hear news from China after the beginning of the conflict between 
China and Japan. During the 1930s, many newspapers emphasised how fast they could 
bring news from China in order to meet the demand that arose after the Manchurian 
Incident in 1931. Some Chinese newspapers, for example, £.Kun-Pao in Malaya, even 
recorded on the top of Page 1 every day the number of years since the Manchurian 
Incident occurred. They tried to encourage their readers to keep in mind this national 
humiliation. 
Another reason for the rise of the Chinese popular press was that more educated 
Chinese migrants began to move to Southeast Asia. The 1920s and 1930s were a time 
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of development for the Chinese education system in Southeast Asia. There was a 
demand for teachers from China, since the Chinese education system in Southeast Asia 
did not produce enough teachers. Many Chinese teachers crune to teach in Nanyang 
Chinese schools in this period. They becrune an important market for the Chinese press, 
and sometimes contributed to Chinese newspapers. 
Almost all Chinese newspapers in the region in the 1930s had one or two pages of 
'Nanyang News'. The topics of Nanyang news were still Nanyang Chinese, either 
Nanyang Chinese affairs or local news which might influence the interests of Nanyang 
Chinese. 'Nanyang News' created a sense of being in a common region, Nanyang. The 
pronoun, 'we', in 'Nan yang News' obviously indicated Chinese who lived in Nan yang. 
For example, Sin po, which was based on Batavia, reported in its page of 'Nanyang 
News' on a case of confiscation of food products owned by a Chinese immigrant by the 
Customs of Singapore. The end of this report expressed the hope to improve this kind 
of situation from the perspective of Nanyang Chinese. It shows that the sense of being 
in a common region could be easily received through Nanyang Chinese newspapers.27 
Research on Nanyang 
Lim Jim Koon ed., Our Seventy Years: Jh:;tory olt/Je Leading Chinese Newspapers in Singapore. 
(Singapore: Chinese Newspapers Division, Singapore Press Hoidings, 1993), p. 25. 
"Haiwai kaqiao lieisou guanyuan liounan: huaqiaoshe chengching caitien sunling fahuan." [Overseas 
Chinese are harassed by the Customs: the Chinese community demands improvement] Sin Po, 28 
De;;ember, 1936. <<lflm.lfi!Mlf;l!~i;mt'l!.i/11:: '1j\;f,tifi:Ui!_lfilM!lfil'\'Jili!Jl'!!>>. <~~>. 28 December, 
1936, 
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Another clear indication of the rising discourse of Nanyang was academic research on 
the Nanyang Chinese. Interest among Chinese intellectuals in Southeast Asia flourished 
in the 1930s. Traditional intellectual concerns in the Middle Kingdom did not lead to 
interest in the southern foreign territories. If we look at the bibliography of Chinese 
literature on Southeast Asia, most publications appeared after 1928. 28 The 
establishment of the Institute of Nanyang Studies at Jinan University in 1928, which 
was the first research institute of this kind in China, was the beginning of the 
institutionalisation of social science research on the Southeast Asian Chinese. 
Publications about Nanyang increased rapidly in number in the 1930s.29 Scholarship on 
Southeast Asia, particularly on the topic of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, developed 
quickly. This new interest in Nanyang was not limited to academics. Popular books 
and magazine articles were published along with academic works, as the situation of the 
Chinese gathering in the South Seas now attracted popular interest. Most of them were 
published in Shanghai or Hong Kong, the major ports for Chinese migrants to come and 
go by. At this time, only a few publications came out in Singapore or Penang. Some 
authors might write or edit in Southeast Asia, but still send their manuscripts back to 
Shanghai or Hong Kong to publish, because Chinese printing was not readily available 
overseas. Writing about Nanyang in this way bridged China and Nanyang. 
" Institute of Southeast Asia, Nan yang University, Nan yang yan ju zbong wen qi kan zi !iao suo yin. 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia, Nanyang University. 1968) [Index to Chinese Periodical Literature 
On Southeast Asia, 1905·1966] r{;JJ'f};:l!JtPl'!~ltff5'!:J'iJ1, <lWP"lifl"li:'i':XWJfU~:pr:;f;;'5 I> (~rt:U~: .r¥l 
f¥:J;:f¥1¥Ji"fw-ll'€J'i!f, 1968) ' 
" Yao Nan, 'Foreword to South Sea Culture , Sjn aiew fir Pao, I June, 1940. l\itml, «i¥i#:X ft\l!Htl 
l!iil», <£mlB¥1i!>. 1June,1940 ° 
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The flourishing of research on Nanyang which occurred in the 1930s grew from 
the need for mainland Chinese to develop expertise on Nanyang. Increasing academic 
interest in Nanyang will be discussed subsequently in the context of the establishment 
of Nanyang Studies at Jinan University. The increased popular interest can be seen in 
several magazines, which published articles about Nanyang in considerable numbers; 
for example, Dong Fang Zazhi (Oriental Magazine) 30 and Nanyang Pinglun (the 
Nanyang Critic)31 • Many non-academic books based on intensive studies of Nanyang 
were published in this period. Eventually, daily newspapers started to print feature 
columns on Nanyang Studies, written by experts for general readers, in the late 1930s.32 
The demands of the growing education system also stimulated the quest for 
better knowledge and understanding of Nanyang. The intellectuals among Chinese 
migrants were mainly in educational circles. Teachers in Chinese schools in 
Nan yang demanded suitable textbooks for Southeast Asian students. Huang Su 
Feng, who lived in Tega!, Java and taught in a small Chinese school, wrote a 
Nan yang geography textbook based on his survey of the region for use in 
Chinese schools. He explained that the textbooks in use in Chinese schools 
only presented the geography of China and were inappropriate for the Nan yang 
30 
JI 
J2 
Dong Fang Zazhi C!f!::Oniit), conventionally translated as 'Eastern Miscellany' , was an intellectual 
magazine based in Shanghai. 
Nanyang Pinglun (1¥i1'f'il'Pifiill, meaning Nanyang Critic, which commenced publication in 1922, featured 
articles on Nanyang history, geography and folklore. 
'Sin Chew' s promotion of South Seas Studies' , in Lim Jim Koon ed., Our Seventy Years: HisloJY of 
the Leading Chinese Newspapers in Singapore. (Singapore: Chinese Newspapers Division, Singapore 
Press Holdings, 1993), p. 125. 
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students, so he was keen to produce appropriate textbooks himself. 33 In another 
book, he described the pleasures of being in Nanyang in contrast to China, 
using the word 'paradise' (leyuan) to describe Nanyang.34 
A major driving force behind this literary production and research was obviously 
concern with the situation of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. This was why most 
studies of Southeast Asia by Chinese scholars focused only on the Southeast Asian 
Chinese. Many authors had personal experience of Nanyang, like Li Zhang Fu; some 
were returned migrants from Nanyang, like Zhang Xiang Shi. Zhang Xiang Shi even 
published a book with the title of The South Seas: Centre for the overseas Chinese, in 
which he pointed out that his interest in Southeast Asia was only in the Chinese 
settlers. 35 There was a belief that if the fatherland became strong, then Chinese 
migrants would not suffer discrimination. When the Chinese Republican revolution 
succeeded, the attitude of the Dutch to the Chinese changed. The export and import 
quotas that had applied to them were lifted, hotels opened to Chinese and they gained 
freedom to travel. However, domestic political conflict later brought about reduction of 
their status again. 36 
"' Huang Su Feng, Kexue di N!i11ylillg Heshu Dong Yindu bian. [Essays on Science in The Nanyang 
Islands; Duu:h East Indies edition] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan. 1931), p. 21. <t~ft:Ji¥1 
l'F--llifli!l~ff[l3!'.llii> U:W: iill~~P1!1'!lfil, 1931), 21 , 
Huang Sufeng, N!i11ti!il1 Leyuan. [The Paradise of the South] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yishuguan.1934) p. 98. 
w*M, <1¥J;:i;:!!!!1~>, C.tll!i: lii!~E[J{!}Jllii, 1934), 98 , Leyuan (~i!l!!). 
" Zhang Xi<mg Shi, Huaqiao zb.ongxin zb.i nllP.y!iJlg. [The South Seas: Centre for the overseas Chinese] 
(Hai:ian: Haikou Shuju, 1927), p. 3. ~m~. <~tj:r{,•Zi¥li'F> • (mffi!l: irar111~;u, 1927), 3, 
" Li Zhang Fu, Nanyang Jwaqiaoshi [The History of the Nanyang Chinese] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshu 
guan. 1929), p. 40. :f'~lli. <i¥Jft'i'ljiff.t9':_>. (l:./llJ: rm~~[l~~. 1929), 40' 
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The reorganization of Jinan University in 1929 marked the new intellectual 
respectability of Nanyang Chinese studies. This university was the only one in China 
established specifically for overseas Chinese students. Before 1928, there were only 
two departments: the Department of Normal Education and the Department of 
Commerce. 37 The graduates either went to teach in Chinese schools in Southeast Asia 
or went into business. Those subjects were still considered suitable for the needs of 
Nanyang Chinese, according to the annual report of 1926. But the university reform 
plan of 1928 argued that those subjects were not enough for Southeast Asia. For 
instance, the reform plan expressed the need to set up a Department of Political 
Economics in this way: 'Because the Nanyang Chinese lack experience and interest in 
politics, we have set up the subject of Political Economics in order to encourage this 
interest, which will improve the treatment of the Chinese by the colonial 
governments. ' 38 
The emergence of Nan yang Chinese studies was stimulated by Japanese interest in this 
region. The establishment of the Institute of Nanyang Studies at Jinan University was 
prompted by the Japanese research enterprise in Southeast Asia. The reform plan for 
Jinan University said 'Considering what the Japanese government has done, setting up 
the Nanyo Bureau for Southeast Asian affairs, spending a huge amount of money to 
'Outline of University Refonn' in Jinan Daxue huaq1ao yanjju suo, Jinan xiaoshi ziliao xumJJi 
(Guangzhou: Institute of Overseas Chinese Studies, Jinan University, 1983) [Selected Source Material on 
the History of Jinan University (1906--1949)], pp. 3-8. ~fW7'~Wfff!Jlitt"i'e!\fi, <~l¥!7'.!i!tit'il:JfM~ 
ii> ° Cili'N: i;rr¥!7;:~ffWf:li'.:l'\IT, 1983), 3-8. 
'Outline of University Reform' in Jinan Da.rue .~uaqiao yanjju suo, Jinan xiaoshi ziliao xua.n}l: 
[Selected Source Material on the History of Jinan University. (1906--1949)] (Guangzhou: JinanDaxue 
huaqiao yanjiu suo. Institute of Overseas Chinese Studies. Jinan University.1983), pp. 11 -14. 
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conduct research on Southeast Asia, its deep purpose can be known. We have five 
million people living in Nanyang. We would be well advised to set up a department 
that will increase our understanding of Nanyang. ' 39 
The Japanese academic surveys and eeonomie initiatives drew much attention from 
Chinese intellectuals working in Nanyang studies. Liu Ji Xuan and Shu Shi Zheng, for 
example, were concerned about Japanese ambitions towards Nanyang. The Japanese 
takeover of Taiwan was seen as the beginning of the realization of this ambition. The 
transfer of the trust territories of the Mariannas and Marshall Islands from Germany to 
Japan was seen as a big step in Japan's southward advance. These two authors 
suggested monitoring Japanese actions towards Southeast Asia. 40 Some scholars 
deeided to move to the field of Southeast Asian studies because of Japanese interest in 
this region. Li Zhang Fu, for example, was worried about the Japanese southern 
advance, although he was not quite sure which aspect to be most fearful about. Because 
of the way southern migration was supported by their government and encouraged by 
society, he saw that the Japanese would become the enemy of the Chinese migrants, 
even though the number of Japanese in Southeast Asia was quite small.41 
40 
'Outline of University Reform' in Jinan Daxue huaqiao yanji11 s110, Jinan xiaoshi zili110 xuanj 
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This was why the training of Chinese experts in Nanyang studies addressed the 
importance of Japanese language ability rather than European languages. In Jinan 
University, language teaching emphasized only Japanese and Malay. The handbook 
indicated that Japanese language study was to facilitate Nanyang research, 'to learn 
Japanese is in order to read Japanese publications on Southeast Asia'. But this was not 
the case with Malay. Malay language ability was seen as important 'in order to serve 
directly in Southeast Asia' .42 
Information about Nanyang appeared in academic works, popular journals and 
textbooks and changed the direction of discourse about the Nanyang Chinese. The late 
Imperial tradition of exiling overseas Chinese rebels against the nation, which had been 
expressed in Qing law, lost its effect on current opinion. Chinese traditional values had 
not encouraged people to have adventures in foreign lands. Cheng Ho himself went to 
Nanyang not for adventure but in the Emperor's service, reinforcing the tribute system 
or pursuing the former emperor.43 Only a few years after Cheng Ho's journeys, all 
official documents concerning them were burnt, to prevent succeeding emperors 
developing the same interest. This is why the assistants' travel accounts from Cheng 
Ho's journeys have become an important source. There was little space in late Imperial 
China for a genre of travel writing to develop. 
"' 'Outline of University Reform' in Jinan Daxue huaqiao yanjiu suo, Jinan xiaoshi ziliao xuan)i. 
[Selectx Scurce Material on :he History of Jinan University. (1906--1949)] (Guangzhou: Jinan Daxue 
huaqiao yanjiu suo. Institute of Overseas Chinese Studies. Jinan University.1983), p. 17. 
Cheng Ho 00®). 
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By the 1930s, though, the motives of the Nanyang Chinese for being in Nanyang were 
no longer questioned. Instead, their right to be in Nan yang was often the concern of this 
research. For example, Li Shengwu used many legal cases of protection of overseas 
nationals to show how overseas Chinese could get legal protection. 44 The research 
helped people have a clear idea of Nanyang life, culture and politics. It showed that 
Chinese had been in Nanyang for centuries, earlier than European settlers. Studying 
European colonial treatment of Nan yang Chinese, especially abuses, was another major 
topic of research.45 Even research that might not have helped ethnic Chinese to earn 
their rights in colonial settings prior to World War II became an important source of 
ideas on gaining rights in Nanyang in later periods. 
Nanyang Identity through Literature 
Literature was particularly important in forming the Nanyang identity. Literature was 
the way for an individual to be able to express his or her own idea of identity and to 
influence readers. Compared to academic writing about Nanyang, literature potentially 
addressed a broader audience. Here we will examine the following two categories of 
Nanyang literature: travellers' accounts, and literary sections of Nanyang newspapers, 
which will hereafter be called 'Nan yang literature'. The travellers' accounts reflected 
,, 
Li Shangwu, 'Guojijian jijian paoqiao ming' an.' [Famous Cases of Protecting Overseas 
Nationals]D:ing Fang Zazh1; [Eastern Miscellany] 33(19), 1936. *ll:li, «iil!lf~~r.IJ~{41!\l:iil!I~~». < 
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Affairs] Dong Fang Zazhi, [East.em Misce\tany] 33(9): 61-74. (!936). ~#.lm. <<i\;[il!Jl¥j'/¥!1fllilliil%!1.llti 
WM!~», <m1lii!tltt>, 33(9): 6!-74. 0936), 
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images of Nanyang Chinese from the view point of Chinese in China. The Nanyang 
literature showed self-identity from the view point of Nanyang Chinese. Both helped to 
shape mainland China's perceptions of Nan yang Chinese. 
There is a long tradition of Chinese travellers' accounts of Nanyang. s.ome very old 
Chinese records cited in contemporary works on Southeast Asian history are in fact 
travellers' notes. There are also many travellers' accounts of Nanyang in modern 
Chinese literature. Travel literature was one of the genres promoted by the Chinese 
'New Literature Movement' in the 1920s. Three travellers' accounts of the 1930s will 
be discussed here: Zheng Jian Lu's Nan yang san yue ji (A three months' journey in 
Nanyang, 1933), Chen Da's Lang ji shi nian (Ten years of wandering, 1946) and Ai 
Wu, Nanxingji (Record of Travels in the South, 1935).46 Zheng Jian Lu was a publisher, 
Chen Da a sociologist and Ai Wu a labourer. They all took an interest in the 
contemporary situation in Nanyang, and their travel notes bear witness to social change 
in Southeast Asia in an era of transition. 
Zheng Jian Lu travelled in Nanyang to collect information for use in editing new 
textbooks for Chinese schools in Southeast Asia in 1933. Chen Da travelled in 
Nanyang to comprehend the general situation of the overseas Chinese, in support of a 
sociological investigation of the home towns (guxiang, a term of legal significance as 
well as general social currency, as Chinese citizens were recorded in local government 
46 Zheng Jian Lu, Nan yang san yue ji. [Three months' journey in Nanyang] (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 
1933). ~~Ill. <1¥ii'F:=::PI ~c> 0 (~it: 'P!li'i<l'll, 1933) ° Chen Da, Lang} i shini an. [Ten 
years of wandering] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1946). ll!lil:l, <lti!~JJi-tlf-> 0 (J:#l):: 
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and workplace documentation by the place of their birth) of N anyang Chinese in China. 
Feeling strong curiosity about their surroundings, they wrote down the details of their 
journeys in the form of diaries or short stories. From their detailed records and 
descriptions, we can observe many different aspects of social life in Nan yang. Their 
travel notes are also useful in conveying the situation of the Chinese communities at 
that time, since they used networks of Chinese friends and acquaintances to travel in the 
region. Their travel notes contain rich information on the issues of Chinese education, 
family and community structure, and ethnic relations between the Chinese and 
indigenous populations. They reveal much about the outlook and lifestyle of the 
Nanyang diaspora. 
A number of ancient Chinese traveller's records became well known again in this 
period, because they were often cited in Southeast Asian historical studies. Some were 
by Buddhist monks, like Fa Xian (399-412) and I-Tsing (671-695), who wrote travel 
accounts after their journeys to India, Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia,47 and some were 
by government officials, like Zhou Da Guan (1295-1297), Wang Da Yuan (1340-1348) 
and Chen Lun Jiong (1710). 48 There is a detailed contemporary description of 
47 
48 
i!ijl'§'EPi'ml, 1946) 0 Ai Wu, Nanxingji.[Record of Travels in the South] (Shanghai: 
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[Notes from the Buddhist Nations] ({~lil<J~c) (415), I- Tsing (~l'Jl) Nan bai ;igui cbuan. [Notes on 
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guo jian wen Ju. [A traveller' s account of the Sea Countries] <Wlil<lJlr.lii!I<> (1710). 
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Cambodia in the thirteenth century in Zhou Da Guan's Zhenlafengtu ji. [Record of the 
customs of Cambodia], (1279), which became a precious historical record of Cambodia 
in the ancient time. Cheng Ho's famous journey to Southeast Asia in the fifteenth 
century (1405-1433) was recorded by his assistants. 49 These travel accounts became 
important sources for understanding the past of Southeast Asia, among the general 
population as well as among scholars. By means of citing ancient Chinese records in 
contemporary literature, the long-term Chinese connection to Nanyang became common 
knowledge and helped to build the sense of belonging to Nan yang for Chinese residents, 
once they considered that Chinese people had been travelling there for centuries. 
There are some common characteristics among these modem Chinese travellers' 
accounts. First, all of the travellers had reasons for travelling through Nanyang. They 
were not travelling for the sake of it. Their travellers' accounts were by-products of the 
trip. Second, all of the authors valued the information on other lands and peoples they 
obtained, and tried to write down the details for their records. A traditional proverb 
translates as 'Travelling for ten thousand miles is better than reading ten thousand 
books'.50 In some ways, travel is a better source of information than anything else. 
Third, the authors downplayed their own role in their travel accounts and focused on 
describing people and places in a foreign land. There was little appreciation of travel in 
Cheng Ho jijf!l (Zheng He). The records of his assistants were Ma Huan (Ali,"llii\) Yir,g ya sheng Jan. <ill!\ 
~llE'!r> [The splendours of nature in the farthest seas] (1416), Fei Xin Cl"(lil), Xing chuo she.1g lw. <£ 
~.lm'!r > [The splendours of nature at the end of the earth] 1436) and Gong Zhen (l!iiliii:). Xi y11.I1g tan 
guo zhi [Strange coun:ries of the Western Seas] <i'!ilF'lil'~~> (1434). 
Xing wan Ii lu po wan juan shu (ff/.fl;JllJa.~;li!;t:'i!), a Chinese saying, meaning 'travelling teaches 
more than reading' . 
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the Chinese cultural tradition, so the 'literary traveller' did not exist as a role model. 
This can be seen as one of the detenninants of Chinese travel literature. 
The modem travel accounts which I will discuss here have the same character-they 
contain rich information about the people and places encountered. The modem Chinese 
travel accounts of Nanyang are in modem vernacular Chinese, or bai hua wen51 , rather 
than classical Chinese. One of the traditions of Chinese traveller's accounts is to write 
down the details of places and people; in Chinese terms, fang tu ren ching (wind, earth 
and human nature).52 From their all-inclusive records and descriptions, we can observe 
many different aspects of social life in Nanyang. I will not go into the full details but 
will focus on why they made the journey and what were their main concerns during 
their journeys. 
Zheng Jian Lu was a senior editor in the Zhonghua publishing company,53 a leading 
publisher and bookstore dealing in academic and educational books. He spent three 
months travelling in Nanyang in 1933. His main purpose was to collect information 
about Southeast Asia in order to edit a new textbook for Chinese schools in Nanyang. 
At that time, all Chinese printed material used in Nanyang schools came from China, 
mainly from Shanghai and Hong Kong. The Zhonghua publishing company and 
bookstore was one of the biggest in China. Zheng told news reporters in Singapore that 
his company had established a printing factory in Hong Kong, which would be the 
5J 
bai hua wen ([J~;t), modem colloquial C'hinese. 
feng tu ren ching Olii:t;~fi!IJ. 
Zhonghua Shuju (tp'/jlij!JiU), 
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biggest in South China. 54 The company wanted to edit a new textbook and print it in 
Hong Kong for Chinese schools in Nanyang. This was significant news for Chinese 
schools since local Chinese newspapers in Nanyang in each place he visited reported on 
his visit when he arrived. 55 It shows that the need to have Chinese textbooks for 
Nanyang Chinese was well received. 
Zheng travelled through British Malaya, Siam, and the Dutch Indies in 1933. He visited 
more than 30 places, staying ten or more days in some, only two or three days in others. 
After he finished his journey, he submitted his business report to the publishing 
company. The travel notes were edited from his private diary. In the preface he made a 
short list of topics in which he was interested in the places he visited. They are: (1) 
local history (2) geography (3) migration regulations (4) visa and custom regulations (5) 
agricultural products and handcrafts (6) natural features and cultural heritage (7) the 
general situation of the Chinese community (8) the customs and life of the indigenous 
people (9) interesting news he read (10) people he met and their conversation.56 
Though the purpose of his journey was to collect information to use in editing a new 
textbook, Zheng came to a new degree of awareness of the general situation in 
Nanyang, compared to existing common knowledge in China. In every place, he 
collected general information about local history and other matters. He summarised the 
Zheng Jian Lu, Nanyang san yue Ji [Three months' journey in Nanyang] (Hong Kong: Zhonghua suju, 
1933), p. 40. l!ll{!t!At, <1¥JW.C::fl~C>, (ftj:fl;: cp~ifli\l, 1933), 40. 
" Zheng Tian Lu, Nany:mg san yue Ji [TI.ree months' journey in Nanyang) (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 
1933), pp. 313-316.1!11~111. <i¥f:i'F=:J'J~i::l>, (1ffi1li: i:fl¥iF.1"1, 1933), 313-316. 
" Zheng Jian Lu, Nanyang san yue ji. [Three months' journey in Nanyang] (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 
, (i!fl!!1: i:fl'lll'i!i!i'ii, 1933), 16 • 
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information and entered it in his diary. In the diary, Zheng reported the special attention 
to migration regulations and visa matters he paid while editing the textbook in its 
political context. He mentioned several times that the new textbooks from his company 
would not contravene the law in Nanyang as there were political problems involving 
some textbooks used in Nanyang. In some places, the governments had banned certain 
Chinese textbooks, so attention to the regulations was needed in editing the new 
textbook, to avoid such a situation. Also, he was sensitive towards the treatment of 
Chinese by the Customs. He said: " We will collect all kinds of relevant information 
and discuss with experts in order to edit Nanyang Chinese textbooks. These textbooks 
should be suitable for Chinese eduation in Nanyang and will not contravene regulations 
of governments in N anyang."57 
Education was his main concern during the journey. He visited several Chinese schools 
in most towns and cities, and outlined the features of Chinese education in Nanyang. 
He distinguished between two kinds of Chinese schools. One was the bang schools, 
which were maintained through native place associations by a particular dialect group, 
for instance Cantonese or Hokkien. The second was the school maintained by local 
community-based funding bodies representing diverse regional groups. He called these 
schools 'public schools'. The 'public schools' taught in Mandarin, but the bang schools 
taught in their specific dialects. Zheng could speak Cantonese, Hokkien, Tiochew, 
51 Zheng Jian Lu, Nanyang san yue Ji. [Three :nonths· journey in Nanyang] (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 
1933), p. 41. ~rut.•. <i¥lw.=:fl~t>, <~;t 'fl'1i'ii1EU. 1933), 41., 
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Shanghai, Fuchou, and Mandarin,58 but he seemed to prefer Mandarin as the medium of 
instruction. He encouraged the trend to turn the bang schools into 'public schools'. 
As a businessman, he paid attention to economic life in Nanyang. He recorded the 
exact prices of different items. He observed that the position of the Chinese in 
economic life had been challenged by the Japanese, the Indians and the indigenous 
people. In every place, he read the Chinese newspapers to be up to date with the current 
situation. For example, when he was in Bangkok, there was a coup on 20 June, 1933, 
which he described.59 When he travelled in the Dutch Indies, he observed that the elite 
of the indigenous population was organised, and that they called themselves Indonesian. 
Chinese, of course, were not included in the term 'Indonesian'. Overall, he addressed 
the need for new, detailed knowledge of Nanyang. 
Chen Da was a professor in the Sociology Department of Qinghua University in Peking. 
He belonged to the first generation of Chinese sociologists to receive Western training 
in sociology. He is the author of the only study of the home towns of overseas Chinese 
in South China in the prewar era.60 Today, this book is always cited in discussion of the 
reasons Chinese people went to Nanyang. Most people who know this book refer to it 
as an academic text, without realising that Chen actually travelled in Nanyang. 
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Zheng Jian Lu, Nanyang san yue 11: [Three months' journey in Nanyang] (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 
1933), p. 315. ~fll!!a. <J¥ii'f.:::JH2>, (1\l'itt: '*1¥l!fli'il. 1933), 315., 
Zheng Jian Lu, Nanyang san yue Ji [Three months' journey in Nanyang] (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 
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Chen Da, Nanyang lwaqiao yu minyue s!Jelwi. [Nanyang Chinese and Fujian and Guangdong 
Society](Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1938), p. 16. Q, <1¥il'f•'iiliiWOOJJl\lfd:i!> ' (J:li!I: l!llf'lil±l 
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Chen Da had also his own purpose for travelling in Southeast Asia in 1934, one year 
after Zheng Jian Lu's trip. It was to be a field research trip. The places visited are 
similar to those in Zheng Jian Lu's journey, with the addition of more places on the 
Indo-Chinese peninsula. However, Chen Da published his book ten years later, after the 
Sino-Japanese war ended, so his traveller's notes include his trips to Russia, Central 
China and Southwest China. The trip to Southeast Asia occupies only part of the book. 
Chen's report is also a diary-style travel account. In the preface, he explains why he 
used this style to write his travel notes. As a sociologist, he considered how to record 
his experience. He thought of several modes of writing, like autobiography and 
personal memoir. But he thought it was too early to write his autobiography, and the 
subject was too serious for a personal memoir. He also considered other ways of 
writing used by American and German sociologists. Eventually, he decided to use the 
form of notes, or bi ji in Chinese61 • That is, a series of short essays in chronological 
order, each short essay with a title. He concluded that bi ji was actually the best writing 
form for him in this situation. As a sociologist, he always considered people and events 
from social perspectives. He thought his notes might convey some sociological insight, 
though they are not structured as a systematic argument in the manner of a sociological 
study. 
His journey originated as a study of the home towns of Nanyang Chinese in South 
China. He was invited by the Pacific Institute to conduct research on the background of 
bi ii (~~[l). 
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Chinese migration to Nanyang in 1933, and made a one-year research plan focused on 
Canton and Fujian. He started his field research in 1934. First he organized an 
investigating group to collect data for him, then he conducted his research in South 
China, visiting Amoy, Canton, Shantou, Quanzhou and Zhangzhou.62 After this, he set 
out for Nanyang in order to get a better idea of life there. 
Unlike Zheng Jian Lu, Chen Da did not concern himself with local history or 
geography. He focused on social relationships among Chinese migrants in different 
places. To gain information, he interviewed people intensively, including local Chinese 
gentry, Western researchers and non-specialists of all kinds. For example, when he 
visited an old people's home in Bangka, he interviewed more than ten old men and 
recorded the basic information about every one, such as how long he had lived on 
Bangka island, and how many times he had gone back to China in his life. 
He also developed a theory about the Nanyang Chinese communities. He defined the 
first generation of Chinese migrants as qian min 63, literally 'moving population', and 
the local-born Chinese as qiao min, literally 'moved population'.64 He recorded all his 
observations of the difference between qian min and qiao min.65 When he visited a 
factory in Java, he also tried to identify the difference between qiao min and Malays, the 
62 
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AmoyC!i:r~. Xiamen), CantonC&i1H, Guangzhou), Shantou(i'JlJjl), QuanzhouCIM1'1l and Zhangzhou(f!i[ 
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Chen Da, Nanyang huaqiao yu minyue shehui [Nanyang Chinese and Fujian and Guangdong 
Society](Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1938), p. 78. H, <l¥!l'F:'~litW!Ml~ffd:1!!'> ' (J:#ll: lmffit±:\ 
ttRffd:, 1938), 78 . , 
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term for indigenous people. He admitted that it was difficult to tell the difference 
between the two in appearance, but it was easy to distinguish them by words they used. 
For example, the local-born Chinese called their boss Tawkey and the Malays called the 
boss Tuan. 66 
He also contacted Chinese members of Volksraad in Java and described their political 
ideas and concerns, so he was familiar with the activities of Partai Tionghoa Indonesia 
(pro-Indonesian Chinese association in Eastern Indies) and Tiong Hwa Hwea (Chung 
Hwa Hui, pro-Dutch Chinese association in Eastern Indies). He thought that 
discrimination in law between Europeans, Chinese and indigenous people was the main 
stimulus for the Chinese to organise politically. After contacting many local-born 
Chinese, he concluded that the customs of local-born ethnic Chinese migbt be close to 
those of Malays or Europeans in appearance, but their minds were still Chinese minds. 
The local-born Chinese might marry Malay girls, but their children would still have a 
Chinese mind. 67 This reflected the popular opinion on Chinese descendants in the 
Chinese intellectual cycle. 
Ai Wu was a labourer when he travelled in Nanyang. His travel account, Nanxingji. 
(Record of Travels in the South, 1935), was written only after he returned from his 
journey. During his travels, he had no intention of writing down his experiences. 
Chen Da, Nanyang huaqiao yu minyue sfJefJui. [Nanyang Chinese and Fujian and Guangdong 
Society](Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1938), p. 16. !ill!¥., <r¥l~$iliWrJ11.¥1JJ.ifd:'lfl> ' CJ:illi: fill;f;lil:J::\ 
lifg,fri, 1938), 16. ' 
Chen Da, Nanyang huaqiao }71 minyue sflehui [Nanyang Chinese and Fujian and Guangdor.g 
Society ](Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1938), p. 127. ~it <r¥ll'P~1\!ll:W!lill.¥!JJ.ifd:'lfl> ' Ctw: l!ll~l±I 
Jlil(;fri, 1938), 127. 0 
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Unlike Zheng Jian Lu and Chen Da, he did not set out with the purpose of studying 
Nanyang. It might be that because he was not an academic but a non-specialist of very 
ordinary social position, his work earned more popular attention and made a more 
sympathetic impression on his readers. 
Ai Wu went to Nanyang (mainly in mainland Southeast Asia today) to earn his living. 
At the beginning he went to see one of his relatives and asked for a job. It was a similar 
experience to that of many Chinese workers who went to Nanyang to try their luck. Ai 
Wu stayed in Nanyang for seven years, then went back to Yunnan, where he started to 
write down his experiences. In his record, he described relations between the ethnic 
Chinese, the local indigenous population, Westerners, and other ethnic minorities. His 
short stories illustrated social relations in Nanyang. After publishing the first short 
story based on his experiences, he received a lot of encouragement from readers, so he 
went on to write a series of stories based on his own experience. He eventually 
published this series of stories as a book, Nan:xingji. 
Even though these travel accounts were written from the view point of Chinese in 
China, this kind of publication in China helped to create a vivid image of the Nanyang 
Chinese. The 1930s were also a time when Chinese intellectuals began to move to 
Southeast Asia in large numbers. Going to Nanyang became a recognised option for 
Chinese people in China who wanted to change their life. For them, being in China and 
being Chinese in Nanyang were lives of different status, but exchangeable. 
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Nanyang Literature 
Nanyang Literature here means literary works that appeared in the literature pages, or 
fukan (literally meaning 'auxiliary pages') in the daily Chinese newspapers in 
Nanyang. 68 The fukan was the most important feature of Chinese newspapers for 
modern literature. They contained short stories, essays, poems, criticism and all kinds 
of genres. Even long novels were published in serial form infukan. Today the study of 
Nanyang literature mainly concerns fukan. Why was the fukan so important for 
Nanyang literature? It might be because this was the only form of literature which 
could be seen as a genuinely local product. Other forms of Chinese literature, even if 
written by people residing in Southeast Asia, were typically published in China because 
of the difficulty and great cost still involved in Chinese print technology. Hence there 
were few publications other than daily newspapers which could be presented as local 
literature. The Nanyang literature in daily newspapers provides us with good material 
to analyse consciences in Chinese communities.69 
According to Fang Xiu, modem Nanyang literature appeared for the first time in the 
1920s, following the Chinese 'New Literature Movement' which began in 1919. 70 
From then on vernacular Chinese entirely replaced classical Chinese as the language of 
the Chinese mass media. However in the early 1920s there was very little modem 
fukan (ii!UfUJ. 
There are many issues which we can discuss by using this material of Nanyang literature. For example, 
the literatere about towkayaad coolie would help for discussion on class conscience. Here we only 
concentrate on how the sense of being local was generated before the Second World War. 
Fang Xiu, Malwa wenxueshi Jun}!: (Singapore: We~ie Suwu, 1986) [Essays on the History of Malayan 
Chinese Literature], p. 19. tfff{f, <Y.!i,"iilf3(~ll::iii1ii~> 0 (if1.IO:!!t: ;:::l'f,!tf~, 1986), 19. 0 
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Chinese literature related to Nanyang. Identifiably Nanyang literature, as defined by 
Fang Xiu, began to appear in 1927.71 However, as Lin Wan Jin pointed out in her study 
of Chinese writers in Singapore, the influence of Chinese writers from China was still 
considerable in Nan yang Chinese literature of this period.72 
The newcomers were sometimes enthusiastic in building up a Nanyang style for their 
Chinese communities. From the late 1920s, literature pages appeared in Chinese 
newspapers in Nanyang, especially in Singapore. One of the early literary supplements 
was Huang Dao {literally 'bold island'), which began in 1927. The slogan was 'bring 
the local style of Nanyang into work'73 , and it was acted on with conviction, as shown 
in one example: 
n 
'Why can we not have an independent kind of literature in Malaya? Look at 
America! It was only seen as a place to get rich by European people three 
hundred years ago. Now they have their own literature in America. Why should 
we, Malayan Chinese, be left behind? Can we not create an independent kind of 
literature? I don't accept that!' 74 
Fang Xiu, Mabua xinwenxue jianshi. [A Short History of New Malayan Chinese Literature] (Kuala 
Lumpur: Dongcong. 1986), pp. 55-6L JJ{~, <~'llli'l\T:Y:~ml~> ' C61\i~: IU\i!, 1986), 55-61. ' 
See Lin Wanqing, Zfongguo zuojia zai }{in;Japo Ji qi yingxiang. [The Chinese Writers in Singapore and 
their influence] (Singapore: Wanli Publishing Co., 1978). tff.i\\'l*', <9'1l&lfF1!RtE:lllT!JDM;li;~!!!i>' ( 
:ll!T!JU:tffi:: f.i\\ll't1111ii, 1978). ' 
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We can also use Yu Ta Fu's encounters with Chinese youth in Nanyang to illustrate the 
will towards Nanyang identity. When Yu Ta Fu, a representative figure in the Modem 
Chinese literature movement in China in 1920s, arrived in Singapore in 1938, the issue 
of Nanyang style could not yet draw much attention even in Nanyang. Soon after Yu 
Ta Fu arrived in Singapore, a debate took place over one of his articles, entitled 'Several 
Questions'. This debate now holds a celebrated place in modem Nanyang literature. 
He addressed the following questions asked by some Malayan Chinese youths: (1) Why 
were the topics of most literature in Nan yang the same as those in China? (2) How can 
Nanyang literature reflect local life in Nanyang? (3) Do we need to have an 
enlightenment movement in Nanyang? (4) How to popularise literature? Yu replied 
that the issue of importance was good literature rather than specifically Nanyang 
literature.75 This provoked a series of debates on the issues involved. 
Yu's ideas, stemming perhaps from an incomplete knowledge of the actual situation in 
the local area, did not touch the real concerns of the Malayan Chinese youths. Their 
eagerness to use literature as a weapon to rouse popular sentiment to support China's 
resistance led them to believe that literature should reflect social reality rather than 
pursue the literary values of the traditional intellectual elite. Many local writers wrote 
artieles to voice their dissent. Most either questioned Yu's personal political stance or 
expressed strong disappointment in his response. Through this debate, we can see signs 
of the tendency toward localization among Chinese in Southeast Asia. But the context 
they situated themselves in was the category of Nanyang rather than any new nation in 
Southeast Asia, as these did not yet exist. 
7l Yu Ta Fu 'Jige wenti.' [Several Questions] Xingz/Jou Ribao, 21January,1939. fllli'l!i.5le, «~.l\ffi!IF~~ 
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The debate appears to have changed Yu's views on Nanyang literature. From then on, 
Yu encouraged the local youth to write more literature expressing their true feelings 
about their surroundings. His article, 'Trip to Melaka', written subsequent to the 
debate, was in a characteristic Nanyang style and was eventually selected as a 
representative example of Nanyang literature in Malaysian textbooks. 76 Yu also 
supported the localization of intellectual circles by joining the exeeutive committee 
when the Nanyang China Society, the first Chinese academic association to focus on 
Nanyang, was founded in 1940. 'Trip to Melaka' appeared in the first issue of the 
Journal of the Nanyang China Society.77 We don't know how much Yu was influenced 
by the debate on his article of 'Several Questions'. Whatever influence the 'Several 
Questions' debate may have had on Yu, it is true that many Nanyang writers were 
encouraged by Yu in the direction of cultural localisation. The will to develop true 
Nanyang literature was realised in the genre of 'Mahua literature' after World War II. 
Yu Ta Fu's contribution to this genre is recognized by scholars of the history of Mahua 
literature. 78 
m» .. ~m!El¥R>. 21January,1939.' 
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Influence of Nanyang Identity 
Nanyang identity contained two different ways of identities. On one hand, Nanyang 
Chinese were proud of being Chinese. On the other hand, Nan yang identity emphasised 
being in Nanyang as a different status. Nanyang identity is a concept implying both 
China-oriented and local-oriented identification to the Chinese communities in 
Southeast Asia. This locally oriented identity was not strongly associated with 
categories of identity delimited by political boundaries. Nan yang identity developed in 
the 1930s, before the nationalist movements for the new Southeast Asian countries 
gained power. This development can be seen in so-called 'Nanyang literature' in 
Chinese, which includes writing in Nanyang, writing for Nanyang and writing about 
Nanyang. The booming development of Nanyang literature influenced more ethnic 
Chinese toward seeing their place of residence as home. Being in Nanyang became a 
kind of personal status which was conceivable and acceptable, once it was given regular 
expression in mass-market literature, rather than being an economic expedient bearing a 
distinctly negative social cachet. Thus the literature helped the Chinese communities to 
build up their own distinctive identity. At the same time, Nanyang identity implied a 
degree of identification with Chinese culture. Particularly after the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War in 1937, all concern with political events was focused on China.79 
79 
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Even the Chinese peranakan who founded a political party devoted to Indonesian nationalism were 
influenced by the Sino-Japanese conflict. The situation brought about a distinction between Chinese 
peranakan and pribumi. See below. 
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The 1930s were an important period for nationalist movements in many parts of 
Southeast Asia. They were also the period when the ethnic Chinese built up a sense of 
identity founded on being Chinese in Southeast Asia. This kind of identity was still far 
away from being a political identity in the modem nation-state sense. But it was 
because of the association with China that the local nationalist movements, in many 
cases, kept aloof from the Chinese communities. Most local nationalist movements used 
features of ethnicity to mobilize the people and gain solidarity. The Chinese 
immigrants, particularly those who still displayed Chinese cultural characteristics, were 
seen as outsiders in the nationalists' eyes. The policy of the colonial governments 
toward the diverse ethnic groups was basically 'divide and rule'. The colonial 
authorities worked against the possibility of alliance between the Chinese communities 
and the indigenous population. Traditional ways of thinking among the Chinese 
communities also worked against this possibility. The mainstream political tendency 
among the Chinese communities was to obey the law without making any trouble with 
the authorities. 80 The development of Nan yang identity connected to the local colonial 
territories was not involved much with the local nationalist movements before the 
Second World War. 
Even in these conditions, Chinese communities themselves gradually developed a sense 
of identity centred on being in Southeast Asia in contrast to being in China. This sense 
of identity was not associated with the colonial governments or the local population but 
with the Chinese communities themselves. Being in Southeast Asia, in the eyes of 
Chinese of the 1930s, was a special status compared with that of their relatives who 
"' Wen Gu Zhi, Huaren di zhengzhi yizhi. [The Political Consciousness of Ethnic Chinese] (Kuala Lumper, 
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lived in China. In this way a sense of identity for the Chinese in Southeast Asia was 
generated among the communities without being announced by any government or 
organisation. In the 1930s, mass circulation literature in Chinese about Southeast Asia 
socialised this sense of identity, which can be seen in the growing discourse on the 
topic of ' the Nanyang Chinese'. This discourse itself argues for the existence 
of a distinctive Nanyang Chinese identity. The discourse of the Nanyang 
Chinese was not limited by sub-ethnic categories based on political belief, 
religion, or hometown origin. Investigating mass circulation literature for Southeast 
Asian Chinese is a good means to evaluate the general situation of cultural and political 
identity of Chinese residents in Southeast Asia in the 1930s, since it emerged at this 
time. 
Nanyang identity was different from Tiochew identity, Hokkien identity or any of the 
other forms of social self-identification based on family origin in one region of China. 
It was a kind of artificial and situational identity, not based on primordial sentiment but 
more on acquired culture. The concept of Nanyang identity can be seen as the product 
of two equal and opposed sets of political, legal and material distinctions, each 
providing an occasion for Nan yang Chinese to consider the issue of their membership in 
a social category--the distinction between the Chinese and the Malays, Javanese, 
European colonialists, Indians and others living in Nan yang, and the distinction between 
themselves and the Chinese living in China. 
1981).1/IA~, <$AJl"Jll&it5;!i!'illlll> ° Ci'illi:\llt: '}.I'~. 1981) • 
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There were two dimensions to this sense of Nanyang Chinese identity. One was a sense 
of being in the South Seas, or 'Nanyang' in Mandarin, rather than in the fatherland, 
China. The other was the strengthening of a sense of being Chinese. Chinese writing, 
including newspapers, magazines, periodical articles and books, demonstrates that the 
majority of Chinese residents in Southeast Asia paid more attention to China's affairs 
than those of Southeast Asia in this period. Except for a small number of peranakan 
Chinese in Indonesia, 81 Chinese people were seen as unchanging, with a strong 
tendency to preserve their customs and folklore. Many studies emphasize pro-China 
movements among the Chinese population during the Republican Revolution and the 
Sino-Japanese war.82 
But the 1930s were also a period in which Southeast Asian Chinese built up their sense 
of being Southeast Asian, or Nanyang Chinese. A discourse about Nanyang Chinese 
arose in the 1930s which gave Chinese people in Southeast Asia, on the one hand, more 
Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan C?inesc Politics in Java, 1917-1942. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1981), pp. 72-90. He argues t'iat ln pre-war peranakan Chinese politics in Indonesia there were three 
mainstreams: the China-oriented Sin Po group, the pro-Dutch Chung Hwa Hui and the pro-lndonesiim 
Partai Tionghoa Indonesia. As Leo Suryadinata has suggested, the pro-Indonesian group were very small 
in numbers but their opinion, which differed from the mainstream, achieved significance. 
About the pro-China movement during the Republican Revolution, see Lea E. Williams. Overseas Chinese 
Nationalism: The Genesis of/he Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia 1900-1916. (Glencoe: Free Press, 
1960); Yen, Ching-Hwang, 'The Chinese revolutionary movement in Malaya (1900-191 !)' ., Ph. D. 
dissertation, ANU. 1969; Yen, Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: l'v'ith 
Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, (Kuala Ll.!.lllpur: Oxford University Press, 1976). About the 
pro-China movements during the Sino-Japanese war, see Yen, Ching-hwar.g, 'Overseas Chinese 
Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya.' Modem A;ian Studies, 1982, 16(3): 397-425; Leong, Stephen 
Mun Yoon, 'Sources, agencies 1md manifestations of overseas Chinese nationalism in Malaya, 1937-
1941' Ph.D. dissertation, University of Califomia, Los Angeles, 1976. 
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consciousness of being Chinese and on the other hand led them to consider what it 
meant to be in Nanyang. 
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Chapter3 
China-Nanyang Relations and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1942 
Although a Nanyang identity developed in the 1930s, it was still far from being a 
political identity tied to a nation-state. At the same time, Nanyang Chinese developed 
new feelings of patriotism toward China after 1931 in response to the Sino-Japanese 
conflict. 1 The conflict drew the attention of Southeast Asian Chinese more to events in 
China and away from events in the places where they lived. The outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War in 1937 then prompted Southeast Asian Chinese to take action to assist 
the fatherland and engendered unprecedented feelings of patriotism toward China. In 
this chapter, we will examine how the Sino-Japanese conflict influenced the 
development of Nanyang Chinese identity in the 1930s, and evaluate the impact of the 
Sino-Japanese War on the identity of Southeast Asian Chinese. 
The Sino-Japanese war had a variety of consequences for Nanyang Chinese identity. 
Previous studies of the relationship between China and the Nanyang Chinese before 
World War II have mainly focused on the so-called 'National Salvation Movement'.2 
Despite some minor conflicts in earlier periods, the Sino-Japanese conflict is counted in this context as 
beginning with the Manchurian Incident in 193!. The whole decade of the 1930s is here considered to be 
the period when patriotic feeling toward Cnina developed due to the conflict between China and Japan. 
Yoji Akashi, The Boycott and Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement of the Nanyang Cmnese, 1908-
1941 (Wash., D.C.: Georgetown University, 1963). Yoji Akashi, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation 
Movement. 1937-1941. (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1970). Antonio S. Tan, The Chinese in the 
Philippines. 1898-1935: A Study of their National Awakemng. (Q. C.: Garcia Publishing Co., 1972). 
Leong, Stephen Mun Yoon, 'Sources, Agencies and Manifestations of Overseas Ctinese Nationalism in 
Malaya, 1937-1941.' Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 1976. These srJdies all 
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In discussing the identity issue, however, we should examine this relationship from a 
different angle. We should evaluate the different levels of relationships between 
Nanyang Chinese and China, which were linked to identity shift in the post-war era. 
There were two different levels of linkage between China and Nanyang before the 
Pacific War, which began in December 1941. The first was that of the primordial ties 
of Nanyang Chinese with their hometowns in China. The second level was that of 
political and legal relations between Nanyang Chinese and the Chinese government. 
These two levels of linkage were maintained and even reinforced between the start of 
the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the start of the Pacific War in 1941. The impact of 
generation change on this linkage will be discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
In the second section the focus will be on the impact of the Sino-Japanese War on the 
Nanyang Chinese in Malaya and Indonesia. The role of the Chinese intellectuals who 
came to Southeast Asia to launch an anti-Japanese propaganda campaign and their 
impact on the relationship between China and the Nanyang Chinese will be discussed in 
the third section. 
Relations between China and the Nanyang Chinese 
Previous studies of the relationship between China and the Nanyang Chinese before 
World War II put much weight on Chinese nationalism. But the relationship between 
the Nanyang Chinese and China should not be considered as a one-way relationship 
only. Akashi Yoji investigated the relationship in this period in his research on the 
focused on the National Salvation Movement as the major theme in the relationship between China mid 
Nanyang Chinese, and used similar ideas of "Chinese nationalism' to frame ibis theme. 
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Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, and concluded that 'The Nanyang 
Chinese National Salvation Movement was not an example of total patriotism; the 
Nanyang Chinese could not be expected to be completely altruistic.' 3 The problem here 
is the definition and measurement of 'patriotism' or 'nationalist sentiment'. It would be 
difficult to expect 'total patriotism' from most groups and in most situations, especially 
since there is no objective measure by which a historian can assess degrees of 
patriotism. Pan-Chinese patriotism is doubtlessly a real though numerous factor, but any 
explanation of this relationship between the Nanyang Chinese and China should also 
consider other factors. 
In this section we will consider how the relationship between Nanyang Chinese and 
China was affected by the Sino-Japanese War from its outbreak in 1937 to the start of 
the Pacific War in 1941. This relationship will be examined from two perspectives: the 
'hometown' level and the 'national' level. 
Interaction with home villages 
Primordial attachment is a connection among people who have cultural factors in 
common, such as descent, race, language, religion and customs. This kind of 
connection often goes beyond geographical and national boundaries.4 In this context, 
the relationship between the Nanyang Chinese and China operated at the individual or 
Yoii Akashi, The Nanyang C11inese National Salvation Movemenr, 1937-1941. (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas, 1970), p. 166. 
Clifford Geertz. The Integrative Revolution----Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States.' Old Societies lilld New States. (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 109. 
79 
family level. It operated also at the regional or language group level, through relations 
such as those of Nanyang Chinese community organisations with similar organisations 
in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, or those among Hakkas and Hailamese as 
language groups. It is important to examine this kind of connection between Nanyang 
and South China in the 1930s before we discuss connections through political 
institutions. 
The primordial bonds between Nanyang Chinese and their home villages in China in the 
1930s were generally still strong, according to many surveys done at that time.5 In this 
period, the majority of Nanyang Chinese still maintained some degree of interaction 
with their home towns in China. Huang Sufeng, a demographer and geographer, made 
this judgement and thought it applicable to most parts of Nanyang. 6 Local-born 
Chinese children might be sent back by their parents to their home towns in China for a 
while, either to receive Chinese education or for less classifiable family reasons. These 
local-born Chinese were reg;<1rded as culturally the same as Chinese newcomers, known 
as singkeh,7 among the Nanyang Chinese. This relationship has often been neglected by 
scholars, particularly those who rely on statistical data as the basis for their analysis. 
For example, Toa Keizai Chosakyoku, Ranryo indo 1li okem kakyo. [Overseas Chinese in the Netherlands 
East Indies]. (Tokyo: Toa Keizai Chosakyoku, 1939). !lf9!*'111'1lllll~/l\-l, <lllfrllEP!!!'.h::~!j :0 '!!¥~ 0 
J:l!!!Eltilf\'l!llllt.fl\l$ilill!!il 0 lf.ili~J:l!s!!*l/%it'ijj~Ji\l, 1939) a.~d Chen Da, Nanyang huaqiao Y'J 
MinY'JC shehw: [The Nanyang Chinese and Fujian and Guangdong Society] (Shanghai: Shangwu 
Yinshuguan, 1938). Q' <!¥i#'!i!'frlijl1.fi!i!fi!J,'!!}fft±ff> 0 (J:#!i: jl:fjl\J3EP~~' 1938). 0 
Huang Sufeng, 'Yijiu sanling nian Dong Yindu renkou wenti he huaqiao' (The overseas Chinese and 
the population problem in the East Indies in the 1930s), Kexue di nanyang. [Essays on Science in The 
Nanyang Islancs) (Shanghai: Shangwu Yi1tuguan, 1931), p. 43. j(~~. <<-:tLE0£f:%~Pli'.fDfi.i 
111!*1l'!i!'f.ii» 0 <t~l¥11¥l#> 0 (J:w: i!lil\J3EfliJ.fim • 1931), 43. 0 
Singkeh ( ::ITT~). 
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The statistics on the proportion of local-born Chinese in Chinese communities might not 
mean much in these circumstances. The local-born Chinese obtained the status of local 
'subjects' by Dutch colonial law. But among local-born Chinese, those who maintained 
direct links with China were, culturally the same in this respect as the huaqiao, singkeh, 
totok, or any terms commonly understood as applying to 'pure Chinese'. The Chinese 
government also treated all Chinese descendents as Chinese citizens by Chinese law. 
In this period, many Nanyang Chinese supported their extended family in China 
financially, accepted marriages arranged by the family, and participated in clan affairs 
in their home villages in China. 8 This type of interaction with their home villages 
reflected their world view as it had been shaped by rural life in South China. Most 
Chinese migrants who arrived in Nanyang were sponsored by people of the same 
regional origin. In the first few years they might work in shops owned by their sponsors 
as low-paid workers. After they gained experience in running a small business, they 
might hope to run their own shops. Most Chinese businessmen in Nanyang went 
through this process. 9 
Before the war, the Nanyang Chinese community was regarded as a divided society 
because of the function of language difference as a cause of social segmentation. A 
survey has demonstrated that the Chinese in Malaya had a strong sense of identity based 
About financial support of relatives in China, see Zheng Linkuan, Fukuken Kakyoyou No Soukin. 
[Remittances from Fujian Huaqiao] (Tokyo: Mantetsu Toa Keizai Chosakyoku, 1942). l!ilf*:ll w' l'!!JEB 
"l':lll:i\R 0 <~9!-jlt0)~3E> 0 (J.l:[g : )i1ey~J.l:[i!Et1¥ii'fi\llill!Eli';l, 1942) 0 About arranged marriages and 
clan affairs, see below. 
Nan'yo Kyokai ed. Nan'yo no kakyo. [Overseas Chinese in the South Seas] (Tokyo: Nan'yo Kyokai, 1940), 
p, 8. 1¥il'F1bb~tii'ii , <1¥il'F.1ilii> ( J.l:[g : 1¥il'F1bb~ , 1940) , 8. 
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on language group. 10 Another survey conducted in 1937 in Fujian and Guangdong 
provinces showed that most first-generation Nanyang Chinese migrants maintained 
strong connections with their home villages. 11 Some migrants left their wives and 
children in their home villages. If they were single when they migrated, most of them 
came back for a few months to have a marriage arranged with a woman from the same 
region. Bigamous relationships were commonplace, as Nanyang men often married 
local women and thus frequently supported families in both China and Southeast Asia. 
This was called liangtoujia, the 'two-families system' .12 
A certain case study shows how Chinese migrants on Billiton island in the Dutch Indies 
were involved in clan affairs in their home villages in the 1930s. Their home village in 
south Fujian wanted to build a community hall in 1934. Clan A wanted to build in the 
south side of the village, and Clan B preferred the north side. The people of Clan B 
failed to get the result they wanted and so wrote letters to their relatives in Billiton, who 
held a meeting to discuss this event later. Members of Clan B in Billiton decided to 
support their clan in China and suggested founding a new school and a new hall for 
their own clan in their home village separately from the hall proposed by Clan A. They 
agreed to provide the money for this. With the participation of their relatives on a 
remote island in Indonesia, this clan group in China found a way to solve their 
" Tt.e period of strong identification with languages/dialect groups among Nanyang Chinese is before 1945. 
See Li Yi Yuan, Yige yizm dishizhen. [An Emigrant Town] (Taipei: Journal of the Institute of 
Nationalities, Academia Sinica, 1970 ), p. 105. 2%1/f'lll ' <-@~71!1Jl'Jrn~> (#Jc : t:f1!ilfllie.Rfffi2Jiff 
~f!J , l'f/0), 105. ' 
Chen Da, Nanyang lwaqjao y.i Afinyue shehui. [The Nanyang Chinese and Fujian and Guangdong 
Sociery] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1938), pp.133-135. Jill!~' <l¥!l'E~~OO~?d.it> ( 
.Lllit : lllffqjfn~lli'i ' 1938) ' 133-135. " 
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problem.13 This example illustrates the overriding importance of hometown and family 
identity for Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia. 
It is quite understandable that most Chinese migrants in the early twentieth century 
should have had a stronger orientation towards their regional origins than towards China 
as a whole. The political situation in China did not offer a stable framework by which 
overseas Chinese could identify themselves as Chinese nationals. The civil wars 
between warlords in China in the first fifteen years after the founding of the Republic 
prevented national integration in China as well as in Southeast Asia. Before 1928, the 
central government of the Republic of China in Beijing was controlled by the Northern 
warlords, who were not interested in Southeast Asian Chinese affairs and had little 
knowledge of South China (the homeland of the Southeast Asian Chinese) and less of 
the South Seas (Nanyang). So Nanyang Chinese were able to maintain involvement in 
local affairs in their hometowns in China, but this did not require participation in any 
organisation or activity above the local level, as the political space for this did not 
exist.14 Direct interaction with relatives in China reinforced attachment to the migrant's 
place of origin. In this way, the Nanyang Chinese could easily maintain their original 
identity. Many of them chose to go back to their home towns after they retired. 
'Jiang tou jia' (l'l>J!il'l*l 
" Chen Da, Nanyang huaqiao yu Minyue shehui [The Nanyang Chinese and Fujian and Guangdong Society) 
(Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan. l 938), pP. 131-133. H • <l¥Jl'f.;1j¥fr!iiW00111\lffrJ:.i'> ( 1:.IB : 
[m&Sf.P~iliJ; • 1938), 131-133. • 
" Yang Jinfa (C. F. Yong), Zhanqian do Chen Jia Geng yanlun shiliao yu fenxi [Tan Kah Kee in Pre-War 
Singapore: Selecte<l Documents and Analysis] (Singapore, South Seas Society, 1980), p. 13. ~~.<lilt 
1lrIIY:Jll!fillifl<t~~JJ':lfStW?T*'IT> 0 <fi!Ja!Jli: : i¥Ji"f'!'j!Jf!I-, 1980), 13. • 
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The majority of ethnic Chinese in Nanyang came originally from two provinces in the 
south of China, Fujian and Guangdong. From the Chinese newspapers, we know the 
main concern of Nanyang Chinese with China was focused on these two provinces. 
There was a page headed 'Minyue news' in the Chinese newspapers, which meant news 
from Fujian and Guangdong.15 We need to understand these kinds of relationships in 
order to have a better understanding of Nanyang Chinese responses to China's affairs 
during the 1930s. For example, when Tan Kah Kee, a prominent Chinese leader based 
in Singapore, 16 discovered that the Nationalist Party governor of Fuji an Province was 
corrupt, he decided to withdraw support from the Nationalist Party government in China 
and give his backing to the Communist Party. 17 This was one of many instances which 
show the importance of the primordial ties between Nan yang Chinese and China. 
We should not consider these primordial ties as operating in one direction only. 
Connections with home towns reinforced China-oriented identity. At the same time, 
however, ties to the home region could also help migrants to establish a new identity in 
Nanyang. Nanyang Chinese helped newcomers who were of similar regional or 
language background to settle in Southeast Asia. During the 1930s, a high proportion 
of women came to Southeast Asia, either for family reunions or to marry male Chinese 
migrants. The primordial ties of Nanyang Chinese were built up in this way in 
Southeast Asia. This helped both to maintain ties with the home region and to help 
migrant communities put down roots in Nanyang. 
" 
Minyue (~Jil), the short forms of the names for Fujian (lllln) and Guangdong (yue) provinces. 
Tan Kah Kee (l\ll[lf;!J.t), or Chen Jia C-eng in Mandarin. 
Tan Kah Kee, The Me111oll-s of Tan Kah &Y:. Edited and trans. by A. H. C. Ward, Raymond W. Chi.:, 
Janet Salaff. (Singapore: SingajJQre University Press, 1994), pp. 202-209. 
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The Sino-Japanese War cut the direct links between Nanyang Chinese and their 
hometowns in China, since Japan controlled Fujian and Guangdong provinces. The 
families who relied on money sent by Nanyang Chinese suffered during this time. As a 
result many fled from China to Southeast Asia. The primordial ties between Nanyang 
and China were weaker in the post-war era, and this had considerable impact on the 
shifting of ~anyang Chinese identity. The practice of Nanyang Chinese men supporting 
families in both Southeast Asia and China declined rapidly, as families of migrants 
arrived in Southeast Asia. The families who decided to move to Southeast Asia after 
the war often tended to see their new places of residence as home. 
Political Linkage at the National Level 
The Nanyang Chinese community had a strong sense of political identification with 
China in the 1930s. Politically, most Nanyang Chinese did not identify with either 
British Malaya or the Dutch Indies, because these were European colonies and there 
was no room for Chinese to develop their local identity. Legally, except for the Straits 
Chinese in Malaya and the peranakan Chinese in the Dutch Indies, most Chinese people 
living in the territories were Chinese nationals. After the eruption of the Sino-Japanese 
War, linkages between China and the Southeast Asian Chinese strengthened the formal 
political relations between the government of China and the Nanyang Chinese. The 
sense of patriotism towards China had reached a historical high by the time of the 
Japanese occupation. Exploring the relations between China and the Nanyang Chinese 
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at this time helps in understanding the dramatic changes in this linkage before and after 
the war. 
Before the 1930s, governments in China tried many times to build direct institutional 
links between China and the Nanyang Chinese, but were not very successful. For 
example, when Sun Y at-sen became president in 1912, he created several positions in 
his government for representatives of overseas Chinese, and also set up the bureau of 
'overseas Chinese affairs', the first such bureau in Republican China.18 But Sun fell 
from power the following year and these projects were soon cancelled. In 1918 the 
Chinese government sent Chinese labourers to work for the European Allies in the First 
World War and, impelled by this, established an administrative unit to take charge of 
overseas Chinese affairs.19 In 1924 this unit asked all Nanyang Chinese to register, but 
less than 8 percent did so, and the project was soon abandoned. 20 Then a special 
committee for overseas Chinese affairs was set up by the Kuomintang (Nationalist) 
government in 1928. This committee tried to forge links with overseas Chinese to 
mobilize manpower and money for the economic development of China. It was no 
more effective in practice than the scheme of 1924. 
" Huaqiaozti bianzuan wuiyi;anhui ed., Huaqiao zbi zongz/Ji [The History of the Overseas Chinese] (Taipei: 
Qiaowu Weiyuanhui, 1964), p. 524. ffY~*!i!lll~~1Jif ' <'ii¥bl\f.1;> (flJt : 1ilil~~ji1f' 
1964), 524. , 
Nan'yo keizai kenkyujo ed., Nan'yo no kakyo. [Overseas Chinese in the South Seas] (Tokyo: Nanyo 
Keizai Kankyujo, 1941), pp. 60-61. ilf!i#*llii'i~~J'lFf,\i • <i¥i#'ii¥1ifl> Cll<Cl'!'l : il'.''l'Mt¥.1J1'iID~Jifr • 
194 l), 60-61. 
» Qiu llanping, Huaqiao wenti. [The Problem cf the Overseas Chinese] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinsbuguan, 
1937), p. 57. li:ll~ZJS • <~11iilr&ll'b Cl::.ll!f: il!~EPitllt!, 1937), 57. 
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Despite the failure of these schemes, some forms of influence from China had started to 
spread through the Chinese communities in Nanyang, mainly in the fields of Chinese 
education and Chinese newspapers. First, Mandarin-medium schools were set up in 
Southeast Asia. Mandarin had been adopted as the national language of China in 1919. 
Through the New Culture Movement, which promoted plain Chinese language (bai hua 
wen) as the basic written form for Chinese in order to eliminate illiteracy,21 Mandarin-
based mass education started to be established in China and later in Southeast Asia. 
Many schools in Southeast Asia with 'Zhonghua' (China, with emphasis on the cultural 
meaning) in their names were China-oriented, Chinese-medium schools. However, 
most schools attended by Chinese children in Indonesia were run by Chinese 
associations (huiguwi in Mandarin). For example, one survey conducted in 1931 
showed that 13 out of a total of 15 Chinese schools in Batavia were founded by 
huiguan. 22 A survey of Chinese schools in the Philippines showed that the media of 
instruction were still regional languages in the majority of schools. Mandarin was 
taught from year five as a subject in primary schools, and had not yet become a 
language in common use in most places in Southeast Asia.23 Most Nanyang Chinese 
ll bill hua wen, (8 ~1151:). 
Tiansheng Ribao, Heshu gepu tongqiao xuexiao diaochabiao. [Survey of Chinese Schools in the Cities of 
the Dutch East Indies] (Jakarta: Tiansheng ribao shizhounian jiniance, 1932), pp. 1-3. 7(§8~ '«W 
!l~:Ul1.l'U1t*tx~~» · <7Cl!fB~+lllil:t;:*c;E;H!i-> 0 Cfff!JO~: JZ§El~ • 1932), l-3. 0 
Toa Keizai Chosa\:yol..11, 'Hiripin ni okeru kakyo'. Toa Keizai Cl1osakyoku. [Overseas Chinese in the 
Philippines] (Tokyo: Mantetsu Toa Keizai Chosakyoku, 1939), p. 120. :ll<!:ifli*li<:jji\'itil!'i!EFnl, <tcf'!!:'ll!:I.:}; 
lt 6¥f,ll;> 0 (:ll<i:Jil: : Yiii~:lflifli~tiij'~J11i:Fill, 1939), 120. 
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either did not know how to speak Mandarin or had learnt it only at school, and had had 
few chances to use it outside schoo!.24 
The contents of Chinese newspapers and other publications in Southeast Asia indicate 
that the political situation in China was considered more important than the local 
political situation by Chinese residents in Southeast Asia in the 1930s. 25 Chinese 
newspapers in Southeast Asia before the war show that social distinctions according to 
regional origin were significant. Every person's regional origin was indicated as an 
important element of identity if they were mentioned in the local news. News about 
Nanyang Chinese was printed in the so-called 'Nanyang news' section. If we examine 
the list of publications in Chinese published in Southeast Asia before the Second World 
War, most of them were published by regional huiguan.26 This indicates that social 
classification among Nanyang Chinese was predominantly based on their regional 
origins in China. 
There was very little written material in the contemporary Chinese print media to 
suggest that the Chinese should identify themselves with the local indigenous 
Li Xuemin and Huang Kur.zbang, Yinni huaqiaoshi. [The History of the Chinese in Indonesia] 
(Guangzhou: Guangdong Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1987), p. 384. *!\)\'~ • ' <EP!t:~filii.11:'. 
> 0 c•1H : •W:il'ii~*'!(f!fl±\ii&Jfd: • 1987), 384. 0 
Zuo Nansen ed. Sjn Chew !it Poh, 511 An11iverS[JJ'y Souvemr Magazine, 1929-1979. (Singapore: Sin Chew 
Jit Poh, 1979), p. 8. -'Ii/Wt!:.~, <iiE~~IEl ¥1l'i'f £%'H SD :ff. 1929-1979> 0 ('\frfJD:fdi.: l'il.lfl 13~. 1979), 
8. 
Sharon A. Carstens, 'Chinese Publications and the Transformation of Chinese Culture in Malaysia', 
Changing Identilies of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War IL 1985, pp. 2-3. 
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communities. If we borrow Benedict Anderson's idea of 'imagined community', 27 the 
Nanyang print media before the Second World War did not project an imagined 
("Indonesian" or "Malayan") national community incorporating both Southeast Asians 
and Chinese. Nanyang identity, in the early stages of its development as a generalised 
form of self-reference among Southeast Asian Chinese, was still Nanyang Chinese 
identity, the character of the Chinese pioneer on the frontier of the civilised world. 
Under the Shadow of the Sino-Japanese War 
As Akashi Yoji records, 
The time was ripe; the national sentiment of the Chinese people everywhere in 
Southeast Asia was reaching a climax on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, 
which broke out in the early morning of July 7, 1937, at Marco Polo Bridge near 
Peking.28 
Patriotism toward China among Nanyang Chinese after the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese war is illustrated by the so-called National Salvation Movement, which 
mobilised financial support for the Chinese war effort. Remittances to China from 
Southeast Asian Chinese were an important element in the funding of China's military 
campaign.29 The National Salvation Movement during the Sino-Japanese War has been 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflection of the Odgin and Spread of Nationalism. (London: 
Verso, 1983). 
Yoji Akashi, The N;myang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941. (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas, 1970), p. 12. 
Nan'yo Kyokai ed., Nan'yo ,70 kakyo. [Overseas Chinese in the South Seas] (fokyo: Nan'yo Kyokai, 
1940), p. 2. i¥l#llil\~l'Aiii , <i¥l1¥o<V•l\ll\> ' ( ** : ffi#lbb~. 1940) '2. 
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investigated by scholars such as Akashi Yoji and Victor Purceli.30 Estimates of the 
remittances from overseas Chinese communities suggest that about one-third of China's 
military costs were paid by remittances from overseas.31 This amount does not include 
remittances to private or local recipients such as families, relatives, clan associations 
and local government in the contributors' home towns. If these are included, overseas 
Chinese paid half of the total costs of China's government. At that time, 86 percent of 
those overseas Chinese were in Southeast Asia. 
Some scholars have argued that the Chinese in Malaya and in Indonesia had different 
attitudes toward the Salvation Movement. This is because Indonesian Chinese did not 
fully support economic sanctions on Japanese goods during the National Salvation 
Movement. Indeed, some even imported more Japanese goods because they yielded 
high profits. 32 Japanese sources list the names of Chinese businessmen who kept on 
doing business with the Japanese.33 This indicates that the degree of Chinese patriotism 
among the Nanyang Chinese varied greatly and that some had little genuine sentiment 
for the fate of their mainland compatriots. 
J2 
Yoji Akashi, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941. (Lawrence: Cniversity of 
Kansas, 1970). Victor Purcell, The C!Jj,wse in Southeast Asia. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University. 1967). 
Huaqiao xiehui ed. Huaqiao gemingshi. [The Revolutionary History of the Overseas Chinese] (Taipei: 
Zhengzhong Shuju, 1974), p. 688, '!ii?11ili!a\Writi?!:ltm , <'!ilffiflfJ'fiifP~> Cil~c : IE'P~fi'l\. 1974), 
688. 0 
Victor fu"Cell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, Kuala Lump~r: Oxford University 1967, p. 463. 
Investigation Section, Hwa '.\'an Bank, Ran'in shokm nokakyo. [Chinese Merchants in the Netherlands 
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Mobilisation was a major consequence of the Sino-Japanese war. After the outbreak of 
war, the main concern throughout the Nanyang Chinese community was how they could 
help China. Compared to other overseas Chinese communities, the Nanyang Chinese 
were not only more numerous but also located closer to China geographically. Many 
different kinds of mobilisation of people and resources took place. Some of them, like 
the National Salvation Movement and the anti-Japanese boycott, have been well 
investigated by scholars. There were also other forms of the campaign, such as 
organising teams of technical workers to go to China, fundraising in order to buy 
aeroplanes for China, and organising youth corps to participate in combat in China. 
Compared to the movements associated with the Chinese Republican revolution in the 
1910s, the basic form of the patriotic movement of this period was very different, even 
though both are described by the same term, 'Chinese nationalism', by scholars.34 In 
the era of the Chinese Republican revolution, the Chinese communities were divided. 
The target was internal to China, the Imperial government of the Qing dynasty. Not all 
of the mobilisations were open. There were various kind of secret movements. In 
contrast, during the Sino-Japanese war the mobilisation was open instead of secret and, 
indeed, because of the mood of patriotism, participation was seen as an honour. Later, 
the colonial governments in Malaya and the Dutch Indies decided to clamp down on the 
Chinese patriotic movements in their territories as a result of Japanese pressure. The 
34 Yen Ching-hwang, 'Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya' . Modem Asiill1 Studies, 
1982, 16(3): 397 ·425. Williams, Lea Overseas Chinese Nationalism; t?e Genesis of the Pan-Chinese 
Movement iry Jndo.1esia 1900-1916. Glencoe: Free Press, 1960. Leong, Stephen Mun Yoon, 'Scurces, 
agencies and manifestations of overseas Chinese nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941'. Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Los Angeles, 1976. 
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Chinese people were outraged and the anti-Japanese sentiment among Chinese turned 
into anti-colonial sentiment. 
The leaders of the National Salvation Movement were China-born and China-educated. 
That Western-oriented and educated local-born Chinese leaders were left out of the 
leadership circles confirms the existence of a chasm between the China-oriented 
Chinese and the West-oriented Chinese. This division within the Chinese community 
was particularly marked in Singapore-Malaya, where there were both China-centered 
and British-centered loyalties. The existence of that divided loyalty was public 
knowledge; Tan Kah Kee, the leader of the Salvation Movement, complained that local-
born Chinese did not contribute as much as China-born Chinese. A similar distinction 
existed in the Dutch Indies between the singkeh and the baba. 35 
Another obvious consequence of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war was to promote 
solidarity among Chinese in the whole region of Southeast Asia; that is, place of 
residence in Nanyang as well as sub-ethnicity became less important. In October 1938, 
a new umbrella organisation was formed which included all Chinese representative 
associations in Southeast Asia, in response to the call by the major Chinese newspapers 
for unity to fight the Japanese. 36 The Chinese Government strongly supported this 
organisation and urged Chinese community leaders to organize resistance against the 
Yoji Akashi, TfJe Nanya/1.g C/JLryese Nadonal Salvation Mo;·ement, 1937-1941. (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas, 1970), p. 162. 
The name of this organisation was Nanyang Geshu Huaqiao Chouzhen Zuguo Nanmin Zonghui (l¥J#'2'i-
Jl1jl)U~~llml,ll!i!il\it, Southeast Asia Federation of China Relief Funds). 
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Japanese. Tan Kah Kee was elected chairman of this organisation.37 The Singapore 
Chinese cultural community set up a wartime working group, and the Singapore 
Chinese Enemy Resistance Mobilization Committee was established. This group 
decided to arm the people. This decision made a difference to the subsequent history of 
Malaya. 
Akashi argues that 
The clannishness characteristic of Chinese communities was also evident in the 
exclusion of Hakkas. Except for two Cantonese Hakkas, Fukienese controlled 
the organisation of the Salvation Movement. Throughout the four-year 
campaign there appears to have been no attempt to unify the Fukienese and the 
Cantonese. The rivalry between the Fukienese leader Tan Kah Kee and the 
Hakka leader Aw Boon Haw did not help solve the unity problem.38 
However, this conclusion can be questioned. For example, the following people were 
Chinese community leaders in Indonesia during the Sino-Japanese War. From this list, 
we find many examples of people from different regional origins. Hakka were not 
excluded. 
Table 1 Regional Background of the Leaders of Major Chinese Associations in Batavia 
during the Sino-Japanese War 
Stepher. Mun Yoon Leong: 'Sources, agencies and manifestations of overseas Chir.ese nationalism in 
Malaya, 1937-1941". (Los Angeles: Ph.D. dissertation, university of California, 1976). 
Yoji Akashi, The N!i!1y:mg Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941. (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas, 1970), p. 162. 
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Chinese Association of ExportersJ' Zhuang Xi Yan (Fukian) 
Pan Gan Huai (Hakka) 
Shi Ren Rui (peranakan, born in Java) 
Batavia Charity Society-" I Qiu Yuan Rong (Hakka) 
Chen Xing Yan (Fujian) 
Hong Yuan Yuan (peranakan, born in 
Java) 
Lin Sheng Hui (Fujian) 
Lin Wei Min (Hakka) 
Ke Quan Shou (peranakan, born in Java) 
Aspiration Society41 Shi Ren Duan (peranakan, born in Java) 
Zhuang Xi Ya (Fujian) 
Qiu Yuan Rong (Hakka) 
Hong Yuan Yuan (peranakan, born in 
Java) 
There was a pattern to anti-Japanese activism m the 1930s. When one locality 
organized some kind of anti-Japanese activity, other places would soon follow. For 
instance, the San Francisco Chinese Association organized a working group to raise 
funds for anti-Japanese activity a few days after the beginning of the Manchurian 
Incident. Then Chinese associations in New York and Chicago followed a week later. 
The name of thi3 organisation in Chinese was Huaqiao Sburu Shangbui (ffl!iltr.A.i!lil!f). The Chinese 
characten; of the personal names are Zhuang Xi Yan 00:1§\3 ), Pan Gan Huai (illFf'li) imd Shi Ren Rui ( 
M!it!ffil). 
The name in Chinese was 'Bacheng cishan hui' (E'..\~~~ttl. The Chinese characters of the personcl 
names are Qiu Yuan Rong Chen Xing Yan (llli!Jl'lLli!l.), Hong Yuan Yuan (#i;i!lMlilifJ, Lin S'ieng 
Hui (~llil!J, Lin Wei Min (;ffjl~), and Ke Quan Shou (f<il~#) 
The name in Chinese was Li Zhi She (llCIJ~Hl. The Chinese characters of the personal names are Shi Ren 
Duan (/jfjjtJlii,l), Zhuang Xi Yan Qiu Yuan Rong (li:Jf;~). and Hong Yuan Yuan (#\:ll!lfllllf). 
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Within a few weeks, many towns in the Philippines, Thailand, the Dutch Indies and 
Malaya had the same kind of groups performing the same kind of fund-raising 
activities.42 In this sense, under the impact of the Sino-Japanese conflict, the Chinese 
communities in Southeast Asia were no different from other overseas Chinese 
communities elsewhere in the world. 
However, the interaction between China and the Nanyang Chinese community in anti-
Japanese activity was even closer than that involving Chinese in other areas. The kinds 
of interaction between China and Southeast Asian Chinese in anti-Japanese activity can 
be summarized as follows: first, fund-raising to support the Chinese government, in 
which sphere Southeast Asian Chinese contributed the majority of the money remitted 
by overseas Chinese; second, young people went to China to join the army; third, 
skilled labour was provided from Southeast Asia. Altogether, Southeast Asian Chinese 
did more than overseas Chinese communities in other regions. 43 
4) 
Zhang Xi Zhe, 'Kangri zhanzheng shiqi guomin zbengfu de qiaowu gongiuo.' [Overseas Chinese 
Affairs policy of the Republican Government during the Anti-Japanese War] Huaqiao Wenti Lunmwenj, 
46. [Overseas Chinese Issues] (Zhongguo Qiaozheng Xiehui, 1999) [Association for the Study of 
Overseas Chinese Politics], p. I. «MJ:Jlj'IX'fl'!eyJtljili!;JB';jJ&Jffil'JfrliimI{')E» '<ffibiii'fl;jfl'ij3t 
~> , mll.9+nm · '*'~frliill&:~fr. 1999, 1. , 
Zhang Xi Zhe, 'Kan1>ri zhanzheng shiqi guomin zhengfu de qiaowu gongzuo.' [Overseas Chinese 
Affairs policy of the Republican Government during the Anti-Japanese War] Huaqiao Wenti Lunmwenji, 
46. [Overseas Chinese Issues] (Zhongguo Qiaozheng Xiehui, 1999) [Association for the Study of 
Overseas Chinese Politics], pp. 1-22. «ffLEi~~Wllilrei&if.filtlf.lili'bI{')E» 0 <~lilliF~9m 
;jfl'ij3t:lfb, ~17.9+1':~' (tj:ilil{illlil&cl!l\f/, 1999), 1-22' 
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Chinese Intellectuals in Nanyang 
After the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937, many Chinese intellectuals arrived in 
Nanyang to contribute to the anti-Japanese campaign or to avoid the war. :-To matter 
what their original reasons for coming to Nanyang, their arrival in Southeast Asia 
further stimulated a strong sense of patriotism toward China among local Chinese. 
Some wrote articles for newspapers and some became editors. Gradually the Nanyang 
Chinese newspapers became full of concern about the Chinese struggle with Japan, with 
a strong sense of patriotism toward China. The newcomers from China in this period, 
particularly the intellectuals, were seen as one of the main factors stimulating patriotic 
sentiment among the Chinese communities.44 
Jf we consider the role of Chinese intellectuals in the relationship between Nanyang 
Chinese and China in this period, it is easy to find a paradox. The Sino-Japanese 
conflict was the force which drew the attention of Nanyang Chinese to China and, at the 
same time, brought more Chinese intellectuals to Nanyang. Those intellectuals became 
the main groups to develop and debate the idea of a new identity for Southeast Asian 
Chinese in the post-war era. Many key figures among them, such as Yu Ta Fu, Hu Yu 
Zhi, and Bah Ren, arrived in Nanyang in the 1930s because of the Sino-Japanese 
conflict. I will deal with the intellectual and social histories of their new ideas 
individually in Chapter 5. Here I will use their experiences to illustrate their 
engagement with circumstances in Nanyang under the impact of the Sino-Japanese War. 
44 Ide, Kiwata, Nan yo to kakyo. [The South Seas and :he Chinese] (Tokyo: S1mseido, 1941), p. 4. #tl:\*5f[l 
:ct. <1¥i#'iliiilii>, (!lliJlt: ='.~:!It 1941), 4., 
96 
Yu Ta Fu 
At that time, it was common for Chinese intellectuals coming directly from China to 
Nanyang to take up high positions in Chinese newspapers or Chinese schools.45 They 
were often asked to take charge of the anti-Japanese campaign, because they were 
supposed to have the authentic knowledge of events in China required to do this job. In 
the 1930s intellectual exchange between Nanyang and China was still comparatively 
easy. 46 Singapore at that time was the centre for Chinese media in Southeast Asia. 
Singaporean newspapers were influential across the whole region.47 This was why most 
Chinese intellectuals gathered in Singapore in this period. Yu Ta Fu arrived in 
Singapore in December 1938, and became editor of the literary supplement of Sin Chew 
lit Pao.4S 
Many Chinese writers arriving in Nar.yang followed this pattern. For example, Hu Yu Zhi (liJJ~) came 
to Singapore in 1940 to become chief editor of Nan Yang Shang Pao. Wang Ren Shu (:Eff:U'!Zl was 
employed as a teacher by tile Nanyang Nonna! College in 1941. Yang Sao (;\!i\ll!li) came to Singapore as 
the editor of Min C?ao, a journal owned by Tan Kah Kee, in 1941. Zhang Chu Kun (~~:f.!\D arrived in 
Singa;iore ir. 1937 to become editor of L'le literanae section of Nan Yang Shang Pao. Gao Yun Lan (flli'j~ 
I;) came to Muar, Johore to teach in a high school in 1937. Shen Zi Jiu (tl:;:s;.;tL) arrived to become Ho 
Yu Zhi' s assistant at the Nan Yang Shang Pao in 1941. Wang Jin Ding (iEmJI came from Shanghai to 
Singa;iore to teach in 1938, Wang Ji Yuan (:E*C.JI;) came with Hu Yu Zhi to Singa;iore in 1941 and 
became an editor of the Nan Yang Sfuwg Pao. 
This exchange did r.ot take place in the direction from China to Nanyang only, For instance, Lim Boon 
Keng (Lin Wen Qing, tf3ti:!), a Straits Chinese, became the president of Xiamen University in Amoy in 
1935. 
The two major daily newspapers, S1n Chew lit Pao and Nan Yang Shang Pao, were issued in all major 
cities across Southeast Asia and were the major source of information among Chinese intellectual circles 
in Nanyang, 
Some people suggest t'lat Yu Ta Fu was the first famous Chinese writer to be invited to work in Nanyang 
because of the war. See Xu Jun Lian, 'Yu Ta Fu xiansheng zai Xingzhou zayi.' [Remembering Yu Ta 
Fu in Singapore] in Chen Zishan, Wang Zili eds. Hw"yi Y11 Ta F11. [Remembering Yu Ta Fu] (Hunan: 
97 
Yu Ta Fu's life in Nanyang provides a very good example of how a Chinese intellectual 
came under the influence of the Sino-Japanese War. Before Yu went to Singapore in 
December 1938, he was an established writer with a strong individualistic style. He had 
been criticized as 'romantic', 'decadent', and even 'erotic' while he was gaining in fame 
in the 1920s. This was because his '>Vriting was influenced by a Japanese school of 
novelists, the writers of 'shi shosetsu' ('private novels' or 'individual novels'). His 
novels revolved around the themes of individual frustration, anxiety and depression. 
This style was difficult for adherents of traditional Chinese literary styles to accept. His 
novels have been depicted as follows: 'His descriptions of abnormal psychology are 
courageous and truthful, and were greatly admired by the young at the time'. This is 
representative of opinion about Yu Ta Fu among contemporary literary circles.49 But 
because Yu's fiction came at a time of transformation for Chinese literature in the 
1920s, when it catered to a new fashion for individualistic expression, Yu won 
immediate success and was acclaimed as one of the leading exponents of modern 
Chinese literature. His successful novels were therefore acclaimed as pioneering works 
of the new Chinese literature, that had broken with the old Confucian ethical code and 
opened the way for a new era. 
For a vrriter such as Yu Ta Fu, individual circumstances and emotions were the main 
focus of his attention. According to a memoir by his son, Yu became interested in 
Hunan Wenyi Chuba.~she, 1986), p: 479. fff:~illli , <flll.li:K51:::i.{E,!!l.t!Ji~(Hi> " llll!'JF-¥f • ::E§J'.r 
11 " <@ltttmm:K> - <!lillm : llillm3t1tt±::iilird: • l 986J, 479 .• 
'" Ye Wangling, Selected works of Yu Ta Fu. [Modern Literature Library] (Sha.1ghai, Zhongyang Shudian, 
1937), p. I. ~~~Iii • <flll~:k:l!~> • Ji!l.f'Ct!IJ1'F.3tl!i.l 0 (l:i'!JJ: rp;k:ifljflf, 1937), !. • 
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travel and liked to write of his travel experiences before he came to Singapore. One 
important reason for his accepting the invitation to work in Singapore was that he 
wanted to get away from the political atmosphere in China. 50 After he arrived in 
Singapore, he still wrote, as he used to do, about his own personal life in detail for 
newspapers and journals. He published his collection of poems titled 'Narrative Poems 
of a Ruined Family'51 in the third month of his stay in Singapore. In these poems he 
described his feelings of suspicion and frustration about his wife's adultery. Many 
critics pointed out that while the war was raging in China, it was not the right time to 
mourn over personal sorrows to the exclusion of the national crisis. But he continued to 
encourage the local youth to create literature which expressed their true feelings toward 
the world in which they lived. Yu answered his critics with 'I am not a fighter but only 
a writer.' 52 He declined to respond to the expectations of Nanyang Chinese who had 
been concerned from the beginning about the social and political situation resulting 
from the Sino-Japanese War. 
Soon after, though, people gradually discovered that Yu was a fluent and convincing 
writer of political essays. He was in fact one of the key figures who wrote political 
essays in the newspapers to encourage the Nanyang Chinese to support the anti-
Japanese campaign. He switched to a new theme and genre, which was to instigate anti-
Japanese passions and to support the resistance in China. His style was simple and 
Yu Fei, 'Yu Ta Fu di Xingzhou san nian.' [Yu Ta Fu' s t.'rree years in Singap0re] Hujyi Yll Ta Fu. 
[Remembering Yu Ta Fu] (Hunan: Hunan Wenyi Chubanshe, 1986), p. 452. fil!:IR: • «1l~~~!f;J£ll':·IC:: 
olf», Jllll:f~ · ±E!l'l:lii, <IE!t'-fl1lii*> 0 (li\Jlf¥i : li\JJWl>c'1il±\lt&ifd: ' 1986), 452. 0 
The Chinese title is Huijia shiji (ll.f):~~*E). 
Yu Ta Fu' Wo dui ni :nen mei you shi wang.' [I don' t feel disappointed in you] Xjng z/1011 d baa, 25 
January 1939. fll\~7': • «f!l!>lf~pfl'Jt~ 1'f 9':'§'!.» 0 <Ji!.l'ltl 13 ¥!<>, 25 January 1939. ' 
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forceful, and readily persuaded his readers. Liu Zunqi, his colleague at the Sin Chew fit 
Pao, described Yu's writing thus: 'On the anti-Japanese war, no matter how many 
terrible things have happened at the front and behind the lines, Yu always maintains a 
high degree of optimism in a convincing manner' .53 
Many people have confirmed that his articles evoking anti-Japanese sentiment were 
popular among Nanyang Chinese readers.54 An expert on Mahua literature (Malayan 
Chinese Literature), Fang Xiu, provides a detailed account of how he discovered to his 
amazement that the anonymous political essays published in Sin Chew fit Pao were 
penned by Yu Ta Fu. Fang Xiu suggested that Yu's main contribution to Mahua 
literature was those political essays rather than any other form of literature, and that his 
writings on political issues were critica1ly important in leading Nanyang Chinese to 
support China's struggle with Japan.55 The career of Yu Ta Fu illustrates a writer who 
had been only interested in individual emotion tuming into a fighter for the whole 
Chinese nation. 
" Preface by Lii: Zunqi to Yu Feng, ed. The co!lectc:d overseas writings of Yu Ta Fu. {Beijing: San Lian 
Publishing co .. 1990). irrlitm. <Ff>, fi~Jl\i~ · <filli'!~l'lii'7f.Y:~>, {;fcl'ii: : C:::l!ml±ill!iJi[t, 1990). , 
H For instance, Xu Jun Lian, 'Yu Ta Fu xiansheng zai Xingzhou zayi.' [Remembering Yu ':'a Fu in 
Singapore] in Huiyi Yu Ta Fu. [Remembering Yu Ta Fuj (Hunan: Hunan Wenyi Chubanshe, 1986), p. 
Y:~l±l!i&lii± ' 1986), 479 ° Also Li Jin Quan 'Yi Yu Ta Fu xiansbeng' [Remembering Mr. Yu Ta 
Fu] Huiyi Yu Ta Fu. (Hunan: Humm Wenyi Publisher, 1986), p. 503. *5lI*', «tlfl1l~*%~» 0 !Ill! 
r~ • =EIS::VJliii 0 <liiltiffil~*> 0 (il;!ll¥J : ii\llJ¥i:ttil±l~&ifd: · 1986), 503. 0 
55 Fang, Xiu, 'Yu Ta Fu liugei bendi di yibi wenxue yicban.' [The Litera.ry Heritage that Yu Ta Fu Left 
for Malaya] Mahua xjnwenxue j qi /Js,?i Iunkuo. [The New Mahua Literature and its historical outline] 
(Singapore: Wan Li Cultural Enterprises, 1972). Jifll!', «ti~~*1¥1re;¢::f!!l1¥.1-*Y.:~iii1l1» 0 d!ii 
v~x"J!.&;tt:~5!:'.fi!li,fg> , <ol'fr.tm:tti : mH!Y:ft:JE:*, 1972). , 
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When the Pacific War broke out, Yu Ta Fu led 74 representatives of literature and the 
arts in Singapore in a public manifesto, which proved to be the last political essay 
published by Yu in Singapore. The text of the statement declared: 
Nobody will ever forget the debt in blood the Japanese fascists have mounted 
towards our ancestral land over the last four years .... Nobody will stand by and 
watch while the tragedy is re-enacted in Malaya. .. . We must protect our 
brothers and sisters, our homes and property, and we must protect Malaya' .56 
We can see here that although the starting point is China, the conclusion is clear that the 
Malayan Chinese should strive to defend Malaya. This essay reflects the impression 
that the outbreak of the Pacific War made on Chinese intellectuals and sets an aim for 
the Malayan Chinese; the defence of Malaya. 
Hu YuZhi 
Hu Yu Zhi's work as a journalist was based in Singapore. He remained in Nanyang for 
seven years, from December 1940 to March 1948. 57 Memorial articles after his death in 
1989 said he had played an important role in China's new literature movement, had 
been a prominent publisher in China, and had conducted the Chinese Esperanto 
Yu Ta Fu, 'Open letter to our compatriots from the Chinese literary and cultural workers of Singapore' , 
Sin Chkw lit Pao, 13 December, 1941. f!B~7': • <<*1f!JotB<:wfrlli:X:~I{'Fi'!fJ.l&llfilll;jf,1l;*215fr<!lllfilit 
», <!ii'ltl B¥f.l>, 13 December, 1941. 
" Zhang Chu Kun.' Hu Yu Zhi zai Nanyang di qinian' [Hu Yu Zhi' s seven years in Nanyang] Fei Xiao 
Tong and Xia Yan ed. Hu Yu ZhiyLryxiang Ji [Our memories of Hu Yu Z'ii] (Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi 
Chubanshe, !989). ~;11!~, <<tiiJ~;<:.1£i¥.iff.i'l(J-t:"JO», ff®., b!ro >l!iij, <i1itll!'i;t;;~:Ellll<~C> 0 W; 
: tflml:tz1ti'illilt&lfd:, 1989), ~ 
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promotion campaign. 58 Ru's Nanyang experience was only a part of his lifelong 
achievement. From the Malayan point of view, he left Malaya in 1948 after living there 
temporarily, and never came back to the Malay Peninsula again. It is easy to neglect his 
role in the history of the Malayan Chinese. 
Hu Yu Zhi arrived in Singapore in December 1940, two years after Yu Ta Fu, to work 
for the leading Chinese newspaper, Nanyang Shang Pao, as chief editor. Before he 
came to Southeast Asia, he was an established writer of fiction as well as a 
commentator on international politics in China. In Singapore he wrote leading articles 
for Nanyang Shang Pao almost every day in 1941, until the eve of the Pacific War. 
This was the period when international politics became the real focus of attention for 
the Nanyang Chinese communities. These articles gained him quite a reputation among 
the Nanyang Chincsc.59 
Among Hu's articles, the most famous was his series titled 'Protecting Nanyang'. It 
consisted of six ar1icles under the same main heading. The first appeared on 14 
February, 1941. He chose the title 'Protecting Nanyang' to indicate that this was the 
major responsibility of the Nanyang Chinese. He asserted that protecting Nanyang was 
the responsibility of the Nan yang Chinese because Nanyang was their second home, and 
because 'only Nanyang Chinese could claim that they wanted to protect Nanyang as a 
whole', He raised the question of who would be willing to fight for the Southeast Asian 
'' Pei Xiao Tong and Xia Yan ed. Hu Yu Zili yinxiangji, [Our memories of Huy, Zhi] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
Youyi Chuba~she, 1989). 'R:f¥li!i, ~. <Nl!S£EfJ~&'.> 0 (~tJi!: : itl!!!lt!tttl±lit,W!±, 1989). • 
" Yu You, Hu Yu Z/Ji zhuan. [Biography of Hu Yu Zbi] (Beijing: Xinbua Chubanshe, 1993). 'J':;!t, <Rll~ 
ZfltlJ> • (~tl'Jl: : ff-t±llt'lfiii±, 1993). , 
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territories in fighting colonialism, and suggested that only the Nanyang Chinese would 
do so, 'for the obvious reason that Nanyang was their lifeline' .60 
In the second article, Hu discussed how to avoid war in Southeast Asia. He suggested 
that the local Chinese in Southeast Asia should support China in fighting the Japanese 
so as to prevent the war spreading to Southeast Asia. 61 He insisted that protecting 
China (baowei Zhongguo) was of higher priority than protecting Nanyang (baowei 
Nanyang). His articles consistently argued that for the Nanyang Chinese, to support 
China's resistance against Japan was always the first priority. This kind of opinion also 
appeared in his other articles supporting fund-raising activities by the National 
Salvation Movement for China. 62 In the third article of this series, he continued to 
discuss the relationship between protecting China and protecting Nanyang and argued 
that his concern was not only with the interests of the Nanyang Chinese but also with 
those of the other people in Nanyang. 63 If China could maintain an effective resistance 
against Japan, Japan would lose the ability to advance southwards. 
In the fourth article, Hu Yu Zhi expressed appreciation of the US government's 
financial loans to China to support China's resistance. He suggested that the best way 
See Hu Yu Zhi, 'Lun baowei Nanyang' [Protecticg Nanyang (l)J Nanyang Shang Bao. , 14 Feb, 194 L 
ii!J!!)):z, «~illif'iH~ii¥il'f'», <i¥il'¥"~¥1b. 14 Feb, 1941. 0 
See Hu Yu Zhi, 'Zai lun baowei Nanyang.' [Protecting Nanyang (2)] Nanyang Shang Bao, 15 Feb. 
1941. i.'i§l!\zZ., «R~i!il~l¥ii'f'», <f¥jrf::'!ll¥11>, 15 Feb. 1941. 
For details about this moverr:ent, see Yoji Akashi, The Nanyang Cillnese Natiomll Salvation Movement, 
1937-1941. (Lawrence: U:iiversity of Kansas, 1970). 
See Hu Yu Zhi 'San Jun baowci Nanyang.' [Protecting Nanyang (3)] Nanyang Shang Bao, 17 Feb. 
1941. ~~z. <<=-~1iill*1Wi¥J1¥», <l¥Jt¥'ii:ij¥Jb, 11 Feb. 1941. 
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to protect Nanyang was through cooperation between the US and Britain.64 In the fifth 
article, he continued to proclaim that the Americans, British and Dutch should form an 
alliance to defend Nanyang against Japan. He suggested that economic sanctions 
against Japan could be the first step for those countries to take in cooperation before 
entering a military alliance.65 Clearly, he had no Southeast Asian perspective at that 
time. His strategy still relied on the colonial powers and he was unaware of a Malay or 
Indonesian perspective. His consideration of the coming war in Southeast Asia was still 
China-centred. 
Hu Yu Zhi also responded to the powerful Japanese propaganda campaign for 'Asian 
liberation'. In the final article of this series, he discussed how to approach the professed 
Japanese policy to liberate the people of Southeast Asia. He suggested that 'Far East 
democracy' could defeat the Japanese efforts to recruit the Southeast Asian natives 
behind the vision of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. He said that the 
pursuit of freedom and democracy for the people in Nanyang and the protection of 
Nanyang were indissolubly linked.66 'Far East Democracy' according to Hu meant that 
Nanyang Chinese could work together with other ethnic groups in order to resist 
invasion and protect their freedom and dignity once they had achieved democracy. 
M See Hu Yu Zhi, 'Si lun baowei Nanyang.' [Protecting Nanyang (4)] Nanyang Shang Bao, 18 Feb. 
1941. tJJJ!!.(z, «12]~fflr~lfl.ii¥il!i':» • <i'l'if'fi!ll'¥~>. 18 Feb. 1941. 
" Hu Yu Zhi i'iJJJ!!.(Z.(1979) li;~Jlli:Z'.'F.IIill!l • Jj'/J{f:t~ · 'tfi!JDI&' : J:ifi,!tfliU • Hu Yu Zhi zucpin 
xuan. F:mg Xiu edit. Siagapore: Shanghai Sh:iju. [Selected works of Hu Yu Zhi]. 
" See Hu Yu Zhi, 'Liu Jun baowei Nanyang.' [Protecting Nanyang (6)] Na,1yang Shang Bao, 28 Feb. 
1941. i'i.lli!'!:z, «/\ir.l~f«fiflw» ~ <i'l'i/¥-11!lW>, 28 Feb. 1941. 
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That was the way he responded to the Japanese propaganda of liberation for the 
Southeast Asian races. He maintained this opinion on democracy after the Japanese 
occupation. Through his intensive publicity work at this critical time, the slogan of 
'Protecting Nanyang' became widespread in Nan yang Chinese circles. 
The Consequences of the Sino-Japanese Conflict 
Akashi Yoji has written that: 'Their anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement in its 
various forms was the only way the Nanyang Chinese knew in which this minority 
group could express its national feeling against Japan's injustice toward their 
fatherland.' 67 Akashi used the term 'National Salvation Movement' to cover many 
different kinds of relationship between China and the Nanyang Chinese in this period. 
The activities of the anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement included soliciting 
contributions, bond subscriptions, boycotts, investment in China's industrial 
development, sending combat and non-combat service corps to China, and the 'Buy-
Chinese-Products' campaign. Akashi's work mainly focused on structural relationships 
and organisational activities, and accordingly he argued for a causal relationship 
between the National Salvation Movement and Nanyang Chinese nationalism as 
follows: 
"When the economic or self-interests of the Nanyang Chinese were not 
compatible with KMT political interests, the National Salvation Movement 
began to lose its effectiveness .... This self-interest explains both the decrease of 
Yoji Ak:ashi, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941. (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas, 1970), p. 167. 
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enthusiasm as a result of the prolonged drive and the noticeable slackening of 
boycott and anti-Japanese activities when Japan emerged as a dominant 
Southeast Asian power in 1941. A general decline in the effectiveness of the 
National Salvation Movement may be attributed to Nanyang Chinese interest in 
protection and survival. The behaviour of some business leaders indicated that 
they did not wish to get involved further in outright anti-Japanese activity when 
Japan's dominance was imminent in Southeast Asia.''68 
There is a problem in the definition of 'self-interest'. Sometimes, the 'self here means 
personal business interests, sometimes it means the interest of the Nan yang Chinese 
community. Ku Hung Ting, a scholar who did research on this issue, criticized 
Akashi' s conclusion, pointing out that nationalism is not a good explanation for the 
movement. The causality could have worked in the opposite way. The movement 
could have generated a sense of nationalism. 69 
The majority of the Chinese population worked in business in most parts of Southeast 
Asia. 57.6 percent of the Chinese worked in business in Java and 41 percent in Malaya 
in the early 1930s. 70 The Chinese communities in Southeast Asia were basically 
apolitical before the Sino-Japanese conflict, with some exceptions of peranakan politics. 
Political links with China were strengthened through the practice of anti-Japanese 
Yoii Akashi, The Nany!ll1g Chinese National Salva/ion Movement, 1937-1941. (Lawrence: University o:!' 
Kansas, 1970), pp. 165-166. 
Gu Hong Ting, 'Lun malaiya huaren minzu zhuyi yundong zhi yanjiu.' [Research on the nationalist 
movement among the Malayan Chinese] in Dong nan ya huaqiao di rentong wend. [The problem of 
identity among the Southeast Asian Chineo5e] ('Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Gongsi, 1994), pp. 39-40. 15~ 
~ • «~Rt'31<:.5.2¥A.R~.:Ei!l!!!!llhZliff"fD> 0 <~1¥J2'1i\i~fl'lllllil1lf!ll2!'!> Ctl~t : ~MlltHK&0 
Ei] ' 1994) , 39·40. 0 
N. A. Simoniya, The Overseas Chinese in Soulheast Asia- A Rusd!ll1 Study. (New York: Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 1961), p.57. 
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activism. Close contact with China's government did not mean that the Nanyang 
Chinese were directly influenced by the political situation, but it meant that the public 
space for political issues had been widened. The Southeast Asian Chinese now had 
their own voice in regard to political issues. Many Chinese writers arrived in Southeast 
Asia to take part in the propaganda movement. However, even when those writers 
occupied the most important positions in the Nanyang Chinese newspapers, once they 
started to work in Nanyang, they tended of necessity to consider issues from the 
Nanyang Chinese point of view and to express opinions in the way which their Chinese 
readers could accept. 
To understand the consequences of the Sino-Japanese war among the Nanyang Chinese 
community is essential for understanding of the shift of Chinese identity after the war. 
Patriotic sentiment towards China reached a historical high point during the war. We 
should consider this situation as the starting point for the identity issue of the post-war 
era. The impact of the Sino-Japanese War on the mindset of the Southeast Asian 
Chinese was great. The effects of the mobilization of Chinese residents in Southeast 
Asia before the Pacific War could still be seen after the period of Japanese occupation. 
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Chapter4 
The Turning Point: the Japanese Era, 1942·1945 
The era of Japanese occupation (1942-1945) played a very significant role in the 
modem history of Southeast Asia. The Japanese regime was the only one in modem 
history to control the whole Southeast Asian region. Though the duration of the 
Japanese era was very short, less than four years, it was a turning point in the history of 
most countries in Southeast Asia. Japanese rule or intervention marked the end of the 
European colonial era in Southeast Asia as well as the beginning of modem national 
integration for most Southeast Asian nations. This period is also very important in the 
process of identity change among Nanyang Chinese as it is often described as 'the 
watershed' in the modern history of Nanyang Chinese. 
The impact of the Japanese occupation on Chinese identity should not be seen only in 
terms of the historical events that took place during the occupation. The first section of 
this discussion will focus on Japanese perceptions of Southeast Asia, and explain what 
made their ethnic policy distinctive. The most important impact of the Japanese 
occupation in the long tenn was the changes it made in the Southeast Asian political 
structure and in people's understanding of what was politically important. This will be 
discussed in the second section of this chapter, 'The Japanese legacy in the structure and 
agenda of Southeast Asian politics'. The third section will examine the impact of the 
Japanese occupation on ethnic relations between Chinese and indigenous people in 
Malaya and Indonesia in the 1940s. Due to the different Japanese attitudes toward 
Southeast Asian 'natives' and Chinese, the impact of the occupation on this ethnic 
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relationship was considerable, and led to reorientation of identity within Chinese 
communities, and of the relationship of the Chinese with indigenous people and with 
the new nation. 
These changes in the relationship between ethnic Chinese and pribumi are traced in this 
study to the influence of Japanese pan-Asianism. The Japanese attempted to develop 
their own style of colonialism, which differed from that practised by the European 
powers. Their pan-Asian propaganda initially conveyed brotherhood with Southeast 
Asian indigenous people but suspicion toward Chinese residents. However, Japanese 
administrations later found it necessary to use Chinese in the economic and military 
sectors, which allowed for Chinese and indigenous co-operation. This close contact 
under these special conditions again influenced the subsequent ethnic relationship. We 
should investigate the different Japanese perceptions of Southeast Asian Chinese and 
'natives' in order to know how and why these policies were made. 
The Impact of Japanese Occupation: Pan-Asianisrn and Ethnic Policy 
There are relatively few studies of the Japanese era in Southeast Asian scholarship in 
English. 1 Among them, the main focus is on the relationship between the Japanese and 
Southeast Asian nationalists. 2 Ethnic Chinese are not the major concern. However, 
Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Inrroductory History. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), p. 134. 
For example, Benedict Anderson, lava in a Time of Re;-oludon: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University, 1972) and Harry Jindrich Benda, 'Indonesian Islam under the Japanese 
Occupation, 1942-1945.' Pa.ci!Ic Affairs, (1955), 28(4): 250-262. Harry Jindrich Benda, The Crescent 
and the Rising Sun: lndonesian l>lll!ll under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. (The Hague: Van 
Boeve, 1958). 
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Chinese literature on the subject, both academic and non-academic, emphasizes that the 
Japanese era was the watershed for the change in Nanyang Chinese identity and for 
ethnic relations. Instead of deseribing the hardships suffered during the Japanese 
occupation, as many memoirs written by Southeast Asian Chinese have done, I will 
record Japanese perceptions and policy towards Southeast Asia and how this related to 
Nanyang identity. In measuring the impact of the Japanese oecupation, the longer term 
effects will be considered. For example, in Hara Fujio's study, the resettlement 
schemes of the Japanese occupation were seen to contribute to reorientation of Chinese 
identity because they led to the founding of the locally oriented political party, the 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1949, four years after the end of the Japanese 
occupation. In this sense, the discussion of the impact of the Japanese occupation will 
not be limited to the events which happened in this period. 
The Significance of the Japanese Occupation 
After the invasion of the Dutch East Indies, the archipelago was divided into three 
administrative units--The Sumatra region was administrated by the Japanese 25th 
Army, the Java region by the 16'0 Army, and the remainder of the Indies by the 
Japanese Navy. Malaya was once under the administration of the Japanese 25'0 Army, 
and then seperated ftom Sumatra a year later. For the two future countries, Indonesia 
and Malaya, the differences and their subsequent effects of the Japanese were very 
significant. But here I would like to focus only on Japanese ideas of Pan-Asianism and 
the ethnic policy in this period of time. Pan-Asianism was used as a legitimating idea in 
Japanese propaganda. How it would be applied to the relationship between ethnic 
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Chinese and indigenous populations, and its effect on Chinese identity, need further 
research. Twang Peck Yang's work on the Chinese business elite in Indonesia is an 
exception to the rule that studies of the occupation have focused on the Indonesian 
indigenous population (henceforth pribumi). 3, though his main concern was the business 
activities of ethnic Chinese rather than identity or ethnic relationships. 4 Studies of 
Malaya tend to focus on the impact of the Japanese occupation on ethnic relationships 
or on the Malay population rather than how this period contributed to the shift in 
Chinese identity from China-oriented to local-oriented5, except for Hara Fujio in his 
work on Chinese communities in Malaya during the occupation period.6 
For example, Benedict R. Anderson, Some Aspec/s oflndonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 
1944-1945. (It'iaca: Cornell University. 1961) and Harry Jindrich Benda. The Crescent and the Rising SuD: 
lndoDesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. (The Hagee: Van Hreve, 1958). Also GolD 
Ken'ichi, lVihon semyoki idoneshia kenkyu. [Studies on Indonesia Under Jap1mese Occupation] (Tokyo: 
Ryukeishosha, 1989). f&ii~- <B 2f',:~liliflltll 1 r ~ y 7liff'1:> , C~]j\ : 1989) . , 
Twang Peck Yang, The Chinese Business Ehte in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence 194{}-
19S(}. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
Regarding etlmic relationships, see Wan Hashim Wan The, Race Relations in Afalaysia. (Kuala Lumpur: 
Heineman. 1983) and Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Re:efstance and Socjaf CoDflict D111ing 
and After The Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983). 
Regarding the impact on Malay people, see Halinah Bamadhaj, The lm]Jtlcl of the Japanese Occupation of 
Malaya Society and Politics 1941-1945. (Auckla.~d: University of Auckland, 1975) and Abu Talib Ahmad, 
'The Impact of the Japanese Occupation on the Malay-Muslim Population' , in Paul H. Kratoska ed. 
!vfalaya and Siogap0re During the Japanese Occ11pation. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1995). 
Hara Fujio ed., Tomm Aja kakyo to chugoku--chugokll kizoku ishiki kara ka;in islli c. [Overseas 
Chinese in Southeast Asia and China: Conversion of the Object of Their Identity from China to the 
Residing Counuies] (Tokyo: The Institute of Developing Economies, 1993), lii\1'=* ( ~) ~ J.!l:i¥f7 
:;7~~/:tp[J>i-tj::l~:lffl~;fi!:iiil!i:6''',11¥A.gllill:"'• )f!)i'(:797~Wiliff'l'e.PJT' 1993' (liff'f'i' 
"IX~ 436) and Hara Fujio, 'The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and the Chinese Community' , in 
Paul H. Kratoska ed. Malaya and Singapore During the Japanese Occu]Jtl/Jon. (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1995). 
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In his well-researched article, "The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and the Chinese 
Community'', Hara Fujio examined the Chinese leaders of different organizations by 
comparing their background, their behaviour during the Japanese occupation and the 
quality of their leadership in the post-war era. He concluded that the occupation period 
did contribute to the transformation of Chinese identity in Malaya, though he did not 
pursue the implications of this transformation. He stated in his conclusion: ' ... this 
situation [forced resettlement of Malayan Chinese, a scheme promoted by the Japanese 
Military Administration in Malaya] played a part in reorienting the identity of Chinese 
settlers from China to Malaya. In this sense, Japan contributed to affirming the 
Malayan identity of the Chinese.' 7 
Japanese occupation policy was not based altogether on objective strategic analysis of 
the aims and needs of their military administration, but was deeply influenced by the 
cultural stereotypes then prevailing in Japan about Chinese and pribumi. The Japanese 
occupation makes for very controversial history: as Murai Yoshinori has suggested, two 
different kinds of historiography are contending in the study of the Japanese occupation 
in Southeast Asia, and particular! y Indonesia, in which the intellectual influence of the 
needs of post-war Japanese domestic politics clashes with the categorical realities of the 
dominant Anglo-American world view. 8 Murai suggested an alternative viewpoint 
which would bypass the debate of the "great discourse" over Japanese national guilt or 
Hara Fujio, 'The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and the Chinese Community' , in Paul H. Kratoska 
ed. Malaya and Smgap0re Dwillg the Japanese Occupation (Singapore: Si'.lgapore University Press, 
1995), p. 58. 
One is the Allies historiography, which implies that the Allies stood on the side of justice. Another is 
"liberation historiography" , which emphasizes that Japan did the right thing to help Asian liberation. 
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the lack of it.9 In another article, he suggested a 'third-party' position, neither from the 
Japanese side nor from Southeast Asian nationalist side, for research on the Japanese 
occupation. He and his co-authors presented two possible perspectives from the 
experience of other participants in the war and the occupation. One is that of Korean 
soldiers, who joined the fighting and the administration of occupied territory without the 
ideology of Asian liberation into which Japanese soldiers had been indoctrinated. 
Another is from the romusha, (pribumi recruited as labourers by the Japanese) who 
cooperated with the Japanese authorities without concern for political aims. 10 The case 
of the Korean soldiers in a further study also provides a different viewpoint on the 
history of the Japanese occupation. 11 The experience of ethnic Chinese during the 
Japanese occupation can provide another base for a third party position, perhaps one 
that further illuminates the operation of cultural stereotypes about races and nations, 
past and present, and helps to counter their effect. I will discuss Japanese pan-Asianism 
and Japanese perceptions of and policy towards Southeast Asian 'natives' and Chinese 
from this perspective. 
Murai Yosbinori, 'Nihongunsei no Seijiryokugaku.' [The Political Dynamics of Japanese Military 
Administration in Indonesia] Tonan A)ia no Kokusaikankei [International Relations in Southeast Asia] 
(Tokyo: Kobundo, 1991) f't#el!&, «E3 *jjl'.iJ&OJiJ&yfOJ:J'.'f» 0 <*1¥J7 y 7 <V[;!;i~~~{}i',> ° Clf!: 
J.(," : 'lL3t:J.il;, 1991). 0 
Murai Yoshinori (1991), p. 235. 
Utsumi. Aiko and Murai, Yos.hinori, Sekidoka no chosen.fin hanran. [Revolts of Koreans in Japanese 
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Pan-Asianism 
As a late-emerging colonial power, Japan tried hard to learn from the experience of 
European rule in Southeast Asia. The Japanese conducted extensive surveys of 
Southeast Asia before the southward advance. They also tried to find ways of 
governing their colonies which were different from those of the European colonial 
powers. Pan-Asianism was conceived by the Japanese military as a legitimating ideal 
before they took action to go southward. 
In Japan, a school of thought known as pan-Asianism existed long before the Pacific 
War. At first, the term "pan-Asianism" referred to East Asia, or to the domain of Kanji 
culture. Even though many Japanese close to the government had expressed special 
interest in Southeast Asia for several decades before the Pacific War, the Japanese 
government only seriously considered taking Southeast Asian territories as colonies of 
the Japanese empire after the alliance with Germany and Italy was concluded in 1940, 
one and a half years before the outbreak of the Pacific War. 12 Before this, Southeast 
Asia had been the recognized purlieu of European power, while the Philippines were an 
American colony. Japan's imperial ambitions were focused on China and other East 
Asian areas, Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan. The association between Japanese pan-
Asianism and Southeast Asia came very late.13 
Hatano Sumio, 'Goukubo to nanshinron.' in Yano Tooru ed. Tonanaja tonihon. (Tokyo: Kobunto, 
1991), pp. 147-165. l!!l.§.lffl!fti, «illll~.JJ:m11!,1t1¥l~i\f.l», :')<::!l!J'~li <l:fl'.i¥i7 y 7 t 8::$:> ' C!ll' 
J.i{: !ll.37.::§1: ' 1991), 147-165. ' 
Myers, Ramon H. and Mark R. Peattie eds., The Japanese Colomal Empire, 1895-1945. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984). Yano Tooru, Nanslu'n no keffu. [Genealogy of 'Southward 
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Japan launched the concepts of the "East Asia New Order" and "Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere" in 1940 and 1941, just before the advance into Southeast Asia, and 
used the idea of "Asia for the Asians" as propaganda throughout Southeast Asia during 
the occupation. The idea of "Asian liberation" was a new element in Japanese 
colonialism. This colonialist ideology, which claimed to oppose European colonialism, 
had never been applied when Japan colonised Formosa, Korea, Manchuria or the 
occupied area of China. Also, when a Japanese pan-Asianism first appeared as a current 
of political thought in the early 20th century, the reference to "Asia" chiefly meant 
China, sometimes included India or Korea, but never referred to Southeast Asia. The 
Japanese notion of pan-Asianism only started to refer to Southeast Asia from the late 
1930s. 
The impact of Japan's pan-Asian ideology varied across the occupied territories. There 
are many nations, ethnic groups, religious sects, and language communities in Asia, and 
the sense of genuine "Asian" identity is arguable. But Japanese military authorities did 
use the idea of pan-Asianism as propaganda to legitimate their southward advance 
policy in the Japanese domestic context, and to induce the people of Southeast Asia to 
cooperate with Japanese administration during the Second World War. Domestically, 
this idea helped to legitimate the southward advance, with the aim of winning public 
support and full mobilization. In Southeast Asia, it won the collaboration of some 
nationalists, such as Sukarno in Indonesia and Aung San in Burma, at the beginning of 
the Japanese occupation. 
Advance' ](Tokyo: Chuo Shinsho, 1975). 5".ll!fim, < "1¥i~J (l)*ilf> •(~Ult i:j:i~~iftt' 
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Japanese pan-Asianism had a dual character. As many Japanese scholars, like Miwa 
Kimitada and Takeuchi Yoshimi, have suggested, the concept actually mixed the ideas 
of invasion and liberation, and combined official ends-oriented pragmatism and non-
official idealism. 14 The concept of pan-Asianism emphasized the need for economic 
collaboration but was based on presumed cultural affiliation. The Japanese pursued 
control in Southeast Asia but also supported independence movements. Even though 
Japan promised to support political independence, the Japanese still emphasized that 
Japan should be the leader of the co-prosperity sphere. They helped anti-colonialism 
against the Western powers but strongly encouraged Japanisation as well. They 
repressed Chinese in the region because they were at war with China and because 
Chinese were seen as middlemen collaborating with Western colonialists, but they also 
recruited Chinese because they thought Chinese should contribote to local society. 
Through Japanese eyes, the Southeast Asian Chinese were sometimes the enemy and 
sometimes a "brother race" in the "Asian family". Thus, Japanese pan-Asianism was 
shot through with contradictions. 
Pan-Asianism was not exclusively Japanese in its intellectual origins. The concept of 
pan-Asianism was also well known in China, because it had been developed by Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen. On 28 November 1924, Dr. Sun gave a series of speeches on pan-Asianism in 
Kobe, Japan. He said there were two ways of practising pan-Asianism. The first one, 
1975). ' 
Miwa, Kimitada, Ni.lion na 1930 nendm> Kuni no uclii to soto kara. [Japan in the 1930's: an inside and 
outside view of the country] (Tokyo: Saikosha, 1980). -'11\i0,\l:. <E;2j\:(7) 1930 "Ffl:':---·IJ!IO:>i*l l::~tP 
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corresponding to the Confucian ideal of "the king's way", was to help other Asian 
nations to become free from foreign control. Dr. Sun's follower Wang Ching Wei 
referred to pan-Asianism to legitimate instituting peace talks with the Japanese. Later 
he became president of the puppet regime in the occupied area of China. But pan-
Asianism in occupied China never developed in the direction of "Asian liberation". The 
Chinese people were not asked to help other Asian nationalist movements. If we 
examine Japanese propaganda in China at this time, we find the only emphases are on 
cooperation between Chinese and Japanese, social justice in East Asia, and correction of 
pro-British and pro-American attitudes. There was no idea of "Asian Liberation" for 
the Chinese people in China.15 
Communist ideology in Asia also suggested the idea of "Asian liberation". But the 
Chinese Communist Party did not emphasise pan-Asianism. The declaration of war on 
Japan by the Chinese Communist Party on 9 December 1941, one day after the Pacific 
War began, did not express any such idea.16 Tan Malaka, an Indonesian revolutionary 
leader and former head of the Communist Party, lived in hiding within the Indonesian 
Chinese community for more than ten years. He did not ask the Chinese to help the 
Indonesian struggle for independence.17 In short, left-wing activists did not use pan-
ll 
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Asianist sentiment to mobilize the people before the Japanese launched their pan-Asian 
propaganda, even though there were communications between Asian Communist 
Parties at the time. 
Japanese Ethnic Pereeptions and Ethnic Policy 
During the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, at least in Malaya and lndonesia, 
Japanese policy was racially oriented, especially in its differing treatment of the Chinese 
and the other Malay/Indonesian ethnic groups. Japanese ideas about Southeast Asian 
natives led to their policy of favouring Malay and Indonesian natives. There were 
romantic "noble savage" ideas about Southeast Asian natives, or Malay/Indonesian 
natives, expressed in Japanese popular literature. This is likely to have changed the 
ethnic relationship between Chinese and pribumi. 
This romanticized idea of Southeast Asian natives, namely the Malay and "Indoneshia" 
race, gradually developed in Japan during the 1930s. A sense of intimacy between the 
Japanese people and the native people of Southeast Asia was emphasized in popular 
discourse. Unlike the contemporary emphasis on the concept of "essence of 
civilization" in discussion of the relationship between China and Japan, expressed by 
Japanese terms such as "bunmei kaika" (literally 'civilization and enlightenment')18 and 
"dobun doshu" (literally 'the same races using the same characters')19, this sense of 
intimacy between Japan and Southeast Asia based itself on ethnography rather than 
"bunmei kaika" (3t~ll~ft). 
" "dobun doshu" (IQJ3tfl'J;!!ID. 
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civilisation, referring to physical characteristics, items of material culture and racial 
history.zo At the same time, Japanese perceptions of Southeast Asian Chinese gradually 
came to contain more contempt and even animosity. Japanese images of pribwni and 
Nanyang Chinese are discussed in tum below. 
The Japanese image of the pribumi 
A great number of books and articles on the geographical and ethnographic situation of 
Southeast Asia were published in Japan just before the Japanese invaded Southeast 
Asia. Through them we can compare Japanese racial ideas about Chinese people and 
Southeast Asian natives. The racial romanticism about these peoples was evidently 
widespread among the Japanese population, as these books and articles include not only 
academic works but also publications for general readers. Simplified summaries from 
ethnographic works appeared everywhere in publications which promoted the 
Southward Advance policy. The same ideas can be found in propaganda issued in 
Southeast Asia during the Japanese occupation.21 
These ethnographic works made the sense of intimacy with the Southeast Asian 
indigenous people seem more authentic and intense. For example, Matsuoka Shizuo 
emphasized the close relationship in racial origins among the "Pacific Races", which 
Nihon Takushoku Kyokai ed., Nanpo bunken mokuroku. [Classified Bibliography on the Soufu] (Tokyo: 
Nihon Takushoku Kyokai, 1942). El*f.!iiliiffr!,f< *i, <i¥i1l.Y:~§~> ° CllUJ<: B4-i6l:l'\li0Jfi': 
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(Tokyo: Sengabo, 1943). <Jf!l'Ff";~I:: \*j'l>' Gf!>if : rll!fft~, 1943). ' 
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included the Japanese as well as the races of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. 22 
Nishimura Matsugi emphasized that the Japanese race and the races of the South were 
all "ocean races". The "ocean races", unlike the "Mongolian race" in China, did not 
bond with territories and could migrate from island to island, so it was easy for "ocean 
races" to mix blood with other races.23 One of the origins of the Japanese race was the 
"lndoneshia" race. He believed that the Japanese race actually shared ancestry with the 
"Indoneshia" race. 24 The appearance of the Hayato, who came from the south 
according to ancient Japanese records, was the evidence.25 
It is not unusual for scholars to be interested in the question of ethnic origins, or to 
present arguments and try to prove them: the identity of the Hayato is still an issue in 
current academic circles. But the Japanese idea of race at this particular period of time 
was clearly romanticized and subsumed as propaganda under the framework of the 
Southward Advance and pan-Asianism. For instance, Koyama Eizo analysed the 
weather, the diseases, and the people of the region in order to prove that the Japanese 
race were able to settle in the tropics. He concluded that the Japanese should have no 
problem settling in Southeast Asia, since they possessed the same characteristics as the 
Chinese and Indians: they were all Ajia Minzoku -- Asian races. 26 The following 
" Matsuoka, Shlzuo, Taiheiyo minzokushi[Paci:ic Ethnography] (Tokyo: Iwar.ami Shoten, 1941). f.liili1lii'Pi!li', 
<X'f'i'F.B<!b*&t> ° Clf~t" : 1941) , 
Nishimura, Matsugi, Nanpo minzokushi. [Ethnography of the South]. (Tokyo: 1942). \l§:ft~;J;: <l¥1JJ~ 
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In his book. he attributed the "failure" of European settlement in Southeast Asia to the effects of the 
tropics and explained why Chinese and Indians could live in the region.. Koyama Eizo, Miuoku to bunka 
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paragraph was published in 1914 but is still a good example, showing how common 
readers were given the message: 
"Malays, the natives and the real owners or rulers of the South Seas, even though they 
appear to have different skin, are actually the same race as the Japanese race, because 
our ancestors came from the South. Recent anthropology has proved that so clearly that 
people cannot treat it as nonsense. Even though our bodies are mixed in with the 
Mongolian race, we still have the same root as the Malays. Because of this, the 
Japanese people should respect the Malays."27 
Several Japanese intellectuals were influenced by this view. There are a number of 
memoirs which mention Japan's assistance towards the Indonesian independence 
movement. 28 
"I believe that the Japanese and Indonesians have been brothers for 2000 years. It is said 
that the Proto-Malaysians came some 4000 years ago from the central part of Asia to the 
south, forming the Malayan race on the Malay Peninsula, and then crossed the Malacca 
Straits to Sumatra. They then spread to Java, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, forming the 
races collectively known now as Indonesians. They then went further north, becoming 
no shomondai. [Some Problems in Race and Culture) (Tokyo: Haneda, 1943) 1Nl)*=:, <BO~ I:: :Xf{;CI) 
MlF~~M> ° C1'1<l:Er : 3J3JE!l~Jij), 1943). 
27 Inoue, Kiyoshi, Nan'yo to nihon. [Japan and the South Seas) (1914) pp. 10-11. # J:n'I <i¥fi¥' I:: B :if> 0 
(1914), 10-11. 
28 Nishijima, Shigetada, Shogen: indoneshia dokuritsu kakumei Ano mhon1in kakumeika no hansei. 
[Testimony: a Japanese revolutionary fighter for Indonesian independence) (Tokyo: Shin jinbutsu oraisha, 
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the Filipinos and the Formosan native tribes in Taiwan. Some 2000 years ago, they 
finally reached Japan and formed the Japanese race, mixing with the people from the 
continent. Part of the blood of the Japanese is, therefore, Malaysian, that 1s, 
Indonesian. "29 
The concept of pan-Asianism was used to persuade the masses in occupied Southeast 
Asia to cooperate with the Japanese military administration. The idea spread to the 
villages through propaganda and became a new political orthodoxy, leading to differing 
interpretations aniong Japanese political workers for the war effort, some of them 
critical of the military administration. Nishijima Shigetada, a Japanese senior officer, 
thought that the feudal society of Indonesia had been unintentionally destroyed by the 
policies of the Japanese military administration.3° Forced labour moved peasants from 
one village to another, and sometimes from one ethnic group to another ethnic group. 
Many Indonesian royal families of the Dutch era were seen as betrayed. The training 
offered by the Japanese-sponsored nationalist organizations inspired the masses.31 But 
the different local ethnic groups gave it different interpretations shortly after the war. In 
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Malaya, Chinese political parties emphasized that the three main races should unite 
together, while the Malay parties used the same kind of rhetoric, introduced under the 
occupation, to proclaim "!v1alaya for the Malays". In Indonesia, at the beginning of the 
Indonesian struggle for independence, the nationalists accepted that all Asian races 
should have Indonesian citizenship automatically, in order to earn their support. Some 
Chinese, influenced by Sun Yat-sen's idea of pan-Asianism, thought that they should 
retain Chinese identity while supporting Indonesian independence. 
The Japanese image of the Nanyang Chinese 
Kakyo, the Japanese term for overseas Chinese, was used to describe Nanyang Chinese 
during the whole period of the Japanese occupation. This Japanese term is a direct 
transliteration of the Chinese term "huaqiao", with the same implications.32 Japanese 
perceptions of Nan yang Chinese in this period were mixed. China had been regarded as 
the "core" to Japan's "periphery" and the source of philosophical, literary, religious and 
material culture to be emulated since the Tang Dynasty. After the Meiji Restoration, 
however, and particularly after Japan's victory over China in the war of 1894, the 
Japanese still respected Chinese traditional culture, but started to despise contemporary 
Chinese as uncivilized and unmodernized. At the same time, the Chinese residents' 
adaptation to Southeast Asia impressed Japanese scholars. For example, Ide Kiwata 
cited some western scholars' views that "Easterners generally stay in their own 
Kakyo in Japanese and huaqiao in Chinese \il!f1/.!l). 
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countries, which can be seen as the real difference between Easterners and Westerners, 
with the sole exception of the people of Southeast China."33 
Within the conceptual framework of pan-Asianism, the Japanese can be seen to have a 
particular perception of the Chinese in Southeast Asia in this period, when a great 
number of books and surveys focusing on Southeast Asian Chinese were completed. 
The two main institutes doing surveys on "kakyo" were the Southern Manchuria 
Railroad Company, and the office of the Governor of Taiwan.34 From their surveys and 
other publications, we can explore Japanese perceptions of the Chinese in Southeast 
Asia. They saw the Southeast Asian Chinese as middlemen collaborating with Western 
colonialists. They kept an eye open for anti-Japanese movements among Chinese 
communities in the region. Detailed reports were made on which groups of Chinese had 
joined the anti-Japanese movement, and which newspapers expressed anti-Japanese 
attitudes. All of this, in the context of war between Japan and the Republic of China, 
indicated they would see the Chinese in Southeast Asia as the enemy at the beginning of 
the occupation. 
The Japanese disseminated these ideas to the native populations to encourage their 
collaboration with Japanese military administrative authorities, but not to the Chinese 
residents. Their policy towards the local Chinese was ambivalent. The Japanese 
initially saw the Chinese as enemies, but subsequently appeared to think the Southeast 
Asian Chinese could be a "brother race" and contribute to an "Asian family". Chinese 
Ide, Kiwata, N.wyo to kakyo. [The SouL1 Seas and the Chinese] (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1941), p: !. #IB* 
Mantetsu Toa Keizai Chosakyoku (Jll!j~Jii!Mllll'lll'HlE!iU) and Taiwan Sotokufu (:liJ!lf!i!lfliHffl. 
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were treated as foreign residents in the Southeast Asian lands, but were informed that 
they could have the same rights as other Asians if they collaborated with the military 
administrative authorities. 
The Japanese military administration tried to make a distinction between the Chinese in 
China and the Chinese in Southeast Asia in the later period of occupation. They tried to 
use more the category "huaqiao" or "kakyo" for local Chinese, including totok and 
peranakan. 35 At the beginning, the Japanese saw the Chinese as foreigners, so 
registered them in the category of gaikyo. 36 But their ideas about the local Chinese 
changed as the occupation of Southeast Asia progressed. Japanese publications about 
Southeast Asian Chinese in 1944 showed that they were still looking for the right 
policy. By the final year of occupation, they seemed to consider that huaqiao or kakyo 
were an essential part of the Southeast Asian territories. Go Shukei's book reflected this 
idea. He tried to explore the essential character of the kakyo, and argued that policy had 
to change from seeing them as competitors to seeing them as playing an indispensable 
role in constructing the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. 37 
Jl 
l? 
sina (szjjj5), sinajin (xtl{lA). 
gaikyo (jj.f;t). 
Go, Shukei, Kakyo bonshitsuron. [The Nature of the Overseas Cbinese].~:tl\!I, <~1\lll;j;':j!j'.1ilfil> ' Ct:f!: 
:ij{ : 'f:l11rw m, 1944). 0 He was actually a Taiwanese who lived in Tokyo at that period of time. But his 
views can be seen as one of the Japanese views in this context. 
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The Japanese legacy in the structure and agenda of Southeast Asian politics 
Several reports on the situation of the occupied territories were printed by the Japanese 
Military Administration after Japan gained control of most of Southeast Asia. 
Takahashi Kazuyo discussed the general situation of Malaya under Japanese rule. He 
was still not certain of the best policy toward ethnic Chinese.38 The problem was that 
Japan was al war with China, and the Nan yang Chinese could not reasonably be worked 
into the political narrative in which the noble savages of Indonesia and Malaya were to 
be liberated by their more culturally developed Asian brothers from the British and 
Dutch imperialists. Iizawa Shoji admitted that the Huaqiao were only a small problem 
for Japanese authority, and Japan faced more important problems.39 From the legal 
theory point of view, there was a problem of dual nationality among the Chinese in 
Southeast Asia. In general, the Japanese considered that the issue of nationality for 
Chinese was different from the nationality issue for Westerners, and that all the Chinese 
should be included under Chinese nationality. However, Occupation policy tended with 
time to distinguish between Chinese in China and Chinese in Southeast Asia. Chinese 
representatives eventually served on the Committee for the Investigation of Indonesian 
Independence established by the Japanese. The not entirely consistent steps taken by 
the Japanese either to suppress the Chinese or to neutralise them by assimilation under 
the legitimating standard of anticolonialism established a framework of political 
" Takahashi, Kazuyo, Senryoclii marei o kataro. [About occupied Malaya) (1942). ilfll:li!ilfllt!t <t1J1JjjJtl!< 
v-.[-iffl9>, Cilf!'.Jil: : 'JY:l:l!l:ffllll;fd:, 1942) , 
"' Iizawa, Shoji, Nanpo kyoeiken. [The Co.-prosperity Sphere in the South] (1940), p. 173. j!Jj(rR:litlti, <1¥i 
Jj;!J,;*~>. (lf:[g : i'i11itll'i!t#il, !940), 173 .• 
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institutions and a brief but important history of political experience that gave shape to 
the post-war negotiations for a political form in both the new nations. 
In the final year of the Japanese occupation, the Preparation Committee for Indonesian 
Independence decided to accept Chinese people as part of the nation. The Committee 
was under Japanese advice and the members were Japanese-appointed. This move 
followed the Japanese policy of self-dependence, or genchi shugi. The Japanese 
suggested that nationalist leaders should integrate the "immigrant ethnic groups" such 
as Chinese and Arabs. Four Chinese representatives were appointed to the Committee. 
Following Japanese advice, those Chinese representatives fully supported the struggle 
for the new nation and requested that ethnic Chinese should automatically become 
citizens of the new nation. 40 
This move, to admit Chinese as pait of the new nation, crune somewhat too soon for 
both pribumi and ethnic Chinese. In 1946, the nationality law allowed Chinese to 
obtain Indonesian citizenship by 'passive' means, simply on the basis of residing in the 
country. In 1948, China's government asked Indonesia to change this to require 
Chinese in Indonesia to make a decision about Indonesian citizenship by 'positive' 
means, on the grounds that this was more democratic. On the pribumi side, the 
Indonesian government was requested not to grant equal economic rights to ethnic 
Chinese of Indonesian citizenship, because they were no different in mentality and 
Benedict R. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-1945. 
(I:haca: Cornell University, 1961), p. 18. The four representatives were Oei Tjong Hauw, Oey Tiang 
Tjoei, Liem Koen Hian and Tan Eng Hoa. They served on the Committee for the Investigation of 
Indonesian Independence during the Japanese occupation. 
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behaviour from Chinese who remained Chinese nationals. These later moves indicated 
that the decision, promoted by the Japanese, to accept Chinese as part of the future 
nation in 1945 was a surprise action without full consensus among pribumi or among 
Chinese communities. 
The impact of Japanese policy on nationalist sentiment in Malaya might not be as 
obvious as in Indonesia. But the politics of Chinese participation in Malaya were 
similarly changed, directly or indirectly, by the Japanese occupation. Prior to the 
Second World War, British Malaya was not a single unit. In a political sense it was a 
"mosaic" of governments with different systems: the Straits Settlements, the Federated 
Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States, which manifested various forms of 
integration of existing Malay kingdoms with British authority. In terms of participating 
in local politics, only Straits Chinese in the Straits Settlements had this privilege. The 
Federated Malay States and Unfederated Malay States consistently rejected any 
proposal for peninsular union and civil rights for Chinese migrants. Prior to the Pacific 
War, the majority of Chinese migrants in Malaya were not seen as part of the nation by 
the Malay elites. At the same time, most Chinese people were concerned only with 
China's affairs. Very little political interaction between ethnic Chinese and pribumi 
took place in the Malay Peninsula in the period before the Japanese occupation. 
The Japanese occupation was the first regime to integrate government into one united 
administration for the whole of Malaya, with its headquarters in Singapore. 41 This 
41 Cbeah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and After The Japanese 
Occupation, 1941-1946. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), p. 53. 
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made a significant impact on Malay communities. 42 Although as William Roff has 
pointed out, the origins of Malay nationalism can be traced back as early as the 
beginning of this century,43 the idea of Malaya as a single political entity and the object 
of political loyalty was still not very strong among Malays at the grass-roots level 
before the Japanese occupation.44 This early Malay nationalist movement, which kept 
struggling to define a proper boundary for the Malayan territory even in the 1940s, was 
basically a Muslim movement from which ethnic Chinese were excluded.45 Malay 
leaders did not accept that ethnic Chinese could become a part of a Malay nation, 
whether they defined the nation as either a small kingdom or as a bigger political entity. 
During their occupation of Malaya, the Japanese did not promise Malaya would be an 
independent entity, but urged the Malay radical nationalists to join the Indonesian 
nationalist movement based on the concept of Melayu Raya or Indonesia Raya (Greater 
Firdaus bin Haji-Abdu!lah, The Origins and Early Development of l'ie Radieal Malay Opposition 
Movement 1n l'vfalaysia.n Politics, Ph. D. thesis Columbia University (l 981), p. 132. ' ... such examples of 
contradictions can be prolonged with many others. The main implication is that in a relatively short span 
of three and a half years (February 1941 - August 1945), the Malays underwent a series of shocking 
experiences and were forced to face a series of delicate situations, all of which had profound impact on 
their world view and self-perception.' 
William R. Roff, The Ongins o!Malay Nationalism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). 
Ariffin Bin S. M. Omar, Bangsa Mclayu: Concepts of'Democracy and Community Among !.be Malays 
1945-1950. (Canberra: Australian National University, 1989). 
William R. Roff, The Orig1ns of Malay Nationalism. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 56. 
The expression of the sense of 'oneness' between tlie Indonesians and the Malays can be t:aced back at 
least to tlie year 1906, when tlie celebrated Islamic refonnist journal, AJ..lslam, published in Singapore, 
addressed its readers in the then British Malaya and Dutch East Indies in term of 'our religion' and 
'our community' . This concept continued to be expressed up to the 1940s. 
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Malaya and Greater Indonesia).46 With Japanese blessings, the Malay leader Ibrahim 
Yaacob formed a new political organization known as KRIS with the purpose of 
preparing to unite with Indonesia. This organization was led by Malays only, with no 
delegates from the Chinese or other ethnic groups. The project was unsuccessful. As it 
was not established until the final year of Japanese occupation, KRIS came too late to 
change traditional Malay loyalties to their kingdoms. After the Japanese administration 
collapsed, the Malay nationalist movement leader Ibrahim Yaacob left Singapore for 
I akarta rather than stay and fight for Malaya. 
The Japanese policy in terms of ethnic participation in public life in Malaya was 
somewhat confusing. The Chinese in Malaya were encouraged to join the low and 
middle levels of government administration, but were not directed to join the Malay 
nationalist movement or to develop any nationalist sentiment, in contrast to the Japanese 
policy toward Malay and Indian people in the same country. But political awareness 
was more widespread in Malaya after the Japanese occupation, not only among Malays 
but also among Chinese and other ethnic groups. 
The politics of Chinese participation were introduced into Malaya immediately after the 
occupation through British plans for a Malayan Union. This project was very important 
in shifting Malay attitudes from their original position of excluding ethnic Chinese to 
one of inclusion. Unlike the Japanese policy, which had not required ethnic Chinese to 
Firdaus bin Ha ii-Abdullah, The Odgins and Early Development of t11e Radical Malay Opposition 
Movement in Malaysian Politics, Ph.D. thesis Columbia University (1981), p.7. The radical nationalism 
was mainly from the Isla"llic educated teachers and writers and vernacular Malay educated teachers and 
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participate directly in the Malay nationalist movement, the Malayan Union plan, which 
was officially announced in October 1945 and was founded in April 1946, granted 
ethnic Chinese Malayan citizenship with certain conditions for China-born Chinese. 
The plan was in operation only for a short time; it was abolished in 1948. Despite its 
abandonment, the plan for a Union had a significant impact. It was the first plan to 
grant political rights to the majority of Chinese residents in Malaya, and it gave 
prominence to the issue of Chinese citizenship in Malayan politics. It had been 
developed during 1942-1945 in order to counter the legitimacy of Japanese rule in 
Malaya, and if not for the Japanese administration's policy of exclusion, the Union plan 
may never have taken the stand on citizenship that it did. 47 A. J. Stockwell has 
commented thus on the matter: "Although the origins of the Malayan Union lay in 
long-simmering vexation over the administrative hotchpotch of British territories, the 
Japanese occupation introduced considerations which had not existed to sway previous 
planners. War created its own demands."48 
journalists. Tue radical nationalists,. .. during the Japanese occupation they received favourable treatment 
from the Japanese Military Authority.' 
A. J. Stockwe!l, Bdtish Po/icy and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948. 
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The impact of the Japanese occupation on Chinese communities 
The period of Japanese occupation was disastrous for many ethnic Chinese in Malaya 
and Indonesia. This can be seen from several accounts. 49 But few studies have 
discussed in detail the impact of the Japanese occupation on the inner structure of the 
Chinese communities. There were two major directions of change among Chinese 
communities in Malaya and Indonesia under the occupation which led to further 
changes in the post-war period. The first was a shift of leadership, and the second was 
internal integration among the Chinese. Without understanding these changes, we 
cannot understand the changes in political and cultural identity of the post-war era. 
During the Japanese occupation, the treatment given former leaders of Chinese 
communities in Malaya and Indonesia was different. Policies in both colonies were 
based on detailed information from Japanese pre-war surveys in Southeast Asia. 
Leadership in each Chinese community in Southeast Asia was a major focus of these 
surveys. The details recorded about the Chinese leaders included names, addresses, 
positions held in associations, business details, property value, and even their political 
attitude. For instance, in a record based on a survey in Medan, the owner of a pro-KMT 
Chinese newspaper, Su Yuan Chang, was noted to be pro-Japanese. The former 
chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, On Kin Roat, was noted to be 
Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down. (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1946), Li Tie Min ed., Dazhan yu 
nanqiao [World War II and the Nanyang Chinese] (Singapore: Xin mm yang Chubanshe, 1947). *~JJC~ 
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sympathetic to the Japanese. 50 Before the Japanese moved south, they had full 
information on the leadership of the Chinese community in every city in Southeast Asia. 
In Indonesia, leadership among Chinese communities undetwent a significant change 
between the pre-war and post-war eras. In every major city, prominent Chinese leaders 
were imprisoned by the Japanese when the oc<:;upation began. Five hundred Chinese 
leaders were incarcerated during the occupation period. Those former leaders who were 
not put in prison were forced to cooperate with the Japanese.51 Many young peranakan 
were appointed by the Japanese as leaders of Chinese organizations or representatives 
of Chinese communities to fill the vacuum of Chinese leadership. Those peranakan 
figures, who had been active only among peranakan Chinese communities, were then 
promoted to be leaders of the whole Chinese community, including peranakan and 
totok. 52 The shift in Chinese leadership in Indonesia was dramatic because it would 
have been impossible for those young peranakan leaders to achieve such status without 
Japanese intervention. 
For example, Yap Tjwan Bing became the chairman of the Bandung Chinese 
Association.53 Liem Koen Hian, Oei Tjong Hauw and Oei Tiang Tjoei were appointed 
Investigation Section, Hwa Nan Bank, Ran Jn shokai no J:akyo. [Chinese Merchants in the Netherlands 
Indies During the 1930s] (Taipei: Huanan Bank, 1941), p. 169. 'Jilirl'i~ffilli!li!tiJlli!, <llilf-Pffll!'l--0 'Jilifflli> 
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by the Japanese as representatives of the Chinese community. These peranakan leaders 
were counted as part of a pre-war pro-Indonesian group in Leo Suryadinata's study of 
pre-war peranakan Chinese politics in Java. 54 They were moved to top-ranking 
positions among the Chinese in the Japanese military administration, and therefore these 
pro-Indonesian peranakan Chinese became the new leaders of the entire Chinese 
community. 
In Malaya, most former leaders who did not flee the country were forced to cooperate 
with the Japanese military administration. This made them unpopular among the 
younger generation in Chinese communities after the war. MPAJA became the most 
powerful political organization and its leaders were highly regarded by the Chinese 
community for their armed resistance against the Japanese. 55 The young leaders of 
right-wing armed resistance, like Zhuang Hui Quan, also became active and outspoken 
in the Chinese communities. Without this wartime experience, those young figures 
would never have gained leadership, which was dominated by gentry-type businessmen 
in the pre-war years. 
From their detailed records, it was easy for the Japanese to identify former Chinese 
leaders in order to give them special treatment. In Singapore, many formerly prominent 
Chinese leaders survived the massacre of "anti-Japanese elements" in the first month of 
the Japanese occupation. Those leaders were required to form a united Chinese 
association to help the Japanese administration. Former Chinese leaders survived in 
55 
Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1981). 
Hara in Kratoska ed. (1995), p. 45. 
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Indonesia too, but remained in prison for the entire Japanese occupation. The Japanese 
promoted people they trusted. After Japan brought Singapore and the Malay Peninsula 
under control, the military authorities established one Chinese Association and 
abolished all others. All former leaders among Chinese communities were asked to join 
this organization. The urban middle class remained quiet and obedient to the Japanese 
military authorities during the occupation. 
As Hara Fujio pointed out, many wartime Chinese leaders remained as prominent 
community leaders during the post-war years. Most of the leaders of pro-Japanese 
organisations resumed their activities soon after the war in such mainstream 
organizations as the assembly halls and chambers of commerce. MPAJA took its 
revenge only on lower-level collaborators and other people who betrayed them rather 
than on these leaders. 56 However, they no longer played such a prominent leadership 
role as before. New groups of young Chinese had emerged because of their experience 
during the Japanese occupation. The leaders of MP AJA and other anti-Japanese 
guerrillas soon became influential after Japan surrendered. This shift in Chinese 
leadership in Malaya later led to further changes in Chinese identity. 
Another obvious change within the Chinese communities in Malaya and Indonesia was 
internal integration. This came about partly because of the Japanese policy of allowing 
only one organization for ethnic Chinese in one place. This integration included 
integration between totok and peranakan Chinese, and integration between Chinese 
from different regional origins in China. 
Hara in Kratoska ed. (1995), p. 51. 
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Since ethnic Chinese had been migrating to Malaya and Indonesia for centuries, and the 
early migrants were mostly single males, they quite often married indigenous females. 
Their children were called peranakan. The meaning of this term in Malay/Indonesian 
was "people of mixed blood". Later, the population of peranakan became large enough 
to form a distinct ethnic group. Native-peranakan intermarriage declined as the 
peranakan community provided its own wives. The early Chinese settlers easily 
absorbed local culture and customs, and they soon mingled with the local population. 
Formal distinctions between early Chinese migrants and the indigenous people were 
relatively few. 57 In the pre-war era, local-born Chinese obtained status of local 
'subjects' in the Dutch Indies. However, before the war local-born Chinese peranakan 
possessed a distinct identity, since they had their own organizations and newspapers in 
the Malay language, as shown by Leo Suryadinata.58 Chinese peranakan could still be 
identified as 'Chinese' by their patrilineal surnames during the Japanese occupation.59 
Totok and peranakan might disdain each other for their cultural practices. New Chinese 
immigrants who tried to ensure that their children were brought up within Chinese 
culture might look down on the bastardized peranakan culture, which was a mixture of 
Dutch, Chinese and Indonesian pribumi elements, tending to generate di verse political 
H. Usman Effendy, AMOL· Aku Men}adi Orang Indonesia. (Amoy: I become an Indonesian) (Jakarta: 
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loyalties. The Chung Hwa Hui, which was founded by Dutch-educated peranakan 
professionals and businessmen in 1928, advocated the acceptance of Dutch nationality 
and participation in local politics. Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (P. T. I.) was favourable 
to Indonesian nationalism and encouraged the 'Indies Chinese' to identify themselves 
with Indonesians, while they still favoured Dutch as a medium of education. The most 
influential pro-China group among the peranakan was the so-called Sin Pao group, 
members of which supported China politically, but were not willing to maintain the 
totok culture or identity of their parents or of previous generations.60 
The Japanese military administration ignored the difference between totok and 
peranakan. They took the view "once Chinese always Chinese", and placed Chinese 
people born in China and locally born people of Chinese descent in the same 
administrative category, the kakyo. They criticized peranakan Chinese for not being 
able to read or write the Chinese language, and required the peranakan to send their 
children to Chinese schools. This was in effect a re-sinicization of the peranakan.61 
When the Japanese military administration required all Chinese, both totok and 
peranakan, to register as kakyo, many peranakan could not give their names in 
Mandarin. The Japanese administrators would then ask them to write their names 
down. But many peranakan could not write Chinese characters. The Japanese 
administrators then would kick or hit them several times, saying "You are Chinese, how 
" 
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can you not speak Chinese?" or "You are Chinese, how can you not write Chinese?"62 
Many peranakan were affected by this humiliation and afterwards tried to learn the 
Chinese language. Many even sent their children to Chinese schools after the end of the 
war. This happened not only in Singapore but also in places in Malaya and Indonesia. 63 
Under Japanese influence, the fates of Chinese peranakan (or baba) and new 
immigrants became more closely tied together. The distance between them, which had 
been created by the European colonial system, became meaningless under the Japanese 
anti-Western policy. The two groups necessarily had more opportunity to meet together 
and learn from each other during and after the Japanese occupation. They began to 
consider that in outsiders' eyes they would always be put into the same category. 
After the Japanese occupation, more peranakan Chinese sent their children to Chinese 
schools. The relationship between local-born and China-born Chinese communities 
became more integrated. A report in 1948 estimated that 85 per cent of all Chinese 
children in elementary schools in Dutch-controlled areas of Indonesia were in Chinese-
language schools. 64 A survey done in 1930 found that only 36.4 per cent of Chinese 
migrants in Indonesia were first generation.65 This meant that many peranakan children 
whose parents spoke only Dutch and/or Indonesian were being "re-sinicised" by an 
Qiu Xinmen, Zhaonan shidai shihua. [The History of the Shonan Era] (Singapore: Qlngnim1 Press, 1993). 
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education emphasizing Chinese language, culture, and politics. 66 This trend of the 
1950s for Chinese peranakan to become more Chinese can be considered to have 
started during the Japanese occupation.67 
Among the different parties which were organized by peranakan after the war, such as 
Persatuan Tionghoa (P. T.) formed in 1948, Partai Demok:rat Tionghoa Indonesia (P. D. 
T. I.) formed in 1950, and Baperk:i (Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body) formed 
in 1954, some favoured maintaining a separate Chinese identity within the Indonesian 
nation, while some wished to drop the term "Chinese" in order to merge into Indonesian 
society. But in either case their constituency included all Chinese in Indonesia, both 
totok and peranakan. 68 
During the occupation, the Japanese military authorities permitted only one organization 
for Chinese in each place. That was the Kakyo Sakai, the General Association of 
Overseas Chinese. 69 The Japanese required all Chinese to register with this 
organization. The essential goods for everyday life were distributed by the Kakyo 
Charles Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 2, Table 2. 
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Sakai. Since Japanese military administrators forced Chinese from different regional 
origins to work together, those Chinese became more integrated than before.70 
Also, Nanyang Chinese could no longer travel freely between China and Southeast 
Asia. This was different from the Japanese policy in Hong Kong, which encouraged the 
Hong Kong Chinese to return to their home villages in China. It was the first time that 
the link between China and Southeast Asia had been broken since regular shipping 
routes were established between China and this region in the 19th century. The 
Nanyang Chinese lost contact with their homeland between 1942 and 1945. When 
Japanese troops occupied Guangdong and Fujian provinces in 1938, the mail service 
between Nanyang and South China was cut. When they occupied Southeast Asia, all 
Chinese newspapers were banned except the one controlled by the Japanese military 
administration. 
Japanese expansion, therefore, affected Chinese identity by disruption of the 
"primordial ties" with China that existed among the Nanyang Chinese. On one hand it 
consolidated the sub-ethnic groups, which used to be divided by regional origins, by 
enforced collective organization, and on the other it cut their links to China. As a result, 
the Chinese people were forced to regard themselves as a unified community, with 
common interests and experiences. This had a profound impact on their attitudes to the 
post-war period and their perceptions of their own identity. 
"' Go, Shu.i:ei, Kakyo bonshitsuron. [The Nature of the Overseas Chinese] (Tokyo, 1944), p. 15. ~±Jfi:, < 
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The relationship between Chinese and pribumi 
The Japanese occupation influenced the relationship between ethnic Chinese and 
pribumi by the introduction of new elements to the political agenda, and creation of new 
political institutions through which they were pursued. It accelerated the nationalist 
movements in Southeast Asia, as many studies have pointed out, and impelled 
subsequent power holders to consider whether ethnic Chinese could be accepted as part 
of the new nation, and how to integrate them if they were accepted. The following 
discussion will focus on how representatives of ethnic Chinese were assigned by the 
Japanese to join the lndonesian nationalist struggle, and how the politics of Chinese 
participation would become important in post-war Malaya. 
Particular attention will be paid to the impact of Japanese pan-Asianist propaganda on 
Chinese-pribumi relations. The Japanese military administration was the first 
government to put moral pressure on Chinese residents regarding their relationship with 
the indigenous population. The European colonial authorities had never done so. In 
post-war Chinese writings dealing with local culture or defending the attitudes of the 
Chinese population, we can observe the effect of this kind of moral pressure. Some 
Chinese writers criticised the Chinese for being keen to end European colonialism, but 
at the same time not respecting or supporting indigenous political movements. Such 
views emerged in Chinese writings under Japanese rule. In this way, the Japanese 
concepts of native nationalism inspired the Chinese, by a process of ideological 
competition. 
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Japanese pan-Asianist propaganda was ethnocentrically Japanese, as shown in the 
'Triple A champion' publicity used in Java in the first year of the Japanese occupation. 
However, the direction of pan-Asian propaganda turned towards demonstrating 
Japanese support for Indonesian nationalism. After Japan formally announced it would 
conduct preparations for Indonesian independence, there were numerous public 
meetings in which Chinese, pribumi and other ethnic groups took part together, so the 
Chinese had to learn to voice their support in public. Some Chinese leaders showed 
stronger sentiments toward Indonesian nationalism than did the Japanese. During the 
Indonesian Revolution, which followed the Japanese surrender, pribumi nationalists 
continued to request Chinese support for their struggle. 
In Malaya, the same kind of competition between political ideologies took place 
between Japanese and Chinese. Since the Japanese offered a pro-Malay ideology 
during the occupation, the Chinese guerillas who remained in Malay-dominated jungle 
areas needed to advance an alternative claim to political legitimacy. The Chinese-
dominated MPAJA, the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army, used tiga bintang, three 
stars, representing the three major races (Indians, Chinese and Malays) fighting for 
Malaya, to counter Japanese propaganda for Asian liberation. Even the Malayan 
Communist Party, which led MPAJA's armed resistance, secretly advanced the strategic 
slogan "establish the Malayan Democratic Republic" after 1936.71 This concept did not 
appear in local Chinese newspapers, since it was far from being accepted among 
Chinese communities in Malaya before the Japanese occupation. By using anti-
7l Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflicl DwiJJg a,1d Airer The fapililese 
Occupalion, 1941-1946. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), pp. 56-100. 
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Japanese sentiment, the MCP attracted numbers of Chinese youth to join its guerrilla 
campaign and tum towards the locally oriented political struggle. 
Before the Pacific War, local nationalism was not an issue in the Nanyang Chinese 
newspapers. Under the occupation, it beeame a topic for debate. For example, an 
article on the theme of Asian values in Kung Jung Pao, the Chinese newspaper in Java 
under the Japanese occupation, said that family values could become the philosophical 
core of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.72 The author claimed "Asian 
peoples, like brothers, live together in a family." But he went on to criticize the 
Chinese, since the Chinese lived in Indonesia as if living in a brother's house, but when 
their brothers were in trouble, meaning colonisation by the Dutch, the Chinese did 
nothing to help them. 
As we have seen, this propaganda spread messages of antipathy towards European 
colonialism and provoked ideological competition among different sectors of the 
Chinese community. Since Japanese pan-Asianism offered a pro-pribumi and pro-
independence ideology, Chinese leaders could not afford to maintain their indifference 
toward the pribumi issue. This situation shaped the central issues in the dispute 
between ethnic Chinese and pribumi leaders in the post-war era. 
In Indonesia, the nationalist movement did not invite participation by Chinese residents 
before the Japanese occupation. In other words, Chinese residents, assimilated or 
unassimilated, were not seen as part of the Indonesian nation by most Indonesian 
~!be Asian Family." Kung Jung Pao, 3 April, 1943. 
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nationalists. On the eve of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, the Sino-Japanese 
War (1937-1945) made most Chinese in Indonesia devote their attention to China's 
affairs. Although a group of peranakan Chinese were keen to join the Indonesian 
nationalist movement, as Leo Suryadinata has pointed out, 73 their efforts did not 
convince the mainstream on either the Chinese side or the pribumi side of the need for 
Chinese involvement. There was a lack of interaction between the Chinese nationalist 
movement, in the form of the National Salvation Movement, and the pribumi nationalist 
movement in Indonesia before the Japanese occupation. 
The most significant crossing of ethnic boundaries in the modern Indonesian nationalist 
movement was the announcement of the Youth Oath in 1928, from which the name 
"Indonesia" was adopted as part of an effort to achieve consent among the different 
ethnic groups to the boundaries of the new nation. It proposed unification of the various 
ethnic groups in the archipelago to form one independent Indonesian nation. After 
pledging this solemn political oath, ethnic consciousness grew into a political awareness 
of new nationhood. The nationalist leaders encouraged the melding of all ethnic groups 
into one entity-people of mainly common descent, language, and history who 
inhabited the territory of the Dutch East Indies. These nationalists did not consider that 
7! Leo Suryadinata, PeranakP.n Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942. {Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1981), pp. 78-90. He defined three political streams in the peranakan community in Indonesia: pro-China, 
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Indonesia (PT!), led by Lim Koen Hian and Ong Liang Kok in 1932. This group wanted the 'Indies 
Chinese' to remain Chinese but be politically assimilated into indigenous Indonesian society. The author 
admitted that PTI was a fairly small party in numbers, and their influence was mainly limited to East Java, 
particularly in Surabaya. The imporumce of this group was in their ideas rather than in their power or their 
mass base. 
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distinct Chinese ethnic communities would be part of their proposed Indonesian 
nation.74 
Ethnic relations between Chinese and pribumi in Indonesia underwent a series of 
significant changes due to Japanese policies toward ethnic Chinese during the Japanese 
occupation. As outlined above, in the beginning of the Japanese occupation, ethnic 
Chinese were treated differently from pribumi by order of the Japanese Military 
Administration. Later, ethnic Chinese were encouraged to join the construction of "the 
Greater East-Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" in which ethnic boundaries would not be an 
important issue among "Asian Races". In the final year of the Japanese occupation, 
ethnic Chinese were encouraged by the authorities to join the nationalist movement. 
However, the Japanese impact on indigenous populations affected Chinese-indigenous 
relations more than Japanese policy toward the local Chinese did. The local Chinese 
were presented in Japanese propaganda as part of Western colonialism. At the 
beginning of the occupation period, the Japanese tried to provoke anti-Chinese 
sentiment among the indigenous population.75 The Chinese were described as usurers 
and exploiters of natives. This kind of anti-Chinese sentiment was still expressed 
among indigenous populations in Malaya and Indonesia after the Japanese surrendered. 
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Apart from the changes in the political agenda discussed above, the new patterns of 
daily contact created between Chinese and pribumi represent another important impact 
of the Japanese occupation on this relationship. These new patterns fall into two types: 
increased routine social and community contact, and ethnic violence. Most reports of 
this have looked at the events following the Indonesian Declaration of Independence in 
August, 1945. Among them, the riot in Tanggerang in 1946 is repeatedly mentioned as 
the worst outbreak of anti-Chinese ethnic violence in the period of the Indonesian 
Revolution.76 Some reports even see this event as the beginning of the pattern of anti-
Chinese riots. 77 Actually, similar anti-Chinese riots occurred during the Japanese 
landings on Java and Sumatra in 1942, and they are the earliest examples of the same 
kind.78 
All riots of the 'contagious' pattern happened in unstable periods of shifting political 
power. Ethnic Chinese were seen to be in a disadvantageous position by the new power 
holders in each period. When Japanese soldiers landed on Java and Sumatra in March 
1942, mass riots against ethnic Chinese began. The riots were widespread in Sumatra 
and Java where law and order simply broke down. Chinese shops and factories were 
looted by pribumi. In some cases lootings were initiated by evacuating Dutch soldiers. 
In other cases, the doors of warehouses and factories were opened by Japanese 
71 
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soldiers.79 Chinese property became the target of widespread looting. The Japanese 
army enforced order only when they controlled the whole island of Java. The total loss 
is estimated at 100 million East Indies dollars minimum, while the total casualty list is 
unknown. 
The following story is related in Tan Kah Kee's memoirs. In Batavia (now Jakarta), 
hundreds of pribumi came to rob a peranakan family of seven. Because the landlord 
had two guns, looters surrounded the family home but dared not get too close. A 
pribumi servant stood aside and offered to help. The landlord passed his guns to this 
servant, who then turned them on the landlord. The landlord said in surprise "You have 
worked for me for more than twenty-two years. Why do you want to betray me?" The 
servant answered "Today is a good opportunity for me." He killed the landlord. Five 
members of the family were killed and all their goods were stolen.80 
The Chinese community leaders pointed out that Japanese soldiers encouraged 
Indonesian pribumi to loot Chinese shops. They insisted that the violence toward 
Chinese was unprecedented, that there had been no sign of anti-Chinese sentiment 
among pribumi in Java before the Japanese arrived.81 Ba Ren discussed the situation 
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with some Indonesian youths in 1942, and they confirmed that the Japanese did 
encourage them to rob Chinese shops when they (the Japanese) first landed on the 
island. 81 William H. Frederick confirms that some looting of Chinese property was 
encouraged directly by the Japanese. 83 This might have been inspired by rumours that 
the local Chinese were hostile to the new rulers. 84 
As noted earlier, the Japanese altered their policy after they gained control of the 
situation, and soon set rules with severe punishments for disturbing the peace. The 
Chinese residents welcomed the end of chaos, for they could not live in such conditions. 
There were other aspects to the riots apart from Japanese participation. As a Japanese 
survey suggested, a religious factor was involved in the ethnic hostility. After the riots 
in which poor pribumi robbed Chinese shops and burned Chinese houses, a Japanese 
scholar examined the reason why the rioters did not attack the Arab people in Java. 
Both ethnic Chinese and ethnic Arabs maintained similar attitudes of cultural 
superiority toward pribumi. In economic terms, both ethnic Chinese and ethnic Arabs 
could be considered exploiters of pribumi. But there were no riots against the Arabs at 
that time. The conclusion to this survey suggested that religion played an important 
role. Arabs were seen as t-.foslim brothers by pribumi. 85 Some cases even indicate that 
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Arabs encouraged pribumi to rob Chinese shops because of the economic competition 
between Arabs and Chinese. 
The Japanese occupation in Malaya also engendered hostility to pribumi among some 
Chinese. It can be counted as the origin of the Sino-Malay conflict right after the war, 
whieh has been explored by Cheah Boon Kheng in his work, Red Star Over Malaya.86 
Once the Japanese had conquered the Malay Peninsula, Malays were in the top 
positions in most levels of government. During the Japanese occupation, most Malay 
people did not see the Japanese as their enemy. Both Japanese policy and the Malay 
response were unacceptable to the Chinese, who did see Japan as the enemy, and this 
added to the tension between Chinese and pribumi in the post-war period.87 
The other kind of contact between Chinese and pribumi during the Japanese occupation 
was routine social contact, to a degree unprecedented in the European colonial era. The 
Chinese had more opportunity for contact with Malay and Indonesian pribumi during 
the Japanese occupation, and some were inspired by this experience and became 
enthusiastic about Malay or Indonesian affairs.88 The reason Chinese people had more 
opportunity to be in contact with indigenous populations was because of their migration 
to rural areas. During the occupation, many moved into villages or Malay kampw1g and 
dressed as Malays, because the Japanese were more cautious in their treatment of the 
Cheah (1983). 
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Malays. If the Chinese had continued to live together in urban areas, they may not have 
had as much contact with indigenous Malay culture. 
Such unprecedented contact between urban Chinese intellectuals and rural Malay 
residents inspired some intellectuals to change their attitudes toward Malays, which ran 
counter to the tendency among some urban Chinese to regard the Malays as 
collaborators. For example, Hu Yu Zhi spent his time during the Japanese occupation 
writing a modern Indonesian grammar book in Chinese, which he claimed to be the first 
one of its kind, under the pen name Sa Ping. He said that he became enthusiastic about 
learning the Indonesian language when in hiding from the Japanese in Pematang 
Siantar, Sumatra. He stated that previously very few Chinese had wanted to learn the 
Malay language, because overseas Chinese held the indigenous populations in disdain. 
In particular, educated Chinese did not acknowledge that the indigenous populations 
had "culture". Chinese merchants learnt some Malay words, but only for business. 
When Hu and his friends, mainly writers and editors from Singapore, came to seek 
asylum in Sumatra and had more contact with pribumi, they realized that this kind of 
attitude was inappropriate and bad for the relationship between Chinese and pribumi. 
They became interested in studying Indonesian, and attempted to make friends among 
the indigenous population, believing this to be the only way to learn the language, 
because there were no Chinese materials available. Hu even took an Indonesian name, 
Sabin, after his pen name Sa Ping. After the Japanese surrender, he continued to use 
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this pen name in Singapore and encouraged Chinese to learn pribumi language and 
culture.89 
Chinese guerrillas who fought against the Japanese in the jungle had to make an effort 
to understand the Malay language and customs, because Malays were the majority in 
rural areas. The propaganda groups of MPAJA wrote several plays in which Malays 
and Indians took roles, because Malays and Indians were the main audience when plays 
were performed in kampong. 90 The prominent playwright and director, Du Bian, 
explained in his memoirs that he got the impression, while he wrote and edited those 
plays during the Japanese occupation, that the term huaqiao (overseas Chinese) should 
be changed to huazu (ethnic Chinese) because these plays were performed by and for 
Malayan people. He considered that his inspiration came from his experience of living 
in Malay kampong rather than from any theory or doctrine.91 After the war, Du Bian 
went back to Singapore and continued to write plays with strong Malay and Indian 
images. 
Social encounters happened not only in informal daily situations but also in the 
workplace, particularly among Chinese and Malays employed in local administration. 
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Under European colonial rule, Chinese and pribumi did not have much opportunity to 
work together in official capacities. The Japanese changed their policy from "divide 
and rule" to "work together" after mid-1943. Eddy Hermawan reported that the mixed 
language formerly adopted by ethnic Chinese, Baba Malay or Bahasa Melayu 
Thonghua, was dropped in favour of standard Bahasa, because there were many formal 
meetings with pribumi where only standard Bahasa was appropriate.92 Xiao Yu Can 
(Siauw Giok Tjhan) confirms in his memoirs that ethnic Chinese stopped using Bahasa 
Melayu Thonghua and turned to standard Bahasa Indonesia from that time on. 93 
To sum up, these experiences during the Japanese occupation drew ethnic Chinese and 
pribumi together. In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese were invited to join the nationalist 
struggle. In Malaya, armed resistance against the Japanese directly involved the 
younger generation of Chinese in Malayan affairs. In the political domain, ethnic 
Chinese played a substantial role in local administration under Japanese mle. More 
intensive contact between Chinese and pribumi during the Japanese occupation 
generated a new relationships. Conflicts between Chinese and pribumi caused further 
troubles in the post-war period, which drew Chinese attention towards local politics. 
Changes in community leadership and internal integration among the Chinese made 
Chinese residents face the post-war situation as a more coherent ethnic group. 
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Chapter 5 
The Indonesian Experience of Chinese Writers in the 1940s 
The post-war years were a crucial period for the Southeast Asian Chinese in reshaping 
their identity. They engaged in intense debate through the Chinese media about issues 
of identity and allegiance, particularly between 1945 and 1949. It was a very hectic 
time for Chinese in the region to search for a new identity, 1 because most external 
factors had not yet been settled; the Chinese civil war and the Indonesian revolution 
were still in progress, and Malaya had not yet found its way to independence. It was an 
environment in which Chinese were forced to reflect deeply on their way of life in 
Nanyang and their role in the local community. Many years later, we still can feel the 
influence of this process of searching for a new identity. In Chapters 5 and 6 I will trace 
the change of identity through debate in the Chinese print media in the post-war period. 
The discussion will begin with a group of Chinese writers who worked for Chinese 
newspapers in Singapore before the outbreak of the Pacific War and went into hiding in 
Indonesia during the Japanese occupation. This group of writers, which I have called 
the 'Fengxia Group', developed a new approach to Chinese identity for Nan yang 
Chinese during the Japanese occupation while Ii ving in concealment in Indonesia for 
more than three years. Some went back to Singapore, but continued to write about their 
Indonesian experiences, or use the Indonesian example to encourage Chinese in Malaya 
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to join local society. Some were inspired by Indonesian nationalism and stayed on in 
Indonesia to fight for the new nation. They broadcast their opinions through the 
Chinese print media in Malaya and Indonesia after the war. As noted in previous 
chapters, this Fengxia group included the writers Yu Ta Fu, Hu Yu Zhi and Wang Ren 
Shu (Ba Ren). 2 It was the most influential bloc in the Chinese print media in Southeast 
Asia at this time. Most other groups of journalists and writers with a local-oriented 
approach to identity had some degree of direct or indirect relationship with this group. 
Unfortunately, the post-war situation in Southeast Asia led most of them eventually to 
leave the region. 3 Their stories tend to be overlooked, as their cross-border experiences 
do not fit the framework of national histories. It is essential to reinterpret their story in 
order to know the whole process of identity change for the Nan yang Chinese. 
The Role of Chinese Writers 
The significance of the Indonesian experience of these 'Chinese writers' in the history 
of the Nan yang Chinese has yet to be fully investigated. This term, 'Chinese writers', 
specifically refers to those established writers who came to Nanyang for the anti-
Japanese campaign during the Sino-Japanese War. The term 'Chinese writers' has a 
twofold meaning, in that they not only wrote for Chinese-language newspapers in 
Although Yu Ta Fu had been killed in August 1945 before Feng Xia started to be published in December 
1945, he was seen as one of the members of this group in this study since he was the key figure associated 
wiL'1 tI1e Chinese writers in Sumatra before the magazine was published. 
Whether they were '.orced to leave by the situation or leave on their own will is still a debatable irn;e 
nowadays. But their efforts did make some significant influence 11.'Ilong young generation of ethnic 
Chinese. This will be shown later in this chapter and next chapter. 
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Nanyang, but they also came to Southeast Asia as writers already established in China. 
They worked for Chinese newspapers in Singapore, then at the centre of the Nanyang 
Chinese press.4 At that time, the Sino-Japanese War stimulated the Southeast Asian 
Chinese towards strong patriotic sentiment towards 'the fatherland', China. The 
'Chinese writers' are recognized as the main contributors to this. 5 Living in the 
countryside or small towns in Indonesia for a few years, these writers were able to 
immerse themselves in the local community and began to rethink the role of the 
Southeast Asian Chinese. We should remember that these writers had interactions with 
local-born Chinese on their experience of generating local-oriented identity. After the 
war, they brought their locally oriented conception of identity to the Chinese media in 
Malaya and Indonesia. Even though they do not represent the whole picture of the 
search for a new identity among the Southeast Asian Chinese, they were the central 
figures in the debate on identity issues in both Malaya and Indonesia in the post-war 
era. Their role in the creation of a new identity for the Nanyang Chinese needs to be 
reconsidered. 
It was not the usual case for this group of Chinese writers to have experience of both 
Singapore and Indonesia in the 1940s. The Chinese writers in Nanyang have attracted 
the interest of scholars in Chinese literature. In a survey of Chinese writers in 
Singapore, a short list of the most important and influential Chinese writers is provided 
This is common usage of the tenn in the academic circle in SingapOre. Lin W anqing, Zhmgguo zuojia z;u 
Xinjiapo jj qi yjngxiaJJg. [The Chinese Writers in Singapore and l'ieir int:uence] (Singapore: Wanli Shuju, 
1978). ;i;;;J<;~. <cpi!¥JfF~tE~JJ~:fil:E::ttl:!:'.ll> • (mJ;a:lf!i:: ;lii;JE'i!f.fill. 197SJ. • 
Fang Xiu, Mahua wenxuesJ>J J1m)i (Singapore: Wenxie Suwu, !986) [Essays on Lile History of Malayan 
Cninese Literature], p. 25. ti~, <!i!1;$?>c!J!.\tminm> • (mtm:lf!i:: >::!!>'I'~, 1986), 25. • 
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by Lin Wanqing.6 According to that survey, ten writers who went to Singapore in the 
years preceding and following the Sino-Japanese war were the Chinese writers most 
influential on Singaporean social thought and culture in this period. As the research to 
date concentrates on their writing activities in Singapore, their Indonesian ex.perience is 
usually omitted, but actually eight of these ten people fled to Indonesia during the 
Japanese occupation of Singapore and stayed there for the entire occupation.7 
The Indonesian ex.periences of three writers among them will be ex.plored in the 
following discussion. They are Yu Ta Fu (Zhao Lian), Hu Yu Zhi (Sabin) and \Vang 
Ren Shu (Ba Ren), who were the most influential writers on the list. Yu Ta Fu was 
involved in the confrontation between Japanese soldiers and anti-Japanese forces and 
consequently died at the hands of the former. Hu Yu Zhi was inspired by the spirit of 
the Indonesian revolution and tried to organize Chinese youth to learn more of 
Indonesian affairs and prepare for the coming revolution. Wang Ren Shu had extensive 
contact with Indonesian pribumi and vigorously supported Indonesian nationalism, to 
the point of encouraging Chinese youths to fight with the independence forces. 8 
The author defines Chinese writers as writers who had become established writers in China before they 
arrived in Singapore. See Lin Wanqing, Zho11gg110 zuojja ziil Jiln}iapo ji qi yingximg. [The Lninese 
Writers in Singapore and their int:uencel (Singapore: Wanli Shuju, 1978). #;!II;'!!!', <tfllii'l!f'F*f:E~J.JO:fllt 
&Jtllfll> 0 c~to:fllt: 1978). 0 
They were Hu Yu Zhi (Sabin) l'i!JJ!ll:Z (i:'.!>?f'), Yu Ta Fu (Zhao Lian) flllli::K (iff:ll911), Wang Ren Shu 
(Bahren) CE ff:iFR (E\A), Shao Zang Han (ll~iRil!l), Zhang Chu Kun (5:&:l\!f;!E), Wang Ji Yuan (x*c:it), 
Shen Zi Jiu (f.t:Bi;tL), Wang Jin Ding (Y:Esf2:f), Gao Yun Lan (jtlJ!lJ.), and Yang Sao cm~), known 
as Lau Ya(¥; Y). 
Hu Yu Zhi and Wang Ren Shu had been secret Chinese Communist Party members before they wenr to 
Southeast Asia. Their purpose to come to Malaya was not limited to mobilize overseas Chinese to anti-
Japanese movement. They might have intension to increase the int:uence of the CCP. But both did not 
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These are cases peculiar to a transitional era, a critical period that saw not only the 
formation of Indonesian and Malay pribumi nationalism but also the quest for a new 
identity on the part of Chinese residents in Southeast Asian territories. The three 
Chinese writers arriving in these Southeast Asian territories found themselves facing the 
same situation as the local Chinese. Thus their personal experiences were, in a sense, 
reflective of that special decade. 
The Indonesian Experience 
Yu Ta Fu 
The story of Yu Ta Fu in Southeast Asia, especially his life in Sumatra, has continued to 
draw the attention of Chinese language readers for the more than fifty years since he 
died so dramatically in Sumatra on 29 August 1945, two weeks after the Japanese 
surrendered. Articles about his life in Sumatra have continually appeared in Chinese 
publications in places as diverse as Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
mainland China. In 1995 a Japanese scholar, Suzuki Masao, published a book based on 
long term study of the last three and a half years of Yu Ta Fu's life in Sumatra. The 
production of a film based on this book was then announced. 
open their membership of CCP before they went back to China The ideas of them which are discussed 
here are on open publications. So their relationship with CCP will not be discussed in L~is study. 
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Yu Ta Fu's six-year stay in Southeast Asia can be divided into two stages: Singapore 
and Sumatra. In Singapore he worked for a leading Chinese newspaper, Sin Chew fit 
Pao, as chief editor of the literary supplement from January 1939 to January 1942. His 
experience in Singapore shows how the Sino-Japanese war changed this Chinese 
intellectual's perceptions. In Sumatra he disguised his previous identity as a writer, 
posing as a businessman named Zhao Lian. His particular experiences in Sumatra 
illustrate the general situation of overseas Chinese, or hua qiao, in the period of the 
Japanese occupation. 
When Yu arrived in Singapore and became editor of the literary supplement of Sin 
Chew fit Pao9, it was common for Chinese intellectuals to come directly from China to 
Nanyang to take up senior positions or become heads of Chinese newspapers and 
Chinese schools. The two other writers whom I will discuss later follow this pattern, 
too: Hu Yu Zhi came to Singapore in 1939 to become chief editor of Nan Yang Sang 
Pao, and Wang Ren Shu was employed as a lecturer at the Nanyang Normal College in 
1941.10 The 1930s were a time when intellectual exchanges were still comparatively 
easy between Nanyang and China.11 
Some people have suggested rhar Yu Ta Fu Wllc' the first major Chine.qe writer to be invited to work in 
Nanyang because cf the war in China. See Xu Jun Lian 'Yu Ta Fu xiansheng zai xingzhou 
zayi.' rMemories cf Yu Ta Fu in Singapore], Chen Zi Shan, Wang Zi Li (eds), Huiyi Yu Ta Fu. 
[Remembering Yu Ta Fu] (Hunan: Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 1986), p. 479. M':'f'l'i!lli, «fiBlil!x'lt'f_{EJ'i[ 
v+r~ii>> 0 P.!l!T-~, ::E.l"n'z:~,ii • <[i'i]t\f,firi~x> 0 <iii!fW: i'li!i¥ix~l:±:litEim±, 1986), 479. " 
Other Chinese >VTiters followed the same route to Singapore. Yang Sao (f!!WI) came to Singapore as the 
ed:tor of kfin Chao, a journal owned by Tan Kah Kee, in 1941. Zhang Chu Kun (~':il'Ji(l) arrived in 
Singapore in 1937 to become editor of the literat"re secticn of Nan Yang Sh1mg Pao. Gao Yun Lan Gl'ii!J!t 
'JI;) came to Johore Baru tc teach in a high schocl in 1937. Shen Zi Jiu (ttB;:JL) mnved to become Hu Yu 
Zhi 's assistant ar Nan Yang Shang Pao in 1941. Wang Jin Ding ()'Biz Tl came from Shanghai to 
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The two major daily newspapers of Singapore, Sin Chew lit Pao and Nan Yang Shang 
Pao, were sold in all major cities throughout Southeast Asia and were the main source 
of information for Chinese intellectual circles in Nanyang. The influence of 
Singaporean newspapers spread to all places in the region. 
When the Pacific War erupted, the Chinese in Singapore, especially intellectuals, were 
filled with indignation. An organization called 'Huaqiao Intellectual Anti-Japanese 
Corps in Singapore' (HIAJCS) was formed and Yu took the position of chairman. 12 
Members of this organization were drawn from, inter alia, the mass media, education, 
publishing, academia and art circles. Hu Yu Zhi was elected vice-chairman. Wang Ren 
Shu became director of the propaganda section. The purpose of this working group was 
twofold: first, to provide preparatory training in armed resistance for cadres; second, to 
organize mass propaganda among the overseas Chinese in support of the anti-Japanese 
war. Thus Yu Ta Fu, a writer who wrote about his own life, became a fighter. 13 On 
receiving the news of the Japanese invasion, HIAJCS immediately condemned Japan's 
actions and began a campaign to organize resistance among Chinese intellectuals in 
Singapore. As a result, many local Chinese organizations joined in anti-Japanese 
Singapore to reac~ in 1938. Wang Ji Yuan CE*c7EJ came with Hu Yu Zhi to Singapore in 1941 and 
became an editor at Nan Yang Shang Pao. 
The movement of Chinese intellectuals was not exclusively from China to Nanyang. For instance, Lin 
Ben King, a Straits Chinese, became the head of Ximnen University in Arnoy in 1935. 
The Chinese title is Xingzhou huaqiao wenhuajie zhanshi gongzi;otua.'1 C!!U'H'!i¥1ilt:t{tW~l>JI {1F:l!f). 
Zhang Chu Kun, 'Yi Jiu wa'!g zhong di Yu Ta Fu.' [Remembering Yu Ta Fu in exile], Hujyj Yu Ta 
Fu. [Remembering Yu Ta Fu] (Hunan: Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 1986), pp. 589-592. *:llll£, <<t!i'VIEl.'... 
tj:l(ii)llJlifx» • lifJFf~ · • <Ufilt!i'llllif:t(> • (/lilll¥i: llilll¥!3tl$1±\ll!.1Ki±, 1986), 592-595. 0 
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activities. Following this, the 'General Anti-Japanese Mobilization Committee of 
Singaporean Huaqiao', was formed to mobilise for armed resistance. 
Tan Kah Kee recommended that Chinese intellectuals active in the anti-Japanese 
movement flee Singapore, when it became obvious that the island would soon fall to the 
invaders. Tan's assistant then arranged a boat for the whole group, and Yu Ta Fu and 
27 others fled to Sumatra on 4th February, 1942, shortly before Japanese soldiers entered 
Singapore. This was the start of their Indonesian experience. Yu stayed in Sumatra 
throughout the Pacific War. For Yu, the war signified the end of his writing career in 
Nan yang. 
After Yu Ta Fu arrived in Sumatra, he concealed his identity because he believed the 
Japanese authorities were seeking to arrest him. To avoid suspicion, Yu took on the 
identity of a businessman named Zhao Lian, 14 who came from Putian,15 a small port in 
Fukian province in South China. Knowing that most people from Putian spoke 
Mandarin Chinese, Yu felt that this would account for his inability to speak either 
Cantonese or Hokkien and fend off enquiries about his accent. 
Extraordinarily, Yu ended up as an interpreter for the Kenpeitai, the Japanese military 
police. The story of the discovery that he could speak Japanese is as follows: as Yu was 
planning to find a residence in Sumatra, he had brought with him a friend's letter 
recommending him to a landlord in Payak:umbuh, a small town in central Sumatra. On 
the journey from Bukit Tinggi to Payakumbuh, the bus in which Yu and several 
Zhao Lian (M!!1'f0. 
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Indonesians were travelling was stopped by a truck loaded with Japanese soldiers. 
None of the Indonesian passengers could speak Japanese, and neither could the 
Japanese soldiers speak Bahasa Indonesia. So some Indonesians, thinking that the 
Japanese soldiers wanted to commandeer the bus, started to get off and head for 
Payakumbuh on foot. Yu Ta Fu understood that the Japanese soldiers were simply 
asking directions, so he answered their questions. The satisfied Japanese soldiers 
saluted Yu and left. After Yu reached Payakumbuh, rumours spread among the local 
population about the arrival of a Japanese spy who was pretending to be a Chinese 
businessman. Some people even confirmed that they witnessed the Japanese soldiers 
saluting him. 16 
Yu was not at first welcomed among the local Chinese in Payakumbuh. He guessed 
that it was probably because he spoke no Cantonese or Hokkien that they did not regard 
him as one of their kind. The situation changed after he saved the life of the son of a 
local Chinese community leader by timely interpreting. The local Chinese appreciated 
having someone who could help them communicate with the Japanese authorities. The 
Kenpeitai soon heard of his linguistic ski !Is, which included Japanese, Chinese, Malay 
and Dutch, and drafted Yu as an interpreter. 
The situation of the Chinese communities under the Japanese Occupation in Sumatra 
seemed different from that of similar communities in Malaya. According to a Japanese 
" Putian (~Bl). 
'' Jin Ding. 'Yu Ta Fu zai Nanyang di jing li.' [Yu Ta Fu's Experiences in Nanyar.g], Huiyi Yu Ta Fu. 
[Remembering Yu Ta Fu] (Hunan: Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 1986), pp. 592-595. «1lll'17'1:£i¥i'ff. 
i¥:Ji\$llil[>> 0 llll!T-i'!f. • <lillt\!il1lli7'>. ailllm: i\'lli¥l>c~t1:1n&Ki±. 1986), 592-595. , 
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survey of the Dutch Indies before the war, the Chinese in Sumatra did not show the 
same enthusiasm towards the Salvation Movement for China and the economic boycott 
against Japan. 17 Another survey on leadership indicated that the owner of the biggest 
Chinese newspaper in Sumatra was 'pro-Japanese'. The founding chairman of the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, On Kin Hoat, was described as having 'good feelings 
towards Japanese'. rn There was no significant resistance in Sumatra. When the 
Japanese army anived in Padang and Bukit Tinggi, the Dutch soldiers immediately 
surrendered. 19 Even though the same units responsible for the massacre of Chinese in 
Malaya were also deployed in Sumatra, there was no violence against the Chinese there. 
The Japanese Kenpeitai permitted the local Chinese residents to continue to run their 
businesses. 
The Kenpeitai needed Yu not because he was a Chinese who could speak Japanese but 
because he was a local Chinese who could speak Japanese. At that time, many 
Nanyang Chinese interpreters were from Taiwan, as people there usually spoke 
Hokkien or Hakka and had received their education in Japanese. The Kenpeitai found 
Zhao Lian the ideal person, as he appeared to be a loeal Chinese who spoke Malay and 
Dutch as well as Japanese. One may wonder about Yu's command of Bahasa Malayu. 
19 
Toa Kcizai Chosakyoku, Ranryo indo ill okem kakyo. [Overseas Chinese ir. the Net~erlands East Indies]. 
(Tokyo: Toa Keizai Chosakyoku, 1939). J!<i!E*!iiOfilJli!'l!tfi'il, <ilfllll~P~f::~l;t o 'ljl;j,t> 0 !l!lifil~li1'iWll 
11t1".J~UI!' , C *ifil~ri'ifilJli!i!E.~. 1939 l . , 
Hwa Nan Bank, Investigation Section. Ran In shokai nokakyo. [Chinese Mercha,~ts in the Dutch Indies 
during the 1930s.] (Taipei: Hwa Nan Bank, Investigation Section, 1941). $1¥l~rrNl~'lfi:ll'I! <l!lmill'JJfi'.O) 
~if.fi> ' G!!Ut: ~1¥i!i!H'f. 1941). 0 
Fusayama, Takao, Sumatora no yoake----a}ia kaihosen hiwa. [ Dawr. h; Sumatra: a secret story of the 
Asian Liberation War.] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1981). ~-r.Lr:;:m, <.'A 7 ~ 7 (7)1:![EJHt---7 Y 7i!IPl5Jl:~w 
~:5> - ~~it±, 1981). ' 
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Yu's own poems record that he actually started to learn Bahasa Indonesia in the first few 
months after his arrival in Sumatra. 
In reply to \Vang Ren Shu's question about how he learned the Indonesian language, Yu 
sighed, 'Good Heavens, I learned it through the miseries of the Malay people!' He 
admitted that he had difficulty in understanding even everyday conversation in Malay 
when he first started to work for the Kenpeitai. He had to pretend to know the Malay 
language, and interpreted by guessing for a time. Each time he hesitated to translate the 
speech of Malay suspects, the Kenpeitai would beat them up, because they believed the 
suspects were either reluctant to tell the truth or were deliberately not using the proper 
words. So Yu tried his best to pick up the Malay language as soon as possible in order 
to avoid Japanese maltreatment of locals. Yu also learned Dutch after he settled in 
Payakumbuh. He even fell in love with a Dutch woman. As he had learned German 
previously, he picked up Dutch very quickly. He collected books in Dutch as well as in 
Japanese and Indonesian, and enjoyed reading in his spare time.20 
After Yu began working for the Kenpeitai, other Chinese writers came one by one to 
Payakumbuh to seek his protection. Yu pretended to be the owner of a factory, and Hu 
Yu Zhi, Wang Ren Shu, Shao Zong Han, Zhang Chu Kun, Shen Zi Jiu, and Wang Jin 
Ding, "Chinese writers" who had followed him into exile from Singapore, became 
workers or cooks in his employment at his factory. This was where the Chinese writers 
organized a secret reading group, which will be discussed in detail later. However, Yu 
Ta Fu did not join this group. 
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His interpreting was mainly between Japanese and Indonesian. According to Jing Ding, 
a Minangkabau theatrical group once sought pennission from the Japanese authorities to 
stage a historical drama which contained revolutionary sentiments. They contacted Yu 
Ta Fu to ask his help. Because the Kenpeitai did not understand the script, Yu reviewed 
it favourably and praised it. As a result, the drama was granted a permit for 
performances across Sumatra.21 Zhang Chu Kun reported another event, in which Yu 
Ta Fu did a favour for the Indonesian Communist Party. The Kenpeitai had learned of 
the existence of a PKI cell in Sumatra. When they were searching for evidence, Yu 
took the list of supporters and translated it to give the impression that the named pe-0ple 
were moneylenders. Yu's efforts actually saved the whole Sumatran section of this 
secret political party from arrest and probable torture. 22 
The most mysterious part of Yu Ta Fu's story is the question of who killed him, and for 
what reason. Many people have wri.tten articles putting forward different theories to 
explain his death. Before Suzuki Masao eventually found the documents which 
established who gave the order to kill Yu Ta Fu, no one had firm evidence. The killer 
could have been Indonesian, Chinese or Japanese. Each explanation had its own good 
reasons. 
ll 
Bao Si Jing, 'Yu Ta Fu xian sheng yu shu' [Yu Ta Fu and Books], Nan Qiao Ribao, 29 August 1947. 
1'1,,\S\:ff, «ffill'!~:\t~!Ji;!~'>> 0 <l¥!1iliit1'~&>, 29 August 1947. 0 
Jin Ding, 'Yu Ta Fu zai Nanyang di jing li.' [Yu Ta Fu's Experience in Nanyang), Huiyi Yu Ta Fu. 
[Remembering Yu Ta Fu] (Hunan: Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 1986), p. 580. m T, «1i~·@tii::t::l¥ii!fii"lf.fil 
~» 0 )!!Ff~ · :EEi :i'i:1li\l 0 <imll1'1ll'!}(> ' (1/ill]'lj: ;>i;IJ]'lj)(~!±l.~&.fr±, 1986), 580. 0 
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The first possibility was that Indonesians killed Yu Ta Fu. Suzuki Masao made this 
assumption at the beginning of his research. 23 Two Indonesian soldiers had summoned 
Yu Ta Fu from his house on the night he went missing. There were many witnesses to 
this. People suggested that the Indonesian heiho probably were aware that Yu Ta Fu 
worked for the Japanese, so they killed hirn.24 The second possibility was that Yu Ta 
Fu was killed by Japanese soldiers. Hu Yu Zhi argued that the Japanese killed him 
because the Kenpeitai had found out he was a famous Chinese writer. 25 The third 
possibility was that Yu was killed by local Chinese, since there were many cases in 
which Chinese who worked for the Japanese military authorities were subsequently 
killed by other Chinese.26 
Hu Yu Zhi's guess was right, but for another reason. A Japanese scholar, Suzuki 
Masao, found out the real cause of Yu's death. One of the commanders of the 
Kenpeitai in Bukit Tinggi ordered his cadres to kill Yu secretly, worried that he might 
" Zha.~g Chu Kun, 'Yi liu wang zhong di Yu Ta Fu.' [Remembering Yu Ta Fu in exile], J!ujyj Yu Ta 
F/J. [Remembering Yu Ta Fu] (Hunan: Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 1986), p. 614. <<fi:Vill'.:'Pl't9 
l'lf'li*» 0 ll!Rr'!!i', ±E!~ 0 <[i'l!·~fllll:!l.*> 0 (!li~m: •x~l:IJ!lNtd:. 19s6J, 614. 0 
11 Suzuki Masao, Sumalora no Yu Ta Fu: taiheiyo senso to chugoku satsuka, [Yu Ta Fu in Sumatra:The 
Pacific WBX and Chinese Writers.] (Tokyo: Toho Shoten, 1995), p, 216. il(l?f\:JE;i(, «A."< ~ 7 (1) 11~~ 
~: :t:LJSW'ltt'P I: rt1kfilf'F~» 0 lf1/Jilltr.tf, 1995), 216 . 0 
Heiho (~1'!11), 'A~xiliary Scldiers' in Japanese. 
" Hu Yu Zhi, Yu Ta Fu di liuwang he shizong. [The Exile and Disappeanmce of Yu Ta Fu] (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong Chiyuan Publishing Co., 1946) tJlJ!ltZ., <1lll~xl't9ifrl:L::f0:5t:i1Jb 0 ~mF~ll!l!dl!lN 
;Fi, 1946). 0 
"' Hu Jian Zl:ong, 'Yu Ta Fu yu Wang Yir.g Hsia di bei}u.' [The Tragedy of Yu Ta Fu and Wang Ying 
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be treated as a war criminal if this action became known.27 Yu was killed not because 
he was the writer Yu Ta Fu, but because he was the middleman Zhao Lian. 
Yu Ta Fu's story illustrates the role of Southeast Asian Chinese as middlemen at a time 
of dramatic political change. When Yu Ta Fu took on the identity of Zhao Lian, his 
position changed from that of a famous Chinese intellectual to that of a local Chinese 
resident. The Japanese authorities believed that he had some local knowledge. Whether 
he wished it or not, he was put in the position of middleman to negotiate between 
Japanese authorities and the local community. Eventually, he became entangled in the 
struggle for power and then died for it. 
From his story we can draw some conclusions about the different situations of Sumatra 
and Singapore. Because there was no significant bloodshed when the Japanese came to 
Sumatra, as there had been in Malaya, the local Chinese community did not feel shamed 
to serve the Japanese authorities. For them, it simply meant a change of power-holders 
but not the power system. And the Japanese soldiers did not intrude great! y into the 
lives of the Chinese residents there. When Yu Ta Fu crossed the border from Singapore 
to Sumatra, the atmosphere among the Chinese community which surrounded him was 
quite different from that in Singapore. 
Also Wen Zi Chuan, 'Yu Ta Fu bie chuan' [Biography of Yu Ta Fu] Xun feng, 1964: 143. ii!.ltf JI I.« 
filllt7.:53U{\!J:» • ~;!i!\>, 1964: 143. • 
Suzuki Yiasao, Sumatora no Yu Ta Fu: taiheiyo senso to chugoku sakka. [Yu Ta Fu in Sumatra:The 
Pacific War and Chinese Writers] (Tokyo: Toho Shoten, 1995), p. 16. ~?f:TI:.51::, <7: 7 ~ 7 Cl.l'fl11~7.:: 
;f,(lf'~~~l:tf!E{'F~> 0 1995), 16. 0 
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Hu YuZhi 
The role of Hu Yu Zhi in the history of the Nanyang Chinese has been more 
controversial. Most people agree that he played a very important role in Malaya in the 
1940s. Lin Wanqing suggests that he was the most influential Chinese intellectual 
among the Nanyang Chinese in the 1940s.28 Some people have suggested that he 
exerted a positive influenee on the process of localization of Chinese residents. For 
instance, Liu Bin indicated that Hu Yu Zhi proclaimed ideas of democracy in Chinese 
circles and fostered the liheralization movement in Malaya. 29 Some think his influence 
was the reverse. For example, Cui Gui Qiang pointed out that Hu represented the 
China-oriented group rather than the Malaya-oriented group in post-war politics. 30 
There is no doubt that his writing was crucial to the debate on the issue of whether a 
China-oriented or local-oriented attitude should be adopted by Chinese residents in 
Malaya. 
Lin Wanqing, Zhongguo zuojia Zlli ){inji11po Ji qi yingxian. [The Chinese Writers in Singapore and their 
influence]. (Singapore; Wanli Shuju, 1978) . .:ftl.11i1'f. <4'~1'.E~:tE~.IJO:!di&Jt~flil>' (fifJO:!Jll: 7ffi 
fil'!l.11il. !978) 0 
Liu Bin, 'Hu Yu C'ti to nanyo l:a.kyo --sanju no mimoto wo motta iinbutsu no l:iseki '. lbna,7 ajia 
kakyo to c/Jugoku ----chugoku kizoku ishiki ka.ra ka;ln isMd he. [Hu Yu Zhi and the Nanyang Overseas 
Chinese] (Tokyo: The Institute of Developing Economies, 1993), p. 148. !i!Ui;J;:, «li!ll!::~Z I:. i¥1#~1'1.ll--· 
=£(7)Ji}7G.a:- t-:> t:::At!Jl(l)Wl.~» 0 <'{iJ\lf 7:/ 7¥1it /:. t:p~--- t:pl!J!!l~Ji!~iJ' 6 C!i¥A£ll'.~ 
"-> 0 (.l¥i11\:: £W2Mllimifi"II:f\~, 1993), 148. , 
Cui Gui Qiang, }{jm11a huaren guojia rentong de zhuanxia,1g. [The shifting direction of national identity in 
Singapore and Malaya] (Singapore: Nanyang Xuehui, 1989). \!11t%.l, ~}i!!,~A~~~,JSIPJl't\JillJfti!, 
1945-1959>, c.mtJa:lll<: 1¥f#~i!t. J989J .• 
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When Hu Yu Zhi first took refuge in Sumatra, he lived in Payakumbuh with others of 
the formerly Singapore-based 'Chinese writers'. At that time, the writers pretended to 
work at Yu Ta Fu's wine factory. Hu Yu Zhi organized a secret reading group, and 
many other Chinese writers joined it, including Wang Ren Shu, Shao Zong Han, Zhang 
Chu Kun, Shen Zi Jiu, Yang Shao and Wang Jin Ding. It was Hu Yu Zhi who initiated 
the idea to support the Indonesian revolution and to master Bahasa Indonesia to prepare 
for the coming Indonesian revolution. 
It was very likely that, prior to their gaining a good grasp of Indonesian, much of their 
reading material was in Japanese. Among them, Yang Shao, Wang Ren Shu, Shen Zi 
Jiu and Jin Ding had studied in Japan. Subsequently Hu Yu Zhi became the first of 
them to learn to read Bahasa Indonesia. He then started to discuss information gained 
from newspapers in Bahasa Indonesia with the others. Perhaps it was because Hu had 
been an enthusiast about Esperanto in the 1920s that he could pick up a new language in 
a short period. The reading group started to translate news from Indonesian newspapers 
into Chinese. Hu described their life in Sumatra as a good opportunity to develop 
contacts with both the local Chinese and pribumi communities during the Japanese 
occupation.31 During his stay in Sumatra, Hu Yu Zhi completed one novel and two 
books on the study of Bahasa Indonesia.32 
3! Sha Ping, J'indunixiyayu yufa yan}iu. [Penjelidikan Tentang Djalan Bahasa Indonesia oleh Sabin; 
Indonesian Grammatical Studies] (Beijing: Renmin Publishing Co, 1951). iJ>lf, <ffl.f!!'!Bil!lilli:Fo<lliltiliff 
'ft> • (~l:;J!t: A~tf:lll!li:ir.±, 1951). , 
Zhang Chu Kuo, Huyuzhi zai nanyang di qinian. [Hu Yu Zhi's seven years in Nanyang] Hu Yu Z/Ji 
yinxi:wg Jf[lmpressions of Hu Yu Zhi] (Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi Publishing Co) p. 171. 5.G~Jlf. <<i'ill 
l!l!Ztl:ffi#rt>Jts~», <i'i!ll!l!Z.EPi!~c> 0 (~l;:\i{: tpfilllailli'.l:H!l&fd:, 1989), 171. 0 
168 
BaRen 
Ba Ren's relationship with Indonesia was even more dramatic than those of Yu and Hu. 
He arrived in Singapore in October 1941, two months before the Pacific War erupted. 
Before his arrival he had not had any substantial contact with this region. In fact his 
original plan had been to go to the United States rather than Southeast Asia. Around 
March 1941, he was asked to leave Shanghai for the USA by Zhou En Lai in order to 
launch a newspaper there. His attempts to gain a visa for the United States ended in 
failure in May 1941, and he began sending articles from Hong Kong to the Nan Yang 
Shang Pao in Singapore. Later he was invited to Singapore by Hu Yu Zhi. In October 
of the same year, he arrived in Singapore to take up a position as lecturer at the 
Nanyang Huaqiao Normal College, and started to explore this new culture and 
environment. 33 
In these few months in Singapore, Ba Ren engaged actively in debate in the 
Singaporean press. When the Pacific War began two months after his arrival, he joined 
the 'Huaqiao Intellectual Anti-Japanese Corps in Singapore' (IBAJCS), and took the 
position of director of propaganda. Then he joined Yu Ta Fu in fleeing to Sumatra in 
February 1942, which was his first visit to Indonesia. He soon developed strong and 
enduring ties with Indonesia. After hiding in Sumatra for more than three years during 
the Japanese occupation, he became an enthusiastic commentator on Indonesian affairs. 
His articles about Indonesia appeared in Medan, Jakarta, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Concerning Ba Ren's e<rrly work and life before his arrival in Singapore, see Quanguo Ba Ren Xuesbu 
Taolunhui ed. Ba Ren ya~Jiu. [Studies of Ba Ren] (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian, 1992). ~~B.A."*'/il\f~;f 
~tt;!,l;\l, <B.A.Wf'Ji:> ° Cl:l'llt: 1992). , 
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Shanghai from 1945 to 1950. After Indonesia achieved independence, he became the 
first Chinese ambassador to Indonesia since 1950. He wrote several books including an 
introductory text on contemporary Indonesian affairs, as well as a four-volume history 
of Indonesia. In his writings, he always expressed strong and intimate sympathies 
toward the Indonesian people. Before he died in 1969, he even expressed the wish in 
his will; 'Divide my ashes into two parts, and bury one in my birth place, the other at 
sea ... I am still concerned about the people in Indonesia.' Such emotional attachment 
toward Indonesia was indeed rare in Chinese writers. 
Available evidence suggests he was the only Chinese writer to leave a detailed record of 
his life in Indonesian territory under Japanese occupation. He wrote at least six articles 
totalling more than 400 pages between 1947 and 1948, which provide a rich source of 
information about his life, thoughts and impressions during his Indonesian experience. 
Those articles can be used for tracing how he built up his feeling for the country over 
time. 
After he arrived in Sumatra, Ba Ren did not immediately join the group of Chinese 
intellectuals from Singapore at Payakumbuh. Instead, he went to live in a village with 
his partner, Xiao Liu, in Selat Panjang, an outer island between Singapore and 
Sumatra. 34 He invited another poet, Lau Ya, to be their companion. 35 He wrote 
'because we could not speak Hokkien or Cantonese, but only spoke Mandarin [or 
Putonghua, 'common language'], we were called "common people" among the 
The original narr.e of Xiao Liu (1 J'>iUl was Zeng De Rong (W°i!El~) or Liu Yan (li\lJ:'Ef). The Chinese 
na.-ne for Se!at Panjang is Shi Li Ban Rang Cf1U,IJJff~. 
The original name of Lau Ya ('\!'; Y) was Yang Sao (;f!l'Jg}. He was a well-known poet in China. 
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Nanyang Chinese.' He said 'In Nanyang, "common people" were a new thing. Local 
Chinese might have thought it dangerous to allow "common people" to live among 
them under Japanese control.' This was because the Japanese might suspect them of 
being actively pro-China, if not actually being spies. Thus, he asked Lau Ya, a 
Fukienese, to accompany them. At this time Ba Ren still had difficulty communicating 
with local people, even ethnic Chinese. 
Later they moved in with a Hakka family in another village. Ba Ren thought it might be 
easier for him to communicate with the host of this family, Renshen. Up to this time, he 
had not considered staying long on this remote island, and sought ways of returning to 
China. He eventually left the island five months later, after receiving a letter from Hu 
Yu Zhi inviting him to West Sumatra. These few months staying with a Chinese 
peasant family in a foreign territory gave Ba Ren a good opportunity to observe the 
daily life of ethnic Chinese and their relations with indigenous people in Sumatra. He 
referred to the indigenous people as 'Malays', as was common among Sumatran 
Chinese, even though this group included Javanese and other ethnic groups. 
Ba Ren described this Chinese peasant family and their neighborhood in detail. He 
began to understand more about the hardships of Chinese peasants who had migrated to 
Sumatra. At the same time he was very impressed with the fact that the ethnic Chinese 
were everywhere in this foreign land. He said 'our people (minzu) can grow in any 
territory.' He asked, 'Why are our people found with strong roots in places within the 
territories of other people?' He paid attention to intermarriage between Chinese and 
Malays and observed the characteristics of the Malay wives in his neighbourhood. He 
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pointed out that their behaviour in matters involving ownership and reciprocity was 
quite different from that of Chinese women. 
Another thing which concerned him was the feeling toward the fatherland, China, 
among these Chinese peasant immigrants. He was always interested in China's affairs 
and liked to discuss them with the ethnic Chinese whom he eould trust. He was quite 
surprised that ethnic Chinese peasants were so apathetic toward China's affairs. They 
were concerned mainly about their own livelihood. One day he asked his neighbor A-
Ru, 'Don't you wish to see the fatherland (zuguo, literally 'ancestors' land') become 
stronger?' A-Ru answered 'What's the benefit for my life if China (Tangshan, literally 
'Tang Dynasty Mountain') becomes stronger?' 36 As a writer who had come to 
Singapore to promote resistance to Japanese invasion, Ba Ren realized that local 
Chinese saw their fate as tied to that of their local region in Southeast Asia, not to 
China. At the same time, he was surprised to find that the local Chinese were eager to 
help him. Each time he said 'thank you' to a Hakka farmer, the answer was 'not at all, 
we are all Chinese'. Ba Ren and his colleagues did what they could to help these 
families. His partner Xiao Liu found that most children in the neighborhood did not 
attend school. She organized a small class for the children and wrote some material for 
use as textbooks. The first sentences she wrote were 'We are Chinese people 
(Zhongguo Ren). Our ancestors came from China (Zhongguo )'. 
Ba Ren's first experience among ethnic Chinese communities in Sumatra was of Jiving 
with a peasant family, quite different from the experience of most other Chinese writers, 
Both Zuguo (if<il.~) and Tangshan Olltill) indicate China. 
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who usually stayed in urban areas during their time in Southeast Asia. Their impression 
was that ethnic Chinese in the region were either businessmen or tradespeople. The 
atmosphere in Sumatran Chinese circles was also quite different from that in Malaya. 
The ethnic Chinese in Sumatra were far removed from Chinese affairs, and most were 
preoccupied with making a living in their present locality. Their roots had grown 
deeply into the territory. 
In August 1942, Ba Ren began to feel that he and his colleagues should do something 
positive instead of waiting to leave for China. At that time, the Japanese military 
administration had been established in Sumatra for five months and law and order had 
been restored. Ba Ren had been staying in Renshen's house for four months. He 
contacted Hu Yu Zhi, who was staying in Payakumbuh with Yu Ta Fu. Hu suggested 
that it was impossible to return to China under the present situation and that Ba Ren 
should consider making long-term arrangements for living in Southeast Asia. Hu 
suggested two important things: to try to survive economically, and to learn Bahasa 
Indonesia in order to prepare for the coming Indonesian revolution. 
It is probable that this advice prompted Ba Ren' s decision to study Indonesian affairs. 
He began to discuss the future of ethnic Chinese and Indonesia with some ethnic 
Chinese who had received Chinese education. At the end of 1942, he was already 
convinced that the ethnic Chinese who lived in Indonesia should help with the liberation 
of Indonesia. His conviction appeared to be the result of Japan's policies in Indonesia. 
He was impressed by the fact that the Japanese could control the place so well with the 
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help of Indonesians. But he found that many local Chinese youths who had received 
Chinese education gave little thought to helping Indonesian liberation.37 
At the beginning of 1943, Ba Ren moved from Selat Panjang to Payakumbuh in order to 
meet Yu Ta Fu and Hu Yu ZhL By that time, he felt sympathetic towards the Malay 
people and in his writing started to address the natives of Sumatra as 'fndonesians' 
instead of 'Malays', 38 His identification with Indonesia and the independence 
aspirations of its people became increasingly pronounced in his writings. When he saw 
palm trees, he wrote 'I always feel that palm trees in Indonesia are very lovely. They are 
simple, delicate and straight. They symbolize the characteristics of the Indonesian 
people-straightness, candidness and open-heartedness.' His writing was full of 
passion on behalf of the unspoilt Indonesian people, even when he did not yet have the 
ability to communicate with Indonesians directly. 
He stayed in Pekanbaru for a couple of weeks during his joumey to Payakumbuh, and 
met a young Indonesian businessman who was visiting the same family. With the help 
of an interpreter, he talked extensively to this young man about Indonesian politics and 
perceptions of local ethnic Chinese. The man's responses to his questions disturbed Ba 
Ren so much that he was unable to sleep that night for anxiety about the fate of the 
Once Ba Ren saiC: to A-Gou, an ethnic Chinese youth in his neighbourhood, that if the Japanese associated 
with the Malay people, it would be disastrous for the ethnic Chinese. A-Gou, who had received primary 
education in a local Chinese school, said that either the Japanese or the Dutch would need the help of the 
Chinese if they wanted to stay in Southeast Asia and achieve the!r purposes. Ba Ren felt disappointed by 
this opinion. See Ba Ren (Bah Ren), lnni sanjj. [Sor:1e Prose Notes ci: Indonesia]. ("rlunan: Hunan Renr:1in 
Publishing Co., 1984) p. 45. BA, <EfJJB~~i:l>, <™ll¥i: JMJ¥f) .. Bf:tl:Jlt'£iil±, 1984), 45., 
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Indonesian people as well as the Nanyang Chinese. He went over the question, 'What 
separates peoples?' He concluded that the Chinese and Indonesian peoples shared the 
same fate, as they were both victims of capitalist colonialism. 
After meeting his old friends Hu Yu Zhi and Yu Ta Fu in Payakurnbuh, he joined the 
discussion group of Chlnese writers and he also learned basic Bahasa Indonesia for 
daily conversation. This group tried to train themselves to read Indonesian newspapers 
and to understand the culture and society of Indonesia. They sought out different kinds 
of material about Indonesia to read, mainly in Indonesian and Japanese. Ba Ren shared 
the same ideas as other Chinese writers, but he wanted to do more to help the 
Indonesian cause. Later the group decided to depart for different places for safety. Ba 
Ren returned to Medan in January 1943. There he began to organize Chinese youth to 
oppose the Japanese. He founded an underground organization called 'Sumatra 
Huaqiao Anti-Fascist Union', 39 which later changed its name to 'Sumatra People's 
Anti-Fascist Union'(SPAFU), in order to mobilize the Indonesian people's support 
against the Japanese.40 
The strategy of SPAFU included: (1) The learning of Bahasa, and studying of 
Indonesia's history, society, culture, and economy as part of its preparations for 
independence, which should come soon. (2) Consolidating the Chinese community to 
Ba Ren, lnnj san}l: [Some Prose Notes on Indonesia]. (Hunan: Hunan Renmin Publishing Co., 1984) p. 50. 
E\J.., <EPJ'tOW,(~C>, (ll;~iW: li\!rnliJ..~1£1lS1if±, i984J, 50. • 
., The Chinese ti::e is Sumendala huaqiao fan faxisi tongmeng (i!'['~;§f!l;i$!\ii!BZ:~1"2!EWT[l'[Jla). 
'" Wang Ren Shu (Ba Ren) Yind1mixiya jndaishi. [Modem Indonesian History] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue 
Publishing Co, 1995), pp. 901-902. :t:tt:r,x, <Ell!!l'ffia.5Zlff\:;J!'.> • ,fii!1¥i3i\!'1:JH! 0 (~l:>i1.': ~t:m*J'f,! 
l±lllru'±, 1995), 901-902. Q 
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engage in a non-cooperation movement. (3) Publishing an underground newspaper, 
Qian Jin Bao (The Advance Post),41 as part of efforts to spread news and organize 
people, especially those from the working class, in the local language orally through the 
secret members of the organization. ( 4) Establishing eon tact with the underground 
organization of the Indonesian Communist Party and cooperating with them to resist the 
Japanese fascists. 
Ba Ren was aware that the anti-Japanese movement was weak, and that the gap between 
the interests and aspirations of the Chinese and pribumi Indonesians was considerable. 
He thought that the best way to improve relations between the two was to join the local 
'anti-fascist movement' (read as 'anti-Japanese colonialism' in this context).42 This was 
why Ba Ren and his group, SPAFU, were keen to contact the Indonesian Communist 
Party, which maintained an anti-Japanese policy under the occupation. But SP AFU was 
unable to locate the PKI and decided to open relations with the Communist Party of 
Malaya (MCP). Eventually they made direct contact with the Malayan People's Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA) led by the Malayan Communist Party. In early 1943, SPAFU 
sent a representative to Malaya to raise funds and get propaganda training. 43 
Throughout the Japanese occupation, SPAFU was unable to contact the 'revolutionary 
elements' in Indonesia. In fact Tan Mataka, who is said to be a prominent leader of the 
Indonesian Communist Party, had been a colleague of Ba Ren at the Nanyang Chinese 
Qian Jin Bao (Jlfj)!¥f1). 
Ba Ren, Innisan;i [Notes en Indonesia]. (Hunan: Hunan Renmin Publishing Co., 1984) p. 70. EA, <~fl 
.ft:li'D:IIB> 0 (i1@¥l: lli'fc¥fAE!!te.i:&ifd:, 1984), 70. • 
Wang Ren Shu (Ba Ren) Yir,d1mixiya jilldaisni. [Modem Indonesian History] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue 
Publishing Co., 1995) p. 902. <~JJ!lltlfilii.llii!.[i-\:Jl:> , mli¥lli':~llll 0 (~tg: ~tB:::k!J11±1~.N 
ifd:, l995), 902. , 
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Normal College in Singapore before the Japanese occupation.44 Towards the end of the 
war, Ba Ren succeeded in establishing links with the Indonesian Socialist Party, which 
was less radical than the PKI. 
In September 1943, the Kenpeitai learned of SPAFU and began arresting its members. 
SPAFU's leadership then disbanded the organization and much of its membership tled 
to other areas in the archipelago.45 Ba Ren went to Pematang Siantar, an inland city 
halfway between Medan and Lake Toba, and hid in a small village. He believed he had 
been betrayed by Chinese intellectuals. He wrote a poem upon learning of the death of 
a friend who had fought together with him against the Japanese. Later, he discovered 
that his dead friend hadn't died for the Resistance but had in fact become a Japanese 
spy. So, disappointed by the Chinese in Indonesia, he kept his distance from them to 
reduce the risk of being caught by the Japanese. 
During 1944, Ba Ren immersed himself in local life. At this time, his neighbours were 
mainly Indonesians. He described his feelings thus: 
,, 
Tan Malaka, From Jail lo Jail. Translated a.'ld introduced by Helen Jarvis. (Athens: Ohio University, 
1991), pp:llO-lll. Tan Ma!aka taught at the Nanyang Chinese Normal School (!Wfltftifjfjlij.\'!i!i!'!tl, for two 
years from 1939 to 1941. Later he fled to Sumatra by boat with some colleagues and students after the 
Japanese occupied Singapore. Ba Ren also used his connection with Tan to hide out in Scmatra. But 
apparently they did not meet di;ring the Japanese occupation, since Tan moved to Java in 1943. Ba Ren 
only later realized Tan Ma!aka was his former colleague, 'Tan Hoo Seng' (IDl!:fl]~). who had posed as 
a Philippines Chinese while at the Nanyang Chinese Normal School. See Wang Ren Shu (Ba Ren), 
Yindunixiya )mdaishi. [Modern Indonesian History] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Publishing Co., 1995) p. 889. 
±if!x. <~r.;'l!';'E'.l'§~lIT1~~> • W£l¥!Ji\lfl!\l'1fi. • c:Jt}j(: :lt»t*~ti:l!tiiti1.t., 1995), ss9. • 
Wang Ren Shi: (Ba Ren), YJndunixiya jndaishi [Y!oderr. Indonesian History] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue 
Publishing ea., 1995) v. 9fJ7. ±ffit9!, <f-PllitffifflfSTilITtt~> • ~m!RmJ'!I! • c:ltJil:: :Jt;JiU::l1lJ<!:l:lli& 
ifd:, 1995), 907' • 
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I myself seem to have forgotten my nationality. I, a stranger who have come 
from an unknown country, dropped into this village where Chinese and Javanese 
Ii ve together in peace. I can touch their hearts, each of them ... On the other 
hand, I don't really understand those diligent Chinese farmers and quick-
thinking Chinese merchants and clever Chinese intellectuals. Whenever I tried 
to be close with them, I always felt a gap between us. Why? Is it because I 
don't want my previous identity to be discovered? Or is it because that there are 
always some linkages, which cannot be disassociated, between them and the 
Japanese, the enemy who wants to chase me?.46 
In the last year of the Japanese occupation, he spent most of his time in a remote village 
in the mountainous area of Pematang Siantar and concentrated on reading and writing 
about Indonesia. 
In Pematang Siantar, he became interested in local history in Sumatra. He asked the old 
people in his neighborhood about local legends, and came to realise how the Chinese 
had contributed to the development of Pematang Siantar. He further considered the 
relationship between the Chinese and Indonesian peoples. 47 His first work about 
Indonesia was written at this time. It was a long epic titled 'The Melody of Indonesia', 
full of passion for the land and the people of Indonesia. 4R In this work, hope for 
Ba Ren (Bah Ren), lnnf sanj. [Notes on Indonesia] (Hilllan: Hunan Renmin Publishing Co., 1984), ;i. 233. 
El.A., <Ef,;l:~~b, (lllJ1¥.i: mlf¥I.A.Wt±l~&.tl. 1984), 233. , 
His Javaaese friend asked about the titles of Chinese community leaders, kapitain and major, which were 
given by the Dutch authorities, and thought that the Chinese acted as the scouts of the Dutch. He was 
aware that the tension between Chinese and Indonesians should be analysed in terms of relations between 
colonizers and colonized. See Ba Ren, lnni sanji. [ Notes on Indonesia], (Hunan: Hunan Renmin 
Publisiing Co., 1984), p. 216. El)'-. <Enn:;~~tl> • (ii\IJJ¥l: ililll¥.i.A.!'\':l:flllli1iit±, 1984), 216. • 
Ba Ren, 'Yindunixiya zhi ge.' [The Melody of Indonesia] Nanya yu dongnanya zf/jao, 5. El.A., «ED 
)ltJEjit[Silzllfi:» , )l(IJ¥.iJ'i;:'fl!'llll • <i?i<'u'i~Jl@:l¥l2~'M» 1984: 5. • 
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liberation of the Indonesian people was palpable. One expert on the works of Ba Ren 
commented that 'The Melody of Indonesia' was the very first, and until the time of 
writing (1986) the only celebration of Indonesia written by a Chinese intellectual.49 
Aftermath of the Indonesian Experience 
The account above shows how the Chinese writers who hid in Sumatra during the 
Japanese occupation were inspired by the Indonesian revolution. After the surrender of 
the Japanese on 15 August 1945, these writers started to consider how to contribute to 
Nanyang by sharing their experiences and spreading the spirit of Indonesian 
nationalism. Shao Zong Han joined Ba Ren in Medan to edit a pro-democracy 
newspaper, Democracy Daily.50 Wang Ji Yuan went to Java to hide from the Japanese, 
and afterwards decided to remain in Java as editor of a pro-Indonesian newspaper in 
Jakarta, Shenghuo Bao (Life Daily). 51 Later Yang Shao went to Jakarta to join 
Shenghuo bao. Gao Yun Lan, Zhang Chu Kun, Shen Zi Jiu and Jin Ding followed Hu 
Yu Zhi back to Singapore to work for the magazine Feng Xia and the Daily newspaper 
Nan Chiau lit Pao,52 which were known among the local people as radical, provocative, 
'nationalist' publications. 53 The experiences of these writers arc discussed in Shen 
SJ 
Zhou Kan Jing, 'Ba Ren yu yindunixiya y:rniiu.' [Ba Ren ;ud Indonesian studies] N11I1ya dongnaoya 
luncong, 1986. ffl1¥i:l?:, <BA.lJi!EPJ'~.'.FE\gtjiIT:iliffJ'i:> ~ *~*fctkKii, J¥j§Jii:1¥i52~iill~. 1986. • 
The Chinese title is Mnzhu Ribao (fl!± Fl'¥~). 
The Chinese characters are Wang Ji Yuan CI]"35tl and Shenghuo Bao (!Efrfi¥1i1, Life Daily), 
The Chinese characters are Yang Shao C.m~11l), Gao Yur. Lan (lill~'lr), Zhang Chu Kun ('li:lll'ml , Shen 
Zi Jiu (ttilfL) and Jin Ding 
Concerning the travels of this group, see Shen Zi Jiu, Liuw!111g w chidaoxj11IJ shang. [Exile on the 
Equator] (Beijing: Sa.'! Lian Shudian, 1985). ttlt;h., <ffitL:::tEtiFJi!~_t> • 1985)' 
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Zijiu's book Liuwang zai chidaoxian shang (Exile on the Equator). There were other 
Chinese writers, not so well known, who do not appear on this list, such as Wu Si Liu 
and Zhang Qi Cheng.54 
Feng Xia means '(Land) Under the Monsoon' .55 In the editorial opening the first issue 
of Feng Xia, Hu stated that the magazine served three purposes: (1) to promote peace 
and democracy in China, (2) to assist the Southeast Asian people to earn independence 
and freedom, and (3) to raise the status of the Nanyang Chinese. From this statement, 
we can see that the idea of Nanyang identity still existed, but it had been blended with 
pribumi-influenced nationalism. Shen Zi Jiu explained this spirit in the same issue: 'We 
want to speak for the people who live in this region, the lands under the monsoon, to 
express their ideas and realize their aspirations.' They strongly supported the goal of 
Indonesian independence, and encouraged Nan yang Chinese to join this movement.56 
Because of their common experience in Indonesia, most of these writers joined Feng 
Xia, including those who had worked for other newspapers before the Japanese 
occupation. The magazine was influential at that time because of the number of 
prominent and respected writers who contributed to its columns.57 Through the letters 
Wu Si Liu (~;,Jill), Zhang Qi Cheng (m:li:Ji). 
The Chinese title of this magazine is Feng Xia (.l!fil TJ. 
Shen Zi Jiu, Kaichangban. [Opening Issue]. Feng Xia, !: (3 Dec. 1945). Cited from Shen Zi Jiu, Liu wang 
zai chidaoxian shang [Exile on the Equator]. (Beijing: San Lian Shudian, 1985). ttill£JL, «OO:lihS», < 
,llfcl">, 1, 3 Dec. 1945 ' Ji!iil.51 §ttti.JL. <ii1H:':::(:E$i1l:*llJ:> 0 (~bJit: =:~ifi!!}16, 1985). ' 
Feng Xia was often seen as the organ publications of the Malayan branch of the China Democratic League 
(CDL) whose Chinese headc;uarters was pro- Chinese Co:nmunist Party. So ::his magazine was seen as 
one of the publications that advocated pro-CCP propaganda. See Cui Gui Qiang, Xinma buaren guojia 
rentong de zbuatJxiar,g [fhe shifting direction of national identity in Singapore and Malaya] (Singapore: 
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from readers, we know that it was distributed across Southeast Asia, and especially 
Indonesia. It was a magazine for readers able to read Chinese throughout Southeast 
Asia. 
Feng Xia gave prominence to Indonesian affairs, and particularly the Indonesian 
Revolution. Because most editors in Feng Xia had lived in Indonesia, they used its 
pages to urge people to learn Bahasa Indonesia and support the Indonesian Revolution. 
In Feng Xia, Hu encouraged Malayan youth to concern themselves with Malayan local 
affairs in the same spirit as the Indonesian nationalists. 
This effort to encourage Nanyang Chinese to learn Bahasa Indonesia had a long-term 
effect. Bao Si Jing published his Indonesian-Chinese Dictionary of Phrases in 1949. 
He confirmed that he embarked on the job of e<liting an Indonesian-Chinese dictionary 
because of his personal experience with the Feng Xia group from the autumn of 1943, 
when they were in Sumatra under the Japanese occupation.58 The popular movement to 
learn Malay during the 1950s was also inspired by this group. 59 Because of this, 
Malay/Indonesian language studies became the first subject other than Chinese 
language studies in the College of Humanities at Nanyang University in 1955. 
" 
Nanyang Xuehui.1989). ~Jl::l!il, < m~~Alil~~fl'llliJfffl'D, 1945-1959>" (~iJOi&:: 1¥.'1¥'Jll'1il', 
1989). But the magazine actually paid little attention to CCP. It would be better to see lhis magazine <JS 
an intellectual magazine which contained some left-wing thought. 
Bao Si Jing, Yindunixiya hua cidian. [Indonesian-Chinese Dictionary of Phrases] (Singapore: Zhongnan 
Publishing Co., 1949). 1Q.,\\,'_;t:f:, <m!!t'ffif!L]s;![lj~rJJ~> ° C*'!!JOJJ!<:: tpJ¥i/f,IIBUH., 1949) - . 
Interview with Liao Yu-Fong, 13 March, 1997. Liao Yu-Fong (ilJfifl'§') was a retired professor in 
Indonesian lar.guage studies at the National University of Singapore. He graduated from Nanyang 
University in the 1950s and went to the University ofindonesia in Jakarta to smdy modem Indonesian 
literature. 
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The Feng Xia group, who still preferred to use the term huaqiao to describe Nanyang 
Chinese, advocated that Nanyang huaqiao should join the local nationalist movement. 
Zhou Rong encouraged Nanyang Chinese to use various indirect means to join the local 
nationalist movement if they could not join directly. One of the best ways to support 
the movement, he said, was through writing and he appealed to Chinese to contribute 
articles on nationalist issues.60 A powerful way for a magazine to do this was to report 
current events with a strongly pro-independence editorial line. Ba Ren, for example, 
denounced the Dutch blockade of Indonesia as imperialism. He also lauded those 
Chinese people who undertook the risky business of smuggling goods into Republican 
Indonesia, describing this as 'business for revolution' .61 
Fang Hua proclaimed that the democratic imperative for Nanyang Chinese was to 
support the local nationalist movement, because Nanyang Chinese lived with 
indigenous people and had the closest relationship with them.62 At the same time, Hu 
Yu Zhi was still concerned with China's affairs. For him, there was no contradiction 
between being China-oriented and Malaya-oriented. He sought the same thing for 
both--democracy. In his writing, he always used the idea of 'progress' to describe his 
opinions. For him, the idea of 'progress' was identical to democracy. Later, he was 
Zhou Rong, "Tan mahua wenyi," [About Mahua Literature] Feng Xia, 10 Jan. 1948 (108). )l!J'l';'., «~ 
~~Y:'il», <Ji,T>, 10 Jan. 1948, (108)." 
Ba Ren, 'Shui ke yu gong tau.' [Crewman and Foreman]. Feng Xia, 24 April 1948, (123). EA.«lJ< 
~!l\lilll'l» 0 <!'ll\ T> ,24 April 1948, (]23). ' 
Fang Hua, 'Mah ca qingyi:;n di xin far.gxiang.' [The '.'lew Direction of tbe Malayan Chinese You:h 
Movement] Feng Xia, 17 April 1948, (122). }J>f;, <<.\li,>f;Wl!l!Et'lm:IJli'.iJ» 0 17 April l948, 
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seen as China-oriented because of his close interest in Chinese affairs. In a debate on 
the nature of Mahua (Malaysian Chinese) literature, he was seen as a representative of 
Chiao-Min, or sojourner's literature.63 We will discuss this debate in Chapter 6. His 
Indonesian experience made him encourage more people in Malaya to take a local-
oriented attitude. Hu himself exhibited both a locally oriented and a China-oriented 
identity. Eventually he decided to go back to China, where he became the Deputy 
Minister of Culture of the Chinese Communist Party government in 1956. 
Among the Chinese writers discussed above, Ba Ren remained deeply involved with the 
local nationalist movement. After the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, he decided 
to stay in Sumatra but he shifted from underground to open activities. He edited a 
magazine, Progress Weekly (Qia:njin zhoubao) and a daily newspaper, Democracy 
Daily (Minzhu ribao).64 The former was in Chinese and the latter was published in two 
editions, one in Chinese and another in Indonesian. Shao Zang Han edited the Chinese 
version, while Ba Ren edited the Indonesian version with the help of Zhang Qiong Yu,65 
who translated Ba Ren's articles into Indonesian.66 At the same time, Ba Ren founded 
the Sumatra Democratic Union, based on the membership of the former Sumatran 
Huaqiao Anti-Fascist Union. His activities in Sumatra in the post-war period were 
based on his belief that the local Chinese should help the Indonesian Revolution in 
Huang Aoyun, Zhongguo zuojia yu NanyaJJg. [Chinese w:iters and the South Seas] (Hong Kong: Kehua 
Press. 1988). Jlif!&~. <tpfil/J{'F~£ffi!~if¥'.> , Citre: N'!ili!ilit/H~Ji(0-l'fJ, 1988). 0 
The Chinese titles for these publications are QiaJJJin Zhoubao (llfJl1§~¥!1., Progress Weekly) and Minzhu 
Ribao (JO\\:±: 13 ¥13_, Democracy Daily). 
Zhang Qiong Yu (~.il:'if~). 
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order to promote friendship between the Chinese and Indonesian peoples. He built a 
relationship with Tan Malaka's 'Indonesian Socialist Party', and even attended the 
meetings of the party in Siantar.67 He also published extensively on Tan Malaka's 
thought and activities, and wrote several articles to introduce the circumstances of the 
Indonesian Revolution to Chinese readers.68 His articles were published in Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Shanghai, as well as in Indonesia. 
Ba Ren was captured by the Dutch police in July 1947, following their growing concern 
at his role in strengthening pro-Revolutionary sentiment in the Chinese community. 
Many of his friends in Singapore tried to rescue him by mobilising international 
pressure on the Dutch government. 69 He was eventually expelled to Hong Kong in 
1948, though this did not halt his efforts to campaign for Indonesian independence. He 
continued to publish many articles about Indonesian history, literature, culture and 
Unfortunately, these n:arerials, if not destrr:yed, are hard to find. See Zhou Kan Jing, 'Ba Ren l'U 
yindunixiya yimjiu.' [Ba Ren and Indonesian Studies] Nan ya dong nan ya lun cong. <ELA.~ 
ffl!f.t'f!,j§QJIW:re> • *~#::J.J,fij, f'i!jii[i.lf:t!\!Jfil!il!ii~, 1986 .• 
It is not very clear whether the name of 'Indonesian Socialist Party' was the forn:al name of !he 
organisation or the way to be described by Ba Ren. Ba Ren, 'Yinni di qingwn.' frhe Yocth yfove:nent 
in Indon~sia] FeP.ff Xia, 1947: 71. EA, «Enffii't'Jjl!fjll!;» 0 <,r.ll',-1'». 1947: 71. 0 
In bis writing, Ba Ren detailed Tan Malaka' s activities, such as his publication about Trotskyism for 
students, when Tan taught at the Nanyang Chinese Normal College. This information might have come 
from his students, since both of them relied on their former students to survive in Sumatra. 
Ming Lun, 'Zao he Jan ju bu di Ba Ren.' [Ba Ren captured by the Dlltch] Feng Xla, 1947: 89. AJl/!if, 
«l'i!'.'11fl!il~t''JE".L0> ° F>, 1947: 89. 0 
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society, 70 and wrote several short autobiographical stories about his experience in 
1ndonesian 
Table 3 Some Articles and Books published by Ba Ren in 1947-1949. 
Ba Ren, Lun yinni di fandi douzheng. [Anti-Imperialism in lndonesia] (Shanghai: Shenghuo 
Shudian, 1947). 
BA· ~¢i!EP ffi i'.19 &. ~ l"'J~> , ctw: :1tm~1.s , 1947) , 
Ba Ren, 'Zhengdang yu jieji guanxi.' [Political Parties and Class Relations] Feng Xia, 1948: 
116, Singapore. 
E:lA • <<i&'.At!M~*&liilfJI\>> , <00.l''> , 1948: 116, ~hat&:, 
Ba Ren, Yuandong minzu geming wenti. [The Nationalist Revolution in Asia] (Shanghai: 
Nanhai Publishing Co.). 
e;, · <~J:l'lR~l'ltlfrJr"~Jl!.11!>, ctw : mw1±11t&iil± , 1948) , 8 , 
Ba Ren, 'Yinni xinwenxue gaishu.' [The New Literature in Indonesia] Xiandai huaqiao, 
1948: 1(10), Hong Kong. 
E:\}, , <<EPffiliIIT:X~~mi;>> , <:£1il.tt:'1!!'~> . 1948 : 1(10), ~m , 
Ba Ren, 'Chundao zhi guo yinni.' (Shanghei: xin zhongguo shuju.) 
E:lA • <gf~;;'.:.i!l---EPffi>, Ctw: ~i:p~~Jl1:\ • 1949), 
Ba Ren, 'Yinni di beiju.' [The Indonesian Tragedy] Ziyou Congkan, 1948: 11, Hong Kong. 
, 1:5/.. • <<EPffii'.19lltJJ!J>>, <Fli±JifflJ> • 1948:11, ~m, 
Ba Ren, 'Ji tongzhi Li Fu.' [Notes for a comrade named Li Fu] Feng Xia, 1947: 72. 
e;, · <<~cftiJitS:$:fi>> , <.l!lii,"f> • (1947) • 12, 
Ba Ren, 'Linrenmen.' [My neighbors] Feng Xia, 1974: 97. 
E:lA , <<~Aif'5>> , <00."f> , 0947) • 97 , 
" It is impossible to give a complete Est of Ba.'irer.' s writings about Indonesia in this period, since many 
have been lost. The followir.g are some articles and books published in 1947-1949. 
71 Ba Ren (Bah Ren) Wu zu miao. [The Temple of Five Gods] (Guangzhou: Huacheng Chuban.she, 1986). B 
A., <liWtlU1Jl>, (JJ!l\9'1: :ft:'.Jll\l±l!l&tt, 1986). , 
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Ba Ren, 'Shuike yu gongtou.' [Crewman and Foreman] Feng Xia, 1948: 123. 
BA , <<71<.~Willl'l>> 0 <00.-f> • (1948) , 123 ° 
Ba Ren, 'Llielun huaqiao minzhu yundong.' [The Democracy Movement of the Overseas 
Chinese] Nanqiao Ribao, 12 Jan. 1948. 
BA· <~ffifii-~.R±~!fil!>>, <fij1iiJElw>. 12 January 1948, 
Ba Ren's feeling toward the Indonesian cause could be described as 'altruistic 
nationalism'; nationalism for others, leading him to persuade Nan yang Chinese to help 
the Indonesian Revolution. His consideration was based on the long-term interest of 
local Chinese residents who had their roots in Indonesian territories. He did not 
emphasize racial brotherhood or the sharing of some common cultural roots but 
acknowledged the cultural divide between Chinese and Indonesians. Unlike the pro-
Indonesia peranakan nationalists, he did not advocate the integration or assimilation of 
Chinese into Indonesian society. Unfortunately, his wish to improve the relationship 
between Chinese and Indonesians did not come true. He beeame the first Chinese 
ambassador to Indonesia from August 1950, but only occupied the position for one year 
and four months. 
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Chapter 6 
Searching for a New Approach to Identity, 1945-1949 
Many people have treated only external factors as the reasons for ethnic Chinese change 
of identity from Chinese to Southeast Asian. Lee Khoon Choy, a former Singaporean 
politican, for example, revealed his views in his memoirs on the shifting identity of 
Nanyang Chinese after World War II. He visited Hong Sisi in Beijing in the 1980s, and 
they exchanged their views on the post-war situation in Malaya. 1 Hong Sisi was editor 
of the Modern Daily in Pinang from 1946 to 1948, and was later exiled to China by the 
British authorities. Lee Khoon Choy complained that 'Tan Kah Kee made a big mistake 
in 1948 (for the Nanyang Chinese). He did not identify himself with Malaya. He did 
not look after the interests of the Chinese in Malaya.' Lee was referring to the fact that 
Tan Kah Kee, the formal leader of the Nanyang Chinese, had left Singapore and 
resettled in China in 1948, and thus set a bad example for the Nan yang Chinese. Hong 
agreed, and said 'a Singaporean delegation came to China in 1956, and Zhou Enlai told 
them they should change their loyalty from China to Singapore. From then on Chinese 
residents in Nanyang started to change their national identity.' Lee Khoon Choy 
recorded this conversation in his memoir without any objection to what Hong had said.2 
Hong Sisi Cl:!U"M*l· 
Lee Khoon Choy (Li Jung Cai), Zbuixun zi;i di guo.iia: yige nanyang buaren di xinlu licbeng. [The search 
for my own country; the mental journey of a Nanyang Chinese]. (Taipei: Yuanliu Publishing Co, 1994), p. 
60. *ffi:t, <i!i~§ si'.1ilf~J1~: ~flllJ¥il'P'IJ.A."'1'L'i*f,'!!'N> 0 (i:l~t: JS!imililt&ii±, 1994), 60. 
T~e miiin :heme of this memoir is bow !..ee progressed from regarding himself as a Nanyang Chinese to 
regarding himself as a Singaporean citizen through a process of localization. He also admitted that the 
majority of Chinese-educated Chinese were still allegiant to China at that time. 
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In this way, both Hong and Lee gave credit to Zhou Enlai for convincing Nanyang 
Chinese to identify as citizens of Southeast Asian nations. 
The Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955 has often been seen as the watershed 
of identity shift for the Southeast Asian Chinese, and Zhou Enlai is seen as the key 
figure contributing to this shift. At this conference, Zhou Enlai, on behalf of China's 
government, announced that the new policy toward overseas Chinese was to abolish 
dual nationality and to encourage overseas Chinese to beeome citizens of their country 
of residence. Indonesian nationalists view this move as the triumph of the Indonesian 
diplomatic effort to solve 'the Chinese problem' in the new nations.3 
I would like to argue that the policy announced at the Bandung Conference was not the 
reason for, but rather the result of, the efforts of the Southeast Asian Chinese to resolve 
the issue of their identity. The debate among ethnic Chinese just after the Pacific War 
indicates that this new direction in national identification had already emerged in this 
period, even though differing opinions remained. It is fair to say that the Chinese 
community went through a process of searching for a new identity to meet the changing 
situations in both Malaya and Indonesia after the end of the Pacific war. To better 
understand these new approaches to identity, we should closely examine the discourse 
among Chinese communities in the 1945-1949 period. This was a time in which 
external political factors did not indicate clear! y what the immediate future would be. 
Malaya did not have a clear agenda to pursue its independence. Indonesia had declared 
independence but was fighting the ~etherlands' bid to restore colonial rule. The 
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Chinese Communist Party had not yet won the Civil War in China. In this time of 
uncertainty, the ethnic Chinese of Southeast Asia sensed the need to reconsider their 
identity. In this chapter we will examine these debates of the immediate post-war 
period. 
The debates in Malaya and Indonesia are discussed separately, although they are 
relevant to each other and interconnected. The debates often crossed today's national 
boundaries, due to the nature of Chinese social networking at that time. They were 
concerned with many different issues, but the search for identity will be considered 
here. For example, the debate on the nature of Chinese literature in Malaya cannot be 
seen as a purely literary issue. The strong will to promote 'Malayan Chinese literature' 
sprang from the issue of identity. Another problem was who was to be considered 
representative of the opinion of ethnic Chinese. Opinions within Chinese communities 
were always divided, no matter how, where or when. Living as they did beyond the 
control of the Chinese government, it would have been unlikely for any Chinese 
community to found a single organisation to represent Chinese community opinion. It 
is always difficult to identify representative opinion. The debate was mainly generated 
by local born Chinese, who had lived there for generations. They might be used to the 
local situation before the war but then became enthusiastic on issues of identity. 
Lie Tek Tjeng, 'Indonesia' s Citizens of Chinese Descent Tenninology,' Citra Indonesia, 2: 8 (August 
1996), p. 11. Also the intemew with Lie Tek Tjeng.(1996). 
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The Malayan Chinese debate on the New Nation 
In Malaya, the debate on identity within the Chinese community was widely publicized 
in the local Chinese media just after the end of the Pacific War. This was not an 
ordinary period for the Chinese press in Malaya. It has been described as the 'golden 
age' of Chinese newspapers there. At the close of the Pacific war, people who had 
worked for Chinese newspapers before the war tried their best to re-launch their 
newspapers as soon as possible. Two weeks after the Japanese surrendered, the first 
Chinese newspaper recommenced publication. Two former leading Chinese 
newspapers, Nanyang Shang Pao and Sinchew Daily, appeared on the same day, 8 
September 1945, three weeks after the Japanese surrendered.4 At that time, necessary 
goods were still in short supply, and these newspapers began with one page only. A 
few days later other papers started to be issued. Not only were previously existing 
newspapers reissued, but many new Chinese newspapers were established in this period. 
Similar things happened in other areas of Southeast Asia at this time. 
Why was this period so important? It has been described as an interval of 'power 
vacuum'. 
5 Malayan Chinese were eager to concern themselves with politics. Li Run 
Hu described the situation thus: 'War changed Malaya. Malaya was not a backwater 
Chinese Newspapers Division, Our 70 Years: A HL<rory of Leading Cfllnese Newspapers in Singapore, 
1923-1993. (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings, 1993), p. 28. $3C(i~~lil. <ill.if'~£1'H::-f··"+:>' (!fir 
tmt&: : $Jt'ffi$f,~J. 28. , 
Tonnesson, Stein. 'Filling the power vacuum: !945 in French Indochina, the Netheria.'1dS East Indies and 
British Malaya.' in Amlov, H. and Tonne;;son, S., eds. lrnpedal policy and SouibeastAsian nationalism, 
1930-1957. (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1995), pp. 110-!43. 
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any more. It became a boundless surging ocean. Everyone shouted out for liberation of 
the people, equal political rights and resurrection of the economy'. 6 The Chinese in 
Malaya, who had been seen as apolitical, suddenly turned into a community very much 
concerned with politics. 
The reason why Chinese identity suddenly became problematic was the experience of 
war, particularly its impact on attitudes to colonialism. A former reporter for Chinese 
newspapers in Malaya remembers the situation in this period, 'Reporting political news 
in the immediate post-war period, I realized that loyalty to Malaya was of great 
importance in the historical development of events in Malaya' .7 On 8 January 1946, the 
Nanyang Shang Pao urged Chinese readers to take Malayan citizenship and to join the 
local political domain rather than to concern themselves only with China's affairs.8 The 
author distinguished between the Chinese in China, as Zhongguoren, and the Chinese in 
Nanyang (the South Seas), as Nanyang huazu. This is the beginning, in public 
discourse, of conscious and deliberate separation of Chinese in Malaya from Chinese in 
China. The English translation of both terms is the same, 'Chinese', but the former is 
defined in Chinese by membership of Zhongguo, the Chinese nation. 
Li Run Hu, 'Zhanhou malaiya di bianhua 111 dangqian weiji' [The Changes in Post-War Malaya and 
the Current Crisis] Feng A.la, 66, 1947. <ji'if,\Jj!jlj, «lj!~~3K5ITIY:J11!ft.~J§tlliU» 0 <fill\:">, 66, 
1947. 0 
In spite of this, lhe author indicated in a following statement that most educated Chinese were still loyal to 
China in this period of time. See Li Jion Cai, Zhuixun ziji di guojia: yige nanyang buaren de xinlu licher1g. 
[The search for my own country; the mental pumey of a Nanyang Chinese]. (Taipei: Ymmliu Publishing 
Co, 1994), p. 12. "f:tfnJ::t, 
1994), 12. 
'Nany;mg huazu de zhengshi weiji.' [The Political Crisis of the Nanyang Chinese], Nanyang Shang 
Pao, 8 January 1946. «l¥.iY'f.iljii~llk/J&mftl;~>, <f¥i#ifi!W>, 8 January 1946. 0 
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Another author pushed the issue further. Qu Zhefu, a Malayan youth, argued that 
Nanyang Chinese should call themselves Nanyang huazu instead of huaqiao. He 
thought the political consciousness of Chinese in Malaya had been changed by the 
events of the Pacific War, that they now considered the colonial system in Malaya 
inappropriate, and that Malayan Chinese should participate in local politics. The 
traditional tenn huaqiao, which defined Chinese people outside China as sojourners, 
could not serve in the new situation of the post-war era.9 
This new political trend emerged suddenly in the Chinese media in 1946. Liu Lang 
argued that huaqiao should participate in politics in Malaya, because they were part of 
the people of Malaya. 10 Chen Zhong Da also raised the question directly when 
discussing political awareness among the Nanyang Chinese and the political situation in 
Malaya. The time to choose to be Chinese or to be Malayan would come soon. The 
Chinese in Malaya should try to obtain citizenship of Malaya, as this was best for their 
collective interest. They would need to prepare to make this choice.11 
Luo Sao thought that the issue of citizenship was not for the government of the 
Republic of China to decide. He said that if the qualifications for citizenship were 
reasonable, Chinese in Malaya would be able to gain Malayan citizenship by formal 
ti 
Qu Zhefu, 'Nanyang huazu yu zhengzhi' [The Nanyang Chinese and Politics] Feng Xia, 6, 1946. }ljj'flf 
~ «i¥il'l'¥~Wi&iil», <l!ii\T>. 6, 1946. 
Liu Lang, 'Huaqiao dui zuguo ce taidu wen ti.' , [The Attitude of Overseas Chinese Toward the 
Fatherland]. Feng Xia, 74. mt~ <<¥iillill1flali\liliJl1',.¥roiii!l'i» '<!fillT>.74, 1947. ' 
Chen Zhong Da, 'Zuo zhongguoren haishi malaiyaren.' [To be Chinese or Malayan] Feng Xia, 95, 
1947. lli!tfrfi~ «f.l!rtfill!l!Jdlff.1!!1;*X[,'j,A.» 0 <li\T>. 95, 1947. 0 
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legal process. This would be the most important step. People who wanted to call 
Malaya home could try to earn their citizenship. The Malayan citizenship issue should 
not be confounded with the situation in China.12 
To earn civil rights for Chinese became the common political goal of the Chinese media 
in post-war Malaya. Chen Zhong Da argued that citizenship was a kind of right, and 
Chinese residents should earn their rights, in order to be treated as equal to other people. 
Citizenship had been introduced to Malaya two months after the end of the Pacific War, 
after the issue was raised in the British Parliament.13 At that time, Malayan Chinese 
were strongly anti-colonial, and supported the democratic movement In his article 
'The New Direction of the Malayan Chinese Youth Movement', Fang Hua suggested 
that the Malayan Chinese youth movement should support the independence struggle in 
the Orient, that this was a democratic movement in which overseas Chinese should 
participate, because the distribution of Chinese gave them close relationships with other 
Oriental races. At the same time, he suggested Malayan Chinese youth should support 
the anti-colonial struggle in China. He believed both movements were going in the 
same direction. 14 This kind of double identification with China and the host country 
was common in this period. Shen Zi Jiu also advocated that the Chinese democracy 
movement in Malaya should associate with the democracy movements in both China 
il 
" 
,, 
Luo Sao, 'Lun huaqiao yu malaiya zhengzhi di guanxi' [The Overseas Chinese and Malayan Politics] 
lvlinsheng Bao, 1947. lllif!jl <<iilti~iitW~?~s:!iF,lcffj!JB'JM{Hi»,<.B!ifal'¥&>. 1947. 
Chen Zhong Da, 'Zuo zhongguoren haishi malaiyaren." [To be Chinese or ~1alayanJ Feng Xia, 95, 
!947. lit'{<fl!il «fliXtpliJAJ~:!ll:fill:~*s:!A» 0 <I!i!iT>, 95, 1947. 0 
Fang Hua, "Mahua qingyun di xinfangxiang.' [The New Direction of the Malayan Youth Movement] 
Feng Xia. 122, 1948. «~~'l'l'lll!B'J~Jfltrr» 0 <Jfil\T>.122 1948. 0 
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and Malaya.15 To associate with the movement in China was uncontroversial, because 
some of these were people who had come from China only a few years ago. The 
interesting change was that they also encouraged participation in the struggle to obtain 
'democracy' for Malaya. 
The desire of Chinese residents to participate in this local struggle was obvious in post-
war Malaya. Shen Zi Jiu suggested that everyone could participate in local politics. 
She observed that there were two kinds of citizenship status among Chinese residents: 
people who had or would have 'Malayan citizenship', and people who had Chinese 
citizenship. Both should participate in local politics in different ways.16 At this time, 
very few Chinese had Malayan citizenship. Shen's remarks were intended to encourage 
participation. Many people did participate in various ways, but not in the domain of 
politics emphasized by Shen Zi Jiu. 
Among these new formulations of identity, that of Hu Yu Zhi was the most fully 
developed. Hu was one of the central figures of the debate, and wrote a series of essays 
on the subject. In one essay, Hu argued that the relationship to an ancestral homeland is 
something that changes with time, and is not fixed forever. 17 He further indicated that a 
'fatherland' is more than the place where one's ancestors lived: it can only be called 
l) 
Shen Zi Jiu, 'Minzhu yundong zai malaiya. · [The Democracy Movement in Malaya] FeDg Xia, 95-96, 
1947. ttnn, «.R±il!!!lill:tEPt:j*illi.». <."it\1'>,95-96, 1947 .• 
Shen Zi Jiu 'Buyao zai haipa zhengzhi.' [Don't be Frightened of Poliiics a.'1Y more]. Fer,g Xia, 18, 
1947. r:tn11. «::flll!M-'i!'f·ttif&m». <;'.ll!.r>,78, 1947 .• 
Hu Yu Zhi 'Zu guo.(l)' [Fatherland(!)] Feng Xja, 91, 1947. i'i!l:r!i.Z, <<JTiill.l(l:)», <ffliTr>,9!, 
1947 .• 
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'fatherland' by those who are linked to it politically, economically and culturally. 18 
Ru's redefinition of 'fatherland' gave the new Nanyang Chinese concept of 'identity' a 
theoretical basis sufficient to make a break with tradition. 
Later, Hu went a step further, and explicitly placed the huaqiao homeland in the 
concrete context of Nanyang/Malaya.19 He pointed out that in the past, nobody doubted 
that the huaqiao homeland was China, but now things were different: there were 
independence struggles throughout Southeast Asia, and it was necessary for Chinese in 
Nanyang to take Nanyang as their permanent homeland and achieve political equality 
with the other peoples of the region, to create the basis for the 'world family' envisaged 
by the United Nations. He considered that the great majority of Nanyang Chinese, who 
had heen born in Southeast Asia, should accept their country of residence as their 
homeland. According to a survey done by the Nan Qiao Daily, 95.6 per cent of those 
surveyed wanted to take part in local politics, but were unwilling to cease recognizing 
China as their real homeland. Hu thought they should put aside their primal allegiance 
to China. 
Finally, on the subject of nationality, Hu criticized the citizenship law of China as being 
unreasonable and backward, and in need of reform. As it stood, China-born Chinese 
who had settled permanently in Southeast Asia were regarded as Chinese citizens, even 
if they had formally taken out citizenship of another country. Dual nationality was 
Hu Yu Zhi 'Zu guo.(2)' [Fatherl<md (2)] Feng Xia, 92, 1947. M'l!lcZ., «~li~Cf)» ' <IJ!.\r>,92, 
1947. 0 
" Hu Yu Zhi 'Huaqiao di zugim' [Fatherland cf L'le overseas Chinese] Feng Xia. 93, 1947. iil:fJ!!i;;(:, « 
:!!l'ii!iili'Jffdl~» - <l!ii1.r>,93, 1947. , 
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accepted. The Chinese government had attempted in 1924 to have people of Chinese 
parentage born in Southeast Asia register with the then Bureau for Overseas Chinese 
Affairs, but this initiative met with a very feeble response and was dropped. Hu thought 
the mental habit of putting bloodline before location should be dropped. Though some 
overseas Chinese had already chosen Nanyang as their permanent place of residence, 
Hu thought they should take the ultimate step of recognizing it as their homeland.20 
This identification of 'permanent place of residence' with 'homeland', which changed 
the meaning of the term 'homeland', was the point on which Hu Yu Zhi placed the 
highest importance. 
These ideas, once circulated, brought an immediate and ardent response. One young 
man asked the question. 'If we Chinese become Malayan citizens, do we still belong to 
the Chinese race?' Hu Yu Zhi answered that Malaya would give rise to a new race 
called Malayu, which would combine the Chinese, Malay, Indian and other races.21 
In 1948, Hu went on to discuss the relationship between nation and state.22 'A people 
(min zu) is not a race (zhong zu). 23 There can be several different races in one nation, 
but only one people.' His aim was to argue that overseas Chinese could make Malaya 
their homeland. 'Overseas Chinese should ally themselves with the other races in 
" Hu Yu Zhi 'Zuguo yu Jiaxiang '[Fatherland and Hometown] Feng Xia, 94, 1947. i\:~J!!(;,(,, «ffrll.ll!1J 
W~lll~» 0 <ill\T>.94, 1947., 
Si Ya, 'Guanyu minzu yu zhongzu.' [About Nations :md Races] Feng Xia, 97, 1947. f1!ii:sl!, «ll!Jn'd'l! 
h*W~» 0 <,;J.T>, 97, 1947. 0 
Hu Yu Zhi 'Gumyu min zu yu guo jia.' [About Nations and States) Feng Xja, 117, 1948. i'i!ll!\'.Z, « 
~~1£W<Wm<i*», </j'1T>, 117, 1948. 0 
23 
min zu (m~), zhong zu ('l!illl!i!J. 
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Malaya to found a single nation, that is Malaya, in the way the American people have 
done. There are two sorts of nation in term of consisting of people. Multi-racial nations 
exist, such as Switzerland and the Soviet Union. For Indonesia to call on the different 
races to unite to form the Indonesian people, in the context of the popular liberation 
movement, is reasonable and progressive. The interracial distinctions created by the 
Dutch, who divided in order to rule, are a source of discord. The White Paper and the 
People's Charter of British Malaya were created on the philosophical basis of a 'mono-
racial polity' .24 Because the area concerned was smaller, and the different races lived 
together, it was difficult for the British effectively to establish separate racial autonomy. 
Therefore there are consistency problems with the British colonialists' public position 
on the 'three great races' of Malaya. It would be better for national unity to call on the 
Malay, Chinese, Indian, Ceylonese, Arab and mixed blood populations to come together 
to found the Malayan people. 
Debating the Nature of Mahua Literature 
A new debate on Malayan Chinese literature, known as 'Mahua literature', commenced 
just as these new ideas about Nanyang Chinese identity were being made public. 
Though the debate appeared to be a literary discussion about whether or not there were 
special, distinctive features to Malayan Chinese literature, in fact it was a debate about 
identity. The central issue was whether Mahua literature (Malayan Chinese literature) 
should develop a regional particularity, and be Malaya-oriented rather than China-
It meant for Malay people only. 
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oriented. The debate clearly showed that the younger generation wanted to build their 
own identity through literature. 
This debate is, at present, generally understood as a phenomenon in literary history. 
Fang Xiu, a historian of Mahua literature who studied the debate over the long term, 
indicated that it had been going on in Malaya since before the war. Pre-war Mahua 
literature was influeneed by the New Literature Movement in China, which was anti-
imperialist and anti-traditional in spirit. Fang considered the post-war debates to have 
taken up and carried on the main themes of New Literature.25 
This was quite right: these issues had been raised before the war. Li Qiu is recognized 
as the first person to raise them, taking up the topic on 20 April 1941 in a Chinese 
newspaper. 26 Aceording to Zhu Li Wen, Li Qiu was the pen name of Wee Mon-
Cheng27 Investigation of the content of the discussion demonstrates its connection with 
the identity issue. The political situation compelled Chinese migrants to rethink the 
implications of their residence in Nanyang. If they were going to fight for this territory, 
this territory should mean more than a place of residence for them. 
Fang Xiu, lviahua xinwenxue ji qi !ishi !wlimo. [The new Mahua Literature and Its Historical Outline] 
(Singapore: Wan Li Publishing Co, 1972), pp. 11-19. 1f{.~, <~lJ~3t~2izJtli'llll".~liiill>' (~fJD!:ti: : 
;ll!;l:t!.3t1t:il':~, 1972), 11-19.' 
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Major topics discussed included: How should one participate in local democracy? Is 
literature an effective means of participating in local politics, by the introduction and 
exploration of basically political ideas? What kinds of literature would help to improve 
the situation? Did literature need refonn in this new era? What new kinds of Malay 
literature would emerge? What kind of Malayan literature would help to create a better 
future for Malaya? Would this kind of literature be unique to Malaya? Many people 
thought the Chinese could help by participating in local politics. This was the most 
obvious way for Malayan Chinese to contribute to building the nation. Another way to 
participate was in literature. Chou Yung advocated that the Chinese should try, in 
writing, to reflect current reality in Malaya, in particular the struggle for democracy.28 
Many of those who expressed their views were young Chinese who had worked for 
underground publications or theatre troupes in Malaya during the Japanese occupation. 
Among them, Du Bian was one of the main figures in underground literature during the 
war. He wrote an article arguing that Mahua literature should develop its own culturally 
distinct characteristics, which would be different from those of Chinese literature. He 
thought that the underground literature of the occupation had advocated fighting for 
Malaya, and that this distinguished Malayan Chinese literature from other kinds of 
Chinese literature, and gave it its own nature. w This article initiated the debate on the 
nature of Malayan Chinese literature and became a widely known seminal article which 
was always cited in the subsequent debate. 
Zhou Rong, 'Tan mahua wenyi.' [On MahuaLiterature] Feng }i.'ia, 108, 1948. Jlil'l'l', «Wl.llir•:ot~ 
», <.l!l!\.T>. 108, 194E. , 
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Historians who work on the history of Mahua literature have confinned that 
underground literature of the Japanese occupation was an important element in the 
development of Mahua literature, which conveys a strong sense of local identity. Many 
underground publications circulated among Chinese during the Japanese occupation had 
promoted patriotic sentiment toward MaJaya.30 Young people who had engaged in anti-
Japanese propaganda in MaJaya founded the Seagull Theatre Company after the war. 
As playwrights and actors, they toured all districts of Malaya, bringing their wartime 
experience to the post-war Malayan political situation.31 
The debate was joined by two groups: writers who argued for the special character of 
Mahua literature and writers who did not favour the idea of developing a recognizable 
genre of Mahua literature. The former will be called Mahua writers. The latter will be 
called Chinese writers, as most writers of the Feng Xia group took this position. If we 
analyse the background of these two groups of writers, they were the same in that they 
were all newcomers to Malaya. Du Bian, for instance, was born in 1914 in Gulangyu, 
!I 
Du Bian 'Kangri weima wenyi yu mahua wenyi dutexing.' [Anti-Japanese Wro: Literature and the 
Nature of Mahua Literature] Nan Qiao Ribao, 1947. t±il, <<tli: B fli.~ X:~~.~~X:!¥jii'l'!f1'±» 
Jll!J~0¥1>!, (Singapore, 1947).' 
Fang Xiu, };falwa wenxue shibu. [The Supplemented History of Malayan Chinese Literature] (Singapore: 
Chun Yi Trading Co., 1996), pp. 3-23. JI~. <~~X:~9:.1'111>, ('1JJO:\llt : J!li~lll'i!l'~0ll'.I, 1996), 
3-23 ' Fang indicates L'iere were Llrree kinds of literature under the Japanese occupation: Pro-Japan 
propaganda, entenainment and underground anti-Japanese literature. Because very little of it remains, 
particuiarly of the underground press, it is difficult to get the whole picture of these publications today. 
We have retained only some names ohnderground publications, fer example, Ziyou bao 8¥1>!, 
'Freedom' ), ar.d Jiefang bao (fli1i'1&¥1i!, 'Liberation' ). 
Chen Liang and Wen Gang 'Xinjiapo haiou jutuan.' [The Seagull Theatrical Company in Singapore] 
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near Xiarnen in Fujian province. He took early to creative writing and published his 
works under a variety of pen names before arriving in Singapore in 1936, where he 
founded the Nandao Travelling Theatre Company. 32 His background appears no 
different from that of an entirely 'Chinese' writer. Perhaps the only difference is that 
the so-called Chinese writers were already well known as writers before going to 
Southeast Asia, and the Mahua writers only became writers after migrating to Malaya. 
Another difference was that the Chinese writers went to Indonesia during the Pacific 
War, and most Mahua writers stayed in Malaya and fought for Malaya. They divided 
into two camps based on the issue of whether or not they had exerted themselves in the 
defence of Malaya. The experience of fighting for Malaya led Mahua writers to treat 
Malaya as a meaningful category of identity. 
In their writings of the anti-Japanese resistance period, Mahua writers already expressed 
awareness that the position of the overseas Chinese needed to be redefined. The ideal 
concept of the Chinese race as one of the three races of Malaya gradually took shape in 
their anti-Japanese resistance work. Du Bian mentioned that the major reason for this 
idea of three races was that these troupes performed in Malay kampong, before mixed 
audiences including Malays and Indians. Because the dramatic content had to be 
addressed to different ethnic audiences, the traditional role of 'Overseas Chinese' was 
plainly unsuited to the new situation. 33 After the Japanese surrendered, Du Bian 
32 Chen Liang, ed., Du Bian yu mahua xinma juyun. [Du Bian and the New Malayan Theatrical Movement] 
(Hong Kong: Jin Cheng Company), p. 10. il'l['.!\'; Iii <tlJIW,\l'i,'ijl;(;JJT}lj,)jljlll!>' : s!t~£-i'fl, 
1994), 10. 0 
Chen Lia.~g, ed., Du Bian yu mabua x1nma: juyun. [Du Bian and the New Malayan Theatrical Movement] 
(Hong Kong: Jin Cheng Company), p. 26. il!l!:Jl': .~ <*'J:JIW,\!i,;lj¥(;JJT~)jljlll!>, : SiZ~.L}fi], 
1994), 26. 0 
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continued to recall group images of Chinese, Indians and Malays in the kampong theatre 
audience. Eventually he settled on this view of the proper place of Malayan Chinese for 
future literary development, which came out of 'the social reality of the overseas 
Chinese' and was concerned with the here and now. 34 
In a 1947 public conference, the literary figures attending, including writers from China 
who had been in Malaya or Singapore under the Japanese occupation and directly 
experienced Japanese rule, and young writers born locally, all tended to the idea that the 
Chinese in Malaya had already become one of the constituent peoples of Malaya.35 Du 
Bian's idea contributed to this trend. He thought that the origin of Mahua literature lay 
in the transition from 'anti-Japanese resistance for national (Chinese) salvation' to 'anti-
Japanese resistance to protect Malaya'. Although this wartime literature gave a 
supporting role only to Malays and Indians, this supporting role was the beginning of its 
specifically Mahua character. 
As the writer who raised this issue, Du Bian admitted later that his original idea was to 
suggest that the Chinese in Malaya should be considered as a distinct race, as 'Malaya 
Huazu', or simply Mahua. They were Chinese Malayan rather than Chinese only. So 
they should produce their own literature, 'Malaya Huazu literature'. But he calculated 
that this suggestion would be too provocative and would not be well received for some 
Chen Liang ed. Du Bian yu mahua xinma juyun. [Du Bian and tl1e New Malayan Theatrical Movement] 
(Hong Kong: Jin Cheng Company), p.36. ~.!Ii?'!:: till <H:~~U~W('liJTJll'i,),fijj!p' (~ml : 'iitl/ilt1ll'fl, 
1994), 36. , 
Pu Luo, 'Zengjing xianshen xinma xiju gongzuo di ren.' [Those who contributed themselves to the 
NewTheatrical Movement in Malaya] Chi dao feng, 1988n. p. 36. 1111'~, «iil'~~,!it~,l!'i;Ni!If'f.tr~ 
A» , ~ii:!ffll\, July, 1988, 36. , 
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time yet, so he confined the issue to whether Mahua literature possessed its special 
character. 36 
If Du Bian' s admission was a matter of fact, then 'Mahua Literature' was first proposed 
as a literature based on Malaya deliberately in order to illustrate a new national identity. 
Mahua writers then stressed the difference between themselves and those who were still 
more concerned with the situation in China. 'The special character of Mahua literature 
is to base itself on the point of view of the Malayan people. The duty of Mahua literary 
work is to make the independence of the people of Malaya the most important task. 
Duty towards China, though it still must be recognized, must take second place'. 37 
Some Mahua writers progressed to criticizing writers who were concerned with China. 
The focus of debate diverged from the original focus on what made Mahua literature 
what it was. 
Hu Yu Zhi was seen as the leader of those in Malaya who were most concerned with 
China. He expressed his concern through newspapers and magazines, particularly 
during the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party. 
He was attacked for his involvement in China's affairs, directly or indirectly. Thus one 
11 
Chen Liang, ed., Du Bian yu ma.hua xinma Jilyun. (Du Bian and the New Theatrical Movement in Malaya] 
(Hong Kong: Jin Cheng Company), p. 38. lll!3\£ Iii! <t±.i!Uii!J:!;;'ljli(!ifr,t,1!,Jj9JI> • : sii'~i}rrJ, 
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Ling Zuo, 'Mahlrn wenyi di dutexing ii qita.' [The Attributes of Mahua Literattre and Other Issues]. 
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of the most prominent advocates of local identity found himself criticized as an 
expatriate writer (qiaomin writer in Chinese),38 insufficiently concerned with Malaya. 
Some of Hu's friends tried to temper the debate. Xia Yan thought 'Differences of 
opinion on ethnic politics and culture are the hardest of all problems to solve'. Xia 
thought there was no need to divide up spheres of greater and lesser importance, that 
democracy in Malaya and reconstruction in China could be pursued at the same time. 39 
Ba Ren preferred to express his opinions more indirectly. Reporting on recent 
developments in Malay literature in 1948, he suggested that Chinese writers should do 
the same, to reflect the new thinking of people involved in political struggle and class 
struggle. 40 
Hu Yu Zhi could not pass over the criticism directed towards him in silence, and wrote 
an essay to address it under his pen name, Sha Ping. He wrote that joining this debate 
was similar to entering a cow's horn: there was no way out and it would be a dead 
end.41 He implied that this debate was nonsense. A few months later, Hu left Singapore 
for Hong Kong. In the essays he sent back to Singapore, he did not explain why he had 
gone to Hong Kong. He explained only that the old China was expiring, and the new 
China was not yet established. He expressed once again his faith in a new prospect for 
Qiaomin (ilii~), Qiaomin writers (1J!lj~ff'l5''.). 
Xia Yan, 'Mahua wenyi shilun.' [An essay on Mahua Literature). Nan Qiao Ribao, 13 April 1948. J'!fi:i 
«,\!!,~:X:~~illi» 0 <JWii!fiB~>, 13 April 1948. , 
Ba Ren, 'Zheng dang yu jicji guanxi.' [Political Parties and Class Relations]. Feng Xia, 116, !948. El 
A, «~Wll'Jl.mm!Vil» 0 <Jll!\'°>,116, 1948. 
Sha Ping, 'Pengyou. ni zllilll.iin niujiaojian 1i qule.' [Friend, You Enter a Dead End Lane]. Feng J.'ia, 
108, 1948. &215- «I!~:li,fll;lt~Lf.fi15k:ff!!.:t::7», <liiT>,108, 1948. 0 
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China.42 His concern for affairs in Southeast Asia had clearly been put to one side, and 
was not mentioned again. 
It should not be forgotten that some months previously he was recognized by Malayan 
readers as the Chinese writer most sympathetic to Malayan national identity. He was 
the one who had published a series of essays promoting Malayan identity in the most 
popular journals. Even as he came under attack by a younger generation, he considered 
himself progressive. However, the younger generation of Mahua writers regarded Hu 
as a representative of the old order. Perhaps he simply left Malaya because he could not 
stand this reversal. 
This debate came to an abrupt end with the Malayan Emergency. Hu Yu Zhi had left 
Singapore by this time. The Seagull Theatre Co. was shut down by the British 
authorities, and many members of the troupe were forced into exile. Tan Kah Kee 
decided to leave Malaya and return to his home district in China. The Nan Qiao Daily 
that Tan had founded, and the Feng Xia magazine, of which Hu had been general editor, 
stayed in publication for a short time and then were closed down by the British 
government for their critical views. There were no means by which the debate could 
continue. However, its influence had been great and was still felt in later years, by 
which time it was recognized as the turning point in the development of Nanyang 
identity. Since then Malaya, instead of Nanyang, gradually became the object of 
identity among Chinese in Malaya. Malayan identity became a new political current for 
Chinese in Malaya. 
Hu Yu Zhi, 'Wo lai!e Xianggang.' [I have arrived in Hong Kong.] Feng Xia. 127, 1948. lill:l!ll.Z <4lt 
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Chinese debate on the Indonesian Revolution 
The debate among the Chinese in Indonesia in this period is also significant for what it 
indicates of Indonesian Chinese perceptions of identity. The anti-colonial revolution in 
Indonesia began as soon as the Pacific war was over, and concluded when the Dutch 
government agreed to hand over power to the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. The 
Indonesian Revolution was a difficult period for the Indonesian Chinese. Before they 
could catch their breath after the three and a half years of Japanese occupation, they 
were in a state of war. Although there is certainly controversy over the role played by 
the Chinese in the Indonesian revolution, no period since the war has been more 
significant for the development of the ethnic relationship between Chinese and pribumi. 
Academic research on the role of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia during the Revolution 
divides into two trends. Many academic studies in the English-speaking world have 
assumed that the Chinese did not side with the Indonesian Republic, and that this caused 
problems in ethnic relations between Chinese and pribumi. For example, G. William 
Skinner suggested that 'The resentment among the natives intensified after the war 
because many Chinese sided with the Dutch in the revolutionary struggle. '43 
*T'ff#b>, <ll!liT>.127, 1948 • 
Skinner, George William, 'The Chinese Minority.' In Ruth Mc Vey, ed. lndonesja. (New Haven: HRAP 
Press.1963),pp.ll3-114. 
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Another description of the Chinese attitude to the Indonesian Revolution comes from 
Jacques Amyot: 'There was a wide range of attitudes among the Chinese during the 
Japanese war and during the years of struggle for independence against the Dutch that 
followed. Some were pro-Dutch, and some were pro-Republic. Most, however tried to 
keep aloof, considerations of livelihood and personal safety being more important than 
politics. In this spirit, they cheered the Dutch occupiers on their return and found it 
expedient to conform to Dutch directives when living in Dutch-occupied territories. 
The same kinds of Chinese residing in Republican areas submitted to local rule for the 
same reason. Republican leaders resented this opportunism and the Chinese were often 
the object of molestation and even violence. ' 44 
But scholars able to use Chinese material have arrived at a very different picture. Chen 
Da Sheng has confirmed that ethnic Chinese did contribute to the Indonesian 
independence struggle in various ways.45 Siauw Giok Tjhan (Xiao Yucan in Mandarin), 
who took part in the revolutionary movement himself, wrote: 'The history of this 
century demonstrates that, when Indonesia's struggle for national independence was 
reaching its point of crisis, the Indonesian Chinese did not look on with their arms in 
their sleeves. On the contrary, they supported the struggle'.46 Chinese scholars born in 
Indonesia, summing up this material, consider that Chinese supported the Indonesian 
Jacques Amyot, The Chiuese and the National Imegralion in Southeast Asia. (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn 
University, Institute of Asian Studies, 1972), p, 56. 
Chen Da Sheng, J'inni wenhua Junwen;i.[ Studies of Indonesian Culture] (Singapore: Educational 
Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 120-126. il!l!li'i, <EPJE03t1t~3t~" (llifJJOI&:: ~Wl:f:Jlt&lii±., 1977), 120-
126. 0 
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revolution in the following ways. l. Propaganda and public relations. 2. Contributions 
of money and goods for the war of independence. 3. Services performed for fighters at 
the front line. 4. Joining the fighting themselves. 5. Resistance to Dutch efforts to hold a 
national congress with intent to divide the movement. 6. Joining the Indonesian 
government and contributing to national reconstruction. 47 
The material available demonstrates that the Indonesian revolution gained strong 
support from Nanyang Chinese, including both Chinese in Indonesia and those in 
neighbouring countries. The boundary between Indonesia and Malaya was not 
meaningful at this time, as the idea of these new nations as nations was in the process of 
forming, and 'Nanyang' was still a meaningful name to many Chinese for the space in 
which they lived. 
The Chinese material contains information on the individual contributions of Indonesian 
Chinese to the revolution. Unfortunately, in contemporary Indonesia, this material is 
not easy to track down. Chinese printed material has been banned in Indonesia since 
1966. It became dangerous to be in possession of printed matter in Chinese, and much 
of this material was destroyed. The main media for expression of the new trends in 
opinion on national identity emerging at that time were Chinese newspapers, 
particularly the Singapore media, which were available in both Indonesia and Malaya. 
Siauw Giok Tjhan (Xiao Yu Can), Sbucu conggw: [Different Roads to the Same Destination] Huang Shu 
Hai trans. (Hong Kong: Di Ping Xian, 1981), p. 37. I\'~. <~~i'illliib' '~ii!! : :ttllZJS 
Mlt±:lK&fd:, 1981), 37. • 
Li Xue .\1in and Huang Kun Zhang, Yiani huaqiaoshi. [The History of the Chinese in Indonesia.] (Canton: 
Guangdong Educational Publishing Co, 1987), pp. 436-446. *<¥.13:\, JiJ!E,lit, <EPfE'1i!i1l!iilb Ol:Hi : 
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There were the Nan Chiau Jit Pao (Nan Qiao Daily), the Feng Xia Journal, the Sin Po 
(Xin Bao) of Indonesia, the Sheng Huo Pao (Shenghuo Bao) and the Democratic Daily 
(Minzhu Ribao). 
The problem for the Indonesian Chinese was that during the 1940s and 1950s it was 
difficult for them to express their views. Many Chinese newspapers in the Dutch-
controlled area were censored by the Dutch authorities. 48 If the Dutch discovered 
evidence of opinion hostile to Dutch colonial rule, the editor could be expelled from the 
territory.49 Some articles not acceptable for publication in Dutch Indonesia were sent to 
Singapore for publication. Many cases show that Chinese writers in Medan and Batavia 
sent their articles to Singapore to be published, particularly in Feng Xia or the Nan Qiao 
Daily. Those publications were then imported or smuggled back to Indonesia. In some 
cases, articles were even sent to Hong Kong to be published. Another way to avoid 
Dutch censorship was to summarise news reports from Singapore. 50 Through the 
Chinese media, people could exchange their views across the strait between Malaya and 
Indonesia. Feng Xia and the Nan Qiar; Daily published correspondence from Dutch 
Indonesia, such as Hu Yu Zhi's opinions on the national identity of the Southeast Asian 
Wang Ji Yuan, 'Gaobie Yinni youren' [Farewell To Indonesian Friends], Minzhu Daily, 6 June, 1951. 
::E*c7t, «1'17JUEP!tlb:A», F:l\'iib, 6 June, 1951., 
Mo Wu, 'He!anren di rendao.' [The 'Humanitarianism' of the Dutch], Feng Xia, 93, 1947. ;ll!'.~ 
«wlR!Ai't,JAtti:», <rr1r>. 93. 1947. 0 
For example, U1ere was a report that Chinese schools were bar.ned in Siam. This news came from 
Singapore. See 'Xianluo paihua yiju' [!'he Rise of Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Siam], Sin Po, 8 June 
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Chinese. Hu referred mainly to Indonesia, and the responses to Hu came from 
Indonesia.51 In this way the debate crossed national boundaries beyond Indonesia. 
It is hard to agree on what standard to use in assessing how much a minority nationality 
supports a nationalist movement. If, as in Malaya, Indonesian Chinese newspapers 
before the war expressed a lukewarm attitude to the nationalist movement, it was not 
necessarily because they did not support national liberation for the people of Southeast 
Asia, but because of the stringency of Dutch censorship. After the Pacific War, though, 
Chinese in Indonesia supported the Indonesian revolution. It could be said that Chinese 
in all parts of Southeast Asia took a sympathetic attitude to the Indonesian revolution, 
and sought out means to support it, to the extent of calling on the Chinese community 
itself to engage in revolution. 
The Chinese and the Indonesian Revolution before 1945 
To clarify the position of the Chinese toward the Indonesian national liberation 
movement, we need to begin by examining this relationship from the origins of 
Indonesian nationalism. There are many examples of Chinese support and participation 
in the early, pre-war stages of the movement. In the revolutionary activity of the 1920s, 
Chinese sympathisers fought side by side with Indonesians. During the fighting against 
the Dutch in Java and Sumatra in 1926-1927, several Chinese were taken prisoner or 
" Zeng Shi Shau, 'We hai suan shi Zhongguoren ma?' [A'Il l still a Chinese?] FeP.g Xia, 93, 1947. !WE 
B, <~~-~rp!l!JJ.,.h,!i?», <lliilF>, 93, 1947., 
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exiled.52 Lie Eng Hok was among the better known of them. He took part in armed 
uprisings in West Java and Sumatra against the Dutch, as a pioneer of independence.53 
In the 1930s as well there are many stories of Chinese supporting or participating in the 
movement. For example, Liem Ching Gie54 organized the Nahdatul Muaalimin for 
Islam and nationalism in Sulawesi in 1936.55 It can be said that the history of the 
Indonesian revolution does not lack for Chinese participation. However, it was only a 
small number of indi victuals who took an active part. 
In Indonesia, in contrast to Malaya, the issue of fighting for the new nation arose among 
the Chinese before the end of the Pacific War. Four Chinese were appointed by the 
Japanese to be members of the Investigative Committee for the Preparation of 
Indonesian Independence (BPKI) held in May 1945. At a July 1945 meeting of the 
Investigative Committee, Liem Koen Hian, 56 the former leader of the Indonesian 
Chinese Party ( Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, PTI),57 suggested that the future Republic of 
Go Gien-Tjwan C~&R7'Jl), The Role of the Overseas Chinese in the Southeast Asian Revolutions and 
Their Adjustment to the New States.' In Michael Leifer ed., Nadonalism, Revolution and Evoludon m 
South-East Asia. (University of HulL Centre :or South-East Asian Studies. Hull monograpl:s on South-East 
Asia, no.2, 1970), p. 64. 
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PTI was a pro-Indonesian party, based in Surabaya. Its founder was Liem Koen Hian. See Pramoedya 
Ananta Toer, Hoa Kiau di Indonesia .. [Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Bintang Press, 1960), p. 94. 
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Indonesia should declare all Chinese in Indonesia to be Indonesian citizens. 58 As a 
result of this Japanese political initiative, Liem's ideas provided a blueprint for the 
representation of Chinese communities.59 Another significant shift during this period 
was in Liem's opinion on the totok-peranakan relationship. In contrast to the position 
taken by his party before the war, which insisted on the separation of totoks and 
peranakans, he asked in 1945 for all Chinese in Indonesia to be given Indonesian 
citizenship. 
Other Chinese members of BPKI held the same pro-Indonesian nationalist views. Oei 
Tiang Tjoei, director of the pro-Japanese newspaper, Hong Po, and president of 
'Huaqiao Zhonghui' (the Chinese Association) in Jakarta, said that Indonesians, 
Chinese and Japanese were all Asians, therefore they should work for the realization of 
'Greater East Asia' .60 Oei Tjong Hauw, the leader of the Chung Hwa Hui, said that the 
future Indonesian Republic should give citizenship to aJI Chinese who Jived in 
lndonesia.61 The Chinese BPKI representatives basically all agreed that local Chinese 
could and should become Indonesian subjects. They regarded the Chinese community 
as a whole, without distinguishing between totok and peranakan. The Indonesian 
nationalists basically accepted that local Chinese could become Indonesian subjects, as 
Yamin, Muhammad, Naskah..persiapan Undang-undang Dasar 1945. [Documents for the 1945 
Constitution] (Djakarta: D.iilid Pertama, 1971). pp. 21&-223. 
This kind of statement has never been considere<l to represent the mainstream view of the Chinese 
community in Indonesia, since his party was small and this opinion was not shared by Chinese language 
newspapers or Chinese peranakan newspapers in Indonesia. 
Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, lhe Cbinese Minority and China. (Kuala L-.impur: Heinemann, 
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well as other Asians.62 From then on, there were always Chinese representatives in the 
congresses of the Dutch-controlled Indonesian Federal Government, as well as those of 
the Republican Government of the revolutionary era. 
Under the Japanese occupation, the Chinese began to feel that they should establish 
relations with the local nationalists. During the occupation, apart from Chinese leaders 
cooperating with the Japanese authorities in the committee of preparation for Indonesian 
independence as mentioned, the Chinese paid special attention to the possibility of an 
Indonesian independence. Chinese underground leaders tried to make links with 
Indonesian leaders. Ba Ren knew the left-wing Indonesian revolutionary, Tan Malaka, 
who passed as a Philippines Chinese called Tan Hoo Seng,63 and took a teaching job in 
Singapore under that alias.64 Ba Ren sent people to try to contact him. But after half a 
year, they were still not able to do so, or to contact his party, the PK!. Ba Ren and his 
comrades decided to contact the Malayan Communist Party and the Malayan People's 
Anti-Japanese Army. In early 1943, they sent comrades to Malaya and made some 
contacts. Later they used these contacts in fund raising and propaganda. 65 There were 
ideological grounds for urging the Chinese people to help the Indonesian revolution. A 
Before the war, no Indonesian party seriously considered regarding Chinese as people of Indonesia. After 
the establishment of the Investigative Committee for the Pre~aration of Indonesian Independence (BPKI) 
by Japanese advisors, the Chinese elements of the future Indonesian nation were basically accepted. 
Tan Hoo Seng (mi!'f[J~). 
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belief spreading among the Chinese was that Asian peoples should help each other.66 
This was why Chen Da Shen described the relationship in this way: 'During the 
Japanese occupation, ethnic Chinese supported the Indonesian nationalist movement 
both in public and in secret.'67 
The Chinese and the Indonesian Revolution after 1945 
For these reasons, as soon as the war was over and the Indonesian revolution 
commenced, a number of Chinese began to assist the revolution. There are many 
accounts of Chinese people helping the Indonesian Revolution in Chinese material. On 
the eve of the declaration of Indonesian independence, a group of young Indonesians 
kidnapped the revolutionary leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, to force them to take action. A 
Chinese resident, Djiauw Kie Sieng, 68 lent his home for Sukarno's and Hatta's 
detention. 69 Because of this, it has been argued that ethnic Chinese did help the 
Indonesian Revolution from the very beginning. 70 The Indonesian declaration of 
independence was broadcast to the outside world through Chinese channels, radios and 
newspapers. Benny Tang has summarized the Chinese role in the Indonesian 
Ba Ren. Yuandong minzu gemil1g wenti. [The Nationalist Revolution in Asia] (Shanghai: Nanhai 
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Revolution as follows: 'On the eve of independence and in the immediate post-
revolutionary period, apart from a small number of overseas-trained doctors who had 
contacts abroad, the Indonesian people were all but cut off from other countries. 
Because the Chinese were in regular contact with Chinese in other countries, they were 
able to perform, disinterestedly, the tasks of foreign liaison, propaganda, and supplies of 
munitions and other necessities during the birth of the Indonesian republic.71 
The post-war Chinese newspapers clearly supported the Indonesian independence 
struggle. Wang Jiyuan, who was the best known journalist from China in Batavia, the 
Dutch capital, stated: 'I have been a committed supporter of Indonesian independence 
since the declaration of 17th August, 1945.'72 He immediately went about establishing a 
new newspaper, in which to express sympathy with the new Indonesia. Throughout the 
Indonesian Revolution, the Chinese press supported the Indonesian side. Li Xue Min 
and Huang Kun Zhang commented: 'The Chinese strongly supported the Indonesian 
Revolution by publishing pro-Indonesian propaganda in the Chinese press. '73 
There were several reasons why the Chinese expressed pro-Indonesian sentiments 
immediately on the declaration of independence. In terms of political thought, they 
72 
73 
Deng Tongli, 'Yingjie guanghui di wushi nian: wei qingzhu Yinni guoqing tan huaren chujing' . 
[Celebration for the Fiftieth Anniversary of lndonesia----Thinking about the Situation of Ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia] Yinniyu Dongxie, [Indonesia and ASEAN], 46 (August 1995), p. 7. Willi::IJ, «lf!lMi:)\';)i:ll!Bj 
E. +~---~IJ!i!15LEPFtl~IJ!&H1tA..IJli±ll'.», <f-PFtlWJf!tfb>, 46 (August 1995), 7. 0 
Wang Ji Yuan, 'Gaobie Yinni youren' [Farewell to Indonesian Friends], Minzhu Dmly, 6 June, 1951. 
I*c:iC, «i'i-5lliEPFtlfl:A.» 0 <N::l::B~>, 6 June, 1951. 0 
Li Xue Min and Huang Kun Zhang, Yinni huaqiaoshi. [The History of the Chinese in Indonesia.] (Canton: 
Guangdong Educational Publishing Co, 1987), pp. 436-446. $~.B'; - ji\J!\~, <EPFtl¥iilii5:> 0 (ill! 
j·M : lll!Jf!~'1J'il'J(rfl:f:lllliiffii, 1987), 436-446. 0 
215 
were anti-colonialist. Wang Jiyuan wrote: 'Indonesia has received the full benefit of the 
cruel tyranny of colonialism for the last three hundred years. China, over the last 
century, has also suffered from imperialism. China and Indonesia have suffered the 
same fate, and face the same adversary. To achieve the thorough liberation of both the 
Chinese and the Indonesian people, all the shackles of imperialism, whether military, 
political, economic or cultural, must be completely stripped away' .74 Political ideals 
aside, the foreign policy of China at that time favoured Indonesian independence. Many 
Chinese newspapers reported that China was the only country to establish diplomatic 
representation in the contemporary capital of the Indonesian Republic, Yogyakarta.75 
Chinese newspapers expressed pride in China's having sent the first representative of a 
foreign government, Mr. Jiang Jia Dong, to visit Yogyakarta. 76 He gave a speech whieh 
Sukarno and all his ministers attended. He said he represented China's government in 
expressing the best wishes for Indonesia's struggle. He predicted that the people of 
Asia would eventual! y win true freedom, and that the second half of the twentieth 
century would be a new era.77 
The presence of representatives of the Chinese government encouraged Indonesian 
Chinese to lend their support to the Indonesian revolution. But when the revolutionary 
government started to offer Indonesian citizenship to Indonesian Chinese, the Chinese 
75 
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consul objected. He considered that this policy involved relations between Indonesia 
and China, and should be approved by the Chinese government before any action was 
taken. The Chinese consulate published a stream of notices in the local Chinese press 
arguing that citizenship was a matter of international law, that the matter would have to 
be discussed between the Indonesian and Chinese governments and a treaty signed. So 
Chinese organisations in Indonesia began to consider that they should not strive to unite 
with Indonesia, but should preserve neutrality. 
Not every Chinese newspaper supported the policy of neutrality, but it was difficult at 
the time for Chinese organisations to support Indonesia openly. For this reason, most 
Chinese who took part in the Indonesian revolution did so as individuals. Though their 
number was perhaps not small, it is difficult to trace them today, and may be 
unnecessary. A few examples are described below for illustrative purposes. 
Oei Yong Tjioe, who is described as a nationalist, took part in the armed stmggle at the 
beginning of the revolution alongside Sukarno, Hatta and the Republicansn In East 
Java, Chen Jinhe, Yu Liangcheng and Wu Sandao joined the revolutionary ranks and 
were publicly honoured for their services to Indonesia.79 Han Linguang of Makasar 
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recruited local Chinese youth for the revolutionary arrny.80 In West Kalimantan, Peng 
Niangbao joined the revolution and was much commended among the people of the 
district.81 Ceng Ruixing and Xiao Yumei of Maowu, Wen Jingduo of Suoluo, Yang 
Fulin of West Java and others also participated. 82 The sources indicate there were 
overseas Chinese participants in the International Volunteer Army, who fought for the 
Republic in Sumatra. Wang Yongli, who subsequently was appointed Treasurer of the 
Indonesian Republic, joined the guerrillas at the start of the revolution. 83 Siauw Giok 
Tjhan, who also was later appointed to a ministry of the Republican government, 
founded the Chinese Youth Corps, which joined the Republican revolution directly and 
took part in the Battle of Surabaya that followed the declaration of independence. 84 
These are all people whose participation in the revolution is well-documented. The 
number of undocumented Indonesian Chinese revolutionaries is probably much greater. 
When Sukarno visited China in 1956, he met Huang Jie,85 who had supported Indonesia 
in the revolution, in Canton and said 'I wish to give thanks once again for the help we 
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received at the most difficult time from your countrymen'. 86 A Chinese historian born 
in Indonesia stated that 'It has been clearly proved that during the anti-Dutch colonial 
movement and the August revolution, a number of Chinese sided with the revolution or 
took part in armed struggle themselves, to the extent of giving their own lives'. 87 
A greater number of Chinese, though, took no direct part in the revolution but used non-
aligned organisations to help the cause of the Indonesian Republican Army. For 
instance, in Malang the Chinese Li Rongkun and Wu Xuceng organised a Red Cross 
brigade to work at the front. 88 More common forms of indirect support for the 
Indonesian revolution were contributions of money, and smuggling of weapons. 
According to one account, in 1946 a Chinese businessman, Tan Gen Hok, was in charge 
of a Chinese smuggling operation running weapons to Indonesia, with the assistance of 
Malays and Indians. Malays sympathised with the revolution as much as Chinese did.89 
The research of Twang Peck Yang on arms smuggling for the Indonesian revolution has 
thrown much light on this.90 
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An outstanding example of Chinese involvement in the arms trade is John Lie, who 
joined the Indonesian navy and broke through the Dutch naval blockade to deliver arms 
from Singapore to the Indonesian Republican Army.91 John Lie's action in breaking 
through the Dutch blockade was critical to the survival of the relatively weak 
Indonesian Republican forces. 92 Most of the Chinese who fought for the Indonesian 
revolution have been forgotten. Given that a war hero such as John Lle, who was 
promoted to Vice Admiral, is no longer mentioned, it is not surprising to find that others 
are forgotten also.93 Economic support for the revolution by Indonesian Chinese was 
even more widespread. 94 Oey Tjeng Hien, later known as Abdulkarim Oey, who 
funded Sukarno directly, is a good example.95 
'Mao sixing zhi weixian gon1,>ying ]Unhuo, huiyi lishi baodao huayi xiaozhong Yinni' [Providing 
weapons at risk to life; the historical contribution of the Chinese to Indonesia l Yinniyu dong.ric 
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Anti-Chinese Riots 
The main disputes the Chinese had with the Indonesian Republic were on the issues of 
anti-Chinese riots and self-defence patrols among the Chinese community. This is the 
reason for the contrast in the content of political debate between Chinese in Malaya and 
Chinese in Indonesia. From the point of view of the Indonesian Chinese, they had 
supporte-0 the revolutionary forces from the beginning, but the anti-Chinese riots cast a 
shadow over their sympathy. The first large-scale anti-Chinese disturbance was the 
Tangerang riot in 1946, which was the most notorious incident in subsequent memory. 
Discussion of the Indonesian revolution in the Chinese media could not shake off the 
effect of the riots, and they deserve closer examination. 
The violence occurred during the struggle for independence. Not surprisingly, the most 
significant events took place in the parts of Java and Sumatra which were being actively 
contested by Dutch and Indonesian forces. Although this was a time of considerable 
uncertainty, the consequences were quite well documented by investigators from both 
armies and independently substantiated by diplomats representing the Republic of 
China in Batavia and Medan. The following information is from the Nanyang Year 
Book of Singapore which contained the Chung Hua Tsung Hui Memorandum on the 
riots.% 
Table 1 Casualties and Loss of Property among Chinese during the Indonesian 
Revolution 
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lONov. 1945 Surabaya 58 dead, 13 injured, 1 missing, 43 houses destroyed 
23 March 1946 Bandung 54 dead, 50 injured, 36 missing, 5020 houses burned 
11June1946 Tangerang 656 dead, 496 injured, 403 missing, 3409 houses 
burned 
18 Sept. 1946 Bagansiapiapi 239 dead, 52 injured 
1 Jan. 1947 Palembang 256 dead, 114 injured, 594 missing, 3060 houses 
destroyed 
20 July 1947 l" police action 
East Java 164 dead, 50 injured, 165 missing, 1849 arrested 
West Java 83 dead, 18 injured, 52 missing, 7233 arrested 
Middle Java 406 dead, 8 injured, 180 missing, 6559 arrested 
Sumatra 196 dead, 92 injured, 78 missing, 89 arrested 
19 Dec. 1947 2•u police action 
Jambi 7 dead, 5 injured, 2 missing, 389 houses destroyed 
Java 757 dead, 89 injured, 9221 arrested 
Sumatra 26 dead, 18 injured, 52 arrested 
In total, some 3,000 Chinese were killed. In the Tangerang Incident, which brought 
international condemnation, over 600 were killed, including 130 women. Other riots 
occurred at Bagansiapiapi in September 1946 and in Palembang in January 1947. The 
Peristiwa Surabaya riot of November 1945 took place after hostilities had broken out 
between Indonesian and English troops and the loyalty of ethnic Chinese toward the 
returning Dutch had become suspect. But it needs to be noted that 6,315 Indonesians 
died in the resulting violence, compared to fewer than 60 Chinese. It is difficult to say 
what is signified politically by their deaths in this context. Moreover, it also needs to be 
Yu Shukun ed., Nanyang Nianjian. [South Seas Year Book] (Singapore: Sin Chew Jit Po, 1951), 1lf!;j!iju.\, 
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noted that the riots in Bandung seem to have been directed largely at property. 
Although all these events can be related to the independence struggle, they do not seem 
to have been part of a deliberate policy by any organisation. Rather, they were carried 
out spontaneously by pribumi in areas where Dutch authority was weak or absent and, 
later, in the case of the various police actions, when there were few republican elements 
around. Perhaps it was the intention of the perpetrators to cause maximum disruption. 
But given the context of the times, the force of anti-colonial sentiments, and the 
international complications, it is difficult to say to what extent the violence or property 
destruction was specifically anti-Chinese. Although Chinese-language sources naturally 
emphasize the racial character of the riots, it must be acknowledged that pribumi 
undoubtedly suffered more, per capita, in the revolution. 
The challenge presented by the anti-Chinese riots is how to understand the reasons 
behind them. Mo Wu, who lived in Jakarta at the time, thought the Bandung riots were 
related to the Japanese occupation. When the Japanese advanced on Bandung, they 
used Taiwanese troops in the front line. Later, when they landed on the mainland of 
Java, the Japanese troops first clandestinely urged impoverished and unsophisticated 
Indonesians to rob the Chinese, and then suppressed the rioters by armed force, which 
appeased the Chinese about Japanese intentions but sowed the seeds of mistrust 
between Chinese and Indonesians. Later, the Dutch followed a similar strategy. No 
such outbreaks of violence took place in territory under the control of the Indonesian 
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Republican forces. They took place only near the boundaries of Dutch territory, which 
suggests the Dutch bore at least half of the responsibility." 
Concerning the Palembang incident, Tian Ren thought the origin Jay in militant 
nationalism, which made everyone either a friend of the revolution or an enemy. 
Moreover, Indonesians were severely disappointed by the ill-advised strategy of the 
Chinese government. The Republican government had been promoting 'East Asia for 
the East Asian peoples' at every opportunity, and China was Indonesia's East Asian 
'big brother', but this big brother was passively supporting the Dutch, and following the 
lead of Britain and the USA in all foreign policy statements, while the Chinese in 
Indonesia still recognized the Dutch as masters. All of this caused anger among 
Indonesians." However, Mo Wu had a different opinion. He thought that the looting at 
Palembang was not directed primarily against the Chinese. Arabs and Indonesians were 
also robbed. It was as much class conflict as ethnic conflict."' Other analyses of the 
riots have pointed out that the large-scale ones took place at times of transfer of power, 
and were related to particular issues of the time and place. Anti-colonialism was the 
most widely current political concept, and some Indonesian revolutionaries were not 
clear about whether or not the Chinese were part of the structure of colonialism. '00 
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Self-defence Patrols 
Another issue which often caused misunderstanding is that of the self-defence patrols, 
known as 'Poh An Tui' among ethnic Chinese, in the transition between Dutch rule and 
the Indonesian Republic. mt The establishment of the self-defence patrols has been seen 
as anti-Revolution or pro-Dutch in subsequent historical writings. 'The Chinese were 
authorized by the Dutch to form the Poh An Tui, a self-defence organisation which was 
also armed by the Dutch. This was also used as a pretext to accuse the Chinese of being 
pro-Dutch and anti-revolution.' 102 
Armed struggle was a new thing for Chinese in Indonesia. Under the Japanese 
occupation, anti-Japanese armed forces were small-scale and few in number.103 But in 
the last few months of the Pacific War, the Japanese military administration encouraged 
the Chinese in Jakarta to fmm patrols. The patrols were maintained to protect Chinese 
property after the end of Japanese occupation. The Chinese tried to organize self-
defence patrols in the Dutch-controlled areas during the Indonesian Revolution. These 
patrols were provided with guns and bullets by the Dutch government. Although some 
Chinese joined the Indonesian Republican Army to fight for independence in the area 
Overseas Chi7ese, 46: 104-112. :f!lilll~ «EPFt:l&,fl-UWtz:3'.!11~11l>>, <~1illiru~lil!'ill\llixi:lb. ti 
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controlled by the Indonesian Republic, 104 the record of anti-Independence activities by 
the Chinese patrols led to suspicion of the political loyalty of the Chinese community 
later.105 
Mo Wu has found that when the Bandung riots began, the Dutch levied troops, and on 
the pretext of defending the Chinese, conscripted Chinese in Bandung and Batavia. 
These Chinese were Dutch-educated and inclined to take revenge for the violence 
against their relatives and friends by the pribumi, so they cooperated readily. The 
intensity and scale of the riots increased, particularly after the second police action, and 
the desire for vengeance among the peranakan Chinese also grew."" What was more, 
the Chinese community leader Thio Thiam Tjong was advising the Dutch, 107 which 
added to the impression that the Chinese supported the Dutch. As this state of affairs 
continued, it became inevitable that it would cause the Chinese to suffer losses in the 
struggle for Indonesian independence. The Chinese community was aware of the 
danger. Totok Chinese, at least, were unenthusiastic about the defensive measures. For 
this reason the Chinese Association of Batavia made a public announcement denying 
103 A small group of secret agents supported by the Chinese KMT government tried to fight the Japanese, but 
soon were arrested. Xu Jingxian, J'inm Shinian. [Ten Years in Indonesia (Lahirnja Indonesia), 1941-1950] 
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Chinese participation in the Dutch anned forces, thereby drawing a line between 
themselves and peranakan Chinese. 108 
It did not take long for a fairly clear Chinese point of view on Dutch policy to appear in 
the Chinese press. Mo Wu considered that the Dutch were deliberately using economic 
measures to gain the good opinion of the Chinese, in the apportioning of government 
expenditure and the processing of foreign exchange, while simultaneously urging 
peranakan Chinese to join the Dutch army. 109 Mo placed particular importance on the 
news from Tegal that the Chinese there had held a banquet for the Dutch arrny, and 
Chinese were driving jeeps for the Dutch officers. He considered that this had been 
orchestrated by the Dutch for political effect. "0 
In these circumstances, the issue of whether or not the Chinese government should take 
action to create and arm Chinese self-defence patrols arose, and proved very hard to 
decide. Lin Zhiwen asked 'What have the self-defence patrols defended?' He 
considered that since they were established by authority of the Chinese consulate and 
armed by the Dutch, and naturally aroused the anger of the lndonesians, they were not a 
good thing for the long-term future of Chinese-Indonesian relations. Also, if the towns 
of Indonesia became battlegrounds there would be no business to conduct, and the 
1
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livelihood of the Chinese would be affeeted. 111 Mo Wu pointed out quite clearly that 
this was due to the Dutch policy of yi hua zhi wu, meaning 'using the Chinese to fight 
with Malay (Indonesian in this context)'. HZ Wherever the Dutch army went, they 
commanded the local Chinese to organize a self-defence patrol, so that the Dutch forces 
could be used at the front line. This was presented as allowing the Chinese to defend 
themselves, but it effectively made the Chinese self-defence patrols allies of the Dutch 
army, to which the Dutch were willing to give arms.m At the same time, the Dutch 
took care to hand over Chinese property confiscated from Indonesian revolutionaries to 
the Chinese self-defence patrols, with the aim of increasing hostility on both sides."' 
This was the opinion of most totok Chinese, and the leaders of the locally born Chinese 
were also aware of this aspect of the situation. Cai Xi yin went as far as organizing the 
Chinese force that had fought at the battle of Surabaya to oppose the self-defence 
patrols established by the Dutch. 115 116 
The establishment of the self-defence patrols had been hard to avoid, as the Dutch 
police and army could not guarantee the safety of Chinese people or their property. 
Whenever there was news of a raid on merchants by the Indonesian army, they were 
m Lin Zhi Wen, 'Qiangpao jiao xiang xia di Mianlan.' [Medan in the Firing Line.] Feng Xia, 65, 1947. 
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always Chinese merchants.117 It was also reported that there was disagreement within 
the Republican army, and that the government was losing control of the situation. 
When Dutch-Indonesian negotiations commenced formally at Yogyakarta and a mass 
anti-Chinese disturbance immediately followed, it made a bad impression. 118 There 
were reports of a great number of minor robberies and burning of houses which were 
not prevented by the police, or at which the police arrived only when the looters had 
gone. When it was reported in other pans of Indonesia that the Chinese in Sumatra and 
Java had self-defence patrols and were going about their business in safety, with 
relatively few attacks by rioters, the Chinese elsewhere also wished to organize, so 
Chinese self-defence patrols appeared all over Indonesia.119 
The self-defence patrols were set up with the support of the Chinese consulate, and the 
organisational assistance of local branches of the Chinese Association. Following an 
initial contribution from the Chinese Association, the patrols were established by means 
of mutual assistance. For instance, the economy of east Java had been disrupted by war, 
so the Chinese in Surabaya contributed to setting up the patrols.120 The attitude of the 
consulate was clear. China was in a state of civil war, and unable to give practical 
11
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assistance to the Chinese in distant Indonesia. However, the staff of the consulate were 
all KMT appointees, and held to the KMT's way of thinking on the overseas Chinese, 
considering it their duty to protect them. Setting up self-defence patrols across 
Indonesia appeared to be the only thing to do, and because at this time China and the 
Netherlands were allies, the simplest way to do this was by gaining the support of the 
Dutch. 
Like the militia established in various parts of Indonesia by the revolutionaries, the self-
defence patrols varied in character from place to place. In some places the patrolmen 
lived in hardship, sleeping on floors. In other places women joined the patrols and took 
charge of support work. In others, the patrols were taken over by Chinese criminal 
gangs, who used them to rob Chinese businesses.121 Security in the localities improved 
after the self-defence patrols were set up, so they appeared to be a good idea. The 
chairman of the General Executive Committee of the self-defence patrols of Java, Lin 
Jianxi, said that wherever there were Chinese living in Java, there was a self-defence 
patrol.122 
However, what some Chinese had expressed concern about in their debates eventually 
became a real issue. Years later, Indonesians would still remember that the Chinese had 
organised self-defence patrols, and fought against the revolutionary army. There are of 
course problems with this view of history. First, at that time the Chinese in Indonesia 
'Fuyuan jundui sirao Suoluo huaqiao shoucang o.ichor.g' [Returning Soldiers Harass Chinese in Solo], 
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were still represented politically by the Chinese consulate, and the self-defence patrols 
had been organized by the consulate. They were at the time considered Chinese but not 
Indonesian citizens. 123 Second, the riots were a matter of public safety. It did the 
Indonesian revolutionaries no credit to be unable to prevent the troops under their 
command from making enemies of Chinese civilians and robbing them under the title of 
revolution. Third, because of the attention to the topic in the Chinese press, self-
defence patrols in all areas paid particular attention to establishing good relations with 
the Republican army. They stressed that their task was only to keep the peace, and they 
wished to make no enemies. At the time, the neutrality of the Chinese self-defence 
patrols was recognized and commended by the Republican govemment. 124 
Identity Issues 
In terms of Chinese opinion on the politics of identity at that time, the newspapers and 
journals that considered themselves progressive were the ones advocating identification 
with Indonesia. These included the Feng Xia journal in Singapore, the Minzhu Ribao in 
Medan, and the Sin Po and Shenghuo Bao in Jakarta. Hu Yu Zhi represents this 
tendency: 
Most Chinese in Indonesia have already set down roots here, and so should become one of the 
constituent nationalities of Indonesia, and fight for the liberation and independence of Indonesia. 
113 Huaqiaozhi bianzua.~ weiyuanhui, Yinni J!uaqiaoz/Ji [The History of the Chinese in Indonesia) (Taipei: 
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There are Chinese ministers in the Indonesian government, and Chinese Central Committee 
members in the Socialist Party. As for those overseas Chinese who have not set down roots here, 
they are of course still part of the Chinese nation, and should concern themselves with achieving 
thorough liberation, democracy and freedom for China."' 
Wang Jiyuan in Jakarta agreed: 'I have lived in this country for so long, it has become 
my second homeland after China. I love my ancestral land, and I also love Indonesia'. 
126 
In comparison with Malaya, the Chinese press in Indonesia devoted relatively little 
space to discussing the definition of an 'overseas Chinese'. There was more stress on 
the right to choose one's identity. This might have been because there were not so 
many large inclusive organisations among the Indonesian Chinese; the situation was 
more complicated. The ideology expressed in the Chinese and Indonesian versions of 
Sin Po was almost the same but the terminologies were different. The word 'fatherland' 
in the Chinese edition of Sin Po meant China, while it meant Indonesia in the 
Indonesian edition. 
In this way, 'identity' was spoken of among Indonesian Chinese as a choice made by 
individual will. This was a result of the Republic of Indonesia's announcing that all 
people of Chinese descent born in Indonesia would automatically become Indonesian 
citizens, which brought the notion of choice to the forefront of debate and made it the 
m Hu Yu Zhi, 'Zhengque di nrinzuguan.' [The correct concept of the Nation.] Feng Xia, 81, 1947. ;'\:l]fi( 
Z, <<lEli1JH¥.i~~lll!>>" <li\l'>, 81, 1947. • 
'" Wang Ji Yuan, 'Gaobie Yinni youren' [Farewell to Indonesian Friends], Minzhu Daily, 6 June, !95L 
Dc7G,«1'fJJ~EPIElltA» 0 <.E£l;:t El¥!<>, 6 June, 1951. • 
232 
main substance of negotiations with the government.127 This was very different from 
the situation in Malaya where the focus of debate there was on how to gain the right to 
Malayan citizenship. 
The Chinese newspapers at the time accepted the view of the Chinese consulate that the 
matter of citizenship had not yet been decided. So although the Indonesian government 
announced, as soon as the Republic of Indonesia was established, that all Chinese born 
in Indonesia were entitled to Indonesian citizenship, this was not considered by the 
Chinese to be an effective act of government. 128 The serving Chinese consul stressed 
over and over again that transfer of citizenship of this kind took effect by citizenship 
law of the Indonesian Republic only with the formal agreement of all countries 
involved, and this issue would have to wait until the formalisation of the Federation 
before being decided. 129 However, by the time the citizenship law of Indonesia was 
formally in effect, the Indonesian government had abandoned this policy, moving from 
"' Mary F. Somers-Heidhues, "Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian 
Revolution." Jennifer Cushman & Wang Gungwu, eds., Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian 
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passive acquisition of Indonesian nationality by Indonesian Chinese to active 
acquisitionY0 This meant they had to apply for citizenship themselves. 
Some scholars consider the number of Indonesian Chinese who applied for Indonesian 
citizenship to be a measure of the extent to which they identified as Indonesians. 
However, there are problems with this approach. At that time, the Chinese were 
regarded as opportunists who had cooperated first with the Dutch and then with the 
Japanese, and now wanted to claim the rights of Indonesian citizens. 131 Because of this, 
one condition of Indonesian citizenship was that the children of Indonesian citizens 
should not attend Chinese schools, which for the totok Chinese at least, deprived them 
of the right to an education in their own language. This made them unenthusiastic about 
Indonesian citizenship. Chinese community leaders argued for citizenship to be 
determined by individual choice. At the same time some of them argued that if 
Indonesian Chinese took Indonesian citizenship they would be able to take part in 
politics, to the general benefit of the Chinese community.132 
Totok Chinese in Indonesia can be considered as immigrants who determined their 
sense of belonging themselves, by moving to the country of their choice. After the end 
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of World War II, totok Chinese in Indonesia could think again about where they wanted 
to live. Many of them who had come to Indonesia in the 1920s and 1930s had returned 
to China during the Pacific War and never returned to Indonesia. Those who stayed in 
Indonesia, or came back from China after the Pacific War, especially those with 
families, had deliberately chosen to be in Indonesia. It can be said of them that their 
home towns were in Indonesia. 133 Some Chinese who wanted to return to Indonesia 
after the war did not wait to go through the process of application in China. They went 
first to Singapore by boat, and applied from there for permission to return to Dutch 
lndonesia. 134 This indicates that they saw Indonesia as home. 
Sources dealing with Southeast Asian Chinese in China indicate that having once left 
China, they were regarded as different. The Jakarta Xin Bao, reporting on how 
Southeast Asian Chinese returning to Xiamen were received by the people there, stated 
that they were called fan ke, 135 meaning 'barbarians', or 'bearers of barbarian 
culture'. 136 And when the local political situation became dangerous, the overseas 
Chinese were the first to be sacrificed. 137 The property of overseas Chinese that had 
been taken over during the Japanese occupation was retained by the Chinese 
'Fuyuan huaqiao di kunan' [Sufferings of Returning Huaqiao] , Sin Po, 26 March 1948. «l!l~ff 
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government after liberation. It was in circumstances like this that Chinese with family 
members in both countries made their choice. 
In fact the material available does not permit any strong estimate to be made of how 
many families returned to China and how many stayed in Indonesia. But the news 
reports and readers' correspondence in the Chinese press at the time indicate that a lot 
of them were settling in Indonesia. 138 The boats arriving in Batavia from Hong Kong 
carried more passengers than goods, and most of the passengers were applying to reside 
in Dutch Indonesia. 139 Later, Chinese in Indonesia sought documentation on behalf of 
their relatives so that they could stay in Indonesia. These were the main political topics 
of concern to Indonesian Chinese at the time. 140 
Another subject of acute interest was the position of the Chinese in Indonesian society, 
in particular their economic position. Because Chinese merchants before the war acted 
as commercial middlemen between the Dutch elite and the Indonesian consumers, their 
business activities were encouraged by the authorities, but after the war, licences were 
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needed for the conduct of a wide variety of business.141 When Chinese went to the 
Ministry of Commerce to apply, they were sometimes told plainly by the Dutch officials 
that only Indonesians could apply for such a licence, not Chinese. 142 
Under these circumstances, creating Chinese representative organisations that would 
gain greater rights for all Chinese was something that tatok and peranakan agreed on. 
Because there was the hope that Chinese would be able to join the new government, 
since both federated and Republican governments contained Chinese representatives, 
the election of Chinese representatives became a motive for political organisation 
among the Chinese. 143 In some places, representatives were chosen by the political 
parties, but because some islands were without political parties, the Chinese 
communities there held local elections to select their representatives. The election 
schedule drawn up by Thio Thiam Tjong became the foundation on which the Chinese 
Association was founded. 144 Most members of the Chinese Association were 
peranakan, but the Association urged that no distinction be made between tatak and 
peranakan Chinese. Its members opposed colonialism and were prepared to take 
Indonesian citizenship, but considered that Chinese who did not want to become 
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Indonesian citizens should have this right to abstain. 145 The creation of Chinese 
representative organisations which would defend the status of the Chinese as a minority 
nationality in a new country was also supported by the Chinese Students' Union of 
Indonesia. 146 These events were part of the process by which the Chinese of Indonesia 
arrived at their national identity. 
Understanding Indonesia 
The most notable achievement of the Chinese press, in its reporting of the Indonesian 
revolution, was to increase understanding among Chinese of all aspects of Indonesia, so 
that the press became a moral force encouraging diverse kinds of Chinese support for 
the revolution. Since anti-Chinese riots continued to happen, for activists to maintain a 
base of support for the revolution among Indonesian Chinese was not easy. Among 
these activist Chinese, Ba Ren was one of the most enthusiastic in bringing the issue of 
the Indonesian revolution to other areas of the Chinese community. He reported the 
situation in Indonesia very closely and published his reports in all major centres of 
Chinese publication. He published an article on the relationship between Indonesian 
new literature and the revolution in Hong Kong. 147 He published an article on 
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participation by Chinese in the Indonesian revolution and launched the democratic 
movement among the Chinese community in Singapore. 148 He also published a book on 
the Indonesian anti-imperialist struggle in Shanghai.149 
Ba Ren's strategy in persuading his readers to support the Indonesian revolution is 
worth analysing further. For example, in his article 'The Youth Movement in 
Indonesia', Ba Ren described the activities of Tan Malaka and his links with China.150 
Ba Ren used to teach at the Nanyang Chinese Normal School in Singapore before the 
Pacific War, where Tan Malaka was his colleague. In this article, Ba Ren explained the 
role of Tan Malaka in the Indonesian revolution. He also mentioned that he attended a 
meeting of 'the Socialist Party', which Tan Malaka belonged to, in Pematang Siantar. 
The purpose of his article is clear. He shows the importance of the youth movement in 
the Indonesian revolution and the role of Tan Malaka. If he had talked about this only, 
it would have been just a report on a particular topic. However, he went on to talk 
about the linkage of the Chinese and Indonesian revolutions through Tan Malaka. He 
knew the Chinese readers' way of thinking. If there were links with China, then the 
issue would merit special attention. Ba Ren did not stop there. He reported his own 
participation in an Indonesian socialist party meeting. He was showing the way toward 
revolution in Indonesia for Chinese people. The message for Chinese readers was that 
they should try to do something for the Indonesian people. 
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Ba Ren also commented on the main points of Sukarno's policy. Sukarno was asking 
other Asian peoples to help Indonesia, but his economic reforms focused only on 
commerce and finance, rather than on the lives of workers and peasants. So Sukarno's 
target was Chinese capitalism rather than imperialism. Ba Ren then commented that 
Tan Malaka's policy was too internationalist and too idealist, not gradual enough to be 
achieved. Sukarno's policy was simple nationalism for a capitalist society, and Tan 
Malaka's was internationalism for a socialist society. 151 
The Chinese had different motives for their actions, and it was often easy for them to be 
misunderstood. Smuggling is a good example. Because Chinese had worked in local 
transport for centuries, when the Indonesian Republican Army was blockaded by the 
Dutch and Allied forces, the channels operated by Chinese became the only way to get 
supplies. Ba Ren reported in his article 'Crewman and Foreman' that many Chinese set 
up businesses in Singapore in order to provide supplies to Indonesia. They took risks to 
break the imperialist blockade to help the Indonesian revolution and earn 'revolutionary 
money' .152 
Ba Ren's writings on Indonesia are the most wide-ranging and complete among those of 
his Chinese contemporaries. He edited the Qianjin (Progress) Weekly and the Minzhu 
(Democratic) Daily with his colleagues of the Sumatran Chinese Democratic Alliance, 
151 Wang Ren Shu (Ba Ren), finnj shehuj fazhan gaiguan. [An overview of Indonesian social development] 
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which agitated forcefully for the Chinese to support the Indonesian revolution. 153 His 
essays appeared not only in Chinese publications in Sumatra, Indonesia, but also in 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai, broadcasting the spirit of the Indonesian 
revolution wherever there were large numbers of Chinese readers. This was the source 
of his great influence. Eventually the Dutch authorities realized how influential his 
works were, arrested him, then expelled him from Indonesia.154 However, he did not 
stop writing once outside Indonesia, and his essays continued to be widely published. 
The Significance of the Debates 
It is worth examining these debates about the future of Malaya and Indonesia for 
Chinese identity in this critical period of change in the region. The change in Nan yang 
Chinese identity cannot be considered as the product of external factors only. The 
opinions of Nanyang Chinese themselves should be taken into account for a better 
understanding of identity issues. Victor Purcell's classic book on the Chinese in 
Southeast Asia is not concerned with how Nan yang Chinese thought about their identity 
in the new nations. It is mainly concerned with the policies toward ethnic Chinese of 
those in power, such as the British Colonial Government, the Chinese Nationalist Party, 
the Chinese Communist Party, the Japanese Military Administration or the new 
independent governments. 155 Purcell hints that these policies were the major factors 
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determining Nanyang Chinese national identification. Wang Gungwu attempted in his 
1988 essay to categorize the factors that influenced identity change among ethnic 
Chinese into four sets of norms: cultural, political, physical and economic. 156 Neither of 
them considers identification as the product of the conscious will of ethnic Chinese 
themselves, based on their experiences on Southeast Asian soil. 
The Chinese viewpoint has been obscured by the dominant trend of national history in 
the post-war practice of Southeast Asian Studies. We need to remain aware that 
different ethnic groups in one country may have different historical memories. This is 
why it is important to understand different interpretations coming from different ethnic 
groups in order to understand the nature of dispute between these groups. In a few 
places like Malaya (Malaysia today) and Indonesia, historical memory differs greatly 
between ethnic groups, particularly between ethnic Chinese and the indigenous 
majority. 
The most important phenomenon in the Malayan Chinese debate in this period is the 
appearance of new terms for Chinese residents in Malaya. Malayan Chinese started to 
think that the term huaqiao (Chinese sojourner) was not appropriate any more as a self-
description for themselves. They created several new terms for themselves; for 
instance, huaren, huayi, huashe or huazhu. All those terms were devised by the local 
Chinese to avoid using older terms that expressed a strong linkage to Chinese 
nationality. These terms then spread to other Chinese communities around the world. 
Today these terms are the ones used internationally in Chinese to describe the situation 
"' Jennifer Cushman & Wang Gungwu, eds., Changjng Identities of the Southeast Asjan Cbjnese sjnce: World 
242 
of Chinese of the diaspora. Those who are ethnic Chinese and want to avoid any 
association with Chinese citizenship find these tenns convenient. They arose from the 
idea of separating ethnicity from nationality for Chinese of the diaspora. The historical 
experience of the Malayan Chinese, described above, was the source of this idea. 
Another significant result of the debate was the establishment of the ethno-political 
category 'Mahua', which means Malayan Chinese. Though the term appeared in 
newspapers in the 1930s, it only came into common use with the post-war identity 
debate. Reportage on many issues concerning culture, arts, social movements and 
national salvation used the 'Mahua' concept. People used it to define categories such as 
Mahua culture, Mahua women or Mahua youth. 
For the Indonesian Chinese, the most important outcome of their debate on their identity 
was the cultivation of sympathy with Indonesian nationalism. According to He Sheng, 
Indonesian Chinese began to regard the independence of colonies as a worthy political 
cause during the Japanese occupation, and before the war was over, many considered 
that independence would come as soon as the Japanese were defeated.157 So post-war 
debate on the Indonesian revolution attracted a broad public response. Southeast Asian 
Chinese who had been indifferent to politics before the war developed a new set of 
values after the war, and considered it their duty to give their full support to the 
War II. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), pp. 1-21. 
'" He Sheng, 'Dongnanya zhimindidi douzheng.' [The Struggle in the Southeast Asian Colodes] Feng 
Xia, 81, 1947. lil!;lf., «:'$U¥152Jii!!~ttill¥~M'¥'», <J!i!\f>, 81, 1947. • 
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nationalist movement. 158 As a consequence, over a thousand Chinese volunteers from 
Malaya and Indonesia went to Vietnam to join the fight for national liberation there in 
1947.159 This degree of active political engagement could not have been imagined 
before the war. 
Much discussion of the political debate in the newspapers at that time has focused on 
the contest between the left and right. According to the thinking of the time, the left 
wing was pro-Communist, and the right wing was pro-KMT. But examination of the 
views on national identification among Southeast Asian Chinese expressed by both 
sides shows that the differences were minor. Officials of the KMT party and 
government considered that because there were so many Chinese in Indonesia, they 
should be recognized not merely as sojourners but as a constituent element of the new 
nation. 160 Both left and right supported the principle of free choice of citizenship. 
Eventually this principle was also adopted by the Indonesian government, and became 
the foundation of the Sino-Indonesian agreement on citizenship reached at the Bandung 
Conference. 
The debate also gave rise to a greater understanding of pribumi among the Chinese, and 
increased cultural contact. Chen Xujing considers that in the past, Southeast Asian 
'" He Sheng, 'Zhongguo yu Dongnanya' [China and Southeast Asia] Feng ;\'.la, 82, 1947. Jliii;,tE, «lfl~ 
.Wlfl:lf.i5H» 0 <mt\T>, 82, 1947. 0 
159 Jing Jing, 'Yuanzhu Yuenan duli shi yinggai de.' [It is necessary to supp0rt Vietnamese lndependance] 
Feng Xia, 62, 1947 . .!lila, «~Wl~i¥J'l001L:l!l:f!:flfi(f:J» 0 <.l\T>, 62, 1947. 0 
"' Chen Yi Lir.g, Yinni XJ'alz!wang yu fwaqiao. [The Cment Situation in Indonesia and the Overseas 
Chinese] (Taipei: Central Publishing Co, 1954), p. 88. il.ii!P_.lfl, <~PIB~§li!'¥jljf;lil>' (E\'~l; : =?.'.k:?t!J"iJ 
\!li~it, 1954), 88. , 
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Chinese paid very little attention to the work of cultural transmission and exchange. 
Education meant education for the children of overseas Chinese. Very few Chinese 
troubled to study the language and culture of the locals, so their knowledge of the 
Southeast Asian peoples was very scanty. 161 During the debate, great amounts of 
material dealing with the Indonesian people was published in the Chinese press, and this 
had a great effect on Chinese attitudes to pribumi. Some essays were published urging 
Chinese readers to learn Indonesian. '" Advertisements for Indonesian-Chinese 
dictionaries and teach-yourself books appeared regularly in Chinese newspapers right 
after the war, both in Republic-controlled areas and Dutch-controlled areas. 
One of the contributions made toward Indonesia by ethnic Chinese was writings in the 
language of Melayu Tionghoa. This language was widespead among Chinese 
peranakan. Its structure was the same as Bahasa Malay, but the vocabulary included 
many Hokkien terms. Reportage in Melayu Tionghoa appeared in newspapers and 
magazines which were published by Chinese but also circulated among pribumi. 163 
When Bahasa Indonesia was established as the standard language after the war, Chinese 
began gradually to adopt Bahasa Indonesia as a means of communication. 
Let us come back to the question raised in the beginning of this chapter. Chen Xujing 
considers that those in charge of Chinese foreign policy before 1948 consistent! y 
161 Chen Xu Jing, 'Zhongguo y\J Nanyang' , [China and Nanyang] Sin Po, 4 June 1948. lll'l!f'i"~' «'1'~ 
~1¥itP» 0 <1\'i'ii&>, 4 June 1948. • 
162 Lia Zhi Wen. 'Tan Yinniyu.' [About the Indonesian Language] Feng Xia, 60, 1947 . .#z:::t, «~f-~ 
!Eliii'i»' <.lili'\f>, 60, 1947. 0 
18 Chen Da Sheng, Yinni wenhua Iunwen}J: [Studies of Indonesian Culture] (Singapore: Educational 
Publishing Co, 1977), p. 8. J!!!!JWt, <EPrBxfUifliY:~ • c~hn:!Jli:: f.l11'fl±ll:&i~±. 1977), 8. • 
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misunderstood the situation in Southeast Asia, because there was no single specialist 
organisation to deal with it.164 Subsequently, many people who had played important 
parts in the process of searching for a new identity for Chinese in Malaya and Indonesia 
went back to China. They were in a position to influence the policy toward 'overseas 
Chinese' of the new Chinese govemment.165 Tan Kah Kee, Hu Yu Zhi and Ba Ren had 
all taken part in the debates on identity, in fact were central to the debates, and 
expressed opinions regarded as progressive at the time. They thought the Nanyang 
Chinese should support the Indonesian revolution and they encouraged the next 
generation to identify with the nation of their birth. They joined the debates in Malaya 
and Indonesia in complete sincerity, and although they finally either returned to 
Mainland China of their own accord or were expelled by the colonial authorities, their 
contributions to the debates remained influential in Nanyang. Their writings form the 
heritage of the Nanyang Chinese. At the time, their opinions were seen as radical, but 
the subsequent trend of events among the Nanyang Chinese went in the direction in 
'~ Chen Xu Jing, 'Lun Zhongguo yu Nanyang di waijiao' . [On Diplomatic Relations Between China and 
Nanyang] Si" Po, 6 July, 1948. l!!i!:ir;*!l! 0 <<liiitflf!l!l!JiJJ¥1#(t(Jjj.x» • <ir¥11!>. 6 July, 1948. 0 
"' Tan Kah Kee became the chief representative for overseas Chinese in the National People' s Congress of 
the PRC in 1949. See Lin Shao Chuan, Chen Jiager1g yu nanqiao jigong, [Tan Kah Khee and The 
Nanyang Mechaaics in China] (Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1994), p, 13. flc'.'.?Jl I, <»!il!!\.Sl<t~ 
'¥11i!lil!I> 0 (~c:iit: tflll!ll"11'1'itl±lit&!fr±, 1994), 13. ' Hu Yu Zhi was the first director of the General 
Publications Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department (tp9;:l[~Jllll±l/Wi:ill!!ii11') in the central 
government of the PRC in 1950, and wrote the Working Outline for Overseas Affairs for the central 
government. See Fei Xiao Tong and Xia Yan ed. Hu Yuzhi yinxiang jj, [Memories of Hu Yu Zhii 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi Chubanshe, 1989), pp. 140, 176. 'l'l'>tJl!l, "l:itJ Iii, <J>lli\t;;'.:f.P~~C> • (~t 
: cp !iilit:mlli~mit. l 989), 140, 176. • Ba Ren became the first ambassador of tl:e PRC to !ndcnesia 
in 1950. See Quanguo Ba Ren Xueshu Taolunhui ed., Ba Ren yanjju. [The Study of Ba Ren] (Shanghai: 
Shanghai Shudian, 1992), p.8. 3':IJlll!E.\A~lil'ilMilillnftlliil, <B.A.i'f%> • (.l::~: 1992), 8. • 
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which they had pointed. Those who went back to China had full understanding of the 
new approach to Chinese identity in Nanyang. 
Zhou Enlai's speech on the new overseas Chinese policy of China's government at the 
Bandung conference in 1955 cannot be seen as the harvest of Indonesian diplomatic 
effort only. Without the debate on the new Chinese identity in Malaya and Indonesia, 
there would have been no ground on which to change long-existing perceptions of 
Chinese identity. Many of the important figures by then involved in the making of 
overseas Chinese policy had gone through the debates in Malaya and Indonesia, directly 
or indirectly. The decision-makers in China's government were therefore fully 
informed about the new approach toward identity issues among Chinese in Malaya and 
Indonesia. China's change of policy toward the Nanyang Chinese should be seen as the 
result of efforts by the Chinese in Malaya and Indonesia to find a new identity. 
247 
Chapter7 
Negotiating Identity in the New Nations, 1950-1955 
From the previous chapter, we have seen that there were new ways of thinking about 
identity among the Chinese in both Indonesia and Malaya in the 1940s. However, those 
ways of thinking were expressed in the sphere of ideas only. Those ideas were easily 
heard because of the debate on the issue of identity in newspapers and magazines. But 
ideas would remain ideas if no organisation took any action to make them real. In this 
chapter, two organisations, one in Malaya and one in Indonesia, are selected to examine 
the process of socialisation of these new ideas of identity for ethnic Chinese. These two 
organisations are Baperki (in Indonesia) and the UCSTA (in Malaya), which can be 
seen as the main mechanisms in the process of socialisation of the new identity concepts 
within the Chinese communities in the 1950s. The 1950s was the period in which many 
communities of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia took actions to make changes on 
issues of identity. We only look at two organisations in this chapter. We cannot say 
that these represent the mainstream of ethnic Chinese because there were many other 
Chinese organisations which had their own views on identity issues at the same time. 
The new ideas of identity which we mentioned previously were not the only solution for 
ethnic Chinese. It should be pointed out that as Chinese communities were often 
divided on their political views, it would be difficult to claim whose views were 
representative. It is not parallelism but two different cases in two different countries. 
These two cases became diverse because of their involvement in domestic politics. 
These two organisations, at least, received considerable public support and played 
important roles in the promotion of new ways of identity for ethnic Chinese at the 
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grassroots level. These two cases are good examples of how ethnic Chinese organized 
themselves and demonstrated a new concept of identity in the 1950s. 
The discussion of these two organisations in this study will be limited to the period from 
1950 to 1955, the beginning stages of forming these organisations. Both organisations 
have longer histories, and judgements on the role which they played would be different 
if their later histories were considered.1 Both organisations were founded in the period 
from 1950 to 1955, the year in which China announced its new policy towards the 
overseas Chinese at the Bandung Conference. The actions and forms of organisation 
adopted by the Chinese in Malaya and Indonesia to solve the problem of identity clearly 
predate the changes in the Chinese government's policy towards overseas Chinese. In 
this period, dramatic political changes in both China and Southeast Asia had a major 
impact on Chinese perceptions of identity. The Chinese Communist Party had defeated 
its rivals and gained power in China in 1949. The Netherlands finally relinquished its 
colonial claim to Indonesia in 1949 and acknowledged the new state's independence. 
The government in Malaya launched the Emergency in order to crush Communist 
guerrillas in 1948 and also formulated a Federation of Malaya which was structured to 
favour Malays in 1948. Against this background, the Chinese communities had to 
decide in a relative! y short period of time how to respond to this new situation and in 
which direction to move. We should remember that the majority of ethnic Chinese in 
both countries were still Chinese nationals in this period. In 1950, neither the British 
About the role of UCSTA in the history of Chinese education in Malaya/Malaysia, see Tan Llok Ee, The 
PoHtks of CJ..inese Education i.1 Malaya, 1945-1961. (Kuala Lumpur; Oxford University Press, 1997). 
About Baperki' s positior in Indonesian politics in tbe 1960s, see Charles A. Cappel, Indonesian Chinese 
in Cdsis(Melboume; Oxford University Press, 1983). 
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authorities in Malaya nor the Indonesian authorities had agreed to give citizenship to 
China-born Chinese. Both authorities were reluctant even to allow local-born Chinese 
to gain citizenship automatically. 2 So the move to form these two associations was 
made before the policies of the authorities had an influence. 
In this chapter, I will reinterpret the history of the 'Chinese problem' in both Malaya 
and Indonesia by looking at the views of these two associations on the issues of 
citizenship and separate Chinese education systems. The two Chinese associations 
played a very important role in these areas. In Malaya, UCST A was founded as an 
educational society, and then became the principal organisation to help Chinese 
residents to gain local citizenship in the 1950s. In Indonesia, Baperki was founded as 
an association to protect the rights of ethnic Chinese who were Indonesian citizens. It 
eventually became an institute devoted to the cause of education for the Chinese in 
Indonesia. Both drew support from the Chinese communities regardless of class, 
ideology, or cultural background. Through these organisations, new notions of identity 
were disseminated and popularised within the Chinese community. The history of the 
two associations is worth a thorough investigation and needs to be reinterpreted in a 
new framework. Here I mainly discuss the views of these organisations on the new 
concept of identity among Southeast Asian Chinese. I also consider how their views 
were associated with the Chinese education issue and the previous history of the identity 
issue among the Nanyang Chinese. 
Donald Earl Willmott, The National Status Of The Chinese In Indonesia. 1900-1958. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1961). 
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BAPERKI: From Citizenship to Education 
Baperki is an abbreviation for 'Badan Perrnusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia', 
which literally means 'the Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship'. This 
organisation was founded in 1954 in order to deal with all the issues connected with 
citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia at a time when Indonesia had just secured its 
independence. Baperki has been described as being founded with the purpose of 
'promoting understanding of Indonesian citir,enship' and 'opposing discrimination' .3 It 
was the largest association in Indonesia which represented the interests of ethnic 
Chinese, and was also seen as the representative association for ethnic Chinese in the 
era of President Sukarno in Jndonesia.4 
Baperki was usually seen as an association for peranakan Chinese, because holding 
Indonesian citizenship was a condition for joining Baperki. 5 Baperki is chosen for 
discussion here because its aim was to represent the Chinese community as a whole, 
including both totok and peranakan Chinese, even though it limited its membership to 
Indonesian citizens. Even though the majority of China-born Chinese could not become 
members of Baperki, it nonetheless helped this section of the community to gain 
eitizenship. Baperki advocated that ethnic Chinese should maintain cultural 
Go Gien Tjwan; foreword to Siauw Giok T}han Remembers: A Peranakan-Chinese and the Quest for 
Indonesian Nationhood Bob Hering, ed. (Queensland: James Cook University, 1982), p. 17. 
This can be seen in tl1e speech of President Sukarno to the national congress of Baperki on 14 March 1963. 
'Baperki Supaya Men_iadi Sumbangan Besar Terhadap Revolusi Indonesia' In Kenangan Lama: 
Koleksi Pidato Pidato Bung Kama. (Jakarta: Prapti, 1976). 
For example, Eric Suryawinata, History of BPK Penabur. (Jakarta: BPK Penabur KPS Jakarta, 1996), p. 
73. 
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Chineseness and thus comes within the focus of this study. Baperki actually challenged 
the perpetuation of the totok I peranakan dichotomy and championed a unified, all-
encompassing Chinese cultural viewpoint, which we will discuss later in this chapter. 
Baperki had what it called an 'integrationist' cultural policy, in contrast to an 
'assimilationist' stance in the Indonesian context.6 The debate between 'integrationist' 
and 'assimilationist' will not be discussed in this study because the debate took place 
mainly in the 1960s, which is beyond the period this study is discussing.7 At least the 
idea of assimilation did not get any support in Chinese newspapers at this period of 
time, that is, the first half of the 1950s. Baperki's integrationist outlook won more 
support from the community than any other single association in the 1950s. 
The Creation of Baperki 
Baperki rapidly gained a large Chinese membership and can be seen as the first 
association ever to gain support from Chinese of all backgrounds in the archipelago. 
After the banning of Baperki following the abortive coup d'etat of 30 September 1965,8 
ethnic Chinese were prevented throughout the 32 years of Suharto rule from 
establishing a nation-wide organisation to represent their interests. Arguably, Baperki 
Junus H. Jabja, Garis Rasia}, Gan's Usang: Liku-Jiku Pembauran. (Jakarta: Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan 
Kesatuan Bangsa, BAKOM-PKB Pusat, 1983), 12. 
For the details of this debate, see Charles A. Coppel, "Peranakan Poltics 1963-1965", Indonesian 
Chinese in Crisis (Melbourne; Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 43-51; and Mary Somers, "The 
Assimilation Controversy to Mid-1963", Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia. Ph.D. thesis, 
Cornell University, !965, pp. 251-261. 
Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Giinese in Cn'sis. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 49. 
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can be seen as the only organisation ever to transcend the traditional divisions within 
the Chinese community in Indonesia and represent the interests of all Sino-Indonesians. 
Although its history was short-from 1953 to 1965--it played an important role not 
only for the Chinese community but also in modern Indonesian history. Baperki is 
deserving of close study, but the history of Baperki has not yet been fully researched. 
Many studies on Indonesian modern history which were made under the strong 
influence of assimilation policy during the Suharto regime avoided mentioning Baperki 
and its role.9 The importance of Baperki's struggle only began to be mentioned again in 
recent years after the end of the Suharto regime.10 
The history of the formation of Baperki shows the difficulty which ethnic Chinese faced 
in the period of intensive political changes. The origins of Baperki were in the Chung 
Hua Hie Hue (CHHH), 11 a pan-Chinese association in Java created and Jed by Thio 
Thiarn Tjong during the 1940s. 12 He believed that Chinese peranakan were Dutch 
subjects, and should be protected by the Dutch authorities, so he founded this 
organisation for the purpose of pursuing civil rights for Chinese from the Dutch colonial 
government after the end of the Second World War. In this way, CHHH gained credit 
from the Dutch authorities, from which the majority of Chinese had always kept a 
distance in the Dutch Indies. It was invited by the Dutch colonial government to send 
For example, Baperki is not mentioned in books which deal with the issue of national integration in 
Indonesia, such as Christine Drake, National Integration in Indonesia: Pattems and Policies. (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1989). And there is no entry for Baperki in a comprehensive dictionary of 
lndonesiar. history, Indoneshja no ;/ten. [Dictionary on Ir.donesia] (Kyoto: Dohosha, 1991) (lf[l¥j 7 :Y 7 
{-:)'Do~')-:;(: /~f;7.V70)~!fll.>, (}i'(j111l: ll1JJl,~~1::2,~.E1· 1991). 
'Fightli;g Racism and Xenophobia' , The Jakarta Post, 8 February 200L 
Chung Hua Hie Hue ( t:fl!ii!i1ii!'1Jt) . 
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representatives to attend political meetings. Because CHHH was recognised by the 
Dutch authorities, the republican government based in Yogyakarta also invited CHHH 
representatives to a meeting which called for 'mutual understanding' .13 Obviously, it 
was seen as the representative body for Chinese peranakan at this time. CHHH also 
had representatives at the round table meeting for Indonesian independence. 14 
After the Netherlands relinquished its claim to Indonesia in 1949, the situation changed. 
At this time, many members of CHHH thought they needed an organisation to assist 
them to become citizens of the Republic of Indonesia.15 The CHHH was reorganized as 
the Chinese Democracy Party, a political party acting in the interests of ethnic Chinese 
in the 1950s.16 But this political party did not progress well in its first three years. In 
1953, leaders of the Chinese Democracy Party suggested forming a new organisation. 
The CDP then became the foundation of Baperki, which was designed to be a political 
consultative organisation, but not a political party. 
" Thio Thiam T.iong (WC~lj,'!l), or Zhang Tian Cong in Mandarin. 
13 Ang Yan Guan (Hong Yuan Yuan), Hong Yuan Yuan zizuang. [The Autobiography of Ang Yan CJ-Jan]. 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao, 1989), p. 252. i;P;llf.lilll! • <#!:ffei!~§lt> (~l;:§t : tf:l~'¥1lt • 1989), 252. 
Siauw Giok TJban (Xiao Yu Can), Shuw tonggui. [Different Roads to the Same Destination] Huar.g Shu 
Hai trans. (Hong Kong: Di Ping Xian, 1981), pp. 61-62. J[lii.m, <7'4:.ilif'\I~' j!l![l!f#lfllli!' (1\'filt : 
l:f!l4'Xill!H\/tfun. 1981), 61-62. , 
Ang Yan Guan (Hong Yuan Yuan), Hong Yuan Yuan zizhuan. [The Autobiogra~hy of Ar:g Yan Guan]. 
(Beijing: Z.'1ongguo Huaqiao, 1989), p. 253. ;l!~jfjlj~ • <Vtllllfl/lll~ll'J> (~CT< : rcplij!l'ifi!11!ii ' 1989), 253. 
Chinese Democracy Party ( tp'lji;J3:0±'.lt) . 
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The leadership of Baperld was distributed amongst people from different political 
groupings. 17 Leo Suryadinata divided Chinese peranakan into three groups before the 
Second World War: the pro-China group, the pro-Dutch group and the pro-Indonesian 
group. 18 The leadership of Baperld was a combination of these three groups. Siauw 
Giok Tjhan, the founding chairman of the organisation, was a leading figure of the so-
called pro-Indonesian group. 19 He had worked for the Revolutionary Republic of 
Indonesia during the years of armed struggle against the Dutch. Its vice-chairman, Ang 
Yan Guan, was the chief editor of Sin Po,20 which Suryadinata classed as a pro-China 
group. Ang was the leading figure in this group; he controlled the policy direction of 
the Sin Po group for a long time and he always helped Chinese communities to form 
links with the Chinese government, under both the KMT and the CCP. Some leaders, 
like those who had been members of the CHH (Chung Hwa Hui), were seen as pro-
Dutch activists. 21 Among them, Thio Thiam Tjong was one of the most prominent 
figures. Thio was advisor to the government of the Dutch Indies during the Indonesian 
revolution. Baperld was the only group which could unite leaders from different 
political groups at that time. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Many sources focus only on the leadership of Si auw G i ok Ti ban. For example, Bob Hering, ed. Siauw 
Giok T;han RemembeIS: A Peranakan Chinese and the Quest for Indonesian Nationhood. (Queensland: 
lames Cook University, 1982). 
Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics 1n Java, 1917-1942. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1981). According to this study, the three major political streams were the pro-China Sin Po group, the pro-
Netherlands Chung Hwa Hui, and the pro-Indonesia Partai Tionghoa Indonesia. 
Siauw Giok Tiban Oll[EJJit), or Xiao Yu Can in Mandarin. 
Ang Yan Guan (#t00/i1.!1), or Hong Yuan Yuan in Mandarin. 
Chung Hwa Hui (tp'1\l'11lf). 
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If we read through the biographies of these leaders, we can find some links between 
them and the groups of people who developed new ideas of identity. For example, 
Siauw Giok Tjhan mentioned in his memoir that he was inspired by Tan Kah Kee 
directly in the struggle for rights of ethnic Chinese when Tan hid in Malang during the 
Pacific War.22 Ang Yan Guan was the main translator and interpreter for Ba Ren when 
Ba Ren was the Chinese ambassador to Indonesia in the early 1950s. It should therefore 
have been easy for them to access the ideas of new identity which had been previously 
generated. 
The name 'Baperki' reflects two expectations of its founders: it was to be neither a 
political party nor a Chinese-only association. 23 The wish to avoid politicisation or 
exclusive Chineseness was not fulfilled. Its members became the members of the 
Parliament and the Constituent Assembly, so that this association not only possessed a 
political function for the Chinese people in Indonesia from the time of its establishment, 
but also was seen as an association which consisted of ethnic Chinese and represented 
the interests of ethnic Chinese, because the majority of its members were ethnic 
Chinese. 24 The expectations of the founders would not have been easy to fulfil. The 
dilemma which Baperki faced symbolized the dilemma faced by the Chinese minority 
during this period. On the one hand they wished to identify with the new country of 
" Siauw Giok Tjhan, Dma Zam1111 Perwu}ud1111 !ntegrasi Wajzr(Jakarta: Yayasan Terarai, 1981), 48. 
Siauw Giok Tjhan (Xiao Yu Can), Shutu tonggui. [Different Roads to the Same Destination] Huang Shu 
Hai trans. (Hong Kong: Di Ping Xian, 1981), pp. 110-120. IEE.i;11, <~l"'li!lll> 0 ji!ft!j:#lj~ 0 (* 
RI! : Jf3zp*,:JH±'JiRifd:, 1981), 110-120. • 
" Ang Yan Guan (Hong Yuan Yuan), Hong Yllil11 Yuan zizhuan. [fbe Autobiography of Ang Yan Guan]. 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao, 1989), p. 256. 'l:!!ilmlim! • <#!;ili1!$H'ljl!j'.> (::lt>i\ : rpliJ'1!lff,11l ' 1989), 256. 
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Indonesia, believing that the Chinese should be a part of this new country, and so 
organised themselves in order to attain and preserve their rights. On the other hand, 
because they considered themselves a part of the new nation, they hoped to consider 
issues from the standpoint of the entire nation, and not from the standpoint of the 
Chinese only.25 
Baperki gained strong support from the grassroots level of the Chinese community. The 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia had never been a homogeneous group. Some Chinese 
settlers had come to the territory earlier than the Dutch. At the same time, there were 
many Chinese newcomers arrived in Indonesia even at the time of the world economic 
depression in the 1930s. Some Chinese newcomers arrived in Indonesia even after 
Indonesian independence, mostly in the 1950s.26 Chinese residents were of different 
regional and professional backgrounds as well. But the support for Baperki came from 
people of all backgrounds. In contrast to the accusations of radical pribumi nationalists, 
the Indonesian Chinese were not foreign nationals who rejected Indonesian citizenship. 
The purpose of founding Baperki was to achieve fair conditions for the granting of 
citizenship to Chinese people in Indonesia. 
26 
Siauw Giok Tjhan (Xiao Yu Can), Shutu tonggw: [Different Roads to the Sarne Destination] Huang Shu 
Hai trans. (Hong Kong: Di Ping Xian, 1981), p. 129. ll!fJs:I~, <1*~1'1.lmii> 0 j;!i'l!f!i!f~ ° Cilfi'li' : :l:fll 
2Pti!lt±llt&fr±, 1981 ), 129. 0 
Yu Shukun ed., Nanyang Nianjian. [South Seas Year Book] (Singapore: Sin Chew Jit Po, 1951), 1llltMilb, 
<1¥ii'Flfi'i> 0 (~JTIJO:liJI:: Jll.lfHB ¥&, 1951). And Wu Wen Hua, Shilun yindunixiya huaren shehui di 
bianqian.[Discussions on the Changes in Indonesian Chinese Society] Zhanhou haiwai huaren bianhua 
guojixueshu taolunhui[Proceedings of the Guangzhou Conference on Change among the post-War 
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The contribution of Baperki in the following three areas will be analysed: first, its role 
in developing a cultural ideal for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia; second, its negotiations 
with the pribumi and gaining of citizens' rights; and third, its contribution to breaking 
down divisions between totok and peranakan Chinese. These three areas will be 
discussed as follows: 
The Cultural Ideal 
Baperki's ideals were clear: on the one hand, it encouraged Chinese residents to gain 
Indonesian citizenship; on the other, it realised that many Chinese parents hoped their 
children could receive a Chinese education and wanted to assist in achieving this. 
Baperki subsequently became concerned with the Chinese education system in 
Indonesia and was active on the issue of Chinese education. 27 The founding of Baperki 
reflected concern that the government of the newly independent Indonesia did not have 
a consistent policy toward Chinese residents. Baperki wanted to influence government 
thinking towards the Chinese. 
The Indonesian government prohibited Chinese education for Indonesian citizens from 
1954. The policies of the Indonesian government were based on the view that if 
Chinese people wanted to have Indonesian citizenship, they should surrender their 
Chinese cultural characteristics and ties and become fully 'Indonesianised'. The 
Ang Yan Guan (Ho:ig Yuan Yuan), Hong Yuan Yuan zizuang. [The Autobiography of Ang Yan Guan). 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao, 1989), p, 257. j;jj;jjiMi!§! • <i:ltm:f\W!sf$> C:lt:!il : i:j:i~'!ji1filii • !989), 257. 
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government ordered that no children of Indonesian citizens were to study in Chinese 
schools.28 Many Chinese residents would be reluctant to take out Indonesian citizenship 
if taking out Indonesian citizenship meant losing the opportunity for Chinese education 
for their children. 
Soon after independence, Siauw Giok Tjhan suggested to the government that it should 
try making Chinese language a secondary school subject. He argued that this would 
encourage peranakan Chinese to send their children to government schools. 29 Leo 
Suryadinata reported that Tjoa Sik Ien and Siauw Giok Tjhan presented a joint paper at 
the Inter-Indonesian Educational Congress held between 15 and 20 October 1949 in 
Y ogyakarta. They argued that 'the ethnic Chinese placed a high value on education and 
that the Dutch had been able to draw the ethnic Chinese to their side by providing 
Chinese children with education. Therefore, if the Republican Government could adopt 
a similar policy on Chinese education, it would win the Chinese to its side.' 30 Siauw 
Giok Tjhan, as a pro-Indonesian leader among ethnic Chinese and one of the few ethnic 
Chinese to become a minister in the Indonesian cabinet, presented this view to the 
Indonesian government five years before Baperki was formed. Baperki actually tried to 
provide education for ethnic Chinese under Siauw's leadership from the beginning. 
Sia~w Giok Tihan (Xiao Yu Can), Shutu tongg-Ji [DiF.erent Roads to the Same Destination] Huang Shu 
Hai trans. (Hong Kong; Di Ping Xian, 1981), p. 124. Jl3i:J~. <~!ii'.iill> ' ' Cili'i-lll : it!! 
2"~/tj,l\&fd:, 1981), 124. ' 
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Suryadinata, ed., Poh'tical Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese, Jf){X}-1995: a Sowr:ebook. (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press 1997), p. 188. 
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After Baperki was formed, it organised a special conference in May 1955 to discuss the 
issues of culture and education in relation to the Chinese in Indonesia. The conference 
decided to oppose the existence of schools organised exclusively for specific groups. 
However, it also urged the government to speed up the expansion and improvement of 
the public school system, to step up efforts to prevent discriminatory practices in the 
schools, to eliminate prejudicial materials from textbooks and teaching materials, and to 
offer Chinese and other Asian languages in public schools. Until government schools 
could meet the education needs of the whole population, aid should be given to private 
schools to provide Chinese education in order to maintain the policy of excluding 
Indonesian citizens from 'foreign Chinese schools', which were affiliated to the Chinese 
or Taiwanese governments. 
The government responded to this request by ordering that students who were 
Indonesian citizens were no longer to enrol in Chinese schools. The Chinese schools 
were required to separate their existing students into two streams, Indonesian citizens 
and foreign citizens. The aim was to disassociate citizenship from Chinese education. 
This added to the difficulties and dilemmas facing Chinese Indonesians. 
Baperki reacted by sponsoring a number of schools and even a university. These 
schools were intended for Chinese, but not exclusively so. Bahasa Indonesia was the 
primary language of instruction but Chinese was taught as a second language. 31 
Baperki University itself eventually possessed an Indonesian Faculty, comprising staff 
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who also taught in other universities in Jakarta. The large percentage of ethnic Chinese 
among the student population and the name of this university made it ethnically 
distinctive among Indonesian universities. 
This illustrates that support for Indonesia, that is, regarding the Chinese as one 
component of the Indonesian nation, while remaining Chinese in the sphere of culture, 
was the direction that received the broadest support from diverse elements of the 
Chinese community. This cultural direction was supported by organisations that 
represented mainly the singkeh Chinese, like the Jakarta Chinese Sojourners' Guild, 
which after the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, indicated on behalf of its 
members that they wished to become citizens of the new country, while maintaining 
Chinese traditions in the sphere of culture. 32 
A similar kind of view was expressed by Chinese artistic organisations, of which an 
outstanding example was the Indonesian Chinese Art Society. This organisation was 
founded in 1953, and expressed its standpoint in the use of Yinhua (Chinese Indonesian) 
to refer to its membership in order to show they had clear Indonesian identity.33 It is 
one famous example of singkeh Chinese, Chinese newcomers, showing their new 
identity by using Yinhua for self-expression. The artworks of the chairman, Li 
Charles A. Cappel, 'Shoeld There be Chinese Schools in Indonesia?' In Proceedings on Chjnese 
Education in Southeast Asia. (Taipei: National Cultural Association, 1995). 
Djakarta Hoa Kiauw Kong Hwee; Yec"iieng lmaqjao gonghui xiojian huisuo Jurx:heng jnjanlan. (Djakarta: 
Perkumpulan Tionghoa Sebera.~g Lantau, 195i) ill!i~Ji~fiji}fl, <illJll;j\;ffi}\t:i!fi~f!/lf[gfiX*c~ 
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Manfeng, used a traditional Chinese landscape painting style to depict the landscape of 
Indonesia. President Sukarno, on viewing Li's work, expressed his approval. His art 
was also appreciated within the Chinese community. 34 The affirmation of this cultural 
ideal throughout the Chinese community is further expressed by the painter and 
businessman Zhou Qingnan, who in his role as cultural consultant published essays in 
the Xin Bao and Shenghuo Bao, stressing that realist oil painting should remain in 
contact with the national style of the people, and that Chinese painting in particular 
should take local, Indonesian subjects. 'He emphasised that paintings had to coincide 
with the spirit of the people, and Chinese painters must incorporate more local scenery 
in their paintings. ' 35 
The leaders of Baperki often expressed their idealist views on the cultural issue for 
ethnic Chinese. They thought that to identify with Indonesia and to keep cultural 
characteristics would become the future for Southeast Asian Chinese. 36 Siauw Giok 
Tjhan argued that ethnic Chinese should be seen as one of the suku bangsa, ethnic 
groups, equal to Javanese or Balinese in Indonesia.37 He thought it also was consistent 
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with the spirit of Indonesian nationalism, which 'unity in diversity' was the emphasis.38 
Ang Yan Guan argued that the effort of Baperki to diminish discrimination among 
ethnic groups was actually to fulfil the aim of Pancasila, the ideal principal of the 
Indonesian Republic. But he also admitted that this attempt was eventually like a 
dream.39 
Rights of Citizenship 
Citizenship was one major issue which caused trouble between ethnic Chinese and 
pribumi in Indonesia at this period of time. Baperki was formed to try to solve this 
issue. The decision on citizenship for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was always made 
from the top rather than by consulting opinions from the communities. At the same 
time, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia comprised very diverse groups. Chinese might 
consider the citizenship issue based on their own experience, and change their stand on 
citizenship and nationality when the political situation altered. Many Chinese who were 
keen to become Indonesian citizens found that they were not treated equally. Some 
3! Siauw Giok Tjhan (Xiao Yu Can), Shutu tonggui. [Different Roads to the Same Destination] Huang Shu 
Hai trans. (Hong Kong: Di Ping Xia.i, 1981), p. 119. Jilf::E~, <~ll'lllil!>' ' (ilfil!l : ti!l 
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Chinese of Indonesian citizenship experienced a feeling of loss because their children 
could not attend Chinese schools. 40 
One of the main problems about citizenship was that the Indonesian government 
repeatedly changed its position on accepting Chinese as citizens.41 The initial decision 
to accept ethnic Chinese as Indonesian citizenship was made in special circumstances. 
'\Vhen the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed the citizenship problem caused 
various misunderstandings. These were aggravated by the Dutch propaganda war.' 42 
This was why the position of the Indonesian government changed several times before 
the Republic took control of the territory. In 1951, the Indonesian government issue-0 a 
provision that most Chinese could become Indonesian citizens by the passive process of 
not refusing it, if they possessed documentation; a certificate proving them to have been 
born in Indonesia. However the Chinese faced difficulties in meeting the requirements 
set out by the government. Chinese people stated that it was impractical to ask the 
majority of local-born Chinese to provide the required birth certificates. The Chinese 
had started to undergo civil registration in 1918 in Java and 1926 in the outer islands, 
but many records had been destroyed during the war. 
Siauw Giok TJnan (Xiao Yu Can), Shv//J tonggvi. {Different Roads to the Same Destination] Huang Shu 
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This policy made the local-born Chinese feel hesitant about gaining Indonesian 
citizenship, since it did not guarantee any benefit but lost them the right to receive 
Chinese education. 43 The Indonesian authorities were clearly dissatisfied with the 
Chinese attitude and felt that the Chinese population lacked commitment to the new 
nation and did not behave in the way the Indonesian nationalists expected. In June 
1952, the Indonesian government issued an order requiring that Chinese students 
leaving for China exit permanently, and it issued a warning to their parents that the 
Chinese students would not be allowed to return to Indonesia. Mononutu, an 
ambassador-elect to Beijing, on the eve of departure in 1953 to take up his posting, 
asked; 'Was it necessary for Chinese students to go to China for their education when 
there were sufficient schools for them in Indonesia ?'44 
Mainstream politicians in Indonesia failed to understand the mentality of the Indonesian 
Chinese. Tjoa Tjie Liang, a journalist for Chinese peranakan newspapers, described the 
situation during that period: 'Most (Indonesian) people still believe that even though 
Indonesians of Chinese descent may have Indonesian citizenship, they are still 
'Chinese'. They are still referred to as foreign adventurers.'45 He thought that this kind 
of belief was found not only among the common people, who were confused about the 
concept of Indonesian citizenship, but also among educated Indonesians and even civil 
servants. 
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For instance, Assaat, a prominent Hadrami Arab politician and minister, asserted that 
Chinese descendants' desire to preserve their cultural heritage was disloyal. Mary 
Somers has suggested that Assaat' s speeches show how racist his ideas were, because 
he proposed that the discrimination be directed solely against the Chinese and not 
against citizens of Arab or Dutch descent. 46 rn this atmosphere, the decision-makers in 
Indonesia always doubted the loyalty of ethnic Chinese. When some government 
officials expressed strong doubts about this loyalty, there was irritation among Chinese 
that they always had to prove their commitment to Indonesia. The Bill of 1954 
requiring Indonesia-born Chinese to reaffirm their choice of citizenship and provide 
birth certificates made the local Chinese uneasy, and they decided to take action. 
The Indonesian-born Chinese in 1950, 'like the other minorities, were awaiting an 
assurance from the government that they would receive equal treatment with other 
Indonesian citizens before making up their minds.'47 The closing down of most Dutch 
schools in the early 1950s drove peranakan Chinese in increasing numbers to enrol in 
Chinese schools. Throughout 1953, representatives of minority groups, especially the 
Chinese, complained of increasing discrimination against them because of the forcible 
assimilation measures of the Indonesian government and the pribumi people. 48 This 
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government policy and the climate of popular opinion affected both Chinese residents 
of Chinese nationality and Indonesian citizens, It caused more and more young Chinese 
and their parents to become alienated in the early 1950s.49 
Responding to this situation, the leaders of Baperki continually expressed their concern 
about the equal rights of Indonesian citizens. On the one hand, Baperki lobbied the 
Jndonesian government to grant local born Chinese Indonesian citizenship 
automatically. so On the other hand, leaders of Baperki repeatedly emphasized that 
personal wishes on citizenship and nationality should be respected for those who did not 
select Indonesian citizenship.51 
Breaking the Framework of the Peranakan!I'otok distinction 
Baperki tended to break down the barriers between totok and peranakan. Even though 
the social categories of totok and peranaka had existed and made some real distinction 
among Chinese for a long time, 52 leaders of Baperki thought that this led to unhealthy 
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relationships among ethnic Chinese in the country. 53 On the one hand, Baperki's 
policies gave peranakan who wished to preserve their Chineseness the right to do so 
and to offer their children a Chinese education. On the other hand they enabled totok 
who wished to make Indonesia their home country to do this with peace of mind, by 
ensuring that their children could become Indonesian citizens with their own distinctive 
Chinese cultural background. 
Baperki's policy was developed in response to the practical situation facing Indonesian 
Chinese at the time. A report compiled in 1948 estimated that 85 per cent of all Chinese 
children in elementary schools in Dutch-controlled areas of Indonesia were in Chinese-
language schools. This was a much higher percentage than in the pre-war period, and it 
indicates that many peranakan children whose parents spoke only Dutch and/or 
Indonesian were being 're-sinified' by an education emphasizing Chinese language, 
culture, and politics. 54 The figures in Table I show that many peranakan Chinese sent 
their children to Chinese schools to learn Chinese rather than to Indonesian schools in 
the 1950s, before the Indonesian government prohibited them to do so. 
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Table 1. The numbers of students attending Chinese schools in Indonesia.55 
Year Numbers of Chinese Schools Numbers of Students in Chinese Schools 
1923 1300 128,000 
1941 502 65,000 
1948 621 141,600 
1957 1669 450,000 
The di vision of totok and peranakan should be reconsidered in assessing the situation of 
ethnic Chinese during the 1940s and the 1950s. Previous studies on the issue of ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia have focused on peranakan Chinese. 56 The reason for seeing 
peranakan Chinese as the more representative group was the belief that they 
outnumbered totok Chinese. But the problem is that the boundary between peranakan 
Chinese and totok Chinese was never fixed nor clear-cut. It can be misleading in trying 
to gain a broader understanding of the Chinese community to only focus on the 
peranakan. As a result of the Sino-Japanese war and the Japanese occupation, there 
was a convergence of interests and outlook between the peranakan and totok Chinese. 
During the colonial period, the main difference between peranakan and totok was 
language ability and political attitudes, but the boundary between them shifted during 
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the turbulent era of the 1940s to 1950s. After WWII, many peranakan-type Chinese 
were willing to learn more Chinese culture and language. This can be described as a 
process of 'sinicization' or 'resinicization' in the 1940s and the 1950s. 57 The 
peranakan-centred framework does not well serve the aim of better understanding the 
situation of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the post-war era. 
The distinction between totok and peranakan has long been used to describe inter-group 
relationships among the Chinese in Indonesia. These two Malay-language terms were 
originally not limited to describing Chinese people or their descendants. In the Malay 
language, totok means 'full-blood' and peranakan means 'mixed blood'. Many social 
scientists have used these terms to describe the main fault line within the Chinese 
community in Indonesia, but most of them define these terms by language ability: totok 
can speak Chinese and peranakan cannot. In Malaya, people use the term baba instead 
of peranakan. The Chinese word for both baba and peranakan, qiaosheng, means 
'local-born Chinese', representing the same meaning as baba or peranakan in Malaya 
and Indonesia. In this study the terms totok and peranakan will be applied to both 
Indonesia and Malaya and are distinguished by place of birth: totok means China-born 
Chinese and peranakan means local-born Chinese. In general, totok refers to Chinese 
who were newcomers, still kept their Chinese culture, and were full-blooded, whereas 
peranakan refers to people who were locally born, kept more to local customs and were 
often of mixed-blood. 
51 Wu Wen Hua, s:?j/un Yindunixiya /Juaren sbe,?w di bjanqi.w.[Discussicns en the Changes in lndcnesia:t 
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It would be problematic if we simply used these two terms to describe the Chinese 
communities without considering the context of real situations. The population structure 
of the Chinese community was different in Malaya and in Indonesia. In Indonesia, the 
peranakan had developed their own identity, which can be perceived by some 
distinctive features of their language. 58 Newcomers from China continued to arrive in 
Indonesia through the late 1940s. In Malaya, the prominent baba did not want to give 
up their 'Chineseness'. There was a Chinese perception of the division between rorok 
and peranakan in Malaya and Indonesia during this period. Chao Hua, a Chinese 
peranakan who had received a Chinese education and had retired from public service in 
Indonesia, published a book about peranakan culture and experiences. He wrote: 'For 
most Chinese people, Peranakan means baba, and baba means locally born Chinese.' 
In Chinese terms, both are qiao sheng, literally locally born. He complained that the 
definition of peranakan or baba according to language ability by Western scholars was 
improper. His ideas reflected the Chinese idea of peranakan. Because the structure of 
the Chinese family was patrilineal, even if peranakan children were of mixed blood, the 
fathers would tend to treat them as Chinese.59 But they often could not speak Chinese, 
because they were raised by their mothers. Even though many Chinese in Java spoke 
some local languages (Malay, Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese) rather than any Chinese 
languages or dialects as their day-to-day language in the home, which might create 
some other kinds of identities, it would not change the situation of being identified as 
58 Dede Octomo, The Chinese Of Pasuman: Their Language And Identity. (Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: 
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Chinese because most had a Chinese surname or a full Chinese name at the time of the 
1950s. In the Chinese media, they were mostly treated as part of the Chinese 
community, but as a distinct sub-category. 
The totok-peranakan dichotomy suggested a mutually exclusive relationship in terms of 
degree of exposure to Chinese culture. But in concrete terms, most Chinese could be 
seen to fall somewhere between these two extremes. Many first generation Chinese 
immigrants took pains to study Indonesian and learn local customs, and many Chinese 
born and raised in Indonesia, who lacked a Chinese cultural background, made efforts to 
study Chinese and preserve Chinese culture. 6° For an organisation constituted to 
represent the interests of Chinese in Indonesia, the issue was how to treat this 
distinction; whether to work to preserve it, or work to eliminate it. 
UCSTA: From Education To Citizenship 
The UCSTA, the United Chinese School Teachers' Association, was an educational 
organisation founded in 1951 for the purpose of 'promoting the benefit of all teachers in 
Chinese schools' in Malaya. The leaders of this association felt themselves obliged to 
lead the movement to maintain the colony's Chinese education system. The role and 
Chao Hua, Yindunixiya Huaqiao Cangsa11g. [The changing fortunes of the Indonesian Chinese] (Hong 
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importance of this association soon extended beyond that of a professional organisation. 
It also played a key role in citizenship issues for Chinese in Malaya during the general 
election under the framework of the Federation of Malaya in 1955. It became a leading 
association in the movement to encourage Chinese residents to join the new nation as 
citizens. The linkage between education and citizenship issues in this context will be 
the subject of the following discussion. 
The Significance ofUCSTA 
The UCSTA can be seen as one of the most representative of Chinese associations in 
Malaya in the 1950s. During this time, there were the so-called 'three big 
organisations' among the Malayan Chinese: UCSTA, the United Chinese School 
Committees' Association (UCSCA), and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). The 
major issue for all three associations was the preservation of Chinese education. 
There is already abundant research on the history of the UCSTA and of Chinese 
d . "Mal 51 e ucatmn m aya. Here we will discuss only the educational issues with which 
UCST A was concerned as they relate to Chinese identity. The efforts of its education 
initiatives were to help the Chinese community to enter into the process by which 
Malayan Chinese identified themselves with the new nation, so that UCSTA in fact 
played a pivotal role in the development of Malayan Chinese identity. Discussion of the 
historical role played by UCSTA should not confine it to the category of education. To 
For example, Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945·1961. (Kuala Lumpur: 
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separate the important topics of the day into the categories of politics and education 
creates misunderstanding of the role played by UCSTA. 
Many studies of the Chinese population in Malaya in this period focus only on MCA, 
the Malayan Chinese Association. 62 But the MCA did not have grassroots support. 
MCA was seen at the time as a gentry organisation, because it consisted of two 
divergent elements: the elite of the Straits Chinese and the elite of the K.\1T. Tan Chen 
Lock was the leading figure of the Straits Chinese. Neither bloc of them were regarded 
as leaders who had mass support from the Chinese community. 63 At that time, there 
were no other Chinese organizations trying to socialize this new idea of identity in 
Malaya. In other words, MCA's idea to be loyal to the new nation, which hadn't been 
established, was later put into practice through socialisation by the UCST A and its 
member schools. With the support of UCSTA, MCA became one of the most important 
Chinese political parties of the time. The condition on which UCST A supported MCA 
was Chinese education, which was the focus of the concern for majority of ethnic 
Chinese. 
MCA was rega.rded as representative of the Chinese commcnity for the following reasons. Firs~ it was the 
only legal Chinese political party du:fag this period. Second, it was founded by Tan Chen Lock, whc was 
seen as the leader of the Chinese in Malaya. Third, the Malayan Chinese Association joined the UMNO in 
an anti-communist movement and won 51 of the 52 seats in parliament in 1955. Concerning the history 
1md the importance of MCA, see Heng Pek Koon, Chinc--se Po/ides in Malaysia: A History of the 
MrJaysi:w Chinese Association. (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
Interview with Sim Mow Yu (tt!i;;J:J, Shen Mu Yu in :Vfa.-1da.'1n) on 23 March 1997. He was a foundation 
member of the Malaya,~ Chinese Association. He s\lbsequently supported the position of UCSTA and 
resigned his MCA membership. He became ehainrum of UCSTA in 1965. 
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There was actually a clear gap between the MCA and the majority of ethnic Chinese in 
the 1950s. The ethnic Chinese population in Malaya was characterised by the 
dichotomous and contradictory social roles played by two divergent elements within the 
Chinese community: the majority of ordinary Chinese and the commereial elites. The 
commercial elites often distanced themselves from the majority of ordinary Chinese in 
their attitudes towards the British authorities.64 The majority of ordinary Chinese, on 
the other hand, had a history of associating with and supporting the MPAJA and MCP, 
which were banned by the British authorities.65 The Emergency made MCA the only 
choice available for the Chinese community in the political domain because leftist 
parties were banned. Eventually MCA gained support from the Chinese community by 
the mediation of the leaders of UCST A, which had made an agreement with MCA 
leaders to support Chinese education. 
The Creation and Leadership of UCSTA 
The foundation of UCSTA is always associated with the name of Lim Lian Geok, (or 
Lin Lian Yu in Mandarin), who was described as 'The Soul of Ethnic Chinese' in the 
The commercial eiite was the social base of MCA, which was often seen as cooperating with the British 
authorities in order to protect the advantageous economic position of its constituency. 
The leadership of MPAJA, the Malayan People' s Anti-Japanese Army, an armed resistance group under 
the Japanese occupation, reorganised as the MCP, Maiayan Communist Party, after the Pacific War. The 
MCP ofte~ opposed L'ie British policy of establishing Malay political dominance of the post-war political 
structure. It then became involved in insurgent operations against the British, and was declared illegal 
during the 'Emergency' in 1948. 
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Chinese community in Malaysia. 66 He founded UCSTA in 1951 and was its first 
chairman. Originally he was a teacher in a state school in Kuala Lumpur, before the 
Pacific War.67 After the war, he became principal of a Chinese high school in Kuala 
Lumpur and organized a teachers' association for Chinese schools in the Selangor area, 
in 1949. At the beginning, this association was concerned only with improving 
conditions for teachers in Chinese schools in the post-war situation. But compelled by 
the policy direction from 1951 that threatened the Chinese education system, Lim 
became an activist leading a social movement for the Chinese community in Malaya. 
The crisis of the Chinese education system gave the Chinese community a clear goal to 
struggle for. Lim won mass support as a leader by his role as educator. The editors of 
his biography summarized his role in this way: 'Because Chinese education has 
survived in Malaysia so far, the contribution of Mr. Lim Lian Geok can never be 
forgotten'. His legacy remained to inspire followers to keep fighting for the rights of 
Chinese education for the Chinese population of Malaysia. 
In 1951 the British colonial government issued a report recommending the substitution 
of English and Malay for Chinese and Hindi in education, which would have meant the 
abolition of Chinese schools, and the Teachers' Association for Chinese Schools of 
Kuala Lumpur, headed by Lim, rose in opposition. Towards this end the Kuala Lumpur 
teachers worked to organise the Malaya-wide Chinese teachers' association, UCSTA, 
which was founded on 25 December, 1951. This organisation then became the core of 
See his biography e<lited by UCSTA, The Soul of the Ethmc Chinese. Lim Lill/J Gook. (Kua! a Lumpur: 
Linlianyu Foundation, 1994), p. I. 
276 
the movement to promote Chinese education in Malaya. Lim's achievement has been 
described as follows: 'The Chinese education system was almost destroyed through all 
kinds of unmerciful measures by the British colonial bureaucracy in the 1950s. 
Fortunately, Lim Llan Geok came out to organise the Jiao Zong (UCSTA) in time to 
call on all Chinese to fight for Chinese education rights. So the Chinese education 
system was able to survive in Malaysia.'68 
It should be noted that Um Llan Geok' s concern with Chinese education and his 
identification with Malaya were directly related. On 25 September 1951, Lim formally 
became a citizen of the Federation of Malaya, only a few months before he established 
UCSTA. Late in 1954, Lim and UCSTA broke with the tradition that the Chinese did 
not concern themselves with politics, and gave an address before the Legislative 
Assembly of the Malayan Federation. He commented in an essay '\Ve will step up our 
work to teach our children to devote themselves to Malaya, and in equality with other 
races together to establish a paradise of peace' .69 This showed clearly his identification 
" See the Introduction by Lim Lian Geok to 'The Lin Lian Yu Foundation' . Huajaojic tejj 1994 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Lin Lianyu Foundation, 1994), p. 2. #!!ll:Elil!t <'!i!Hl&lill~ 1994> 0 (f;:!i~ : #'11! 
:E£11£:1!t, 1994), 2. 0 
" Li Guang Hua, 'Zuhun Lin Lian Yu xiansheng' . [Lin Lian Yu, the soul of the ethnic Chinese] in 
Huajao.ik tej 1993. (Kuala Lumpur: Lin Lianyu Foundation, 1993) p, 25. 3F:l\::¥ • «~lj9j, : #ill!.£$\; 
:'!=.» 0 < •~11ilf!li!!It 1993 > " <aflil:!J!i: : tti!!!:r<£tt. J 993), 25. 0 
Cher. Guo Hua, Xjanquzhe di }iaoyin: haiwai huaren .iaoyu sanbainian. [The Footprints of Pioneers·-Three 
Hundreds Years of Overseas Chinese Edueation), (Canada: Royal Kingsway Inc., 1992), p. 34 L li!ii.~~ 
'<:7t.l!'iti¥J!l!il~n----J'l!.i:i>~~.A1'&WC:::aff.> (Canada: Royal Kingsway Inc., 1992), 341. 
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with Malaya. At the same period of time, Chinese educated Chinese in Malaya were 
still described as owing allegiance to China.70 
The Cultural Idea 
Why would an educational association play such an important role in citizenship issues 
in a new nation? This is directly related to the point of view of culture advocated by 
UCSTA. Many of the documents which show UCSTA's point of view on culture in the 
1950s arc written by Lim Lian Geok. Moreover, he was generally spoken of as 'the 
representative speaker of the Malayan Chinese Community'. 71 For this reason the 
discussion here of the cultural viewpoint of UCST A takes the cultural viewpoint of Lim 
Lian Geok as its focus. 
UCSTA expressed a strong sense of identity with Malaya when it was formally 
established. In the announcement of the foundation of this organisation, this idea was 
presented straightforwardly: 'Now ethnic Chinese form half of the population of 
Malaya, maintain good relations with all other races, live in a civilized manner, and see 
Malaya as their homeland. All show sincerity in their love for Malaya. Malaya will he 
a new nation. It requires the cooperation of all races and mutual respect toward their 
Lee Khoon Choy (Li Jung Cai), Zhuixun zi;i di guojja: yjge nanyang huarcn di xinlu lie/Jeng. [The search 
for my own country; the r.:iental journey of a Nanyang Chinese]. (Taipei: Yuanliu Publishing Co, 1994), p. 
62. ~i:fnJ:t, <ili~l'fB!l'-'.Jli,llJ*: -OOJlill#~A.!¥J{,-~MID 0 (i'!~t: iil!mtlllmi~d:. 1994), 62. 
The spokesman of the Malayan Chinese Community (huazu shehui daiyanren, :ljlil!iiifd:i!itfl:l!! A) 
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cultural heritage. We are loyal to Malaya and willing to construct a new Malaya. We 
did so in the past. We are doing so now and will do the same in the future.' 72 
If they had wanted to maintain their traditional way to deal with local politics, they 
could have said that they did not want to become involved in domestic affairs as they 
had just come there to earn their living. They could have still taken care of their own 
communities in their own way as foreigners. Compared to the previous Chinese 
traditional way, they did take a big step. In other words, it can be seen as an identity 
movement towards Malaya. Chinese leaders stood up to assist people to earn Malayan 
citizenship and encouraged the Chinese community to change its national identification. 
The interpretation of history was seen as critical to this process. Xu Yunqiao indicated 
in 1953 that 'if we want to earn citizenship then we need to understand the history of 
Malaya .... Many British would agree that the Chinese know the history of Malaya.' 73 
Apart from its evident identification with Malaya, another characteristic of Lim' s point 
of view on culture is its stress on the Chinese as one of the three founding races of 
Malaya, with the insistence that these three races should be treated as equal, and none 
'4 
should be seen as inferior or less worthy than any other.' 
72 Jiao Zong, Lianbang huaxiao .iiaoshi zonghui xuanyan. [Manifesto of the United Chinese Schooi 
Teachers' Association] (Kuala Lumpur: Lianbang huaxiao jiaoshi zonghui, 1951) Q, • «~1il'!i!iti:'. 
~alP~ftti'f-i»" c m:eB~t~illl'.aiP*'l!.it , 19s1) . " 
Xu Yunqiao, 'Xu Yunqiao Xu.[Foreword by Xu Yunqiao]' ir. Yu Shou Hao, Malaiya 
gujjntan.[Remarks on the Present and Past in Malaya] (Singapore: Nanyang Shang Bao She, 1953). lff~ 
CWi'i.ml5: : ml'FJ!il~iH: , 1953) • 
Lim Lian Geok (Un Lian Yu) Fengyu shibanian. [Eighteen years of tempests] (Kuala Lumpur: Lin Lian 
Yu Foundation, 1990), p. 62. #J!l!:li, <Mm+ !\ii'>· (j!j'ii,i:\11[ : #~lEIS.;§!;1~'lii'~ 1~ 1990), 62. • 
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The UMNO-MCA Alliance members and UCSTA called a meeting to negotiate a 
political agreement in 1955, two years before Malayan independence was achieved in 
1957. UCSTA asked for Alliance support to maintain Chinese education in Malaya. 
After gaining this agreement, UCST A promised to support the Alliance. The Alliance 
won the election of the same year. This cooperation was regarded by Chinese media as 
the foundation of Malayan independence in 1957. By 1955, the eve of Malayan 
independence, the outline of the new Chinese identity was clearly developed. Chinese 
community leaders continued to fight for 'multicultural civil rights'. Ironically, Lim's 
Malayan citizenship was withdrawn because he suggested Chinese could be one of the 
official languages of Malaysia in the 1960s. 
Cultural Ideas and Cultural Civil Rights 
The two organisations discussed above involve different political systems and social 
environments, and confronted different adversaries, but in both the Indonesian and 
Malaysian cases, the Chinese expressed a similar viewpoint on culture. The examples 
of Baperki and UCSTA indicate that although there was considerable difference in what 
was defined as 'Chineseness' between the Chinese communities in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, they were alike in the basic principles of their cultural viewpoints; as citizens 
of the new nations, the ethnic Chinese possessed the right to maintain the particular 
characteristics of their own culture. They also considered that loyalty to the state and 
preservation of cultural tradition were separate. While these two organisations used 
their considerable mass support bases to agitate for ethnic Chinese to take out Malayan 
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or Indonesian citizenship, and to demonstrate their loyalty to the new nations, each 
considered that this should ultimately be a matter for individual choice. 
The following discussion will approach the issue of national identity from three 
different angles in order to explore the different meanings of new opinions among the 
Indonesian and Malayan Chinese in the 1950s. First, the origins of change; the sense of 
identity among the Nanyang Chinese transformed from the broad 'Nanyang identity' of 
the 1930s to identification with the new nations in answer to new identity concepts 
developing within the local Chinese community, not in response to change in China's 
policy towards overseas Chinese. Second, the circumstances facing the Chinese as 
citizens of the new nations; considering that the Chinese were a minority and part of a 
diaspora, the cultural policy proposals put forward by the Chinese of both countries had 
gone through careful consideration in order to be appropriate to the circumstances, so 
much so that their ideas became a major intellectual current among Chinese 
communities in other parts of the world. Third, the social base of change; from the 
cultural standpoint that they express, it can be seen that these ways of thinking are 
closely linked to historical developments, and that they are the product of the broader 
social and political circumstances of the 1930s through to the 1950s, not just the views 
of a few leaders 
Negotiating Identity in the Local Framework 
The two organisations discussed above demonstrate that by the early 1950s, the shift 
from identification with China to identification with the new nations had become the 
prevailing direction of identity change in the Chinese community in both countries. For 
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the strong sense of sympathetic identification with China engendered by the Sino-
Japanese War in the late 1930s to change to identification with the new nations in less 
than two decades was remarkable. The two major Chinese community organisations 
discussed above played the part of socialising the new identity concepts that had been 
developed in the late 1940s, of taking them beyond the restricted Chinese intellectual 
circles where they had originated and broadcasting them throughout the Chinese 
community. 
Observing this process, it is plain that the identity change among the Southeast Asian 
Chinese was not the result of China changing its overseas Chinese policy. The Asian-
African Conference in Bandung in 1955 has often been seen as the watershed of identity 
change for Southeast Asian Chinese. At this conference, Zhou Enlai, on behalf of the 
Chinese government, announced a new policy toward overseas Chinese; to abolish dual 
nationality, and to encourage overseas Chinese to become citizens of their countries of 
residence. 75 A good example of the usual understanding of national identity among 
Southeast Asian Chinese is reflected by the historian Chen Guohua: 'On 22 April, 1955 
at Bandung, representatives of the Chinese and Indonesian governments signed a treaty 
on dual nationality. The Chinese government formally declared the abandonment of the 
citizenship law based on Chinese descent, and rejection of the principle of dual 
75 For example, Lie Tek Tjeng wrote 'Indonesia' s one-China policy, recognising Beijing, is the reason 
why, around the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955, PM Zhou Enlai signed the dual nationality 
treaty with Indonesia.' See Lie Tek Tieng, 'Indonesia' s Citizens of Chinese Descent: Terminology' 
in Citra Indonesia, 2:008, August 1996, p, 1 L 
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nationality. After this, great numbers of overseas Chinese changed their nationality, 
fundamentally altering the structure of the overseas Chinese community' .76 
This is a misunderstanding, however, based on the belief that 'What was even more 
important to the speed of assimilation than the changes within the Chinese communities 
themselves, was the changing attitude in China towards emigrants.' 77 In fact, China's 
policy towards overseas Chinese had never been a very influential factor in the 
Southeast Asian Chinese community. Politicians put much weight on China's policy 
because it had importance for indigenous Southeast Asians. But the importance of new 
concepts arising from within the Chinese community is correspondingly neglected. 
By the time of this conference, the Chinese communities had been, on their own 
initiative, searching for new identities in Malaya and Indonesia since the end of the 
Pacific war. It has been demonstrated in previous chapters that new ideas on Chinese 
identity in the new nations had been developed by some groups of people in both 
Malaya and Indonesia in the 1940s. But up to the end of the 1940s, these new ideas 
were confined to a few groups of intellectuals. They were broadcast through the mass 
media, but had not yet reached community level. The new approaches to identity had 
remained without mass support or real practical effect, due to lack of a mechanisms to 
transform the new identity concepts into action. In the 1950s new organisations were 
founded which could act according to the new identity concepts and cause them to take 
16 Chen Guo Hua, Xianquzhe dijiaoyin: haiwai huaren ;iaoyu sanbainian. [The Footprints of Pioneers-Three 
Hundreds Years of Overseas Chinese Education]. (Canada: Royal Kingsway Inc., 1992), p. 403. li*!liJll* 
' «7t~'\\l'(l(jlfliJE:P----)ijjj}*)..11lzW.=::a::+:» (Canada: Royal Kingsway Inc., 1992), 403. 
283 
effect for the majority of members of the Chinese community. In this chapter we have 
studied the two most influential Chinese organisations representing the Chinese in 
Malaya and Indonesia as they negotiated the balance of national identity and cultural 
identity in the new nations. 
From the analysis of these two major associations, it is clear that the Chinese people 
were willing to integrate into the new nations. But they wanted to be respected in their 
maintenance of cultural Chineseness. In Malaya, the Chinese education system was 
seen as part of the essential cultural heritage of the Chinese community. In order to 
preserve this system, the leaders of UCSTA believed that they needed to show their 
loyalty to the new nation. Because Chinese associations urged the Chinese community 
to become Malayan citizens, citizenship did not become a question concerning the 
loyalty of the Chinese in Malaysia. In Indonesia, there was no consensus of opinion in 
the Chinese community on language policy, education and citizenship, so the leaders of 
Baperki advocated a free choice policy. Because the structure of the Chinese 
community was more complex than in Malaya, to develop a policy that required the 
Chinese to act in concert on this issue in a short time was impossible. So Baperki called 
on the government to protect the right to choose on citizenship and education issues. 
Baperki later devoted itself to providing Chinese education and won the support of the 
Chinese community because of its efforts. 78 The Baperki schools were Indonesian 
17 
78 
Speech by Lois Michison, cited from Victor Purcell, Tiie PosjtJon of the Cbjnese jn Southeast Asia. (New 
York: Institute of Pacific Relations.1950), p. 45. 
This came from Ang Yan Guan' s memoir and my interview with Nancy Wijaya. Ang Yan Guan thought 
this was a major contribution of Baperki, and Nancy Wijaya, a former student of Baperki University and 
now the Chairman of Oriental Language and Culture Centre in Jakarta, thought that Baperki' s effort 
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national schools, different from Chinese schools run by pro-KMT or pro-CCP groups, 
where Chinese was the medium of instruction. Even using Indonesian as the language 
of instruction and curriculum, the Baperki schools also taught Chinese language for 
ethnic Chinese who were Indonesian citizens.79 
In this period, the traditional idea of Chinese identity-that is, once a Chinese, Chinese 
forever-remained strong among some sections of the Chinese community in Malaya 
and Indonesia. A process of socialization of these new identity concepts was necessary 
in this time of transition. This took place during the first half of the 1950s through 
organisations such as Baperki and UCSTA. These two associations contributed a lot to 
this process. 
The Position of Minorities as Part of a Diaspora 
Another angle from which to approach new identity concepts among the Chinese in 
Indonesia and Malaya is from the double difficulty they faced as a minority group 
which was at the same time part of a diaspora. As a minority race in the new nations, 
they were under great pressure to assimilate into the mainstream of society; but as part 
of a diaspora, no matter to what degree they succeeded in assimilating, they would 
always retain certain cultural and physical characteristics, and would always be 
inspired some Chinese youL~ who are now maj:rr supporters for her Centre (The biggest private centre for 
Chinese language education in Jakarta at the time I did the interview on 15 January 1997 in Jakarta). 
For the situation of the Baperki schools, see Charles A. Cappel, 'Should There be Chinese Schools in 
lndor.esia'I" , in Proceedi.1gs on Chinese Education in Southeast Asia, (Taipei: National Cultural 
Association, 1995). 
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regarded as 'Chinese'. As Nonald et al. theoretically conceptualized the situation of a 
trading minority, diaspora Chinese are subject to three regimes: the regime of the 
Chinese family, the regime of the capitalist workplace and the regime of the nation-
state.80 These regimes often contradict each other. 
If the possession of citizenship did not guarantee the right to the maintenance of certain 
Chinese cultural practices, it was likely that the Chinese would always be subject to 
claims that they were not properly part of mainstream life. The Southeast Asian 
Chinese were often seen as an exclusive ethnic group who did not intend to identify 
themselves with their local communities. Jn fact ethnic Chinese did develop their own 
way of local identity, but the cultural programs of the new nations became a barrier to 
inclusion in national society. The new Southeast Asian states tried to adopt the formula 
of modem nation-states which pursues 'One state one nation'. This formula gave only a 
narrow space for ethnic Chinese to adjust themselves to the new situation. We will see 
how the Chinese communities tried to adjust their identity in order to fit into the new 
framework of the nation. 
The question was how the ethnic Chinese should keep a balance between ethnicity and 
eitizenship, considering their status as a minority in a new nation. From the cases of 
Baperki and UCSTA, influential associations among ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and 
Malaya, we can see that all of their activities aimed to settle ethnic Chinese in the 
framework of the new nations. Under the leadership of these two associations, the 
Donald M. Nonini and Aihwa Ong, ''Chinese Transnationalism as Alternative Modernity", In Aihwa 
Ong and Donald M. Nonini eds. Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Political of Modern Chinese 
Transnationalism. (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 3-33. 
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ethnic Chinese endeavoured, on the one hand to show their loyalty and respect towards 
the new countries and on the other hand to negotiate the conditions for preserving a 
certain degree of Chineseness. In the early 1950s, the two countries were in very 
different situations. Indonesia had gained its independence, while Malaya was still 
under the rule of the British colonial administration but was on the way to earning its 
independence. The will to maintain a certain degree of Chineseness was seen as either 
an unpatriotic attitude towards the new nation or as a potential threat associated with 
communism from China. 
So the main issue in this period was the relationship between cultural identity and 
citizenship. In Malaya, the Chinese wanted to earn full citizenship from the beginning 
of the post-war era. This made the Malays feel threatened, economically and 
politically, because of the position of the Chinese in business and their real or imputed 
links with China. In Indonesia, the new nation wanted more Chinese to become 
citizens. Only half of the Chinese population accepted Indonesian citizenship, and this 
caused anger among pribumi politicians. The issue of providing Chinese education for 
the Chinese in fl.falaya and Indonesia went to the heart of the issue of Chinese identity. 
The Chinese in Malaya wished to show their loyalty toward the new nation by earning 
citizenship in order to pursue equal rights for mother tongue education. In Indonesia, 
some Chinese worried that they could not receive Chinese language education for their 
children, so they rejected Indonesian citizenship. Both cases show that the citizenship 
issue among Chinese in both Indonesia and Malaya would always be strongly 
associated with the question of how to maintain Chineseness. The situation was very 
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different from that of most immigrants in new territories. 81 Chinese people had been 
settled in Southeast Asia for centuries, but they were always seen as foreigners because 
some of them insisted on maintaining a certain degree of Chineseness. Today it is more 
common for a group of people to keep their cultural roots in one soil and at the same 
time to be citizens of another nation. 
For any minority race that also belongs to a diaspora, it is not easy to strike a balance 
between maintaining their own cultural practices and establishing a new identity. It is 
often a tragedy for any kind of diaspora when the host society and the fatherland have a 
dispute. The will and opinion of local Chinese diasporic communities have often been 
neglected. The authorities of the host society tend to doubt the loyalty of the local 
diasporic communities, no matter how many generations they had been in the host 
society, or what their feelings were toward the host society. The voices of the local 
Chinese communities in Southeast Asia were not easily heard by either authorities or 
experts, when China had a different ideology from the Southeast Asian countries. 
When the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war and took power in China in 
1949, the local Chinese communities were judged by this situation rather than by their 
own opinions on their identity. 
When Victor Purcell read his paper at the Eleventh Conference of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, Lucknow, India, in October 3-15, 1950, his main concern was in 
81 Wang, Xiunan (Wang Shiow Nan), Jin}iNanyang buaren mianlin de san da wenti: zbongzu, guo;i; jiaoyu. 
[Three urgent issues for the Southeast Asian Chinese; ethnicity, nationality and education]. (Singapore: 
Southeast Asian Annals, 1976) ::E~l¥i ' «~ EJ)¥ifl''lj\i)..@l:iii;il"J.=:.:*:Fo~M----~ · ~fl! · ~W» 
0 <lf!l¥iii2:1f:iilli~-~> 0 (~!JD:!&:• 1976) . 0 
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'relation to the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia'. He paid special attention to 
the statements of the Central People's Government of China on overseas Chinese.82 In 
these circumstances, the opinion of the Chinese community was naturally neglected. 
This was why the Indonesian authorities arrested the Chinese leaders who had led the 
Chinese community to assist the Indonesian struggle for independence two years ago, 
and put them in prison on suspicion of their connections with Communist China in 
1951.83 This was why the British authorities would not include the Chinese in their 
consultations on the committee of the Federation of Malaya in 1948. These are 
examples of the government in power linking the fate of the local Chinese directly to 
China's international relations. 
The Historical Linkage 
A further important angle from which to view the development of new identity among 
the Indonesian and Malayan Chinese in the 1950s is the historical angle. On the surface, 
the two Chinese organisations founded in the 1950s discussed above were organised in 
response to particular events of the time, and have no direct relation to previous history. 
In fact there is a strong link with the past if the cultural viewpoint of these organisations 
is taken into account. 
82 
83 
Victor Purcell, The Position of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. (New York: Institute of Pacific 
Relations.1950). pp. 73-77. 
The arrests were an anti-Communist drive by the Sukiman cabinet which was not solely directed against 
ethnic Chinese. About the context of the arrests, see Herbert Feith, Indonesian Politics 1949-1957: The 
Decline of the Representative Govemmenl (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1961), pp. 188-189. 
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The examples of Baperki and UCSTA illustrate that this cultural viewpoint was deeply 
influenced by the events of previous history. In Malaya, the reason UCSTA 
demonstrated such strong identification with Malaya was related to its perception of the 
past. The founder of UCSTA often expressed sentiments like this: 'Malaya has 
achieved independence from colonial rule through the combined efforts of the three 
races, the Malays, Indians and Chinese. No rnce is subject to any other. Their positions 
should be equal, with no distinction between master and slave'."' This point of view is 
heir to the understanding of history that developed out of the discussions of 
identification with Malaya within the Chinese community in the late 1940s. This 
historical understanding relates to the 'Nanyang identity' discussed above, the Sino-
Japanese war and the Japanese occupation. 
In Malaya, the experience of anti-Japanese armed resistance, which was the first time 
Chinese people died for Malaya, remains an important legacy of pride within the 
Chinese community, but without recognition in the subsequent national history of 
Malaysia. The slogan of MPAJA, the force that conducted the anti-Japanese armed 
resistance, was 'Kang Ri wei Ma', 85 meaning 'Resist the Japanese and Protect Malaya'. 
There were three red stars in the flag of MP AJA, symbolizing the solidarity of the three 
races: Chinese, Malays and Indians. It was alleged to be the first political proclamation 
to include the three races in the history of ~alaya, even though MPAJA was always a 
'" Lim Lian Gook (Lin Lian Yu) Fengyu sh1banian. [Eighteen years of tempests] (Kuala Lumpur: Lili Lian 
Yu Foundation, 1990), p. 63. ;f*ill!:E:, <f!li\~N+J\if.>, (a~: #ill!:E:iili11\:~.!il.~. 1990), 63.' 
" Kang Ri wei Ma (m B 1$1 ~ ). 
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Chinese-dominated group. 86 After the end of the Japanese occupation, the idea of the 
three races working together became a new political ideal within the Nanyang Chinese 
community. 
The same thing is manifest among the Indonesian Chinese. Baperki was deeply 
influenced by the history of the past twenty years. Siauw Giok Tjhan, for instance, is a 
representative figure among the Chinese who participated in the Indonesian nationalist 
movement during the Japanese occupation. In his memoirs, Siauw stresses that before 
he joined the revolutionary forces, he was inspired by the Malaysian Chinese leader Tan 
Kah Kee in Malang. 87 Although discussion of the Chinese in Indonesia has always 
distinguished between totok and peranakan, and the distinction can be made up to a 
point, the majority of Chinese had social dealings with both totok and peranakan, and 
could be influenced politically by either. 
The establishment of these two Chinese organisations separately but in the same period 
in Indonesia and in Malaya has particular historical implications. If the Chinese 
residents of Indonesia and Malaya had not undergone the intense political changes that 
they experienced, the two Chinese organisations might not have established themselves 
in the way they did. Many people see both cases as different since Malaysia became a 
successful example of the preservation of Chinese education in Southeast Asia, while 
Chinese education in Indonesia was completely eliminated. Although the cultural 
standpoints of the Chinese communities and the circumstances under which the 
86 
87 
Kennedy Gordon Tregonning, A HistoIY of Modem Malaya. (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona 
Press, 1960), p. 285. 
Siauw Giok Tjhan, Lima Zaman Penvujudan lntegrasi Waju: (Jakarta: Yayasan Teratai, 1981), p. 121. 
291 
Malayan and Indonesian Chinese communities attempted to preserve their Chineseness 
were very different for both cases, these are subsequent developments under the similar 
principle. If we look at the first half of the 1950s, before the Chinese communities in 
Indonesia and Malaya had experienced much impact from the policies either of China or 
of the governments of the new nations, the points of view on identity and culture 
expressed by Chinese in both countries are similar; that political identity and the 
preservation of culture can be considered separately, that they willingly identified with 
the new nations but wanted to preserve a certain degree of Chinese cultural practice, and 
that the maintenance of these elements of culture should be recognised as a right 
enjoyed by all citizens. 
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Conclusion: Being in the Middle 
New immigrants changing their concept of their identity, from identification with the 
original fatherland to becoming part of their new place of residence, is a universal 
phenomenon. It is a much-discussed topic in countries founded on immigration, such as 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA. 1 Even in the countries known 
collectively as Asia, change in national identification is not at all unheard of; apart from 
the Chinese, there is no lack of examples of this among Arabs and Indians. 2 The 
reorientation of national identity of the Nanyang Chinese between the 1930s and the 
1950s, which has been demonstrated in this study, was a particular historical 
phenomenon involving concepts of identity that arose in response to particular major 
political changes. We should regard this process as historically contingent, not as an 
instance of a universal and inevitable process. 
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I have sought in this dissertation to use Chinese language resources to narrate the 
process of identity change among Nanyang Chinese in this critical period, in order to 
present and explore their own voices, which are often neglected, and to reach a better 
understanding of this new identity concept from the subjective point of view. This new 
identity concept can be summed up as the product of a huaren discourse on 
Chineseness, which arose out of a number of related debates and actions on specific 
topics of importance at the time. This huaren discourse on Chineseness separated 
political identity from cultural identity, resulting in a new point of view whereby 
Chinese could identify politically with the new countries, while culturally maintaining a 
certain degree of Chineseness. I have described the circumstances of the development 
of this discourse. The discourse gave rise to the dominant tendency of cultural change 
throughout all communities of Nanyang Chinese in the post-war era. Even though 
Chinese communities in Malaya and in Indonesia were differently composed in terms of 
population, economic status, and migration history, as well as being in different 
countries, the basic principles for construction of identity were similar in each case. 
Another aim of this dissertation has been to clarify the image imposed on Nanyang 
Chinese during this period. The popular image of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia in 
the 1950s, suggested by many studies, was of sojourners who did not see their place of 
residence as home. In contrast to this image, many Chinese energetically engaged with 
the new situation in the transitional era in Southeast Asia, and were eager to establish a 
new identity for Chinese communities within the new nations. They expressed their 
loyalty to the new nations and encouraged other Chinese to adopt this patriotic 
sentiment even before the new nations had gained their independence. The pro-
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Malayan or Indonesian sentiments expressed by Nanyang Chinese would have been 
seen as nationalistic if expressed by pribumi, or indigenous people of Southeast Asia. 
But their situation of being a minority and part of a diaspora in a time of dramatic 
political change meant that their sentiments could not be treated as nationalistic, even 
though this kind of feeling among the Nanyang Chinese was not in fact different from 
that shared by other ethnic groups in the new nations. 
There were many misunderstandings between ethnic Chinese and indigenous people in 
the early period of nation-building in Indonesia and Malaya. Among these 
misunderstandings, the idea of preserving 'Chineseness' was the most frequent cause of 
problems between Chinese and indigenous people. The trouble was that the motivation 
of the Chinese was always doubted if they insisted on preserving a certain degree of 
Chineseness. Usually, Chinese people were asked to give up their cultural practices, as 
a sign to confirm that they rejected the previous history of ethnic separation under the 
colonial rulers. In both countries, the Chinese tried to persuade the authorities that 
people could remain Chinese culturally and at the same time be loyal to the new nation 
as citizens. This approach, which in principle could be called 'multiculturalism' as we 
see it in many countries today, failed to convince the pribumi-dominated authorities at 
that time. 
This question has persisted unresolved to the present day. What happened in ethnic 
relations in the past affected subsequent historical developments. The aftermath of the 
struggle of the Chinese for 'cultural civil rights' remained the central issue in ethnic 
relations between Chinese and the non-Chinese authorities. In Malaysia, the Chinese 
education system survived but government policy would restrain its development. The 
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conflict in so-called 'ethnic politics' was always caused by the issue of preserving 
Chineseness. 3 Even though Chinese cultural institutions and practices have been 
preserved in Malaysia, forming a culturally homogeneous nation is still considered 
desirable by the authorities in Malaysia. In Indonesia, successive governments 
including the Guided Democracy and New Order regimes maintained a policy of 
opposing the Chineseness of the ethnic Chinese in order to assimilate them. The latter 
even banned the Chinese language for more than three decades. 4 This assimilation 
policy, however, as many analyses of the New Order have shown, did not help to 
promote mutual understanding or make ethnic relations better between pribumi and 
Chinese. This issue, which can be seen as the legacy of the early history of Indonesian 
nation-building, remains unresolved. 
The problem of identity came into being because of the acceptance in Indonesia and 
Malaysia of the intellectual blueprint for the modem nation state, according to which a 
nation is considered to be a culturally or socially homogeneous entity, and in which a 
nation state is a modem state founded according to this point of view, within which a 
single form of national identity exists. D. L. Sheth has commented that many multi-
ethnic societies in Asia tried to adopt the idea of the modem nation-state in the process 
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of nation-building, and this has been the source of problems involving identity for many 
Asian ethnic groups in modern history.5 
This is an old topic: the conflict between the ideas of citizenship and ethnicity. The idea 
of citizenship in its original Enlightenment form emphasizes equal rights of citizens 
regardless of their ethnicity, language, religion and other cultural characteristics. But in 
many countries, the establishment of a homogeneous population culturally distinct from 
other nations has been understood as the aim of national integration. Citizenship 
becomes identified with cultural characteristics. In the context of Malay nationalism in 
Malaya and pribumi nationalism in Indonesia, a good citizen means a citizen who can 
give up the cultural heritage of his or her ancestors in order to accommodate the 
demands of patriotic loyalty, though he or she will still be considered to belong to a 
minority with a 'foreign' connection. 
Geertz has demonstrated, on the question of integration in the new nations, that the 
effects of primordial sentiments such as those concerned with differences of race, 
religion, language or cultural practice, have conflicted to some degree with the 
establishment of the ci vii state, which in tum has led to a large scale 'integrative 
revolution' developing in these new states.6 The problem is, the impact on the Chinese 
as they went through this process of integration has not so far received sufficient 
attention. 
D. L. Sheth, 'Nation-Building in Multi-ethnic Societies: The Experience of South Asia.' . Alternatives 
XIV:379-388, 1989. 
Geertz, Clifford, 'The Integrative Revolution----Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States' ,in Old Societies and New States. (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 109. 
297 
Under the circumstances existing in these two countries, the huaren discourse of 
Chineseness that arose from within the Chinese community gave rise to the new identity 
concept, including the element of loyalty to the nation of which they were citizens or 
hoped to be, and the Chinese community organisations that attracted broad-based 
support expressed it systematically in public life. The preservation of cultural 
Chineseness sought by the Nanyang Chinese did not prevent them from becoming 
citizens of their countries of residence, and though the concept arose in the immediate 
post-war period, it has retained effect until now. 
The struggle to maintain Chineseness used to be seen as retrograde. Many believed that 
time was on the side of assimilation. It is quite true that cultural practices among 
immigrants changed very quickly in most cases of modem migration. However, 
diaspora has never been simply a matter of one-way movement from home to host 
country. The desire among ethnic Chinese to restore Chinese cultural heritage has 
recently become more and more visible, in its different aspects, in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. In Indonesia the lifting of the ban on Chinese print media was associated 
with cases of violation of human rights in the last years of the New Order. Those 
violations and the reaction to them made changes in the strong policy of assimilation 
toward Chinese necessary after President Suharto stepped down. The new government 
intended to abolish the discriminatory policy which forced Chinese to give up their 
Chinese cultural characteristics, including Chinese names and the right to celebrate 
Chinese festivals. The country had taken three or four decades to learn the lesson that 
to assimilate Chinese was not the right way of dealing with those whose ancestors were 
foreigners. 
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Today the idea of multiculturalism, which accepts that people can be good citizens of 
one country and preserve the cultural heritage associated with another, is established in 
countries which are founded on migrant populations. In the past, in the age of struggle 
for or against nationalism and Communism in Southeast Asia, to have a foreign 
connection meant one's loyalty was easily doubted. Today, linkage to foreign countries 
can become an advantage in the age of the global economy. As Ong Aihwa suggested 
with the concept of "flexible citizenship", global capitalist accumulation is involved 
with the cultural logic of Chinese transnational practices in a form of "fraternal network 
capitalism". Ethnic Chinese from different countries are becoming tied through 
production, trade, and financial circles, leading to the rise of new cultural 
representations of "Chineseness", which is not based on any nation-state, but based on 
ties of Chinese ethnic origin, language and culture in the global context. 7 
In this study, new approaches to identity have been illustrated by vanous source 
materials. This direction in identity was developed by some leaders of the Chinese 
community and gained mass support from the grassroots level. Through the process of 
their evolution, such ideas have caused China-oriented patriotism to evolve into local-
oriented patriotism. In the previous chapters the process of identity change for Nan yang 
Chinese has been explored. Here I would like to summarize the process in five stages, 
as follows. 
Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics ofTransnationality. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999). 
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The first stage is the development of Nanyang identity, which arose in the 1930s, as 
argued in Chapter Two. For a long time, the way Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia 
changed their status and attitude from that of sojourners to that of settlers has been a 
fascinating issue for scholars in this field. Even though the history of migration of 
ethnic Chinese to Southeast Asia has been a long one, for most places in Southeast Asia 
the major increase in the number of Chinese people took place between the late 19th 
century and the early 20th century. The current situation of the ethnic Chinese in 
Southeast Asia should be understood by tracing their origins in modem history rather 
than in ancient history. The tradition of the history of 'overseas Chinese' seems quite 
often to take for granted its beginnings in the early history of marine travel. This 
'tradition' was actually constructed into the so-called Nanyang studies of the 1930s, 
which provided a setting for the historical imagination by which ethnic Chinese could 
interpret their existence in the Southeast Asian territories. It seems clear that the 
Nanyang studies by Chinese scholars in the 1930s were inspired by the contemporary 
Japanese Nan'y6 studies. In that sense, the interaction between the Chinese vision and 
the Japanese vision of Southeast Asia before the war is worth reviewing in relation to 
the identity shift. 
The second stage of this new approach to identity was the strengthening of Chinese 
patriotism during the Sino-Japanese war, 1937-1941. Even though this patriotism was 
directed towards China, the ancestral land of Chinese residents in Southeast Asia, it 
contributed to the identity shift in three ways. First, it encouraged the Chinese to 
integrate as one community. Second, through the experience of fighting the Japanese, 
the Nanyang Chinese developed the idea of belonging to their territory in the South, as 
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the Japanese threat to China and that to Nanyang were linked. Third, they learned 
political participation from this patriotic movement. 
The third stage of this approach was the impact of Japanese pan-Asianism under the 
Japanese occupation, 1941-1945. The Japanese impact on Chinese identity seems 
contradictory in some ways. Japanese policy made the Chinese communities more 
China-oriented, as the Chinese were treated as one group. At the same time, Japanese 
pan-Asian ideology introduced a new political doctrine, which was more local-oriented. 
The wartime experience gave Chinese a chance to become involved in local affairs, 
which was a new situation for them. Racially discriminatory policies under the 
Japanese led to tension between Chinese and indigenous populations. It is clear that the 
Japanese occupation made Chinese people turn towards local affairs, and made the 
identity issue tum from an individual to a collective issue. Through the experience of 
three years of Japanese occupation, Chinese people learned 'pro-native' ideology from 
Japanese pan-Asianism. Their desire to become closer to the native people of Indonesia 
and Malaysia was fostered by the implications of pan-Asian ideology. People learnt 
this discourse to demonstrate their closeness to the pribumi. In this sense, the Japanese 
contributed to the Chinese shifting their identification from China to Southeast Asia 
through the viewpoints and opportunities provided during the Japanese occupation. 
The fourth stage of this approach was the development of anti-colonialism in the post-
war era, 1945-1949. At a time of strong anti-colonialist struggles in many former 
colonies around the world, Chinese intellectuals worked hard to formulate and 
broadcast anti-colonialist opinion in the Chinese media, in order to persuade the 
apolitical Chinese community to support the struggle for independence. The 
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widespread moral support for anti-colonialism in general made the Chinese community 
eager to support the anti-colonialist struggle in the territories in which they lived. 
The fifth stage of this approach was generation of the idea of cultural civil rights, 1950-
1955. The community leaders who encouraged the Chinese to gain local citizenship 
strongly believed that they had the right to maintain their cultural practices as citizens of 
the new nations. This strong belief drove them to mobilise resources from the Chinese 
community and to negotiate for cultural rights with the authorities. The central issue in 
the negotiations was Chinese education. This multi-cultural approach, however, did not 
gain support from the authorities, for whom the dominant ideology was pn'bumi 
nationalism, which tried to pursue 'one people for one nation'. 8 The conflict between 
this "multicultural" separation of ethnicity from nationality and pribumi nationalism 
caused troubles in inter-ethnic relations which still remain today. 
The identities of ethnic Chinese, as shown in this study, have undergone a process of 
intensive change from the 1930s to the 1950s. The changes of this period gave rise to 
the basic conceptual structure of identity of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia which can 
be seen today. Understanding of this process enables us better to understand the present 
cultural stance of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, and their relations with the other ethnic 
groups of Southeast Asia. Analysis of this process also demonstrates that this process 
of change was specific to Southeast Asia, and was quite different from the gradual 
process by which immigrant populations changed the focus of their national 
Aoout the nationalist movements in the formal Europea,'1 colonies, see Anthony D. Smith, State and Nadon 
in the Third World· The Wt:l'tem State and African Nadonalism. (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983). 
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identification as one generation succeeded another, which has taken place in other 
immigrant societies. 
It is easy to see that the process of identity change was deeply influenced by the 
particular historical circumstances of the time and place. If it were not for the 'Nan yang 
identity' that emerged in the 1930s, subsequent generations of Chinese might not have 
evolved a new tendency to identify with Southeast Asia, and might have remained like 
other 'floating populations', staying where they were as long as they were welcome, and 
going their way once they were not. If it were not for the strong, collective 
consciousness of being Chinese engendered by the Sino-Japanese war, they might have 
remained like the Chinese in Australia or in other immigrant nations, keeping to distinct 
sub-ethnic communities, while the issue of national identification remained for the 
individual to decide. If it were not for the links with the native populations forged out 
of necessity by Japanese pan-Asianist policy under the occupation, which went as far as 
Japanese preparations for establishment of a new nation with Chinese participation, the 
'Chinese question' might have remained merely a set of legal questions, concerning 
who would be citizens of the new state and come under its laws, and would never have 
become an issue of individual virtue or political morality. 
If the post-war debate on identity had not taken place in an atmosphere fiercely 
committed to anti-colonialism, which gave rise to the separation of political and cultural 
identity, the 'discourse of Chineseness' would not have developed. That is, the Chinese 
would have awaited the outcome of Southeast Asian political events, stayed if they were 
permitted to, and gone elsewhere if they were not, and would not have striven to prove 
their loyalty to the new nations. If the Nan yang Chinese had not reached these views on 
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'cultural civil rights', they would not have founded representative organisations to 
negotiate with the authorities of the new states for the right to citizenship while 
retaining their cultural heritage, and ethnic relations between Chinese and native 
populations in both Indonesia and Malaysia might present quite a different picture. 
Looking back over the whole process of identity change among the Southeast Asian 
Chinese, we can re-examine the statements advanced in Chapter 1 about the possible 
meaning and importance of this research. Concerning the huaren discourse, we have 
traced its Southeast Asian origins, the way it emerged out of the cultural baptism gone 
through under very specific historical conditions by Chinese intellectuals separately in 
Malaysia and Indonesia. These were the conditions that caused the huaren discourse of 
Chineseness to separate cultural from political identity for Chinese living outside China. 
This huaren discourse of Chineseness is now basic to the consciousness of Chinese of 
the diaspora in all parts of the world where there is a Chinese population. Today when 
we speak of Chinese living in other countries, we no longer assume that they are 
descendants of immigrants who all bear common cultural characteristics, but we can 
appreciate that the separate development of points of view on culture and identity in 
separate modern nation states is the contribution of the Southeast Asian Chinese to the 
issue of identity among Chinese around the world. 
I have made it clear in this study that I consider the history of the Southeast Asian 
Chinese should be interpreted according to the standpoint of autonomous history. This 
has to be explained on two levels. First, the change in the sense of identity of Southeast 
Asian Chinese should not be seen as the result of change in the policy of the Chinese 
government towards overseas Chinese, or the result of international negotiations in 
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which the Indonesian government convinced the Chinese government to sign a treaty 
disallowing dual citizenship. On the contrary, cultural concepts arising from within the 
Chinese community in response to contemporary topics at different times caused the 
question of identity to shift in its emphasis, and these new identity concepts, including 
those concerning Chineseness and those concerning the understanding of local society, 
should be recognised as an autonomous development. 
On another level, since the choice of the Nanyang Chinese to regard themselves as part 
of Southeast Asia was the outcome of a process of autonomous reflection and debate, 
they should then be regarded as part of Southeast Asia. They should no longer be 
regarded as representative of China in terms of the relations between China and their 
countries of residence, or discriminated against on the grounds that they are remnants of 
colonialism. Since historians of Southeast Asia claim that Southeast Asian history 
should be understood from the point of view of the people of Southeast Asia, 9 the 
history of the Nanyang Chinese should therefore be understood in the same way. 
Also, because this study crosses national boundaries, I have referred to the experiences 
of a number of very significant but often neglected Chinese writers, whose lives 
illustrate how historical events transcend national boundaries. At present, history in 
Southeast Asia is usually structured as national history. National history is still an 
important means towards understanding the history of the nations of Southeast Asia. 
However, it tends to gloss over minorities and minority points of view, and is even 
weaker when dealing with transnational phenomena. The particular character of the 
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Nanyang Chinese is that they have been both a minority and a transnational minority, so 
they are a topic which national history is especially ill-equipped to deal with. This 
study has necessarily gone beyond national boundaries in its treatment of its topic. The 
Chinese writers, in particular, were key figures in the development of new identity 
concepts among the Nanyang Chinese in this period, and the experiences of these 
writers themselves transcended national boundaries. To go a step further, the Nanyang 
Chinese view of local affairs at the time also transcended national boundaries. So it can 
be said that the experience of the Nanyang Chinese has contributed valuable material to 
scholars of history, in that it tends to break open the confines of the intellectual 
framework of national history. Ideally we should go on to develop further alternative 
frameworks for the study of history, to improve the current situation in which national 
history dominates in the field of Sou.theast Asia. 
This study has also made changes to the traditional periodisation. It takes the 1930s to 
the 1950s as its scope, while the traditional method is to periodise history according to 
political changes. While this was the critical period for identity change among the 
Nanyang Chinese, it was also the critical transition period for modern Southeast Asian 
history in general. Selection of this periodisation avoids the failure of the traditional 
periodisation to adequately deal with this critical phase of transition in 20th century 
Southeast Asian society. The traditional periodisation uses regime changes as points of 
division between one period and the next, so that Southeast Asian history is often 
divided into pre-war and post-war periods. From this it follows that the influence of the 
Japanese occupation is not gone into in much detail, because it lasted for a short period 
John R. W. Smail, "On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modem Southeast Asia" Joumal of 
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only, and was overshadowed by the war and the damage it caused. There are few 
studies that deal specifically with this short period. Therefore its proper importance is 
not brought out. The only way to gain a clear understanding of the historically pivotal 
character of the occupation is to adopt the longer view. The Nanyang Chinese 
themselves are a very good example of the value of non-traditional periodisation, 
because the specific Japanese view of Southeast Asia, with which this study is 
concerned, developed some time before the occupation, and its influence in the sphere 
of political thought went on being felt after the occupation was over. If the period of 
transition is not seen as a whole, it is hard to talk about the meaning of this episode. So 
this study has experimented with a different periodisation, encompassing Japan's pre-
war views on Southeast Asia and the post-war effects of Japanese occupation policy 
informed by these views as parts of a whole. I hoped to use the advantages of this 
different periodisation in discussing the influence of Japan's encounter with Southeast 
Asia, especially in increasing our understanding of its effects on subsequent relations 
between Nan yang Chinese and pribumi. 
Finally, although this has been a study of change, there are some things concerning the 
centuries-long Chinese experience in Southeast Asia that have not changed. As with all 
kinds of social change, some elements have changed but some have remained the same. 
The objects of identification have changed, from China to Nanyang, from regions of 
China to places of residence in Southeast Asia, from Southern Chinese 
dialects/languages to national languages and even local languages in the Southeast 
Asian territories. Many concrete social contexts have changed. But some things have 
SouilJeast Asian History, 2(2): 72-102. 1961, pp. 72. 
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remained the same over time. One of the important unchanged things is the character of 
ethnic Chinese as the middlemen from the Middle Kingdom. Ethnic Chinese still play 
the middle role between power elites and local communities, between local and foreign, 
between resource and agency. This persistent socio-economic role of the ethnic 
Chinese retains an echo, as social practice, of the doctrine of the Mean, a traditional 
Confucian doctrine, imp! ying 'being in the middle'. 
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